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Abstract:
China’s global quest for energy has been one of the most fascinating developments of the
past twenty years. As Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have increasingly gone ‘global’ in
search of energy resources, scholars have explored the rationale and implications of China’s
investment abroad. However, existing studies have yet to examine the ability of Chinese SOEs to
complete the intended investment projects. Several studies that have noted this gap suggest that
researchers should examine the ability of Chinese SOEs to adapt to different institutional
environments (Smith and D’Arcy 2013) and to analyze the responses of local stakeholders to
Chinese SOEs’ engagement (Abdenur 2017). Responding to their call, my study aims to explain
how domestic political economy (more specifically, institutional arrangements and stakeholder
relations) shapes the ability of Chinese SOEs to successfully participate in hydrocarbon projects
in a host country.
To answer this question, I conducted a qualitative comparative study of Chinese
engagement in the Canadian and Russian hydrocarbon sector. My research consisted of
fieldwork, interviews, and library research in Canada and Russia. I utilized within-case studies –
by looking at specific hydrocarbon projects where Chinese SOEs indicated interest to participate
- to examine the reception of Chinese SOEs’ investment and loans (or other finance) along the
hydrocarbon chain in both countries. My analytical framework combined historical
institutionalism with stakeholder theories to analyze the ability of Chinese SOEs to participate in
hydrocarbon projects in host societies. My framework proposes that stakeholder politics are
shaped by an intervening variable, inter-state relations, which influences the receptiveness of
stakeholders toward Chinese SOEs.
My research finds that Chinese SOEs’ participation – which includes direct investment,
loans, and other finance – in the hydrocarbon industry is determined by host-country institutions
and stakeholder politics. Relatedly, Chinese engagement/participation in the hydrocarbon sector
varies on the basis of the local needs. I propose that inter-state relations influence the timing of
Chinese engagement as they shape stakeholder strategies in recipient countries, while formal and
informal institutions interact with stakeholder politics in shaping the ability of Chinese SOEs to
participate in hydrocarbon projects. Ultimately, this study explains the responses of investmentrecipient countries to foreign direct investment and loans from Chinese SOEs in the hydrocarbon
sector. In doing so, it makes theoretical and empirical contributions to the existing scholarship on
international business, comparative political economy, and China studies.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
The rapid growth of China from the 1990s to the present has been unprecedented.
China’s integration into the global economy has been phenomenal. In the 21 st century, China
became the second largest economic power and one of the largest foreign investors. China’s rise
has fascinated social scientists across the world. Scholars have pondered about the implications
of China’s economic growth and cautioned that it may lead to shortages in domestic natural
resources, including energy (Woo and Song 2000; Ma and Adams 2013). In light of possible
energy shortages, energy security emerged as one of the central issues discussed by policy circles
in Beijing. One method devised by policymakers to address energy insecurity rests on state
support for corporate investment abroad under the “Go Global/Out” policy announced in 1999.
As part of this policy, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies ventured
abroad in search of energy resources. Hydrocarbons – or oil and gas – were one of the energy
resources coveted by the Chinese SOEs abroad.
To acquire these resources, Chinese SOEs have invested in overseas assets, expanded
their energy import contracts, and provided financial support, such as loans and aid, to energyrich states. All of these strategies can be subsumed under the concept of engagement. Chinese
engagement with energy-rich states has fascinated scholars, who noted the unique nature of the
packaged deals extended by Chinese SOEs to host societies in developing countries. According
to scholars, these packages consisted of political support, loans, and aid to make SOEs’
investment bids more lucrative (Alden and Davies 2006; Zafar 2009; Alves 2013). This
dissertation focuses on the ability of Chinese SOEs (as opposed to private Chinese energy
corporations) to engage/participate (these two terms will be used interchangeably for stylistic
variation) in hydrocarbon projects in the host countries through investment, loans, and/or other
financial support.
In doing so, it builds on earlier scholarship on the internationalization 1 of Chinese SOEs
that has focused on Africa and Latin America, often leaving out developed countries from the
analysis. In comparison, the literature on Chinese engagement in developed countries is
relatively scarce and focuses on individual investment-recipient countries. This is problematic
not only due to the fact that Chinese energy quest is a global phenomenon, as demonstrated by a
map of Chinese FDI in oil and gas in figure 1.1, but also because Chinese engagement strategy
differs between developed and developing countries. In the former, FDI is more common than
loans or aid. In the latter, Chinese SOEs adjust their engagement packages to local conditions to
be able to participate in the hydrocarbon industry. As I argue in this dissertation, the differences
in China’s engagement can be explained by the political economy of host countries that
determines the ability of Chinese SOEs to participate in hydrocarbon projects in a host country.

Internationalization is defined as “the process of increasing involvement [of a domestic firm] in international
operation” (Welch and Loustarinen 1988, 36).
1

1

Figure 1.1: The Global Spread of Chinese FDI in the oil and gas industry (China Investment Monitor; Scissors 2018)

The map in figure 1.1 shows that Chinese investment in the oil and gas industry spans
across Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, South America, and North America. The map also reveals
that Chinese investors have been very active (financially) in developed countries with stable
investment regimes, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States. Chinese SOEs have also
made substantial investments in emerging economies with less stable investment regimes, such
as Brazil and Russia. Other countries in Africa, Europe, and Asia have likewise received Chinese
FDI, yet the investment was substantially lower than in the aforementioned countries. While the
quantitative data depicts a general image of China’s global integration, it does not explain how
China integrates into diverse host societies and whether its integration attempts are successful.
On the basis of the data captured on the map, one may hypothesize that Chinese companies may
find it easier to invest in Canada or the United States as the investment numbers in both are
relatively high. However, such a conclusion will be misleading and premature, as it would not
account for the fact that Chinese SOEs are, at times, unable to invest in some of the energy
projects in these countries. Furthermore, it underestimates the total value of Chinese engagement
in the hydrocarbon sector of host societies as it does not account for other forms of finance, such
as aid, loans, and trade contracts.
My broader puzzle is based on the empirical data that is not picked up by the quantitative
data on the FDI flows. The puzzling element rests on the evidence that investment made by
Chinese SOEs in the same industry is treated differently across and within countries. On the one
hand, Chinese SOEs investing in the energy industry are often met with rejection. Several cases
can serve as evidence: Russia blocked China National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC)
acquisition of Slavneft in 2002; the United States blocked China National Offshore Oil
2

Corporation’s (CNOOC) bid to acquire UNOCAL in 2005; in 2016, Australian government
blocked State Grid Corporation and Cheung Kong Infrastructure company from investing in
Ausgrid. On the other hand, Chinese SOEs have successfully acquired multiple oil and gas assets
around the world. Some of the large-scale successful investments made by China include
CNOOC’s purchase of Nexen in Canada in 2013 and China National Petroleum and Chemical
Corporation’s (Sinopec) acquisition of Udmurtneft in Russia in 2005.
The diversity in the ability of Chinese SOEs to participate in hydrocarbon projects across
and within countries is puzzling given that it occurs at different times and across different
countries. After seeing these diverse outcomes in the success rates of Chinese SOEs, I began to
wonder about what can account for this discrepancy. This has led me to the central question that
motivated my research: how do host societies respond to Chinese investment and how does the
domestic political economy of host societies, in turn, shape the ability of Chinese SOEs to
participate in the oil and gas industry in host countries? My dissertation seeks to explain this
observed variance in the success rates of Chinese engagement. In this process, it accounts for
other factors, such as changes in China’s engagement strategies, where Chinese SOEs shift their
engagement packages that are composed of FDI, loans, and other types of finance (ex. long-term
trade deals) to fit host country’s needs. The difference in these engagement packages, at times,
influences the success of Chinese SOEs.

Literature Review and Contribution to the Existing Research
To answer the aforementioned question and explain the observed variance, I have turned
to the existing studies on Chinese engagement for ideas. Researchers examining Chinese FDI
have been preoccupied with establishing why and where Chinese investors venture abroad
(Buckley et al. 2008; Kolstad and Wiig 2012; Li, Xia, and Lin 2017). After carrying out
econometric studies, scholars have determined that Chinese investors are going abroad to acquire
natural resources, managerial experience, and technology (Buckley et al. 2008; Lu, Liu, Wang
2011; Pietrobelli, Rabellotti and Sanfilippo 2011). Scholars have also examined how Chinese
SOEs enter host societies and what factors influence their entry. They have identified multiple
investment strategies adopted by Chinese SOEs (Cai 1999; Cui and Jiang 2009; Zhu 2018) and
noted that these are often supplemented by financial support (aid or loans) (Alden and Davies
2006; Zafar 2009; Alves 2013). These studies have reaffirmed the notion that Chinese SOEs
have developed different engagement strategies when seeking energy resources and relevant
technology abroad.
Scholars have also examined the implications of Chinese engagement in host countries
and analyzed broad geopolitical changes that can be triggered by China’s growing energy
demand. Since resource extraction has a negative environmental impact, scholars have noted that
Chinese FDI in natural resources will exacerbate environmental problems and aggravate host
societies (González-Vicente 2013; Gallagher 2016). At the same time, they also proposed that
Chinese engagement may have a positive economic impact on the host societies (GonzálezVicente 2012; Gallagher 2016). Even though the impact of Chinese SOEs in host societies
appears to be mixed, Chinese growing energy needs may have a significant geopolitical impact
as it may reshape the geography of energy trade (Marketos 2009; Andrews-Speed and
Dannreuther 2011). These studies suggest that China’s investment provides a mixed bag of
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benefits and concerns to host societies, yet does not answer the question about the success/failure
of specific investors.
For my research purposes, I turned to studies that focused on the factors that shape
Chinese investment strategies in the host society. One of these factors is related to home country
institutions in China (Buckley et al. 2007, 2008; Lu et al. 2014; Lu, Liu, Wang 2011), while the
second one is tied to institutions in investment recipient countries (Guillén and García-Canal
2008; Blomkvist and Drogendijk 2013; Beazer and Blake 2018). Their findings suggest that
Chinese SOEs adapt to local circumstances in host countries (Morck, Yeung, and Zhao 2008;
Alon, Leung, and Simpson 2015). Several scholars have also noted the importance of
institutional compatibility between home and host countries (Guillén and García-Canal 2008;
Beazer and Blake 2018; O’neill 2014). However, none of the studies that I have examined
accounted for the adaptability of Chinese SOEs to different institutional environments. I also
noticed that scholars did not engage in comparative case studies focused on Chinese SOEs
operating within a single industry and across developed countries.
Cognizant of the gap in the current state of our knowledge, scholars have pointed out that
new research should engage in comparative studies to analyze how Chinese SOEs operate within
the same industries in different countries (Smith and D’Arcy 2013). Scholars also noted that
future studies should examine how stakeholders in host countries respond to Chinese investment
strategies and how Chinese investors engage with these stakeholders (Abdenur 2017, 192-194).
Others proposed that new research should “analyze both successful and failed cases” of Chinese
investment (Zhu 2018, 165). Following their suggestions, my doctoral dissertation contributes to
the existing research by conducting a comparative study that explains why in certain cases
Chinese SOEs successfully participate in the hydrocarbon sector, while, at other times, fail to
attain their objectives. To answer this question, my dissertation analyzes the impact of
stakeholder politics and institutions in host societies on Chinese FDI, loans, and other financial
engagement in the hydrocarbon projects in a host country. In doing so, it broadens the narrow
focus on investment, to include other types of financial engagement, such as loans or long-term
supply contracts.

My Proposed Solution to the Central Questions or the Overview of my Theoretical
Framework and Arguments
In order to explain the observed variance in the success rate of Chinese SOEs in the
hydrocarbon projects in host countries, my dissertation examines a set of projects where Chinese
SOEs declared interest to participate in Canada and Russia. For the purposes of my study, the
success rate is defined as the ability of an SOE to pursue a deal in a chosen country (i.e. to be
able to invest or engage in the deal through other means, including loans and long-term energy
supply contracts). My dissertation aims to develop a theoretical model that explains why foreign
companies, including Chinese SOEs, succeed or fail to participate in a specific oil/gas project in
a given host country. This model, which will be outlined in chapter three and adapted to the
Canadian and Russian cases in chapters 4 and 6, provides unique theoretical insights and is one
of my contributions to the existing research on Chinese FDI.
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The theoretical model proposes that Chinese engagement/participation in the
hydrocarbon projects in host countries will be determined by stakeholder politics and institutions
in the investment-recipient state. I propose that stakeholders in a given society have a set of
metaphorical licenses – indication of support for a project - that they may grant to a foreign
company that they support. The notion of licenses rests on the idea of a social license to operate
popularized by scholars. Social license can be defined as community permission or support given
out to a business (or businesses) to carry out a specified project (see Gunningham, Kagan, and
Thorton 2004; Prno and Slocombe 2012). My research expands the notion of the social license to
operate by including political and market licenses. According to my theory, the ability of
stakeholders to use these licenses depends on the distribution of power in a given society as
dictated by local institutions. Institutional variable subsumes both formal and informal
institutions in a host country. These two variables are the main independent variables that
determine Chinese engagement in a host society. There is an additional intervening variable2 –
inter-state relations – that I add to my model because it shapes the responses of stakeholders to
Chinese engagement. Ultimately, I propose that the ability of a Chinese SOE to engage in the
hydrocarbon sector will depend on the interaction between these three variables. Each of these
variables will be explained in more detail in chapter 3.
On the basis of this model, I have developed several propositions (or arguments) that will
be explained in detail in my dissertation. First, individual stakeholders can influence Chinese
engagement to a different degree across host societies. To illustrate, Chinese SOEs may find it
harder to participate in hydrocarbon projects in a society with multiple license holders that are
able to shape energy projects, than in a society with fewer stakeholders who are able to influence
energy projects. Since inter-state relations shape the decisions of stakeholders on the ground, my
second proposition states that stakeholders’ responses to geopolitical changes in China’s favour
may make it easier for Chinese SOEs to engage in hydrocarbon projects in a host country.
Conversely, when geopolitical relations are tilted against China, domestic stakeholders will be
more likely to reject Chinese FDI or loans. Lastly, formal and informal institutions influence
Chinese engagement in host societies. To test this theory, I have chosen to examine the
engagement of Chinese SOEs in Canada and Russia by looking at formal and informal
institutions and stakeholder receptiveness to Chinese engagement in specific projects in the
respective countries.

Why Did I Choose to Analyze Chinese Engagement in Canada and Russia and What Have I
Found?
The three elements identified in this model can theoretically be applied to any foreign
company and host country combination as they can be adapted to specific circumstances of host
countries and investors. So why did I choose to analyze Chinese engagement in Russia and
Canada? The empirical data on China’s growth in the global hydrocarbon industry and the
research gaps have motivated my study of Chinese participation in this industry. The choice of
Russia and Canada for a comparative analysis rests on two factors: a) their global importance as
major oil and gas producers, and b) active engagement/participation of Chinese SOEs in the
2

An intervening variable is considered to be a “link between independent and dependent variable" (Abbott and
McKinney 2013, 174).
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hydrocarbon industry in both countries. The two countries are systematically important to
China’s energy strategy as the data, which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 2, indicate. For
example, Canada is the largest recipient of Chinese FDI (Scissors 2018), while Russia is the
largest source of Chinese oil imports (UN Comtrade 2018) and the largest recipient of Chinese
energy loans (Global Development Policy Centre).
The two countries are unique in China’s energy strategy given that they are two of the
largest energy producers in the world. Both countries are also politically and economically
significant global actors and fit within the characterization of developed or emerging economies.
Since a majority of the existing studies have been preoccupied with the analysis of Chinese
engagement in developing countries (Alden and Davies 2006; Bräutigam 2009; Gallagher 2016),
my study adds new empirical data on Chinese engagement from the perspective of nondeveloping countries. Despite the fact that these two countries are systematically important in
China’s energy, scholars have only focused on either of the two countries in their analysis. Since
no comparative studies have been carried out on the Canadian and Russian responses to Chinese
SOEs’ engagement in their respective oil and gas sectors my study will be the first one to
undertake this task. In this way, I also provide an empirical contribution to the existing research.
The two countries are also well suited for comparative purposes because their responses
to Chinese engagement have varied over time, which impacted the inflow of Chinese FDI, as
figure 1.2 indicates. The figure captures two distinct trends. The first trend worth noting is that
Chinese FDI in Canada was very high during the 2009-2015 period and declined thereafter. The
second trend captures the growth of Chinese FDI in Russia from 2013 onward. The two trends
chart an opposite picture, which, as I propose in my dissertation, can be explained by changing
stakeholder attitudes and institutional innovation related to shifting inter-state relations (all of
which are ultimately influenced by the informal institutions of a host state).
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Chinese Investment in Canada and Russia over time (from
2009 to 2016)
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Figure 1.2: Chinese Investment in Canada and Russia from 2009 to 2016 (China Investment Monitor; Scissors 2018)

To test my theoretical model, I relied on qualitative comparative methodology focused on
fieldwork, interviews, and desk research to compare Chinese engagement in Canada and Russia.
I carried out field research and interviews in both countries. I interviewed experts and
practitioners who have monitored Chinese SOEs’ activities in the hydrocarbon sector. I
combined interviews, media analysis, and secondary research in English and Russian to provide
a rigorous analysis of Chinese financial engagement in both countries. As I briefly noted earlier,
my analysis rests on a novel theoretical framework that I have developed by combining historical
institutionalist theories with stakeholder theories. The combination of these two theories allows
me to account for the role of individuals and institutions in shaping Chinese investment and other
types of financial engagement in the hydrocarbon industry. I propose that sometimes the two
variables interact in an unpredictable manner to produce unique outcomes that cannot be
explained by looking solely at institutions or stakeholders.
My research findings reveal that Chinese participation in the hydrocarbon industry
abroad is determined by the interaction between stakeholder interests and institutions in host
societies. To demonstrate, in the Canadian case, the early success of Chinese FDI in the
hydrocarbon sector has triggered a protectionist response. In the Russian case, we can observe
the opposite scenario. Chinese investors were met with early setbacks and failed to acquire
Russian energy companies. However, since the mid-2000s, Chinese investors have been
successful in the major projects along the hydrocarbon chain, from oil production to gas
liquefaction, and transportation. The shift coincides with a growing receptiveness of Chinese
SOEs by key stakeholders in Russia. This phenomenon persisted despite the tightening of
regulatory (formal) institutions, which are often flexible in the Russian case. In both cases,
institutions and stakeholders determine the ability of Chinese SOEs to participate in hydrocarbon
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projects and shape the nature of Chinese engagement in the hydrocarbon sector. These findings
will be explained in detail in the core chapters of my dissertation.
My findings are subject to several minor limitations, which I will discuss in detail in
chapter three. For the purposes of the introduction, I will provide a brief overview of these
limitations. First limitation is related to the unreliability of quantitative data on Chinese FDI,
loans, and other finance. Therefore, I have chosen to conduct a qualitative study. Yet, qualitative
studies have several limitations that are worth noting. One of these, is related to the timing of my
research, where some of the projects that I have analyzed are still ongoing. Given that several
projects are still ongoing it was difficult to make predictions about their future. The third
limitation is related to the nature of the interview process itself, as certain stakeholders –
representatives of Chinese SOEs - declined to participate in the interview process. The fourth
limitation is related to the selected cases. Given that I chose to study Canada and Russia, my
research findings will not be generalizable easily to other cases. Nonetheless, the general model
and ideas that I will outline in my dissertation can be applied to other countries and projects.

Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation is composed of eight chapters. The first three chapters set up the
dissertation. In this introductory chapter, I have outlined key questions, puzzles, and concepts
that will be explored throughout this study. The second chapter analyzes empirical information
by relying on statistical data to provide a general picture of Chinese engagement and reviews the
existing literature on the topic of Chinese FDI and broader engagement. Subsequently, the third
chapter discusses the research design and provides a theoretical model that is used in the case
study chapters (chapters 4-7). Chapters four and six adopt and modify this theoretical model to
the Canadian and Russian cases. The modified model is subsequently tested in chapters five and
seven, in which I analyze Chinese participation in hydrocarbon projects in three case studies
across the hydrocarbon chain of both countries. Chapter eight summarizes the key ideas and
develops relevant arguments based on my findings before concluding. The next paragraphs
provide more information about the arguments advanced in each of the chapters.
Chapter two combines empirical information with a literature review. The first part of
this chapter provides an overview of the Chinese quest for energy resources overseas. It links
China’s rapid economic growth with rising energy demand and traces policy implications. More
specifically, it examines how China’s growing demand for energy reduces China’s energy
security. As I propose in this chapter, China’s policymakers are aware of this insecurity and have
designed a set of strategies to reduce energy demand and increase energy supply. These
strategies have implications for China’s activities at home and overseas. As this chapter shows,
domestic limits push Chinese companies to expand their search for oil and natural gas overseas.
This section outlines their expansion through trade, investment, and loans. It analyzes statistical
data to map Chinese engagement with hydrocarbon-rich countries by examining data on Chinese
imports, FDI, and energy loans. The main contribution of this chapter is to provide a big picture
of Chinese engagement with the hydrocarbon-rich countries and to refine the central puzzle of
my dissertation that will be examined in the subsequent comparative theoretical and case study
chapters on Canada and Russia.
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The second part of chapter two situates my work within the existing scholarship on
Chinese financial engagement in the hydrocarbon-rich countries. This topic has been central to
numerous scholarly studies that span multiple fields of inquiry, including economics and
political science. As I will illustrate in this chapter, economists and political scientists have been
fascinated with Chinese economic expansion and its SOEs. As noted earlier, economists are
predominantly focused on the internationalization of Chinese SOEs, while political scientists
examine the implications of this internationalization for host countries. These two perspectives
are my analytical starting points as they led me to ask novel questions that the literature has not
raised. Specifically, existing studies have not looked at the question of the success/failure –
operationalized by the ability of Chinese companies to participate in the hydrocarbon projects in
a host country. This question has motivated my theoretical approach, which I discuss in the
subsequent chapter.
Chapter three addresses my research design, theoretical framework, and research
limitations. The goal of this chapter is to outline the theoretical and methodological approach
adopted in this dissertation. In doing so, it articulates the central puzzle and rephrases key
questions that I will address in my dissertation. These puzzles and questions seek to advance
research on Chinese financial engagement in host countries in a novel direction that remains
grounded in the existing literature. My research design borrows a theoretical framework from the
scholarship on historical institutionalism and stakeholder theory. The combination of these two
perspectives is a novel approach that I developed to study Chinese engagement in the host
countries. As noted earlier, this framework is generalizable and can be used by other scholars to
study the engagement of other businesses in other economic sectors. I combine this framework
with the qualitative comparative methodology by focusing on the participation of Chinese SOEs
in the Canadian and Russian hydrocarbon sector. In this chapter, I also discuss case selection and
data collection strategies. The final section of this chapter outlines the limitations of my research.
Overall, this chapter is designed to provide all of the building blocks that are utilized in the
subsequent chapters.
Chapters four and five focus on Chinese SOEs’ participation in the Canadian
hydrocarbon sector. The first of these two chapters adopts my general theoretical framework to
the Canadian setting. It examines the role of inter-state relations, formal and informal
institutions, and stakeholder politics in shaping foreign engagement in the energy sector. In this
chapter, I propose that the neo-liberal market ideology combined with supportive Sino-Canadian
relations facilitate welcoming environment for SOEs. However, regulatory institutions and
stakeholders can exert opposing force and block Chinese engagement in Canadian energy
projects. I explore these dynamics in detail in chapter six. This chapter looks at specific
hydrocarbon projects where Chinese investors indicated an interest to participate. This chapter
examines three case studies of SOEs’ investment along the hydrocarbon chain, including projects
in oil sands (CNOOC’s investment in Nexen), liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector of British
Columbia (proposed investment by CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC), and pipeline infrastructure
(SOEs participation in the Northern Gateway pipeline). The findings in this section show that
China’s engagement in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector is more complicated/difficult than the
quantitative data suggest as it is influenced by stakeholders and regulatory tightening. In fact,
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one may argue that Chinese SOEs have been struggling in the greenfield 3 energy projects in
Canada, while their success in a project requiring brownfield investment4 in the oil sands has led
to stricter regulations that will limit subsequent investment by Chinese SOEs in this sector.
Chinese engagement in the Russian hydrocarbon sector is at the centre of chapters six and
seven. Following the model that I developed in the Canadian case studies, chapter seven provides
a theoretical framework to analyze Chinese SOEs’ participation in the hydrocarbon projects in
Russia. This chapter examines how the ideology of resource nationalism (informal institution)
and historically-strained Sino-Russian interstate relations served as constraints to Chinese FDI.
Likewise, it analyzes the impact of Russian regulatory institutions and stakeholders in shaping
Chinese SOEs’ participation in the energy sector. This chapter suggests that flexible regulatory
institutions and stakeholder politics dominated by political and business elites may serve as
constraints to Chinese engagement. Despite this generally unwelcoming investment environment
and some early failures of Chinese SOEs to gain a foothold in the Russian hydrocarbon industry,
Chinese enterprises were successful in multiple projects along the hydrocarbon chain since the
mid-2000s. Chapter seven examines Chinese engagement in the Udmurtneft’s oil extraction
plant, the Yamal LNG plant, and the East-Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline. By analyzing
these cases, it traces how individual factors on the ground provide a flexible environment for
foreign engagement in the energy sector. Thus showing, that China can be successful in countries
with a restrictive investment environment that is adaptive to a changing geopolitical
environment.
The concluding chapter (chapter 8) provides an overview of the main arguments and
findings developed throughout this dissertation. This last chapter restates key questions, puzzles,
and objectives of my study before discussing the main results. In doing so, it expands on the
findings and provides a novel interpretation of the data by comparing the results of the two cases.
This chapter also seeks to draw generalizable insights that can be applied by other scholars in
future studies. Additionally, chapter eight outlines possible future research directions that can be
pursued by scholars. Lastly, it summarizes research contributions that my dissertation makes and
outlines how these findings may benefit scholars, policymakers, industry players, and civil
society actors.

Conclusion
The global expansion of Chinese SOEs in search of natural resources, including energy,
has been one of the fascinating development in the last twenty years that fascinated social
scientists. Presently, Chinese energy companies have spread their activities across the globe as
they invested in oil and gas assets in Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, Latin America, and North
America. As the map in this chapter indicated, Chinese SOEs were especially active investors in
the developed countries and emerging economies with abundant oil and natural gas reserves. The
spread of Chinese SOEs is often accompanied by other types of engagement, such as aid, trade,
financial support through loans, and political support. Despite this impressive growth of Chinese
3

Greenfield investment indicates that a corporation will build its subsidiary from a ground up in a host country.
Thus, creating a new company (by replicating itself and its activities) in a host country.
4
Brownfield investment indicates that the company will take over existing plants/factories/facilities in a host
country.
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SOEs, some of the individual projects in the energy sector coveted by these enterprises did not
materialize.
This phenomenon has thus far flown under the scholarly radar. Yet, multiple scholars
have acknowledged this gap and proposed that further research is needed to analyze how Chinese
SOEs operate within the same industries in different countries (Smith and D’Arcy 2013) and
how local stakeholders respond to Chinese investment (Abdenur 2017, 192-194). As Zhu (2018,
165) has noted we still lack a study that accounts for the successes and failures of Chinese SOEs
to participate in hydrocarbon projects. As I noted earlier, my dissertation seeks to tackle their
questions by trying to account for the aforementioned puzzle - why do the projects proposed by
Chinese SOEs in the energy sector of the host countries sometimes succeed, while at other times
fail to materialize. My dissertation seeks to explain this observed variance by examining the
impact of host country’s political economy on Chinese engagement in the hydrocarbon sector.
The political economy is operationalized by two independent variables –institutions, and
stakeholder politics – and one intervening variable – inter-state relations. The latter variable of
inter-state relations shape stakeholder responses toward Chinese SOEs. These three variables
interact with each other to determine Chinese engagement in a given host country. By carrying
out this research, my study goes beyond the quantitative data, which has been preoccupied with
mapping the flow of FDI.

Chapter 2.

China’s Growing Role in Global Energy Markets

China’s rapid rise and shifting energy needs have shaped its integration into the global
energy sector. China’s integration into the global energy markets also influences energyproducing countries. In 2011, China became the largest energy consumer and producer in the
world (EIA 2015; IEA 2016). As of 2017, the country ranks as the largest oil importer, a rising
consumer of natural gas, an important producer and consumer of coal, and a leader in low-carbon
technologies and renewable energy (OECD Publishing and International Energy Agency Staff
2018, 471). The IEA forecasts that China’s energy demand will continue to grow over time (IEA
2016). This makes China one of the most influential players in global energy markets today.
Chinese energy companies, such as CNPC and Sinopec, are currently competing on par with the
international giants, such as BP (formerly British Petroleum/ now Beyond Petroleum) and
ExxonMobil, for energy assets and market share across the globe.
The objective of this chapter is to outline China’s role in the global hydrocarbon industry
and to position my research in relation to the existing literature. To achieve this objective, this
chapter is subdivided into two major sections. The first section of this chapter examines the
empirical data on China’s growing role in the global energy industry, while the second section
focuses on reviewing the relevant literature. In doing so, the first part provides empirical
information and demonstrates the scale and significance of China’s engagement in oil and gasrich countries. While the first part sets up the broader picture of China’s engagement, the second
part of this chapter identifies gaps in the existing research and positions my dissertation within
the existing literature. This literature also helps me to construct the basic framework of the model
that I develop in chapter 3.
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Tracing the Origins of Chinese Growing Role in the Global Energy Markets
Energy is an essential input for continuous growth and development of the Chinese
economy. China’s economic growth is the outcome of economic reforms initiated in the late
1970s. Starting with Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening Up” policies in 1978, the economy
turned to a resource-intensive model of economic development focused on export-led growth
(White Paper 2012). As the consequence of this reform, the Chinese economy experienced rapid
economic growth (around 10 per cent per annum) from 1978 to 2012 (World Bank 2018). While
this growth has lifted millions of people out of poverty, it also placed pressure on domestic
energy resources (OECD/IEA 2000, 7 and 13). The government has acknowledged that the
“Reform and Opening Up” policy has also increased China’s reliance on overseas petroleum
(Wei 2009; Feng et al. 2012, 8). These phenomena are captured by the statistical data, which I
will analyze in this section.
China’s rapid economic growth coincides with a rapidly rising energy consumption.
Examining the data provided by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, we can see that
China’s energy consumption grew by over 340 per cent from 1990 to 2016. The data are
presented in Figure 2.1 that plots China’s energy consumption (in 10 000 tons of standard coal
equivalent) from 1990 to 2016. A steep upward sloping line on the graph indicates that China’s
energy consumption has been growing every year with a period of rapid acceleration in
consumption around the early 2000s. The consumed energy comes from different energy
sources, determined by China’s energy mix.

Chinese Energy Consumption

Chinese Energy Consumption / year (in 10 000
tons standard coal equivalent)
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Chinese Energy Consumption / year (in 10 000 tons standard coal equivalent)

Figure 2.1: Chinese Energy Consumption per Annum (in 10,000 tons standard of coal equivalent) (Source: National
Bureau of Statistics of China)
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China’s energy mix has been dominated by the consumption of coal, but the country is
moving toward other sources of energy, such as oil and natural gas. As 2014 data, provided by
the Energy Information Administration (EIA 2016), indicate coal dominates China’s energy mix
with over 66 per cent of energy needs satisfied by the burning of coal (see Figure 2.2). In the
future, China’s consumption mix will switch away from coal as the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC) has
committed to reducing China’s coal
consumption (National Development and
Reform Commission 2016, 6). The second
largest source of energy for China is
currently oil, which accounts for 20 per
cent of the energy used by China.
Following the historical trend of 5.77 per
cent growth in annual consumption of oil
since 1993, China’s oil consumption will
likely continue to grow continuously (Liu
et al 2012, 1). Although other sources for
energy generation are used less prevalently
in the current energy mix, with
hydropower accounting for 8 per cent and
natural gas for 5 per cent, Chinese
policymakers are planning to increase the
proportion of renewables and natural gas
in the energy mix. To illustrate, the EIA
(2015) projects that natural gas will likely
Figure 2.2: Chinese Energy Consumption Mix (2014) (graphic from EIA
2016).
account for 10 per cent of China’s energy
mix by 2020.
The government has adjusted its policy to diversify the energy mix. In 2014, the State
Council announced a policy to reduce the proportion of coal-generated energy. This policy was
codified in the “Energy Development Strategy Notification Plan (2014-2020)” (2014). Since the
implementation of this plan, the percentage of coal in China’s energy mix has begun to drop. At
the same time, China’s consumption of non-coal energy sources, such as renewables and oil and
gas continued to grow. Data indicate that China’s demand for hydrocarbons continues to grow
over time, especially for the oil and gas. This growth is depicted in Figure 2.3, generated on the
basis of data released by the BP in 2018. The graph illustrates a steady growth in China’s
consumption of oil and natural gas (Figure 2.3). As Chinese consumption of oil and natural gas
continues to grow, its reliance on these energy sources will expand. Thus, Chinese policymakers
are becoming very sensitive to the question of oil security.
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Figure 2.3:China’s Oil and Gas Demand Growth Data from 2007 to 2017 (source: BP 2018)

China’s government acknowledges that the rising demand for energy is negatively
associated with China’s energy security. Energy security, defined as a reliable supply of oil and
gas resources at reasonable prices (IEA n.d.; Yergin 2006), is an important policy issue in China.
While Chinese White Paper on “China’s Energy Policy” (2012) does not provide a definition of
energy security, it appears to draw on the international definition of the concept. For Chinese
policymakers, security of oil supply has become a central issue as it is tightly linked with the
legitimacy of the Chinese government (Zhang 2004, 164; Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther
2011, 1-4). In the official statements and White Papers, Chinese policymakers acknowledged the
problem of energy insecurity. In the “China’s Energy Policy” (2012), Chinese policymakers note
that China is not well-endowed in natural resources, even though it is growing increasingly
dependent on energy imports, which decreases China’s energy security. According to the White
paper on “China’s Peaceful Development Road” (2005, III and V), China will rely on
international markets to secure energy resources. In an official statement addressing China’s
growing energy needs, Zhang Guobao (2005), from the NDRC, has stated that “China will stick
to the policy of opening up [to] the outside world and continue to strengthen energy cooperation
with other countries” to ensure China’s energy security in an environment of volatile oil prices.

Attaining Energy Security
To satisfy its growing demand for oil and natural gas, China exploits domestic and
foreign hydrocarbon reserves. In pursuit of oil and gas assets, the Chinese government converted
former energy ministries to three large SOEs. The government created CNOOC in 1982, Sinopec
in 1983, and CNPC in 1988 (Feng et al. 2012, 8). These SOEs originally served as
“administrative entities” that had to oversee energy policy and manage state’s energy assets
(Zhang 2004, 6). Initially, SOEs were tightly controlled by the Chinese government (AndrewsSpeed and Dannreuther 2011), but after the 1998 reform of the oil industry, Chinese SOEs began
to pursue commercial interests (Liou 2009). Although there is evidence that Chinese SOEs are
acting independently from the Chinese government and are driven by the commercial motives
(Downs 2004; Liou 2009), there is still a debate to what extent are these SOEs independent from
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the government (Burgos Cáceres and Ear 2013; Alon, Leung Simpson 2015). This debate is
reinforced by the government’s discussion to implement new SOE-related reforms in the future
to turn SOEs into privatized entities as reported by the Xinhua news agency (2017).
Cognizant of the debate on the state-ownership of the enterprises, Chinese SOEs strive to
behave like their Western competitors. Chinese SOEs have created subsidiaries to operate
abroad, such as PetroChina or Sinopec. These subsidiaries are represented across the world; they
operate oilfields, provide technical services, and build infrastructure (ex. refineries and pipelines)
abroad (Feng et al. 2012, 33; Zhang 2004). Although these subsidiaries are listed on the
international capital markets, they also rely on the support of the Chinese government and are
regulated by the governmental agencies in China. Several governmental agencies supervise
SOEs activities abroad, including the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC), the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), and the NDRC. These agencies often
provide directives for SOEs, including a requirement to obtain permission from the NDRC to
invest in specific projects (Li 2010, 237-238). Furthermore, SOEs’ overseas projects are often
supported by loans extended by the Chinese policy banks, such as the China Development Bank
(CDB) and the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of China. Chinese banks also provide finance to
hydrocarbon-rich countries through loans-for-energy packages, which will be discussed in the
latter part of this chapter. However, before turning to China’s engagement in the global energy
markets, domestic resources and policy environment should be explored.
In partnership with SOEs, Chinese policymakers have developed multiple strategies to
improve China’s energy (oil) security. Drawing inspiration from the United States’ model,
China’s strategy to attain energy security combines domestic and international solutions,
including bilateral energy diplomacy, domestic energy conservation, and exploitation of new
energy sources, among other techniques (Chen 2008). The model is based on the premise of
energy security, where a strength of the state depends on its ability to control/own oil and gas
assets in oil-producing regions (Chen 2008, 88). The model combines supply and demand side
strategies to advance China’s energy security. The supply-side strategies ensure China’s
uninterrupted access to energy supplies, while the demand strategies are designed to curtail
domestic energy consumption. Both strategies can be pursued simultaneously domestically and
internationally.
Domestic supply-side and demand-side strategies are designed to help China regain its
energy self-sufficiency to ensure China’s independence from global forces and actors (Liu et al.
2012, 1). In pursuit of the supply-side strategies, China seeks to expand oil production from new
onshore and offshore fields (China’s Policy on Mineral Resources, White Paper 2003, III;
China’s Energy Policy 2012, V) and build strategic oil reserves 5 to ensure that it has adequate
supply of energy to withstand an energy crisis. As part of the demand-side strategies, China
promotes energy efficiency and conservation (China’s Energy Policy, White Paper 2012). The
government also supports economic transition to renewable energy to reduce China’s reliance on
fossil fuels (China’s Energy Policy, White Paper 2012, 1). Yet, domestic energy security
strategies have their limits.
5

The oil reserve has been commissioned by the Chinese government in the 10 th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005). China
finished constructing the first phase of the storage facilities in 2009 and has embarked on the second stage that is
due in 2020 (Bloomberg News 2016).
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The supply and demand strategies that China pursues at home are constrained by the
geological and socioeconomic factors. The demand-side strategies are limited by a continuous
economic growth and expansion of the middle-class, that is increasingly reliant on energy
consumption, will likely reduce the effectiveness of China’s demand-side strategies. As China’s
demand for energy continues to grow, China turns to supply-side strategies. Yet, these strategies
are also negatively impacted by domestic conditions, including geological limits. The country
possesses only 2.3 per cent of global oil reserves and only 0.9 per cent of global natural gas
reserves (Zheng 2004, 163). These resources also have low recovery ratios and their
development is complicated by complex geology (Liu et al. 2012, 18-24; EIA 2015). China has
several large oil fields, such as Daqing, Changing, and Tarim. However, these fields are aging,
and their output is declining (EIA 2015). Development of new oil fields is uncertain as some are
located in the China Sea, which is currently a disputed area, and Tarim Basin, which is located in
the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (OECD/IEA 2000, 23; EIA 2015). These regions are
prone to conflict, which makes the investment in these fields risky.
Limits placed on domestic strategies to attain energy security push China to seek
solutions to its energy dilemma overseas. Domestic factors make it increasingly difficult for
Chinese companies to develop new hydrocarbon fields as they require large upfront costs and
advanced technical expertise to recover resources in precarious fields (EIA 2015). Furthermore,
to extract these hard-to-access resources, Chinese SOEs need to acquire expensive foreign
technology and expand its investment in the domestic market (OECD/IEA 2000; EIA 2015;
China’s Energy Policy, White Paper 2012, V). Acknowledging the limits to domestic strategies,
the Chinese government supports SOEs’ acquisition of foreign technology that is needed to
extract non-conventional oil and gas resources at home (China’s Energy Policy, White Paper
2012, V). SOEs are also encouraged to invest abroad and transition to renewable energy
generation techniques (China’s Energy Policy 2012, V; Liu et al. 2012, 1). Since domestic
strategies are limited, Chinese government officials and SOEs have turned to international
markets to support energy security.
Chinese policymakers have developed a set of international strategies that are essential
for attaining energy security. These strategies supplement domestic initiatives and provide China
with a range of options, including diversification of energy suppliers, construction of energy
transportation infrastructure (for example pipeline and maritime fleet), and expansion of
economic relations with energy-exporting countries (Chen 2008). These strategies are part of the
broader “Go Global” investment program, which was adopted in the 1990s. Under the “Go
Global” framework strategy (and more recently BRI), Chinese SOEs rely on government’s
resources provided for Chinese companies to expand their presence abroad. There are a few core
economic and political strategies under the “Go Global” framework to attain energy.
At the centre of these strategies is energy diplomacy. A general definition of energy
diplomacy suggests that it is composed of a set of “foreign activities with explicit involvement of
the central government…[which aims] to secure foreign oil and gas resources or promote
interstate oil and gas business cooperation” (Chen 2008, 80). This version of energy diplomacy is
pursued by the government of China to help its SOEs acquire oil and gas assets abroad. The goal
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of China’s diplomacy aspires to expand the amount of oil available on the international market
rather than to acquire the sites for domestic purposes, which indicates a commercial logic of FDI
(Chen 2008; Raphael and Stokes 2011). Thus, scholars note that Chinese energy diplomacy
generally follows liberal premises (Ziegler 2006). In general, China’s energy diplomacy
combines political and economic elements. Political elements include diplomatic ties, use of veto
power in the international organizations, and military support, such as the sale of weapons and
other military technology to Sudan and Algeria (Paul 2010), while economic elements include
trade, aid, and investment. The latter is also known as the “Yuan Diplomacy”, a term coined by
Kevin Gallagher (2016). China combines both dimensions of energy diplomacy to attain energy
security, promote corporate development, and provide employment for Chinese labourers (Chen
2008). It does so on the bilateral, regional, and multilateral scale.
At a bilateral level, Chinese officials can secure oil deals during high-level state visits
(Chen 2008; Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther 2011). Chinese officials can offer financial,
military, or political support to its energy partners in exchange for oil contracts (Vivoda 2009;
Paul 2010, 63-64). During these high-level visits, Chinese officials may also sign bilateral
investment treaties. China has currently 110 active 6 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).
Twenty-three out of those 110 are signed between China and the oil/gas rich countries as
indicated in the Table 2.1. BITs may be an effective mechanism to promote bilateral energy
investment. Scholars find that BITs may increase bilateral investment as they reduce political
risk by providing protections to investors (Comeaux and Kinsella 1994; Salacuse and Sullivan
2005).
Chinese BITs with oil/gas rich
countries
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Canada, Colombia,
Congo, Ecuador, Iran, Kazakhstan,
Kuwait, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nigeria
(renewed and changed in 2001), Oman,
Peru, Russia (renewed and changed in
2006), Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United
Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan (renegotiated
in 2011)

Important oil/gas producers
missing from BITs
Angola, Brazil, Iraq, Niger, South
Sudan, Venezuela

Table 2.1: Chinese BITs signed with oil/gas-rich countries (source: Investment Policy, UNCTAD)

China is also becoming more integrated into energy networks at regional and global
scales. Regionally, China has created multiple fora and organizations to pursue regional
economic collaboration that envisions closer energy trade and investment. China’s membership
across several regional economic fora/organizations that deal with energy has grown over time.
China is now a leading player in several regional organizations, including the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation (FOCAC), the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(CELAC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In the past two decades, China
has also grown from a regional to a global player in the energy sector, which reflects China’s
6

By active BITs, I refer to treaties that have been signed and are currently in force.
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growing influence on the global energy market (Ziegler 2006). At the global/international level,
China pursues energy diplomacy within global energy governance bodies, such as the IEA or the
BRICS forum. China’s active role in global energy governance indicates that China is becoming
a more active actor both regionally and globally (Xu 2011, 161). China’s integration into energy
governance signals its growing interest in pursuing domestic energy goals through multiple
channels.
Across all of the levels of analysis (from bilateral to global), Chinese energy diplomacy
appears to be carefully crafted to support its energy strategy. Chinese policymakers acknowledge
that China’s energy security cannot be attained without engaging in international cooperation
(China’s Peaceful Development, White Paper III and V). In pursuit of this collaboration, China’s
energy strategy for the near to long-term, until 2025-2050, supports the expansion of Chinese
SOEs overseas in partnership with foreign companies (Liu et al. 2012, 2). As part of the energy
security strategy, SOEs are encouraged by their government to diversify oil suppliers (China’s
Energy Policy, White Paper 2012, V; EIA 2015). A policy supportive of SOEs overseas
expansion indicates a close connection between political and economic aspects of Chinese
energy diplomacy, where Chinese policymakers collaborate with SOEs to acquire energy
resources abroad. This collaboration rests on lucrative economic packages that combine trade,
investment, and financial support that are extended by SOEs (with the backing of the Chinese
government) to the host countries.
Chinese SOEs are at the forefront of China’s overseas expansion. CNPC, Sinopec,
CNOOC, and their subsidiaries have established their presence across the world by spreading
their operations globally. For example, CNPC has oil and gas assets in 37 countries across the
globe. Feng et al. (2012) identify four “strategic development zones” where SOEs operate - the
Middle East-North Africa, Central Asia-Russia, South America, and South Asia. As Chinese
investment in the developed countries increases, I would argue that North America and Europe
are also becoming key development zones for Chinese SOEs in the oil and gas sector. The global
expansion of Chinese SOEs coincides with the diversification of supply routes for oil and gas
(Van Der Hoeven 2013). By diversifying supply routes Chinese policymakers and companies try
to avoid transportation risks along the maritime passages, such as Malacca or Hormuz Straits
(Paul 2010; China’s Energy Policy, White Paper 2012). While the security of individual routes is
not guaranteed, diversification of import options increases China’s energy security. By
expanding globally, Chinese SOEs become active participants in several societies.
The engagement of Chinese SOEs with the host societies is one of the fascinating
subjects that are explored by several scholars in political science. These scholars find that
Chinese companies are actively engaged in host societies – through trade, investment, loans, and
other financial assistance (Kolstad and Wiig 2011; Gallagher and Irwin 2014; Gallagher 2016).
As noted in chapter two, scholars identified unique packages that Chinese SOEs offer in
exchange for natural resources. These ‘resources-for-infrastructure’ deals are best known as the
“Angola model”, where Chinese corporations support the development of local infrastructure in
developing countries (Alden and Davis 2006; Beseda et al. 2008; Bräutigam 2011; Habiyaremye
2013; Gallagher 2016). These packages are extended to the oil/gas-exporting countries to ensure
that SOEs gain preferential access to oil /gas fields abroad. Since China’s economic engagement
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with hydrocarbon-rich countries is multifaceted, we need to consider each of the individual
elements. The next section discusses each element of China’s engagement, aside from aid.

Chinese Companies Venture Abroad to Meet Domestic Oil and Gas Needs by Engaging
with Hydrocarbon-Exporting Countries
A large portion of China’s oil and gas demand is met by imports; however, these imports
can be interrupted by economic or political conflict. As Chinese government and companies are
cognizant of energy insecurity, they strive to acquire overseas energy resources to ensure that
there is more oil available on the global market from different destinations in case a conflict
occurs in one part of the world. In pursuit of energy security, Chinese companies acquire oil and
gas fields by investing overseas (Alon, Leung and Simpson 2015, 297). Another strategy to
improve energy security is linked to commodity-backed finance, where Chinese SOEs extend
finance to hydrocarbon-rich countries in the form of loans for the construction/development of
energy projects. The three strategies – trade, investment, and loans – are often a part of a
packaged deal (sometimes combined with aid, when extended to developing countries) offered
by Chinese SOEs to host countries.
This section provides empirical evidence of China’s growing global energy engagement
through trade, investment, and loans. This evidence is derived from statistical data
published by the UN Comtrade database (to examine Chinese hydrocarbon imports), the
American Enterprise Institute (to analyze Chinese FDI in oil and gas), and the Global
Development Policy Center (to study China’s energy loans). Each of these sources provides the
most comprehensive data on Chinese finance in the energy sector. However, as noted by scholars
working on China’s finance (Gallagher and Bräutigam 2014), existing data on Chinese finance is
prone to over or under-estimation of China’s actual engagement. Despite this possible limitation,
the data are helpful in charting general trends of China’s global engagement in the global energy
sector. In the next sections, this data will be utilized to examine Chinese hydrocarbon imports,
FDI in the oil and gas industry, and energy-backed finance.
Chinese Hydrocarbon Imports
Starting with trade statistics, we can observe that China is currently one of the largest
importers of hydrocarbon resources in the world. The country became a net oil importer in 1993
and a net natural gas importer in 2007 (IEA 2016). Today, China relies on foreign energy
markets to satisfy over 60 per cent of its oil demand (Paraskova 2017). As China’s demand for
oil and natural gas continues to grow, its imports of these commodities are expanding. In 2014,
China became the largest oil importer and the third largest importer of liquefied natural gas
(LNG) according to the EIA (2015). This upward trend in China’s oil and gas imports is captured
in a graph depicted in Figure 2.4 and 2.5, based on the UN Comtrade data. The graph in Figure
2.4 depicts Chinese imports of oil and natural gas (in billions of American dollars) from 1992 to
2017.
Analyzing the graph on Chinese imports of oil and gas (Figure 2.4 (in millions of dollars)
and 2.5 (in millions of kilograms)), we can observe several important trends regarding China’s
imports of oil and natural gas. The blue line on both graphs indicates that Chinese oil imports
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grew at a rapid rate from 2000 to 2013. During the mid-2000s, we can also observe a rise in
imports of natural gas in the liquefied (orange line) and gaseous (grey line) state. As the graphs
in figures 2.4 and 2.5 indicate, Chinese demand for natural gas (in both liquid and gaseous state)
grew rapidly from 2010 to 2017. This growth in natural gas imports is associated with a broader
shift in China’s energy consumption mix from coal and oil to natural gas. The graph also
captures a decline in oil imports from 2013; this drop may be associated with a global drop in oil
prices and the increasing rise in imports of natural gas. Both figures also indicate that Chinese
demand for oil rose slightly after 2016. At the same time, China’s demand for natural gas rose
steeply suggesting that China’s energy mix may be switching to natural gas in the near future.

Chinese Imports of Oil and Gas from 1992 to 2017 in Billions of
USD
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Figure 2.4: Chinese Imports of Oil and Gas from 1992 to 2017 Measured in Billions of USD (source: UN Comtrade)
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Chinese Imports of Oil and Gas from 1992 to 2017 by volume
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Figure 2.5: Chinese Imports of Oil and Gas from 1992 to 2017 by volume (millions of Kg) (source: UN Comtrade)

One may wonder where does China get its imported petroleum. Looking at the 2017 data,
we see that China imported oil from 47 different destinations. Historically, the majority of
China’s oil imports came from Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Angola (EIA 2015). In 2017, China
imported 38 per cent of its oil from three countries – Russia accounted for 14 per cent of
imported oil, Saudi Arabia for 12 per cent, and Angola for another 12 per cent (Figure 2.6). Iraq,
Oman, Iran, Brazil, Venezuela, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Colombia, and Congo were other
major exporters of oil to China. The trends in the oil imports partially reflect Chinese long-term
supply agreements with the individual countries. For example, Russia’s predominance in the
graph can be explained by several long-term supply agreements signed between Chinese SOEs
and Russian National Oil Corporations (NOCs) in exchange for loans that will be discussed in
more detail in the section on Chinese energy loans. However, before turning to loans, it is
important to discuss Chinese investment in the hydrocarbon sector.
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Chinese Oil Imports by Destination 2017 (in Kilograms)
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Figure 2.6: Chinese Oil Imports by Country of Origin (focused on top 15 exporters) in 2017 (source: UN Comtrade)

Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the Energy Sector
Chinese FDI in energy is the key aspect of Chinese financial engagement. Data indicate
that Chinese FDI in the oil and gas sector has grown at a rapid pace. The growth in Chinese FDI
has been closely monitored by the International Energy Agency (IEA), which has released two
reports (2011; 2014) outlining the magnitude and locational preferences of Chinese investors.
The latest report notes that Chinse SOEs have expanded their overseas investment
geographically – across 42 developed and developing countries - and financially – from 2011 to
2013 they have invested an estimate of $73 billion USD (IEA 2014, 7). Although the report notes
that Chinese SOEs are now globally integrated, it acknowledges that Chinese investors are “still
small players and relative newcomers in the North American energy scene” (IEA 2014, 33). To
analyze trends in Chinese FDI, I generated a dataset on Chinese FDI in oil and gas on the basis
of the China Global Investment Tracker database developed by Derek Scissors at the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI).
The AEI database includes data on Chinese mergers and acquisitions in the oil and gas
industry from 2005 to 2018. The data set focuses on Chinese investment above $100 million and
includes “[a]cqusition of stakes in companies [that] may not always technically qualify as direct
investment” (Scissors 2011, 1-2). While the AEI provides the most compressive database on
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Chinese FDI, it has one notable limitation. After checking several investments noted in the
database through the triangulation process, I have noticed that the database was missing a few
energy deals and some deals that were listed as FDI were never completed. It is thus possible that
the graphs, that I have generated on the basis of the AEI data, have a margin of error. However,
this is standard problem with large databases that measure Chinese FDI as noted by experts, such
as Deborah Bräutigam and Kevin Gallagher (2014). Thus, the data is the best approximate figure
that can be used to capture Chinese FDI.
I have used the AEI data to calculate the total amount of Chinese FDI in each investmentrecipient country. I generated a bar graph in Figure 2.7 to capture the size of Chinese FDI in
millions of USD accumulated by individual investment-recipient countries from 2005 to mid2018. The data indicate that Chinese investors are active in 55 countries around the globe. The
top five recipients of Chinese FDI in oil and gas are Canada ($19,750 million), Kazakhstan
($15,630 million), Brazil ($14,600 million), Australia ($10,600 million), and the United States of
America ($10,070 million). Among the top 10 recipients, we have Iraq, Russia, Iran, Niger and
Mozambique. In total, Chinese companies invested over $157 billion USD to acquire oil and gas
assets (author’s calculation based on data from the American Enterprises Institute).

Chinese FDI in Oil and Gas in Millions USD
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Figure 2.7: Chinese FDI in Oil and Gas Across Investment-Recipient Countries Measured in Millions of USD; Reported
Data Includes Only Countries where Chinese Companies Invested over $2 billion USD (source: AEI Database, Derek
Scissors)

Distribution of China’s FDI in the oil and gas sector reveals several puzzling trends. First,
it is interesting to observe that among the top five investment destinations we have three
developed countries – Australia, Canada, and the United States - that have strict investment
screening mechanisms and placed restrictions on Chinese FDI. As noted earlier, the United
States and Australia have both rejected a few of the proposed investments by Chinese SOEs in
the energy sector. A second trend worth noting is that Chinese investment in the hydrocarbon
sector is substantive in the emerging economies, such as Brazil and Russia. Brazil and Russia are
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among the top 10 recipients of Chinese FDI. The data brings an additional question – why is
Chinese FDI in Canada larger than in Russia? A possible explanation is that Chinese financial
engagement in Russia is not just composed of FDI but also includes loans and long-term oil/gas
supply arrangements – that are absent in the case of Chinese financial engagement in Canada.
Chinese Global Energy Loans
The third aspect of Chinese financial engagement in the global energy projects is loans.
China became an important financier of energy projects around the world. China’s global energy
finance – operationalized as loans - has grown exponentially from 2000 to 2017 – from $149
million to $22.5 billion – according to data gathered by Boston University’s Global Development
Policy Center. The rise in Chinese global finance has attracted attention by scholars, who have
noted that Chinese companies often use loans in exchange for a secure supply of energy
resources – known as the ‘loans for energy’ packages or the “Angola model” deals (Alden and
Davies 2006; Bräutigam and Gallagher 2014). According to Bräutigam and Gallagher (2014,
351), Chinese policy banks “have become major development financiers” as they extended $132
billion USD to African and Latin American countries with half of these assets tied to natural
resources.7 Yet, African and Latin American countries are not the only recipients of Chinese
energy finance.
I used the database developed by the Global Development Policy Centre on Chinese
energy finance from 2000 to 2017 focused on renewable and non-renewable energy finance to
compile a dataset focused on Chinese energy loans to individual countries. Based on this dataset,
I generated Figure 2.8 that depicts the top 15 recipients of Chinese energy finance abroad. The
graph in Figure 2.8 shows that Russia, Brazil, Pakistan, Angola, and Venezuela are the top five
largest recipients of Chinese loans. Looking at the data, we can also see that countries located in
Asia dominate this list (6 recipients), followed by Latin America (4 recipients) and Europe (3
recipients). The data also reveal that most of the energy-related finance was distributed to
emerging and developing economies. However, it is important to note that countries like Italy,
Russia, and Ukraine are on the list of the largest recipients of Chinese energy loans. For the
purposes of my research, Russia is the most interesting case.

7

Natural resources include commodities other than oil and gas. Therefore, the number is larger than the earlier
stated number on energy-backed loans.
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CHINESE ENERGY FINANCE IN BILLIONS OF
USD
Chinese Energy Loans in Billions USD
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Figure 2.8: Chinese Energy Finance Distributed Across the Recipients Measured in Billions of USD (source: Global
Development Policy Centre, Boston University)

As the largest single recipient of Chinese energy finance, Russia stands out from the list.
Russian energy corporations received $42 billion USD in Chinese loans, most of these funds
($25 billion USD) were accessed in 2009 for the construction of the ESPO pipeline. Another
large tranche of finance from Chinese policy banks was released in 2016 to finance construction
of the Yamal LNG (Global Development Policy Center). Both loans came at a time when Russia
could not access capital from the West; in 2009, Western financial markets were recovering from
the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis, which made it difficult for Russia to borrow funds from
the Western financiers; in 2016, Russia did not have access to Western finance again due to the
post-Ukraine sanctions. The details of these loans will be explored in the chapters on China’s
investment in Russia’s energy sector.
As this section has demonstrated, China and its enterprises are increasingly becoming
integrated into global and regional energy networks through FDI, loans, and long-term trade
agreements. It is likely that China will continue to expand its search for oil and gas resources
abroad as its energy demand is projected to grow. This phenomenal growth in demand and its
implications on host societies have been at the center of scholarly debates on Chinese FDI, which
will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

Reviewing the Current State of Research on Chinese Engagement
Chinese engagement has been the subject of numerous studies spanning across multiple
fields of inquiry, including economics and political science. Chinese FDI has been at the centre
of this body of work. Scholars have made substantial progress in analyzing different aspects of
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Chinese FDI from diverse theoretical and methodological perspectives. As noted in the
introduction, scholars working in the field of international business have identified a set of
motivating factors that explain why Chinese businesses invest abroad (see: Buckley et al. 2007;
Cui and Jiang 2012; Paul and Benito 2017), while scholars studying international development
have examined the impact of Chinese investors on host societies – predominantly located in
developing countries (see: González-Vicente 2013; Gallagher 2016). Each of these fields of
inquiry offers a set of unique contributions to our understanding of Chinese FDI and sometimes
its broader engagement with host countries. Yet, they also speak past each other without
engaging in interdisciplinary research. Thereby, they miss important questions and puzzles
identified in my dissertation.
To highlight existing scholarly contributions on the topic of Chinese engagement, this
section is divided into four parts. The first part tackles existing research on China’s rise by
focusing on geopolitical implications and the impact that Chinese engagement has on host
societies. The second part of this section examines the rise of FDI from emerging economies.
More specifically, it examines the distinct nature of Chinese SOEs and analyzes the engagement
packages that Chines SOEs offer to host countries. The third section analyzes scholarly studies
examining the reception of Chinese FDI. The last section identifies the gaps in the existing
research and outlines my research contribution to the scholarship on Chinese engagement.
Examining the Implications of China’s Rise
Political scientists have been fascinated with the rapid rise of China and its SOEs.
China’s rise has made scholars ponder about the future of the geopolitical order (see: Ikenberry
2008; Acharya 2017) and relatedly about the geopolitical implications of China’s rising demand
for natural resources, including energy (Burgos Cáceres and Ear 2012; Andrews-Speed, Liao,
and Dannreuther 2014). Geopolitical considerations have also shaped broader contours of
scholarly debate on the implications of Chinese investment in the resource-rich countries
(González-Vicente 2013; Gallagher 2016). What can we learn about the role of geopolitics in
China’s engagement in host countries? One possible answer is that geography is conducive to
energy trade between countries that share borders (Marketos 2009, 88-89). Yet, geography is
often complicated by a political climate that may not be conducive to investment, such as the
case in Russia (Marketos 2009, 88-89).
In the Sino-Russian case, geopolitics are often used to explain why Sino-Russian energy
partnership will be limited. Scholars specifically point out the changing relative distribution of
power in the region makes China an unlikely energy partner for Russia, given that the latter does
not want to become a resource appendix to the former (Downs 2010, 152; Bellacqua 2010, 160;
Swanström 2012, 11; Lo 2012, 40). Yet, Russia may also see China as an alternative energy
market in case geopolitical situation in Europe turned against Russia (Lo 2008, 139). In the case
of Canada, geopolitical implications of energy engagement with China are less clear-cut given
the geographic distance between the two countries. Ultimately, it appears that geopolitics, which
is subsumed under my inter-state relations variable, play an important role in shaping China’s
engagement in host societies.
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To analyze the implications of China’s rise, political scientists, working on issues related
to international development, place emphasis on the impact of Chinese corporate actors on host
societies. Some of these studies focus on how host societies may benefit from Chinese
engagement (Kaplinsky and Morris 2009), while others examine how host societies are affected
by Chinese investment (González-Vicente 2012, 2013; Gallagher 2016). The latter studies often
tap into the resource curse theory8 to see if Chinese SOEs perpetrate negative outcomes
associated with the resource extraction (González-Vicente 2011; Bader and Daxecker 2015).
While these studies offer interesting insights, it is difficult to trace the impact of Chinese SOEs
on the resource curse in extractive projects where they are only a minority investor, as is the case
in Russia. Therefore, I do not analyze whether Chinese investment is associated with the
resource curse in my dissertation. Instead, my dissertation examines the reception of Chinese
SOEs in host societies. This research topic emerged from the literature that sought to explain
foreign direct investment flows and its implications.
Explaining FDI from Emerging Economies by Focusing on the case of China
FDI became an important topic of inquiry in economics in the 1960s. The core question
motivating the research was why multinational/transnational companies (MNCs/TNCs), which
are private, for-profit firms, generally from advanced industrialized democracies, with
investments abroad, invest abroad? Economists began developing theories to explain a flow of
foreign investment across borders in the 1960s and continued to refine these early theories in the
1990s/2000s (Nayak and Choudhury 2014). Theories developed by leading economists, such as
Stephen Hymer (1960), Massiomo Motta (1992) and John Dunning (1977), explained why
MNCs invest abroad. Hymer explained firms’ decisions to invest abroad through market power
theory; Motta looked at “tariff jumping” for an explanation of a firm’s decisions to invest
abroad; and Dunning developed an OLI (ownership, location, internationalization of advantages)
or the ‘eclectic paradigm’ to explain FDI. Their insights have shaped the subsequent discussion
on the internationalization of corporations investing overseas. While their theories were
innovative at the time and had substantial explanatory power, they only captured the experience
of MNCs/TNCs, which limited their applicability to foreign investors from developing and
emerging economies.
Since the early FDI theories focused on MNCs/TNCs, scholars proposed that new
theories should be developed to explain the investment patterns from developing and emerging
economies, which behave differently than MNCs/TNCs (Nayak and Choudhury 2014). They
argued that the firms behave differently as they pay lower wage, exhibit familiarity with local
conditions, and provide a more suitable technology to host countries (Nayak and Choudhury
2014, 23-24). Given that these firms behave and operate differently, scholars have been
preoccupied with testing and re-shaping these core theories of FDI to fit the emergence of new
sources of FDI. Scholars were especially fascinated with the implications of the rise of a new
8

The resource curse theory emerged in the 1980s/1990s in the works of Gelb (1988), Auty (1990; 1997),
Sachs and Warner (1997; 2001), Karl (1997). After the theory was established several scholars have used it to
outline several predictions about the resource-rich countries; several studies propose that resource-rich
countries may suffer from slower economic development (Sachs and Warner 1995); political violence (Collier
and Hoeffler 2004; 2006); low levels of human development (Ross, 2012); corruption (Leite and Weidmann,
1999); and economic inequality, rampant poverty, unemployment (Ross, 2003; Ross, 2012).
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type of investors from emerging economies –SOEs. Scholars of international business have
developed the most comprehensive research framework to analyze internationalization strategies
of companies originating from the emerging economies. In a review of existing literature
examining enterprises from emerging economies, Paul and Benito (2017, 93) posit that majority
of the existing studies (67 per cent) in international business and management focus on Chinese
FDI in particular, given China’s rising importance as a global source of capital.
Chinese SOEs are new investors coming from a unique institutional setting defined as
state-capitalism (Cai 1999), “bifurcated capitalism” (Hsueh 2016), or “Sino-capitalism”
(McNally 2012). The model resembles a ‘hybrid’ between liberal ideals and interpersonal
networks as it is characterized by “top-down state coordination, bottom-up entrepreneurial
networks, and focused global integration” (McNally 2012, 765-766). This model is pluralistic as
it allows for a variety of state-corporate relations that originate in investors’ home countries and
depends on the role of the state in managing the sector (Gu et al. 2016; Hsueh 2016). Still, the
model remains “state-directed”, where “the state’s interests and priorities” are important, even
though companies may be driven by corporate motives (De Graaf and Van Apeldoorn 2018,
127).
Since the domestic model of Chinese companies differs from the liberal market
economies that produced MNCs/TNCs, scholars began to wonder what impact does the home
state have on Chinese companies. Scholars analyzing Chinese FDI found that Chinese investors
are motivated and behave differently than MNCs; therefore, they proposed that existing models
explaining the investment behaviour of MNCs cannot be applied to study internationalization
strategies of SOEs (Buckley et al. 2007; Buckley et al. 2008; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet
2010). Scholars point out the specificity of Chinese investors by linking them to a domestic
institutional environment that includes a supportive state that encourages FDI (Buckley et al.
2007, 2018; Lu, Liu, Wang 2011). This supportive environment at home may, according to Lu et
al. (2014), be associated with higher risk-taking by Chinese companies when investing abroad.
As FDI from China has unique characteristics, scholars started developing new theories
and explanations to account for the different experience of Chinese SOEs going abroad – or
internationalizing. Current research is preoccupied with explaining where and why Chinese
SOEs invest. The existing discussion on SOEs internationalization centers on the motives of
Chinese SOEs to invest abroad (see: Deng 2007; Quer, Claver, and Rienda 2011; Alon 2010).
Scholars studying motives for SOEs to go abroad have outlined factors that have “pushed”
Chinese companies abroad (Alon 2010; Wang et al. 2012; Gaur, Ma, Ding 2018) and “pulled”
them to specific locations (Deng 2007, 2009; Quer, Claver, and Rienda 2011, 2012; Amighini,
Rabellotti, and Sanfilippo 2013; He, Xie, Zhu 2014).
There are several pull factors that scholars identified as central in shaping the decision of
Chinese companies to invest abroad. Several scholars have noted that Chinese SOEs invest
abroad to obtain new (and, at times, sensitive) technology (Lu, Liu, Wang 2011; Pietrobelli,
Rabellotti, and Sanfilippo 2011; Sauvant and Nolan 2015, 29). Chinese SOEs are also enticed by
the abundance of natural resources in host countries (Buckley et al. 2008; Kolstad and Wiig
2012; Yang et al. 2018). Other studies also raise the importance of acquiring managerial
expertise overseas (Wu and Chen 2001; Pietrobelli, Rabellotti, and Sanfilippo 2011). While
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studies highlight the pull factors, such as natural resources, technology, and managerial
expertise, that attract Chinese SOEs to invest abroad, they do not explain how Chinese SOEs
enter host societies.
To answer the aforementioned question, scholars focused on Chinese investment
packages. Scholars have found that Chinese SOEs have designed a novel engagement strategy
that is distinct from other investors – as it combines trade, aid, and loans with investment prompting scholars to identify a “Chinese model” of investment (Kaplinsky and Morris 2009;
Wang 2011; Kolstad and Wiig 2011; Zhang and Daly 2011). Scholars have sometimes referred
to this strategy as the “Angola model” (Alden and Davies 2006, Kaplinsky and Morris 2009) or
the “infrastructure-for-resources loans” packages (Konjin 2014; Alves 2013). Scholars tend to
agree that Chinese SOEs offer unique investment packages. These unique packages reflect
SOEs’ experience of a late-comer into international energy markets that lacked substantive
overseas experience (Shankleman 2009; Economy and Levi 2014). Chinese companies thus
differ from MNCs/TNCs investing abroad as scholars proposed. Although scholars have traced
China’s unique strategy to developing countries (Alden and Davies 2006; Kaplinsky and Morris
2009; Alves 2013), it is plausible that elements of this strategy may appear in different
combinations in other countries. Thus, it is interesting to examine if this trilogy of China’s
engagement is replicated across host countries and under what conditions this replication process
occurs.
The majority of existing studies on Chinese FDI in natural resources have focused on
developing countries. Scholars examined the implications of China’s engagement in Africa (see:
Alden and Davies 2006; Zafar 2007; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009), Latin America (see:
González-Vicente 2012, 2013; Gallagher 2016; Rosales 2016), and Asia (Swanström 2005). In
their analyses, scholars examined individual countries (González -Vicente 2012) as well as
regional trends (Alden and Davies 2006). Only a few studies have examined Chinese investment
in the resource sector of developed countries, including North America (Zweig and Hao 2015;
Jiang 2010), Europe (Clegg and Voss 2012; Kamiński 2017), and Australia (Drysdale and
Findlay 2009; Wilson 2011). However, to my knowledge, there is only one qualitative study that
engages in a comparison of Chinese broader engagement, which combines FDI with loans and
aid, across the developed-developing country dichotomy – a recent book by Economy and Levi
(2014).
The developed-developing distinction adopted by researchers makes it harder to make
cross-comparisons between the two binary categories. Scholarly work on bridging this binary is
still at the early stages, as the majority of scholars continue to focus on either developed or
developing counties without engaging in cross-comparison. In their book, Economy and Levi
(2014) tried to bridge this divide by tracing Chinese engagement around the world. The book
provides a general comparison between Chinese engagement in developed and developing
countries. At one point in their work, Economy and Levi (2014, 181) note that Chinese
investment practices between developed and developing countries differ; thus, reinforcing the
tendency of scholars to work on either developing or developed countries in a specific region.
Therefore, comparative scholarship analyzing Chinese economic engagement across developed,
emerging, and developing host countries is still in its early stages.
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The only cross-regional study has been done by Bräutigam and Gallagher (2014). The
authors of this study compared the role of Chinese loans across Africa and Latin America to see
if there could be any insights drawn from the comparison. However, even their study followed
the developed-developing dichotomy. My study builds on their work by engaging in a crosscontinental comparison of Chinese engagement in Canada and Russia, which do not fall into the
binary dichotomy. While Canada is considered as a developed country, Russia is perceived as an
emerging or a developing country depending on the ranking system used to classify it.
In addition to the discussion of the investment strategies, my dissertation delves into the
mode of entry preferred by Chinese SOEs by examining how Chinese enterprises enter Canadian
and Russian energy markets. Scholars in international business (Cui and Jiang 2009) and
political science (Cai 1999; Abdenur 2017; Zhu 2018) have examined SOE entry modes, such as
joint ventures,9 mergers and acquisitions (M&A),10 and greenfield investments. While early
studies found that Chinese SOEs prefer joint ventures (Cai 1999) or M&A when investing in
developed countries (Zhu 2018), newer studies emphasized that China’s entry mode depends on
host country’s institutions and is gradually shifting toward more complex categories by moving
away from joint ventures to greenfield investments (Abdenur 2017). Some studies posit that
Chinese SOEs bring their domestic practices when they invest abroad (Jiang 2009), this claim
has been debated in the more recent literature, such as in the work of Alon, Leung, and Simpson
(2015). Ultimately, studies examining the entry modes of Chinese investors emphasize that
Chinese companies adjust to local institutional requirements (Alon, Leung, and Simpson 2015;
Cui and Jiang 2010; Yu and Smith 2018), yet did not explain how Chinese SOEs are influenced
by institutions in the host societies.
Reception of China’s FDI
Recent studies have begun to draw attention to host country’s institutions as they may
impact the inflow of Chinese investment. Scholars pointed out factors like ‘psychic distance’
(Blomkvist and Drogendijk 2013) and institutional compatibility (ex. weak home and host
institutions) (Guillén and García-Canal 2008; Beazer and Blake 2018; O’neill 2014) as some of
the possible explanations of China’s decision to invest in a particular country. A study by
Ramasamy, Young, and Laforet (2010) even suggested that a distinct nature of Chinese SOEs
enables these enterprises to invest in risky political environments. Yet, their study does not
account for the ability of Chinese SOEs to adapt to different institutional environments. Thus,
further research is required to understand how Chinese SOEs adapt to different institutional
environments and how they are shaped by them (Morck, Yeung, and Zhao 2008; Smith and
D’Arcy 2013). To encourage such research, Smith and D’Arcy (2013) note that scholars should
engage in comparative research on Chinese SOEs operating within the same industry but located
in countries with different institutions.

9

A joint venture is commonly defined as a new company that is created by two or more partners (that can be
well known leading companies in the energy industry, for example) to pursue common business interests (such
as exploit natural resources). An example of a joint venture is a TNK-BP collaboration in Russia).
10
Mergers and acquisitions are two types of investment strategies, where a purchaser (a business entity) either
acquires a share in the ownership of the existing company or acquires a whole company (acquisition) or agrees
with other company to merge assets and work jointly.
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Following Smith and D’Arcy’s suggestion, my research embarks on a comparative study
of Chinese FDI with a specific focus on the energy sector in two distinct institutional
environments - Russia and Canada. I draw on insights developed by the earlier scholarship that
identifies China as a growing foreign investor motivated by both domestic conditions and host
society’s environment (Deng 2009; Alon 2010). By focusing on FDI from Chinese SOEs, my
work internalizes an assumption about a close connection between the domestic institutional
environment in China and SOEs noted by scholars (Buckley et al. 2018). My work builds on the
existing studies by differentiating why Chinese investors are successful in some projects while
not in others even though both projects are in the same sector – energy. To my knowledge, this
question has not been posed by scholars in the international business and provides a contribution
to this branch of scholarship.
Furthermore, my work builds on the insights from studies examining the relationship
between host countries and Chinese investors. Scholars examining the impact of host country’s
institutional environment on Chinese investment note that Chinese SOEs adapt to governance
arrangements and development needs of host societies (Morck, Yeung, and Zhao 2008; Rui
2010). For instance, Morck, Yeung, and Zhao (2008) propose that China’s institutional landscape
prepares Chinese enterprises for investing in complex institutional environments abroad. Yet, the
literature also finds that SOEs operate better in countries with high political stability, low
corruption, and strong institutions (see: He, Xie, and Zhu 2015; Houser 2008). Scholars also note
that SOEs’ investment will generate more economic benefits in countries with transparent and
competitive economies (Salidjanova 2015). Based on these propositions, one may deduce that
Chinese investors will operate better in countries with stronger institutions as opposed to those
with weaker ones. However, the existing research does not explain why Chinese SOEs may find
it easier or harder to operate in a particular institutional setting. My research will problematize
these assumptions, as Chinese investors face a set of different constraints in two instances: a)
across investment-recipient countries, and b) within the same country but across different
projects.
For my research purposes, I draw on studies that have examined the reception of Chinese
SOEs by host societies. Scholars have noted that host states may change their regulations or turn
toward protectionist measures to safeguard their extractive sector from foreign companies where
it is perceived to threaten the local economy and businesses (Wilson 2011; Kamiński 2017).
Scholars and practitioners analyzing Chinese FDI in strategic industries identify several concerns
associated with this investment, including the following factors: a) it produces an unfair
competition as Chinese SOEs receive economic and political support from the government
(Schwanen 2012; Chen 2013; Klaver and Trebilcock 2013); b) the investment is closely
connected to the Chinese state, which can lead to a politicization of energy production in a host
country (Chen 2013; Du 2016); c) it may undermine national sovereignty over host country’s
energy resources acquired by Chinese SOEs (Burt, Crawford, Arcand 2012; Jiang, Zweig, and
Kang 2015); and, d) the investment may negatively impact national security of investmentrecipient countries (Dobson and Evans 2015, 12; Jiang 2010, 23). Scholars also point out that
state support may also result in a lower legitimacy of SOEs in host countries (Meyer et al. 2018)
that may lead to a rejection of Chinese FDI (Wang, Qi, and Zhang 2015). In light of these
concerns, multiple countries have resorted to protectionist measures, while others permitted
Chinese FDI.
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The differences in China’s ability to invest in a strategic industry varies not just across
countries but also within individual countries. To illustrate, Russia rejected early attempts by
CNPC to invest in Slavneft but permitted Sinopec’s acquisition of Udmurneft a few years later.
This difference is one of the key issues that is not explained by the existing studies and which I
seek to explain in my study. As I will propose in chapter seven, in the Russian case the only
difference between these two cases is the timing of the investment, which is associated with
changes in stakeholder preference and the institutional environment. By accounting for temporal
dimensions, my dissertation seeks to explain changing host country responses over time. While
timing is an important factor, its salience is dependent on the changes in institutions or
stakeholder politics.
Stakeholder politics may play an important role in shaping Chinese FDI according to
recent scholarship in international law and political economy. Studies by Sauvant and Nolan
(2015; 2017) and Wilson (2011) document the reception of Chinese FDI in host societies. While
Wilson (2011) focuses on Australia’s official response to Chinese FDI, Sauvant and Nolan
(2015; 2017) focus on a set of broad global trends and identify the role of stakeholders - the
media, the governments, the business community, and the trade unions – in influencing Chinese
FDI. Their findings suggest that the responses of individual stakeholders differ, despite arguing
that all stakeholders are generally cautious about Chinese investors as they may obtain subsidies
from the government and may be driven by strategic motives such as the acquisition of sensitive
technology or information (Sauvant and Nolan’s 2015, 291). If their assumptions are true, then
we would expect that Chinese investment in a new energy-related project will be easier than an
investment in the existing energy plant.
The insights from the literature on Chinese interaction with host institutions brings us
back to the idea that Chinese FDI strategies are affected by host countries’ political and
economic arrangements, as proposed by Alon, Leung, and Simpson (2015). This hypothesis is
backed by the broader literature on FDI. The literature suggests that domestic institutional
structures in the investment-recipient countries influence the nature of incoming FDI (Fiodendji
and Kodjo 2015; Dam and Scholtens 2012). More specifically, scholars studying the strategies
adopted by Chinese investors abroad find that there is a difference between Chinese investment
in developed versus developing countries (see: Cheung and Quian 2009; He, Xie, and Zhu 2015).
The difference in Chinese investment strategies may reflect a deeper trend where Chinese
investors adapt to conditions present in a host country. However, it is also plausible that there is
a reverse causality in the relationship as it is also possible that Chinese investment may impact
the host country’s institutions. Developed countries, for example, adopt additional regulations
and oversight mechanisms to oversee investment from SOEs due to a growing suspicion about
Chinese investment (Alon, Leung, and Simpson 2015). Thus, it is important to be cautious about
a potential reverse causality that may occur.
Identifying Research Gaps
Scholars have been fascinated with China’s rise in part because it will have important
geopolitical and economic implications for energy-rich countries (Andrews-Speed, Liao, and
Dannreuther 2014). This chapter demonstrated that researchers, working in the fields of political
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science and economics, have been preoccupied with explaining why and where Chinese SOEs
invest (see: Buckley et al. 2010; Kolstad and Wiig 2012). As I noted earlier, they have identified
domestic factors that drive Chinese companies to invest abroad – the push factors – and outlined
the incentives - the pull factors - that exist in investment-recipient countries, such as an
abundance of natural resources or new technologies. They also looked at how host countries
perceive Chinese SOEs by examining the legitimacy of SOE investments overseas (Li, Xia, and
Lin 2017).
Scholars have also analyzed the impact of Chinese investment on host societies to
evaluate the response of locals to Chinese investment (González-Vicente 2013; Bräutigam and
Gallagher 2014). Newer studies started to examine the impact of stakeholders (residing in a host
state) on FDI (Sauvant and Nolan 2015, 2017). A common thread uniting multiple studies
conducted by political scientists and economists is their emphasis on the role that the host
country’s institutions play on the internationalization of Chinese SOEs (Economy and Levi 2014;
Buckley et al. 2018). However, neither economists nor political scientists explain how the host
country’s institutions interact with domestic actors (i.e. stakeholders) to determine the
success/failure of Chinese engagement in the hydrocarbon sector. In other words, they do not
explain why Chinese SOEs are sometimes successful in participating in hydrocarbon projects
while at other times fail. Although researchers have identified key variables and issues related to
Chinese investment, they failed to ask a very important question – what determines the success
of Chinese SOEs in host countries. Specifically, a systematic analysis of the factors that
determine the success of Chinese SOEs’ in hydrocarbon projects overseas is absent in the
existing scholarship.
My dissertation extends the existing research on Chinese SOEs conducted by scholars in
three important directions. First, it goes beyond a binary focus on Chinese investment in either
developed or developing countries by exploring Chinese investment across different regime
types and institutional structures that exist in Canada and Russia. Since comparative studies
conducted by scholars have not covered the difference between Chinese investment across
regime types, my work will address the lacuna in the scholarly knowledge on this matter.
Second, my work adds to the scholarly discussion on the on the responses of host societies to
Chinese SOEs by focusing on how host societies react to growing investment/loans/finance
offered by these enterprises. My work aspires to move the research further by explaining the
variance in success rates of Chinese investment in the energy industry within and across
countries, as this variance is not explained by the existing studies. In general, my work builds on
the ideas advanced by the aforementioned scholars with an aim to understand how host countries
impact the activities of foreign investors, and more specifically, the ability of Chinese SOEs to
participate in the oil and gas sector.

Conclusion
Empirical evidence shows China’s growing global engagement in (and with)
hydrocarbon-rich countries through trade, investment, and loans. Based on the UN Comtrade
database, I have illustrated that China’s imports of oil and gas have been growing over time.
Data on Chinese imports for 2017 revealed that China imported oil from multiple countries
dominated by Russia (14 per cent), Saudi Arabia (12 per cent), and Angola (12 per cent). Data
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from the AEI’s “China Investment Tracker” database (from 2005 to 2017) revealed that China is
also an important source of FDI in the oil and gas sector. The data revealed that Canada is the
leading recipient of Chinese FDI, while Russia is among top 10 recipients of Chinese FDI. I have
also looked at Chinese financial engagement via loans granted for energy projects overseas. On
the basis of the data provided by Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center, I
determined that Russia is the largest recipient of Chinese loans for oil and gas related projects.
The observed prominence of Canada and Russia in terms of Chinese engagement makes
them interesting cases for my analysis. Canada is surprisingly the largest recipient of Chinese
FDI in energy, yet one of the smallest exporters of oil and gas to China. Conversely, Russia
scored relatively high in all indices; it is the largest exporter of oil to China, the largest recipient
of Chinese loans, and among top 10 investment-recipient countries. The aggregate data,
however, mask the dynamics on the ground as they do not capture how Chinese investors
integrate into the host society and does not account for the obstacles that Chinese SOEs face
investing abroad. For example, the aggregate data cannot explain why is Canada the largest
recipient of Chinese FDI, even though most of the recent projects were less successful. Similarly,
the data does not tell us why does Russia score relatively high across these indices.
To understand the patterns that emerge from the data, the second part of this chapter
examined scholarly literature on the topic. The existing literature on Chinese FDI generally
suggests that Chinese companies are attracted to abundant natural resources and advanced
technology (Buckley et al. 2008; Lu, Liu, Wang 2011; Pietrobelli, Rabellotti, and Sanfilippo
2011), which partially explains why Canada and Russia rank high on the indices. However,
based on the findings from the literature review, one may infer that the existing studies have not
yet looked at the question of the success/failure of Chinese SOEs in establishing their operations
in the oil/gas industry of a host country. This question has been identified as a critical gap in the
current scholarship (Smith and D’Arcy 2013). My research, which is centered in comparative
political economy, contributes to the aforementioned discussion by combining ideas from
economics and political science to examine how Chinese SOEs, investing in hydrocarbon-rich
countries are received and shaped by the investment-recipients.
My research draws on the insights from the aforementioned studies in deducing a list of
assumptions about Chinese engagement in host countries. There are two core assumptions that
shape my research: a) host country institutions shape the behavior of actors operating within a
given society, including foreign investors; and b) Chinese investors operate in accordance with
domestic institutional arrangements, as well as political and economic conditions present in an
investment-recipient country. These assumptions are based on the reviewed literature that places
emphasis on the fact that that large energy SOEs perceive the public image as important because
they represent China (Cui and Jiang 2012). Additionally, in investment-recipient countries with
stronger institutions that are reinforced by monitoring and high penalties for non-compliance, it
is more likely that Chinese SOEs will conform to the institutions (Economy and Levi 2014). The
next chapter develops a theoretical model and builds on these assumptions by explaining how
institutions and stakeholders in the investment-recipient countries impact SOEs’ investment in
the hydrocarbon sector.
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Chapter 3.
Developing a Theoretical Model and Discussing the
Research Design
My research takes me into a realm of theory building and testing, as it seeks to
understand the impact of the domestic political economy – operationalized in terms of
stakeholder politics and institutions - in a host country on the ability of Chinese SOEs to
participate in the hydrocarbon projects in a given country. As my literature review chapter
demonstrated, the relationship between the two remains undertheorized. More specifically, we
lack a theory that will account for the variance in the ability of Chinese SOEs to acquire or
participate in oil and gas projects in hydrocarbon-rich countries. Thus, the aim of this chapter is
to build a theoretical framework, which will explain how institutions and stakeholders in a host
society influence Chinese financial engagement. In doing so, it goes over the research puzzle,
research question, theoretical propositions, hypothesis, and central variables. It also describes the
methodology used to test this theory, discusses case selection technique, and outlines limitations
of the study.

What is so Puzzling about Chinese Engagement in the Hydrocarbon Sector and How Do
We Account for the Phenomena We Observe?
The puzzle, which I briefly outlined in the introductory chapter, is informed by the
empirical evidence. Multiple studies have noted that Chinese SOEs have faced several setbacks
in acquiring assets in advanced industrialized economies and developing countries alike
(Economy and Levi 2014; Alon, Leung and Simpson 2015). At the same time, Chinese SOEs
were also successful in acquiring assets in both types of countries (Liao and Zhang 2014; Wang
et al. 2015). The observed variance in SOEs’ success rate in acquiring oil and gas assets cannot
be explained by the developed-developing dichotomy as China’s success rates also vary within
countries. For example, in Canada, Chinese SOEs successfully acquired Athabasca’s oil sands
but failed to complete two LNG projects. Thus, empirical evidence suggests that the success of
Chinese engagement may not just be determined by the type of the investment-recipient country
but may also be dependent on the nature of the project – brownfield or greenfield investment and on the domestic political economy. This puzzling variation drives a set of central questions
that I grapple with in my dissertation.
My research seeks to account for the elements that determine the ability of Chinese SOEs
to participate in the hydrocarbon projects in the host countries. The central question of my
dissertation – a novel contribution to the existing research on Chinese SOEs’ internationalization
- explores how domestic political economy (operationalized as institutional arrangements and
stakeholder relations, in specific) affects the outcome of hydrocarbon projects supported by
Chinese SOEs. My research thus seeks to explain the ability of Chinese SOEs to pursue selected
hydrocarbon projects in a given country. I propose that the outcome – the success of Chinese
SOEs in participating in a hydrocarbon project in a host country - can be explained by examining
stakeholder politics and institutions. While the foremost goal of my dissertation is to explain the
observed difference in the success rates of Chinese SOEs across and within countries by
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accounting for domestic political economy, I also look at the engagement strategies11 employed
by Chinese SOEs to participate in hydrocarbon projects in host countries as these strategies may
influence the success of Chinese participation.
On the basis of the earlier studies, one can deduce that Chinese SOEs, as new investors,
have developed unique strategies to overcome their late-comer status in the hydrocarbon industry
(Shankleman 2009; Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther 2011). One of these unique strategies is the
aforementioned ‘resources-for-infrastructure’ package that combines loans, investment, aid,
trade, and diplomacy into lucrative deals signed with leaders across Africa and Latin America
(Alden and Davies 2006; Shankleman 2009; González-Vicente 2012). However, this engagement
strategy cannot be easily transferred to other countries. For example, advanced industrialized
countries are less likely to borrow money from Chinese SOEs or receive developmental aid from
China. This generally fits with the assumption in the literature that Chinese SOEs adapt their
strategies to fit the institutional environment in the host countries 12 (Economy and Levi 2014;
Alon, Leung and Simpson 2015; Meyer et al. 2014). The adaptation of the Chinese investment,
aid, loans, and trade packages to local conditions is a unique trait that differentiates Chinese
SEOs from international oil companies (IOCs). The explanation for China’s rationale to modify
its investment package is still absent in the literature. Furthermore, the existing studies cannot
explain the difference between Chinese success across different projects within the same
country.
To explain this puzzling variance, I have developed a set of general propositions based on
the theoretical propositions that arose from the literature. First, I propose that foreign companies’
engagement (i.e. the entry strategy composed of loans, FDI, and other finance) differs on the
basis of the host country’s political economy, where stakeholders and domestic institutions
influence the nature of the investor’s engagement. Second, I propose that domestic political,
economic, and regulatory institutions determine the success rate of the projects in which foreign
businesses engage financially by distributing power among stakeholders and determining the
distribution of metaphorical licenses to operate within a given society. My third proposition
states that in host countries where multiple stakeholders can challenge extractive projects,
foreign investors will be less successful in completing their greenfield projects as there are more
actors that can challenge these types of projects. My fourth, and final, proposition suggests that
stakeholders may be influenced by inter-state relations that shape their receptiveness towards
Chinese SOEs.
Although these propositions are general and applicable to all foreign investors, Chinese
SOEs are considered as a special case as they are perceived differently than IOCs. Stakeholders
may perceive that Chinese SOEs are a source of unfair competition as they receive economic and
political support from the home state (Chen 2013; Klaver and Trebilcock 2013) and are closely
11

As noted in the introduction, the engagement strategies consist of the packages that Chinese SOEs provide
to host countries and may include investments, loans, and trade contracts. The engagement itself is
synonymous with the ability of Chinese SOEs to participate in the specific projects.
12 Here host country category subsumes both developed and developing ones as Chinese SOEs adjust their
packages to fit local circumstances.
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connected to Chinese state, which may lead to politicization of energy production (Chen 2013;
Du 2016). There are also concerns that Chinese SOEs may jeopardize sovereignty of host
country’s natural resources (Burt, Crawford, Arcand 2012; Jiang, Zweig, and Kang 2015) and
negatively impact on national security (Dobson and Evans 2015, 12; Jiang 2010, 23). Therefore,
Chinese SOEs are often subject to closer scrutiny by the host country’s stakeholders than other
investors.
In order to derive an overarching hypothesis regarding the ability of Chinese SOEs to
participate in hydrocarbon projects by acquiring assets, providing loans, and/or setting up longterm agreements in hydrocarbon-rich countries, I have combined these five propositions into one
overarching hypothesis. I hypothesize that Chinese ability to participate in a hydrocarbon
project in a host country is determined by the interaction between stakeholders (that are
influenced by inter-state relations) operating within a particular institutional environment,
where institutions that provide stakeholders with more avenues to influence extractive projects
can make it more difficult for Chinese investors to engage in the hydrocarbon sector. This
hypothesis serves as the backbone in my theoretical model.

Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework (or model) seeks to establish a relationship between the
political economy of host countries – composed of two independent variables, institutions and
stakeholder politics - and the ability of Chinese SOEs to successfully participate in a
hydrocarbon project in a host country (dependent variable). The relationship between these
variables can be explained by unpacking the two independent variables – institutions and
stakeholder politics. Institutions, commonly defined as “the rules of the game in a society
or…the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990, p 3), interact
with the stakeholder politics in a specific country to determine the outcome of Chinese
engagement (or the ability to participate) in hydrocarbon projects in a given country. The
relationship between the two independent variables is complicated by an intervening variable –
inter-state relations – that shapes the decisions of stakeholders regarding Chinese engagement in
hydrocarbon projects. This model also has a feedback effect where an increase in Chinese
engagement (or participation) in a host country may influence institutions and stakeholder
politics in a host society. In this section, I will unpack each variable by discussing its
operationalization and its role in the model.
The dependent variable, the ability of Chinese SOEs to successfully participate (or
engage) in a hydrocarbon project in a host country, is the outcome that I am trying to explain.
This variable is operationalized as a success or failure of Chinese SOEs to participate in a
hydrocarbon project through foreign direct investment and loans (or other types of finance). The
measure of success indicates that Chinese SOEs were either able to gain a stake in the project by
acquiring shares in an existing project, participating in a project as part of a merger, purchasing a
whole company, or contributing financially to a project (either through loans or other financial
means). In light of this, the goal of my dissertation is to account for why some Chinese-backed
projects in the host countries succeed (i.e. a project is implemented), while others fail (i.e. a
project does not materialize). I propose that the answer to this question rests on the receptiveness
of stakeholders and institutions to Chinese SOEs’ declared interest to participate in a specific
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hydrocarbon project. These two independent variables are very complex as they interact with
each other to determine the outcome of interest.
Institutions are the first independent variable that is central to my theoretical framework.
As noted earlier, institutions are the formal and informal rules that are utilized by organizations
or agents in a given society. Formal institutions are “created, communicated and enforced
through [official] channels”, while informal institutions 13 can be defined as “socially shared
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of official
sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, p 727). More specifically, the former
institutions are based on codified regulations, while the latter is shaped by customs and history
(North 1990; Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Jütting 2003). Property rights that are written into legal
statutes exemplify formal institutions. Trust, on the other hand, is an example of an informal
institution. The distinction between formal and informal institutions is important because formal
rules that appear to be similar on paper “may generate dramatically different expectations,
behavior, and outcomes” because compliance differs amongst countries (Levitsky and Murillo
2009, 126).
My theoretical model differentiates between institutions based on their function.
Following the work of Holmes et al. (2011), I start with an assumption that each country has a
set of economic, political, and regulatory institutions that may influence the activities of actors
operating in that society. Regulatory institutions, such as property rights, regulate activities by
domestic and foreign corporations operating within a given state by establishing formal rules and
enforcement mechanisms (Holmes et al. 2011; Puffer, McCarthy and Boisot 2010). They
stipulate laws/regulations/policies that shape the expected behaviour of actors. States can use
regulatory institutions to block FDI from entering into a given economy through investment
screening mechanisms. Therefore, formal institutions are operationalized through investment
screening regulations and property rights.
Political and economic institutions exhibit different functions but can be united for
analytical purposes. Jointly the two institutions define the distribution of power among public
and private actors in a given society. Political institutions, such as democratic or autocratic
governance systems, define political processes and distribute power within society (Holmes et al.
2011). In my model, political institutions shape relationships among stakeholders operating in
society. For example, in democracies, multiple stakeholders are involved in policy-making as
opposed to autocracies where only a subset of stakeholders wields enough power to participate in
the policy-making. Economic institutions, such as property rights and the rule of law, reinforce
political institutions by setting values that define economic activities in society (Holmes et al.
2011). In other words, they define state-corporate relations. In autocratic governments, a few
powerful stakeholders wield a significant amount of power, which enables them to modify
institutions and, at times, work around them. This becomes important when one thinks about the
ability of the institutions to enforce regulations in society. The institutional function is thus one
of the two measures that I adopt in my theoretical framework.

13

Informal institutions may predate the formal ones or may emerge when the formal institutions fail to operate
according to expectations (Helmke and Levitsky 2004).
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As I noted earlier, the distinction between formal and informal institutions provides an
analytical lens that can be used to interpret the relationship that exists between institutions and
actors operating within a given society. Both types of institutions shape the behaviour and
expectations of actors (or stakeholders, which will be discussed later in this section) by defining
incentives and altering transaction costs (North 1990; Levitsky and Murillo 2009). The level of
compliance with these institutions by stakeholder varies across countries. In countries where
formal institutions are stable and enforceable, compliance to set rules is high (Levitsky and
Murillo 2009). On the other hand, in countries where institutions are unstable and weakly
enforced, compliance with the rules set out on paper is low. In other words, rules can be used as
“window dressing”, if compliance is not enforced (Levitsky and Murillo 2009, p 118; Dixit
2009). Thus, my model will take into account that institutions set out on paper – the formal
institutions – may sometimes be disregarded in favour of informal arrangements, which may
alter the investment dynamics.
Operationalization of informal institutions is more complex as it stems from customs and
historical circumstances that shape society. I operationalize them through the variable of
ideology. Ideology, as defined by Douglas North (1988, 15), is encompassed by “subjective
perceptions that people have about what the world is like and what it ought to be”, which are
embedded into institutions. In other words, ideology can be institutionalized when it is embedded
in society’s set of values as an informal institution. In this way, concepts of resource nationalism
or liberal markets may shape the norms and rules – that is the informal institutions – of a given
society. Scholars also suggest that ideas underpin activities of individual stakeholders and shape
the normative direction of the system (North 1988; Rosales 2018). Bearing this in mind, my
model predicts that ideology will influence the actions of the formal institutions and stakeholders
in a given country.
Ultimately, both formal and informal institutions are linked with the success/failure of
Chinese businesses to participate in the hydrocarbon projects in a host country. Scholars identify
a direct link between institutions and foreign investors. They propose that institutions determine
the inflow of FDI, where stronger formal institutions 14 are associated with higher inflows of FDI
(Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff 2008; Menaldo 2016). To illustrate this
relationship, scholars have found evidence that linked economic institutions, such as property
rights and the rule of law, with higher inflows of FDI (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Sokoloff
and Engerman 2008; Menaldo 2016). The institutional strength is important factor for RussiaCanada comparison given that institutional strength helps to account for the inflow of FDI into a
host country. Similarly, political institutions, such as the political system, influence the inflow of
FDI (Bayulgen 2010). For example, Bayulgen (2010) proposes that stable political regimes, such
as democracies (ex. Norway) or autocracies (ex. Kazakhstan), are more attractive to foreign
investors interested in investing in the hydrocarbon sector than mixed regimes (ex. Russia).
The second independent variable is captured by stakeholder politics in host societies,
which, as noted earlier, interact with the institutional variable. Stakeholder politics are
characterized by the interaction among stakeholders, or the actors operating in a given society. A
standard definition of a stakeholder in the business management literature states that a
14

Strong institutions are defined as stable regulatory (formal) institutions that are able to enforce laws
independently of the political meddling (i.e. have strong political constraints) (Williamson 2009).
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stakeholder can be “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of
the organization’s objectives” (Freedman 1994, 46). Freedman et al. (2010, 163 and 170) note
that stakeholder theory is helpful for strategical mapping of individual stakeholders that can be
negatively impacted by the corporate activities. Following this practice, I borrow the stakeholder
concept to map the key stakeholders in the energy industry that may be impacted by Chinese
investment and trace their responses to Chinese engagement. For analytical purposes, these
stakeholders are subdivided into four groups – government actors, businesses, civil society, and
indigenous groups- residing in a society.
I propose that each of these groups can influence the ability of a company (either
domestic or foreign) to operate in a given society. They do so by granting ‘rights’ or ‘licenses’ to
domestic and foreign companies that make it easier for them to operate in a given society
(Gunnigham, Kagan, and Thorton 2004; Prno and Slocombe 2012). Social license to operate has
been popularized in the literature in international business, legal studies, political studies, and
international relations (Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton 2004; Owen and Kemp 2013;
Wilburn and Wilburn 2014). The concept of social license to operate is, however, too narrow for
my research purposes 15. Therefore, I propose that the concept of licenses needs to be expanded to
capture a multiplicity of licenses that a foreign company may need to acquire in a host country
(or investment-recipient country) to ensure its successful integration into the hydrocarbon
industry.
I propose that there are three ‘licenses to operate’ – social, political, and market. Each of
these licenses is extended by a specific group of stakeholders; civil society and indigenous
groups grant a social license, businesses grant a market license, and governments grant a political
license. Each of these licenses has a specific function and role in shaping the participation of
foreign firms in the hydrocarbon sector. Social license is perceived as broad community support
for the project. If a foreign company fails to obtain a social license, then the society may engage
in social action or file a lawsuit that will challenge the project by increasing its operational costs.
A political license is simply governmental permission granted to businesses whose participation
in the hydrocarbon project the government approves. The two licenses remain too narrow as they
only capture an attitude exhibited by the society and the government. I propose that we need to
add a third license to the mix – a market license to operate. The market license is an outcome of
bargaining between foreign companies and domestic businesses. The number of licenses that the
foreign company may likely need to acquire, in order to successfully operate in a host society,
differs on the basis of two factors – the nature/type of a hydrocarbon project and political regime.
The first factor, the nature of a hydrocarbon project, can be conceptualized in terms of
two categories – projects requiring greenfield investment and those requiring brownfield
investment. The second factor, political regime, looks at whether the host country is leaning
toward democracy or autocracy as regimes distribute the power amongst stakeholders within a
society. Based on these two factors we can derive a set of propositions about the number of
‘licenses’ that a foreign company will likely need to obtain to operate in a given society.

15

New research has already begun to reference political license as an important factor that shapes the ability of
corporate investors to operate overseas (Shapiro, Vecino, and Li 2018).
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In a democratic country with multiple stakeholders, the uncertainty16 about whether a
greenfield project will be approved is higher, given that there is a higher likelihood that a
proponent of a project will be required to obtain all three sets of licenses before proceeding.
Conversely, if a foreign company decides to participate in an existing hydrocarbon project in a
democratic country, it will take over an existing social license (and potentially market license)
from the previous owner. In this case, only a political license may be necessary for the project to
proceed forward. Conversely, in investment-recipient countries leaning toward autocracies with
fewer stakeholders the uncertainty of foreign company regarding its participation in a planned
greenfield project is lower provided that the foreign business may only need to acquire a political
and market license. A foreign company that is interested in participating in a brownfield project
in an autocratic country will also likely need political and market licenses to operate. In both
cases, a social license if often subsumed under the market license, given that foreign companies
do not have to deal with the local civil society and aboriginal groups to obtain a social license
These propositions are summarized in table 3.1. Ultimately, I propose that it will be harder for
the proponent to implement a project that requires more licenses; and, by extension, it will be
harder for Chinese SOEs to complete an intended project that requires more licenses.

Greenfield project

Brownfield project

Democracy
Political
Market
Social

Autocracy
Political
Market

Political
Market (sometimes may be
transferred to a new firm from the
previous owner)
(Social license may be transferred
from the previous owner)

Political
Market

Table 3.1: Number of Licenses that a Business may need to Acquire to Operate in a Host Country

The theoretical model will be however incomplete without adding an intervening variable
– interstate relations – given that stakeholders do not make decisions in a vacuum. I propose that
stakeholders not only respond to domestic issues; but, also to international events. Therefore,
changing geopolitical factors will influence the receptiveness of domestic stakeholders to
Chinese businesses. More specifically, changing geopolitical considerations affect calculations
of stakeholders on the ground, who act on the premise of altered calculations. Therefore, interstate relations play a key role in the decision of host countries to accept foreign investment from
a particular country (Medvedev 2015). Scholars analyzing the relationship between inter-state
relations and flows of Chinese FDI note that the existing explanations for the location choices of
Chinese companies have failed to account for bilateral political relations and investment patterns
(Li and Liang 2012). Econometric studies (Li and Liang 2012) and qualitative studies (Camba
2017) have noted that inter-state relations proved to be a significant determinant of the flow of
Chinese FDI. By building on this literature, my model assumes that positive bilateral, inter-state

16

This proposition is building on the definition of ‘uncertainty’ developed by Phillips, Tracey, and Karra
(2009).
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relations between China and the host country will increase the ability of Chinese SOEs to
participate successfully in hydrocarbon projects in a given host country.
As my dissertation focuses on the hydrocarbon sector, I have thought about adding a
variable examining the impact of the oil prices on the ability of Chinese enterprises to participate
in the hydrocarbon projects in any given host country. However, the variable added little
theoretical insight and did not behave as expected in the case studies. The fluctuation in oil
prices appeared to have little impact on Chinese investment or loans in both Canada and Russia
as the investment occurred during both low and high oil prices. However, at certain times, the oil
variable appears to be causality important and significant. While I chose not to incorporate this
variable to the general theoretical model, as more studies are needed to account for its centrality,
I have kept this variable in the sections analyzing Chinese engagement.
Adding all of the variables together, we can derive a model captured in figure 3.1. The
model theorizes about the causal relationship that links institutions and stakeholder politics with
the ability of Chinese SOEs to participate in a hydrocarbon project of a host country. The
stakeholder variable is also influenced by inter-state relations, which are an intervening variable
in the model. As noted earlier stakeholder variable is operationalized through three sets of
licenses that company may likely need to acquire in order to operate; political licenses granted
by the government, social license extended by civil society and indigenous groups, and market
licenses given out by market actors. The number of licenses that businesses will need to acquire
depends on the political institutions – democracy versus autocracy – and the nature of the project
– whether a project requires a greenfield or brownfield investment. The model thus suggests that
stakeholder politics (independent variable) interact with domestic formal and informal
institutions (independent variable) to determine the ability of Chinese SOEs to participate in
hydrocarbon projects in a host society (dependent variable). Returning to the discussion of
operationalization; informal institutions are captured by ideology and regime type, while formal
institutions are operationalized by regulatory institutions, such as investment screening
mechanisms and land rights.
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Figure 3.1:Theoretical Model

The model that is captured in figure 3.2 has a unique feature – a feedback effect – that
allows the model to integrate a reverse causality. The existing research often assumes a static
nature of the interaction between the domestic political economy and Chinese FDI, which I
modify in my theory. According to scholars, institutions provide “elements of order and
predictability” in repeated societal interactions (March and Olsen 2008). Building on March and
Olsen (2008), I propose that repeated interactions between players and institutions set out a set of
predictable actions and behaviours by developing typical ‘pathways’ of interactions. However,
these pathways become altered when a new player enters established organizational patterns and
disturbs this predictability.
If this pathway can be disrupted, then the proposed model should be altered to include
reverse causality. Thus, I hypothesize that a new player may facilitate institutional change by
galvanizing a ‘critical juncture’. These junctures are defined as “relatively short periods of time
during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the
outcome of interest” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p 348). I propose that during these periods
(or ‘junctures’) we may observe changes in the regulatory landscape of a host country. In this
way, my theory proposes a circular causality that links my independent variables (stakeholder
politics and institutions) with the success of Chinese SOEs in participating in hydrocarbon
projects in a given country. In other words, it accounts for institutional changes that result from a
reverse causality as a result of reiterated interaction. It is important to note that this effect is rare
and occurs under exceptional circumstances. Therefore, my dissertation is predominantly
focused on the relationship between the domestic political economy, which I unpack in terms of
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institutions and stakeholder politics, and the ability of Chinese SOEs to successfully participate
in a hydrocarbon project in a host country.
There is one last additional factor that has not been discussed in the context of the
theoretical model but may indirectly contribute to the ability of Chinese SOEs to successfully
engage in the hydrocarbon industry of a host country – Chinese engagement strategies. Chinese
SOEs engagement strategy differs on the basis of the host country’s needs and stakeholders’
interests. There is evidence that as SOEs expand their operations around the globe, they learn
about adjusting their investment strategies to different political, social, and economic
environments (Alon, Leung, and Simpson 2015). I propose that the change in the strategy of
Chinese SOEs to fit into local circumstances can influence the success/failure of their
engagement. For example, in developing countries, Chinese SOEs may offer loans or long-term
supply contracts to gain a foothold in the oil and gas industry, while in democracies they may
only provide FDI. These strategies are ultimately influenced by the host country’s institutional
framework and stakeholder politics. I conceptualize SOE strategies as a relevant factor that helps
to account for the ability of Chinese SOEs to participate in hydrocarbon projects in host
countries. However, it is secondary to the two independent variables – stakeholder politics and
institutions – that ultimately determine the success/failure of Chinese SOEs in participating in a
specific hydrocarbon project in a host country.

Qualitative Comparative Method
My dissertation relies on a qualitative comparative method to determine a causal
relationship between Chinese ability to participate in hydrocarbon projects, a dependent variable,
and host country’s institutions within which operate domestic stakeholders, independent
variables. This method enables me to engage in hypothesis testing and theory building that lead
to causal inference (Landman 2003). This method is ideal for the purposes of my dissertation due
to two major factors that I will discuss in this subsection: a) the nature of the variables; b) the
task of this project - to find a causal mechanism that links domestic political economy with the
change in SOEs’ engagement strategies.
The first advantage of qualitative methodology is that it captures the complexity of
institutions and their interaction with stakeholders better than a quantitative study. Given that
institutions are inherently complex phenomena, they make quantitative analysis difficult as it is
difficult to determine appropriate measurements of institutions. Institutional variance is
analytically tricky to capture by quantitative studies as similar institutions may operate
differently across countries, while different institutions may have similar effects (Stevens and
Dietsche 2008; Pajunnen 2008; Levitsky and Murillo 2009). This produces “causal complexity”,
since scholars may arrive at different results depending on how they measure and test for
institutions (Pajunen 2008, 665). As institutions operate differently across countries, it is difficult
for quantitative studies to capture the effectiveness and functions of institutions. Conversely,
qualitative methods enable researchers to capture variables in a more nuanced way.
Qualitative studies can be used to account not only for the function of individual
institutions but also capture the interaction between them. Since quantitative methodology fails
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to account for temporal changes and focuses on ahistorical “parsimonious explanations”,
scholars propose that qualitative case studies are a better option (Stevens and Dietsche 2008, 64).
Qualitative method also allows me to integrate a circular causality into my model. Due to
circular causality a host country’s domestic institutions (independent variable in the original
conceptualization) can become a dependent variable as they respond to Chinese engagement
(dependent variable in the original conceptualization). The switch in variables is only temporary
as it is used to illustrate changes in the regulatory institutions, which subsequently continue to
influence Chinese FDI.
The second advantage is that qualitative comparative studies allow scholars to examine
causal mechanisms. Causal mechanisms are “a constellation of entities and activities that are
organized such that they regularly bring about a particular type of outcome” (Hedström 2008,
322). These mechanisms can be used to demonstrate how causal relationships operate and
explain how the cause is related to the outcome (Hedström 2008). By tracing causal mechanisms,
I will be able to establish underlying causality that links my independent variables, institutions
and stakeholder politics, with my dependent variable, the ability of Chinese SOEs to successfully
participate in a hydrocarbon project in a host country. This relationship can be represented via a
causal chain, which was depicted in Figure 3.1. As this causal chain reveals, the domestic
political economy, operationalized by the host country’s institutions and stakeholders, produces a
unique business environment. As noted earlier, the model adds an inter-state relations variable
that shapes the responses of domestic stakeholders to Chinese FDI.
To test for causal mechanisms, identified in my research design, I engage in processtracing. This method “involves looking at the evidence within an individual case, or a temporally
and spatially bound instance of a specified phenomenon, to derive and/or test alternative
explanations of that case” (Bennett 2008, 705). I will apply a process-tracing approach to analyze
a set of case studies to examine the relationship between the host country’s institutions and
Chinese engagement. Case studies are the best methodological tool for my research as they allow
me to account for contemporary events, as I have little control over their occurrence (Yin 2003,
7). This analytical tool also makes it easier for a researcher to identify causal mechanisms and
generate a hypothesis (Gerring 2009). Furthermore, case studies enable the researcher to engage
in a multivariable analysis of factors and influences. Given that my research traces multiple
variables across time and explains contemporary events by asking “how” questions, a case-study
method is most suitable for my research purposes.

Case selection
Case selection is one of the most important aspects of qualitative analysis. Therefore, I
have designed a comprehensive set of criteria to maximize the likelihood that my results are
replicable in future studies. First, I made sure that my case selection was non-random to capture
the “variation along the dimensions of theoretical interest” (Gerring 2008, 646; also see:
Seawright and Gerring 2008). This strategy is helpful as a comparison of two countries allowed
me to analyze “multiple causal factors acting together” and reveal “nuances specific to each
country” (Landman 2003, 29). Second, I relied on a most diverse case selection method, which
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seeks to obtain a “maximum variance along relevant dimensions” to capture the diversity of
outcomes (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 300).
I chose to analyze Chinese participation in the hydrocarbon sector in Canada and Russia.
The two countries are distinct from other hydrocarbon producers as they are among top five oil
and gas producers that are also economically and politically dominant global players. Both
countries are also systemically important in China’s global energy strategy. As I noted in chapter
2, Canada is the largest recipient of Chinese FDI in energy and Russia is the largest recipient of
Chinese loans (and currently the largest oil exporter to China). Russia and Canada may thus be
considered as hard cases for the model, given their unique position in China’s energy strategy
that may be due to their position as extreme examples of given phenomena. In light of this, they
may exhibit unrepresentative patterns that may not occur in other countries as a result of their
respective stakeholder politics, institutions, and inter-state relations. Both cases are understudied
by scholars, despite the fact that they are very important hydrocarbon producers that partner with
China. Despite choosing two systemically important countries, which can be considered as
outliers due to their size and the scale of Chinese engagement, the hypothesis and theoretical
model developed in my dissertation can be expanded to other countries where Chinese SOEs
invest, provided that the elements of the model are adjusted to local conditions.
Although Canada and Russia may not be representative cases, the two countries are ideal
for comparative purposes as Table 3.1 illustrates. They are similar in several factors that are not
the central variables of interest but important for comparative purposes. One of the first
similarities is that both have a large territory and are well-endowed with natural resources; they
are both listed among the top five of the largest oil and gas producing countries. The second
similarity is that both are dependent on a single export market for hydrocarbons. For Canada, the
United States has been historically the largest export destination; for Russia, the European Union
has been a recipient of the majority of Russia’s exported oil and natural gas. Relatedly, for both,
China is a relatively new energy partner given that the two have established energy relations with
other regional powers. The Sino-Russian bilateral partnership against the hostile Western
countries may make the dynamics of the partnership more strategic for Russia than we may
observe in the Sino-Canadian relations. The two variables – oil-richness and inter-state relations
impact the flow of FDI but generally do not explain the success of Chinese FDI in the two
countries. Although, some may argue that in Russia changing geopolitical factors have increased
the likelihood that Chinese SOEs will successfully participate in a hydrocarbon project, the
variable influences stakeholder politics, which in turn jointly determine the success of Chinese
SOEs.
Conveniently, the two cases differ in terms of two central independent variables –
institutions and stakeholder dynamics (or the ability of specific stakeholders to influence policy
making). In terms of institutions, on paper, both Canada and Russia appear to be federal states
and constitutional democracies. Russia appears to be a mixed/hybrid-regime with autocratic
elements (or a regime that is straddling a divide between democracy and autocracy) (Bayulgen
2010; Sakwa 2000). In this way, Russia is closer to China’s state-capitalist institutional model of
economic governance than to Canada’s neo-liberal regime. In terms of stakeholders’ ability to
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shape decisions in the hydrocarbon sector, the two cases differ drastically. In Canada, multiple
stakeholders are involved in making decisions, while in Russia the decisions are taken by a few
high-level officials and corporate leaders. In summary, the two differ in the key variables of
interest – institutional setup and stakeholder relations, which will be explored in the respective
theory chapters (5 and 7).

Variables

Canada

Russia

Systemically important and
Oil-rich Countries

Yes

Yes

Inter-state relations:
Dependence on a single
export destination (China a
new partner)

Yes; The United States;
“diversification to Asia”

Institutions, ideology, and
regimes

Democratic; neo-liberal
regime (free markets)

Hybrid; state-capitalist
regime (resource
nationalism)

Stakeholders

Multiple with capacity to
challenge oil and gas projects

Multiple only those with
access to power able to
challenge oil and gas projects

Yes;
European
Union;
“Pivot to the
East”

Geopolitical
changes and
alliance with
China against
the West

Table 3.2: Variance of Key Factors Across Russia and Canada

To test how these differences impact Chinese engagement in host societies, I have
selected three different hydrocarbon projects in Canada and Russia where Chinese SOEs
expressed interest to operate. The case selection focused on the projects from 2005 to 2018 to
ensure that the cases are representative of a particular historical time period in the global political
economy. After identifying hydrocarbon projects where Chinese SOEs have declared an interest
to invest in both Russia and Canada, I categorized them along two dimensions: a) type/function
of the project (brownfield / greenfield; oil exploration, LNG plants, oil pipelines/infrastructure);
b) relative size of the project (in terms of Chinese investment and their coverage in the press).
Projects selected for further analysis were larger in terms of China’s contribution than other
available cases in the same category. While this may bias my analysis, by selecting the larger
cases I was able to gather more information about each of the individual projects. Furthermore,
larger cases are more likely to trigger opposition from the stakeholders, which is one of the key
variables that I have examined.
These criteria helped me to select three representative cases in each country to analyze
Chinese engagement. In the Canadian case, the three core case studies were selected on the basis
of the four factors. First, I selected a variation in terms of investment type: Nexen is a brownfield
investment; the LNG plants are greenfield joint ventures; and the Northern Gateway pipeline is
47

an arrangement for future investment in exchange for financial support. Second, I chose one
representative project along the hydrocarbon chain: the CNOOC-Nexen deal represents
hydrocarbon extraction; SOEs’ investment in British Columbia’s LNG industry relates to the
processing of natural gas; and the Northern Gateway pipeline is an energy infrastructure project.
The cases also captured different stages of Chinese engagement that I will discuss in the
subsequent chapter. The third selection criteria were based on the size of the investment and the
number of available cases in a given category. CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen was the largest
investment made by a Chinese SOE in Canada, while the LNG projects and the Northern
Gateway pipeline were the only available cases in their category. Finally, the investment deals
selected for further analysis have all occurred during formative stages of Chinese investment in
Canada (from 2005 onward) to ensure consistency of research findings across similar time
periods in both countries.
In the Russian case, I followed a similar model. I ensured that the case studies varied on
the basis of the FDI type and across the hydrocarbon chain. The first case, Sinopec’s investment
in Udmurtneft, is a brownfield investment in upstream oil extraction. The second case, the
acquisition of shares in Yamal LNG by CNPC and the Silk Road Fund, is a greenfield
investment in a joint venture to explore for (and process) natural gas. The third case, CNPC’s
financial support provided to Transneft and Rosneft to construct the ESPO, is a financial package
extended by Chinese SOEs to support greenfield energy infrastructure. All of the selected cases
are the largest of their kind, received wide coverage in the press, and stirred a political debate. As
in the Canadian case, the Yamal LNG and the ESPO pipeline were the only available cases for
analysis. The selected cases are summarized in table 3.2.
Selected Projects
Upstream Oil Exploration
(brownfield FDI; M&A)
LNG Plants
(greenfield FDI; JV)
Pipelines

Canada
Nexen (CNOOC)

Russia
Udmurtneft (Sinopec)

Aurora LNG (CNOOC) /
Pacific North-West LNG
(Sinopec) / Canada LNG
(CNPC)17
Northern Gateway Pipeline
(CNPC / Sinopec / CNOOC)

Yamal LNG (CNPC and Silk
Road Fund)

East Siberia-Pacific Ocean
Pipeline (CNPC)

(greenfield FDI / finance)
Table 3.3: Selected Projects in Canada and Russia where Chinese SOEs Indicated an Interest to Participate

Discussing the Data: Data Generation, Analysis, Reliability, and Ethical Considerations
In order to analyze the selected cases, I have combined several data generation
techniques. My research relied on desk research and fieldwork to gather data. The two
techniques worked together seamlessly. Desk research was essential for gathering publicly
17

Given the similar nature of these projects, I have decided to treat them as a unified case.
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available data from the internet or university libraries, while fieldwork allowed me to gain an indepth understanding of the selected cases. By employing both strategies, I was able to gather and
combine information from primary and secondary data; this process is known as “triangulation”
as I will explain later in this section. Given the nature of my project, I utilized data sources in
both English and Russian languages to provide a balanced analysis of the information gathered
during interviews and desk research.
As part of my desk research, I gathered and examined primary and secondary data
sources in both English and Russian languages. Primary sources that I utilized are newspaper
articles, legal documents, governmental and non-governmental publications, corporate reports,
and statistics. I have also used secondary literature on the topic generated by scholars and
examined grey literature, including reports, working papers, white papers, and evaluations. As I
carried out research in Canada and Russia, I relied on website engines and libraries unique to
each location. For example, for my research on Russia, I used search engines such as Yandex or
Rambler, while in Canada I relied predominantly on Google.
I have supplemented my desk research with fieldwork in Russia and Canada. I travelled
to Russia in the fall of 2016. As part of my trip, I visited Moscow, Novosibirsk Oblast, the
Republic of Tatarstan, and the Udmurt Republic. I spent approximately two weeks in each
location to conduct interviews (in English and Russian) and engage in participant observation. I
spoke with experts, professionals, scholars, and civil society actors in Russia to understand the
impact of China’s engagement. I carried out similar research in Canada in the fall of 2017. I have
spent time in British Columbia and Ontario18 to conduct interviews with a range of actors and to
engage in participant observation. Interviews with experts residing in the province of Alberta
were conducted remotely via emails and phone conversations.
Semi-structured interviews were designed to conform to the ethical standards in my
discipline. I obtained approval for my research from the Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid
Laurier University. In consultation with my supervisor and the ethics committee I have
developed a set of core questions, which are included in the appendix. These questions were
designed to gain insight about individual participant’s perception of the Chinese investment in
their respective country. Generally, interviews took approximately an hour.19 The participants
were initially identified by an independent search of governmental, corporate, and university
websites. I contacted those participants by sending out a set of recruitment emails asking them to
participate in my study. The subsequent round of interviews was done by using a snowball
effect, where the participants of the first round of interviews were asked to identify suitable
participants for the second round of interviews.
The interviews were held in person or remotely via email or phone. I interviewed 13
participants in Russia and 14 participants in Canada. The participants were of working age,
employed, and had substantial experience in the hydrocarbon sector. I interviewed scholars,
policymakers, Indigenous representatives, local workers, researchers, lawyers, and journalists.
18
19

I also conducted an interview in Saskatchewan in 2018.
Interviewees had the option to interrupt the interview process at any point.
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Participants were encouraged to share their experiences, beliefs, and perceptions about the topic.
Interviewees provided their personal insight about China’s economic engagement within their
respective home countries. In confirmation with the Tri-Council Policy Statement for Ethical
Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS2: Core), I have stored and treated gathered
information as confidential and ensured its secure storage on my laptop. All of the quotes used in
this dissertation were obtained with the permission of the individual participants, who were
consulted about using the specific quotes in the final draft of my dissertation.
Fieldwork proved to be a valuable tool for my research as it helped me to identify better
measures of key concepts (Adcock 2001) and contributed to my causal inference (George and
Bennett 2005; Brady and Collier 2004). For my study, field research was key for identifying
causal mechanisms and for analyzing conditions under which these mechanisms operate (Wood
2007, 126). As part of my fieldwork, I engaged in what Wood (2007) identifies as “weld
research”, which is characterized by “personal interaction with research subjects in their own
setting” (125), through interviews and observations. Interviews provided additional information
that was inaccessible via other research means. Interviews also helped me to understand the
rationale behind the issues that were not explained in publically available sources. Although
interviews are criticized for being “imprecise…[and] subject to multiple interpretations”,
Rathbun proposes that interviews are “often the best tool for establishing how subjective factors
influence political decision-making, the motivations of those involved, and the role of agency in
events of interest” (687). Furthermore, in-depth interviews and participant observations are
important to “uncover a deeper level of information in order to capture meaning, process and
context” (Landman 2003, 19).
Ultimately, a combination of desk research and fieldwork allowed me to gather multiple
sources of data. By using two strategies to generate data, I was able to “triangulate” information
found across different sources to confirm the reliability of the findings (Wood 2007, 127). In this
way, I was able to check the consistency of my findings and gain an in-depth understanding of
the issues at hand. I used desk research throughout my dissertation; I relied on it to identify
information gaps, key issues, and trends before conducting fieldwork. Subsequently, I engaged in
desk research during fieldwork to gather additional data or to check the reliability of
interviewees responses. Finally, I have turned to desk research after fieldwork to find
supplementary information. Additionally, for the Russian-language sources, I supplemented
information with publications written in English to check for data reliability.
To analyze the compiled data, I used qualitative and mixed-methods software, NVivo
10/11, Word, and Excel. NVivo is computer software for qualitative data analysis. It supports a
systematic analysis of text-based and multimedia information. I have used the software to
code/classify information and to examine relationships between individual data. The software
improves the validity of research as the coding ensures its replicability in future studies. I used
Excel to generate pie charts, line graphs, and bar graphs from the data. For example, I coded
exports/imports of oil/natural gas, domestic responses to greenfield LNG plants in British
Columbia, and the number of investments screened under the Investment Canada Act.
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Limitations
My study has a few limitations that may impact its replicability. One of these limitations
is associated with time. Given the qualitative nature of my dissertation, the interviews that I
conducted in Canada and Russia reflected interviewees’ opinions at a particular historical time.
Thus, the individual responses were influenced by structural and temporal factors. This impacted
the interpretation of the results for some of the projects that are currently undergoing rapid
development. The major obstacle was associated with acquiring and adding information about
projects that are still ongoing. For example, the LNG chapters in both countries have shifted as
the projects evolved and new data became available.
The second limitation is in the small number of interviews I carried out in both countries.
The small number of respondents is the outcome of both temporal constraints (limited time for
fieldwork) and the general unwillingness of respondents to discuss Chinese investment in the
hydrocarbon sector, given its strategic nature. As a result, I was unable to consult managers of
Chinese companies as they ignored my outreach emails inviting them to participate in my study.
Relatedly, managers of CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC have been very cautious about media
appearances. Therefore, both primary and secondary data on the responses of Chinese managers
are limited. To compensate for these limitations, I have relied on secondary data to fill the gaps
and focused on the visible changes in China’s strategy or institutional responses.
The third limitation is inconsistent data availability across the six case studies in Canada
and Russia. In general, Chinese proposed investment projects were better documented in Canada
than in Russia. Still, in both countries, some projects were better documented than the others.
Projects that are more recent had more sources of information and data available for analysis.
Conversely, older projects had fewer available data. This may be due to the fact that projects that
were recently completed or are currently under construction have a larger internet presence and
have recently submitted their documents to the government. As the information available on the
internet can be easily deleted, the older projects have fewer data than the more recent ones. A
good example is the disappearance of information released by the proponent of the Northern
Gateway after the project was suspended.
To mitigate this problem of information discrepancy, different sources of information
were utilized to gather data. I have found information about these projects in articles written by
scholars and in the media, grey reports, and documents prepared by local governments.
Interviewees were especially helpful to discuss projects that were older with little secondary
information available. To balance this information, I selected projects from the early to mid2000s to present. Although temporal range gave me some flexibility, I had to carefully manage
available information to focus on central indicators to ensure consistency across different data
sources.
The fourth factor that has limited my research is the unreliability of the quantitative data
which I have used to generate graphs in this section. Publically available data on Chinese
investment is often unreliable given the general preference to keep the investments a ‘lowprofile’ endeavor by Chinese SOEs. Scholars studying Chinese aid, loans, and investment, such
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as Deborah Bräutigam and Kevin Gallagher, note that quantitative data are often unreliable and
that there is a discrepancy between the databases used by different organizations and agencies. I
have noticed data discrepancy in the AEI database, where the reported projects that were
suspended by Chinese companies remained listed as a finalized investment. Similarly, several
smaller investments were absent from the database as well. One of the problems is that
researchers rely on the media to gather data on Chinese FDI in energy, which may over/under
report certain projects. Given the multiple issues with quantitative data, I chose to focus my
dissertation on qualitative data and to supplement large-scale databases with independent
research in Canada and Russia.
Lastly, as noted earlier, Canada and Russia are systemically important hydrocarbon-rich
countries which may influence my findings. Since the two cases are the extreme cases in terms
of the scale and scope of Chinese engagement, it may be difficult to draw general conclusions
from the qualitative studies that I have conducted. Further studies will be required to test the
hypothesis and model in different settings. I will test this model by engaging in within-case
analyses of hydrocarbon projects in Canada and Russia to showcase how the core variables
respond to different background factors along the hydrocarbon supply chain. In doing so, I will
test how the model can be applied to similar projects in different countries and to illustrate the
adjustments that may be required to capture the dynamics of the model.

Conclusion
This chapter discussed seven distinct elements of my research design. First, it reaffirmed
the central puzzle and research question by stipulating that my study examines how domestic
institutions along with stakeholders influence the ability of Chinese SOEs to participate in
hydrocarbon projects in host countries. In doing so, it explains the discrepancies in the success of
Chinese SOEs across the selected projects and countries. The first section of this chapter also
restated a set of theoretical propositions that can be summarized in one over-arching hypothesis –
that Chinese ability to participate in a hydrocarbon project in a host country is determined by
the interaction between stakeholders (that are influenced by inter-state relations) operating
within a particular institutional environment. This hypothesis also suggests that in the recipient
countries with the institutional environment that incorporates the desires of multiple
stakeholders, Chinese SOEs’ participation in the hydrocarbon industry may be met with more
opposition than in countries where decisions about Chinese participation (which includes FDI,
loans, and other finance) are made by the top leadership without consultation with the other
groups. Relatedly, one may assume that Chinese enterprises will find it more difficult to operate
in democratic countries with multiple stakeholders than in autocracies, where a political license
to operate often triumphs other considerations.
This general hypothesis informed the theoretical framework that I have discussed in the
second part of this chapter. My theoretical framework relies on three moving pieces – Chinese
SOEs desire to participate in the hydrocarbon projects abroad (and their willingness to modify
their engagement to fit the needs of the host country); domestic institutions responding to their
participation; and stakeholder politics that determine social, political, and economic dimensions
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of bargaining in the society. Drawing on the historical institutional literature and international
business literature, I combined theories on institutions and stakeholder relations to explain the
success/failure of Chinese SOEs planned engagement in hydrocarbon projects abroad.
The second section elaborated on my theoretical contribution to the existing literature. As
I proposed in this chapter, scholars need to expand the concept of ‘licenses to operate’, which is
popular in the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR). I propose that we need to
include other types of licenses in this model. Therefore, I have added a market license to social
and political licenses that are currently discussed by scholars. By expanding the notion of
licenses in this chapter, I have proposed that foreign companies that want to establish their
presence in democratic societies need to obtain multiple licenses to operate. In comparison, in
autocratic societies, where the three sets of licenses are conflated and often subsumed under one
overarching license – a political license to operate, foreign businesses may find it easier to
establish their presence if they are supported by the party in power. These licenses are important
when we consider two types of investment – greenfield versus brownfield FDI. As noted earlier,
investors engaging in a brownfield investment do not need to obtain a social license, which was
already granted to the project by a local community. This may make it easier for Chinese SOEs
to participate in projects that require brownfield investment rather than in those projects that
require greenfield investment.
The third section explained the selection of the qualitative conventional method for my
analysis and discussed the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables. Since I
chose a comparative case study analysis with an emphasis on fieldwork and observations, I had
to identify a set of cases for my analysis, which I discussed in section four. In this section, I also
explained the rationale for choosing Canada and Russia for comparative purposes and elaborated
on the choice of specific projects in the hydrocarbon sector that were selected for an in-depth
analysis. The last two sections of this chapter elaborated on my data collection technique and
outlined limitations of my study. The research design has thus covered all of the elements that
are essential for the analysis of my cases in Canada – chapters five and six – and in Russia –
chapters seven and eight.

Chapter 4. The Role of the Canadian Institutions and Actors in Shaping
Chinese FDI in the Canadian Hydrocarbon Sector
Introduction
Canada is one of the top hydrocarbon producers and exporters in the world. In 2015,
Canada was ranked as the fourth largest producer and the third largest exporter of crude oil
(Natural Resources Canada 2016, 28). The Canadian oil industry produced over 3.8 million
barrels of oil per day in 2016 from conventional and unconventional sources (Canadian
Association of Petroleum Producers). The majority of this oil (80 per cent) is produced in
Alberta (Natural Resources Canada 2016, 30). Canada is also the fifth largest producer and the
fourth largest exporter of natural gas (Natural Resources Canada 2016, 52). Canada’s geological
profile coupled with its stable politico-economic environment draws foreign investors into the
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Canadian hydrocarbon sector. Among these investors, we find Chinese SOEs, which expanded
their presence in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector in the 20 th century.
Rapid growth in FDI by Chinese SOEs in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector has stirred a
debate among policymakers, media, scholars, and the public. One of the central questions of this
debate is how to regulate this investment. Scholars and practitioners are concerned that Chinese
SOEs may be driven by political rather than by economic considerations (Dawson 2012; Chen
2013; Du 2016) and may undermine Canadian national security (Jiang 2010; Dobson and Evans
2015). These concerns motivated my central question: how is Chinese SOEs’ participation in
hydrocarbon projects impacted by Canadian institutions and stakeholder politics?
To provide an answer to the raised questions, I will construct a theoretical model that
rests on three elements – inter-state relations, institutions, and stakeholder politics 20 - discussed
in chapter 3 and will develop a set of theoretical expectations. The model applies the three
elements to the Canadian setting by focusing on the reception of investment by Chinese SOEs in
the Canadian hydrocarbon industry. In doing so, it unveils a complex system of interacting
variables that have evolved to shape Chinese engagement in Canada since the 1990s. The
theoretical model, which I will construct in this chapter, will be subsequently tested in chapter
six by using empirical cases to demonstrate how each of the three elements affects Chinese FDI
in Canada. The model will also account for institutional evolution in Canada, which is depicted
by the changes in the investment screening mechanism in response to an inflow of FDI from
Chinese SOEs.

Inter-state Relations
Inter-state relations shape the broader political and economic landscape that influences
the receptiveness of domestic stakeholders to foreign investment in the Canadian hydrocarbon
sector. One example of this is the bilateral energy partnership between Canada and the United
States. Canada’s close energy relations with the United States have historically shaped and
continue to shape the flows of energy-related trade and investment across the North American
continent. Inter-state relations thus play an important role in directing the inflow of FDI. As
noted in the methodology section, supportive inter-state relations are an insufficient but
necessary condition that enables Chinese investors to acquire assets in the Canadian hydrocarbon
sector. At times when Sino-Canadian bilateral diplomatic relations are supportive they act as an
enabler of FDI as stakeholders are more supportive of Chinese SOEs. Relatedly, during periods
of bilateral hostilities, this variable may restrict investment flows.
As I propose in this section, bilateral relations between states are complicated by the
notion of energy security that is tightly linked with a desire to diversify energy partners. As the
regional and global demands for energy change, countries seek to rebalance their trade and
investment partnerships to reflect the altered reality. In the Canadian case, Sino-Canadian energy
partnership is shaped by a mutual desire to diversify energy partners. This section examines
geopolitical factors that shape Canada’s energy security and analyzes Canada’s strategy to
20

As noted earlier, stakeholders are composed of four sets of actors – the government, businesses, civil society, and
Indigenous groups.
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diversify its energy partnerships by trying to reach Asian energy markets. The goal of this
section is to examine how interstate relations influence the inflow of Chinese FDI into Canada.
In doing so, this section first examines broader trends in FDI in the hydrocarbon sector and
subsequently analyzes Canadian bilateral diplomacy with China.
Foreign Investors, Geopolitics, and Energy Security
Foreign investment is an important source of capital for the Canadian hydrocarbon sector.
Foreign ownership/control, where a majority (over 50 per cent) of a business is owned by a
foreign entity, has been substantial in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. Foreign control of
Canadian oil and gas sector has been relatively high; in 2016, foreign control stood at around 42
per cent, which is similar to a 2004 figure (Natural Resource Canada 2018, 15). Data from
Statistics Canada indicate that foreign investment in the Canadian oil and gas sector has been
generally increasing from 1999 to 2016 (despite several episodes of falling investment during the
periods of commodity downturns and economic crises – 2005/2006, 2002/2008, and 2013/2014).
In general, FDI in the Canadian oil and gas sector grew substantially from C$17,619 million in
1999 to C$137,738 million in 2016. This rapid growth in foreign investment is captured by the
orange upward sloping line in Figure 4.1, which depicts stock of FDI in the Canadian oil and gas
extraction. This figure was generated on the basis of data released by the Statistics Canada. The
blue line on the graph depicts American investment in the Canadian oil and gas sector.
There are two important trends captured in the graph below (Figure 4.1) that are
consistent with my argument that close Canadian bilateral relations with the United States have
shaped FDI patterns. The first trend that is worth noting is represented by the proximity of the
orange and blue lines on the graph. The proximity of these two lines reveals that the United
States was the dominant investor in the Canadian oil and gas sector during the early 2000s. In
2017, the United States accounted for 60.3 per cent of FDI entering Canada (Global Affairs
Canada 2017). Until 2006 American investors accounted for almost all of the FDI entering
Canada. Since 2006 foreign investment from other regions, such as Asia and Europe, has
expanded. This expansion has reduced the proportion of FDI sourced from the United States.
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Figure 4.1: U.S. stock of FDI in the Canadian Oil and Gas Extraction Compared to the Total FDI (source: CANSIM,
Table 376-0052 (generated in 2018)

In comparison, Chinese FDI in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector had a relatively slow
start. It began to expand rapidly after the Global Financial Crisis, which coincided with a decline
in investment from the IOCs. The inflow of Chinese FDI to Canada is depicted in figure 4.2.
This figure shows that the stock volume of Chinese FDI has been rising and falling rapidly over
time. The spikes coincide with the large investments made by Chinese SOEs in Canada, such as
CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen in 2013. In 2009, Chinese FDI in the Canadian oil sands stood
at C$1,741.5 million (stock measure). In comparison, in 2012, the stock of Chinese FDI in the
Canadian oil sands sector was C$15,766.5 million (Global Data 2012). In 2011, Chinese
investors owned 10 per cent of the Canadian oil assets (Global Data 2012; Coates 2014). To
bring these numbers into perspective, around half of Chinese investment in Canada was in
natural resources at the time (Grant 2012, ii). The rapid growth of FDI from China over the last
few years is slowly chipping away at the American dominance in the Canadian hydrocarbon
sector. Although Chinese investment in the Canadian oil and gas sector is growing, its impact
remains relatively minor compared to the influence exerted by IOCs and other factors shaping
the industry (Woo 2017, interview with the author).
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Figure 4.2: Chinese FDI (measured in terms of flow) into Canada data generated based on the AEI, Scissors, 2018.

One of the factors that shapes FDI in the Canadian energy sector is energy security.
While a general definition of energy security focuses on the reliable supply of oil and gas at
reasonable prices (IEA n.d.; Yergin 2006), a more nuanced definition of energy security rests on
the premise that energy producing countries need to obtain investment to develop these
resources. In the Canadian case, industry leaders and government officials from The Energy
Council of Canada define energy security in terms of managed energy supply, reliable energy
infrastructure, and satisfaction of current and future energy demand. If we expand their
definition, we can arrive at a much more general concept of energy security that includes
investment in the production of energy resources to meet anticipated energy demand.
Energy security has shaped Canada’s position on issues related to energy investment and
trade. Historically, Canada has pursued a regional energy security strategy by maintaining close
investment and trade ties with the United States. Today, the two countries are united by bilateral
trade and investment agreements, such as the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) 21
(Hale 2014, 353). Market integration between the United States and Canada via the NAFTA
(now USMCA) and the CUFTA helped to lock regional energy trade in place. Currently, Canada
ships the majority of its oil and gas exports to the United States. Data on Canadian oil exports for
2014 indicate that over 90 per cent of exported energy – 97 per cent of oil and 100 per cent of
natural gas – were shipped to the United States (Natural Resources Canada 2016). Close trade
relations in the energy sector between Canada and the United States have determined broader
investment patterns across the energy industry.
Canada’s economic dependence on the United States has produced an integrated energy
market, tied by a joint pipeline infrastructure running from Canadian hydrocarbon-rich provinces
to American consumers and refineries. In comparison to the pipeline connection between Canada
In the fall of 2018, Canada, Mexico, and the United States have signed a new trade agreement – the USMCA.
Prior to the USMCA (from 1994 to 2018), the two powers have been united economically by the NAFTA.
21
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and the United States, Canadian domestic pipeline infrastructure remains underdeveloped (CAPP
2018). The existing pipeline network locks Canadian producers to American energy markets and
limits their ability to sell their products internationally. This dependence on the American
demand for Canadian hydrocarbons makes Canada vulnerable to changes in American demand.
Given that the pipeline connection between hydrocarbon suppliers in Alberta and ports in British
Columbia is limited, Canada’s attempt to shipments of hydrocarbons to Asia has been wrought
with uncertainties (CAPP 2018, iv).
Canada’s attempt to expand domestic cross-country infrastructure is complicated by
logistical and political considerations. Politically, an effort to expand infrastructure to access
Asian markets has been unpopular among different stakeholders. As I will elaborate in the
subsequent chapter, stakeholder politics have blocked a recent proposal to build a new pipeline –
the Northern Gateway Pipeline – from Alberta to British Columbia. As Canadian pipeline
infrastructure remains underdeveloped, Canadian energy producers are locked into regional
energy markets, which offer lower prices for the Canadian oil and gas (National Energy Board
2016b, iv). Therefore, Canadian policymakers emphasize the importance of energy
diversification, which can be attained through the construction of new pipeline infrastructure. A
recent example of the government’s activities to develop pipeline infrastructure is the acquisition
of the Kinder Morgan pipeline expansion project by the Trudeau administration to ensure that the
pipeline will be built. Ultimately, inter-state relations may constrain the maneuverability of
Canadian energy producers to pursue energy diversification as it may lock-in pre-existing trade
and FDI patterns.
Bilateral Diplomacy with China
Bilateral diplomacy is an important element that needs to be in place in order to support
energy diversification. Scholars analyzing Sino-Canadian diplomatic ties find a correlation
between political and economic relations (Nossal and Sarson 2013), where closer political ties
are linked to higher energy investments (Jiang 2010). Considering these studies, one may expect
that political ties between the Canadian political leadership and Chinese government officials
may shape bilateral investment flows in the hydrocarbon sector. Empirical evidence appears to
be largely supportive of this correlation. Scholars find that bilateral economic relations between
the two countries have expanded gradually, since the time the former Prime Minister Pierre
Elliot Trudeau established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in the 1970s
(Edwards 2009; Nossal and Sarson 2013). As the bilateral economic ties grew, so did energy
trade and investment (Nossal and Sarson 2013).
Conversely, a deterioration of bilateral political relations during the Harper
administration, driven by the skepticism about Chinese democratic and economic principles, is
associated with a brief cancellation of bilateral diplomatic meetings and a decline in China’s FDI
from 2006 to 2009 (Nossal and Sarson 2013; 4-5; Jiang 2010, 16; Jiang, Zweig and Siqin 2015,
112). The brief decline in FDI was reversed after the Harper administration readjusted its official
policy on China. This occured during Harper’s second term in office. Empirical evidence
indicates that Chinese investment in the hydrocarbon sector picked up and large deals followed
after bilateral relations were stabilized. However, the announcement of the SOE-specific

58

guidelines by the Harper administration has acted as another roadblock for Chinese investors as I
will explain in the next section on regulatory institutions. In general, evidence suggests that
diplomatic relations serve as an indicator of economic collaboration between China and Canada
in the sphere of energy. However, there are exceptions to these broader trends.
Economic and regulatory factors may counteract diplomatic efforts. We can observe this
discrepancy in recent diplomatic missions carried out under Justin Trudeau’s administration.
Under Trudeau’s leadership, the two sides have re-established a “strategic partnership” discourse
in 2015 to showcase closer bilateral relations (Jiang 2010, 17). Both countries have also placed
emphasis on energy cooperation in a Joint Statement Between Canada and the People’s Republic
of China, signed during Premier Li Keqiang’s official visit in Ottawa in 2016 (Prime Minister of
Canada 2016). A growing bilateral partnership between China and Canada is reflected in the
official statements released by the Canadian government.
One of these statements was made by Jim Carr, Canadian Minister of Natural Resources.
In his speech at the annual Energy and Mines Ministerial Conference in China, Carr has
expressed Canada’s interest in expanding relations with China after declaring that “Canada is
open for business” and stating that “no partnership holds more potential than the one…[Canada]
enjoy[s] with China” (Natural Resource Canada 2017b). Carr also emphasized that Canada is
trying to develop pipeline infrastructure to reach China’s markets, by alluding to the expansion
of the Trans Mountain pipeline (Natural Resource Canada 2017b). The official statements
culminated in a Memorandum of Understanding with China on “The National Energy
Administration on Cooperation in the Field of Energy” (Natural Resource Canada 2017c).
However, as I will illustrate in chapter six, energy trade and FDI did not expand as expected.
Despite the mixed evidence linking diplomacy to investment, Canadian federal and
provincial governments continue to use diplomatic channels to entice Chinese investors to invest
in Canada. At the provincial level, governments are actively seeking Chinese FDI in the energy
sector. Alberta and British Columbia are among the most active Canadian provinces in this
regard. Both provinces have established political and economic ties with China. These ties are
partially facilitated by the Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs). These IPAs attract Chinese
FDI into Canada as they lower transaction costs associated with foreign investment by reducing
information asymmetries and ‘liability of foreignness’22(Anderson and Sutherland 2015, 816).
They do so by supporting trade missions and providing Chinese business with information about
Canadian political, cultural, and economic environment (Anderson and Sutherland 2015). In
Canada, the Canada-China Energy and Environment Forum, headed by Wenran Jiang and
supported by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), has
been very active since 2004 in promoting energy ties between the two countries. From 2004 to
2007, the Forum held bilateral conferences to promote bilateral energy partnership between
China and Canada (Jiang 2010).
Other factors that may impact the inflow of FDI and restrict domestic regulatory
institutions are BITs, such as the Canada-China Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection
22

The “liability of foreignness” or higher costs of operating due to a lack of experience in operating in a host
country (Boisot and Meyer 2008; Wong 2012).
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Agreement (FIPA) that was signed in 2014. This agreement is however not analyzed in my work
due to its limited analytical contribution to my argument as BITs do not explain why certain
investment projects are approved while others fail to proceed. Bearing in mind the main
arguments of this section, I propose that close diplomatic ties incentivize FDI but do not explain
its success in Canada.

Formal and Informal Institutions
Institutions are the second variable in my theoretical model that accounts for Canada’s
receptiveness to Chinese FDI. In this section, I discuss two institutional types – informal and
formal institutions. As noted earlier, informal institutions are operationalized through the
variable of ideology. Ideology forms the basis for societal interactions in a given country and is
thus an important variable that operates in the background of my model to influence the activities
of stakeholders in Canada. I have identified two key ideologies – liberal democracy and
economic neoliberalism - that shape broader politico-economic institutions in Canada. Formal
institutions are represented by the regulatory institutions that may influence operations of
Chinese SOEs in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. I focus on two types of regulatory
institutions: those that regulate the inflow of FDI into Canada, and those that deal with the
Canadian property rights and regulations. In the first category, we will find an investment
screening mechanism, embodied by the Investment Canada Act (ICA). In the second category,
we will find Canada’s domestic regulations, such as property rights that include Aboriginal land
title. The latter set of institutions (property rights and related regulations) become central after a
foreign investor passes the ICA and establishes his/her operations in Canada.
Jointly domestic institutions produce a regulatory regime that restricts and modifies
conditions under which FDI occurs and operates. As noted in the earlier paragraph, ideology
provides a normative basis for societal interaction that enables certain types of behaviour and
proscribes others. Canadian regulatory regime legally bound domestic and international
corporations to comply with the established legal principles. Thus, rules laid down by these
institutions influence the activities of Chinese SOEs operating in the Canadian hydrocarbon
sector. In a case where a corporation does not follow Canadian norms and regulations, the noncompliant firm may be fined or stripped of its political license to operate. Assuming that Chinese
SOEs are interested in retaining their operations in Canada, they will follow the rules set out by
the provincial, federal, and territorial regulators. These ideas will be discussed in two subsections; the first will examine informal institutions, while the second will focus on the formal
ones.
Informal Institutions; Charting the Ideological Basis of the System: Liberal Democracy and
Neoliberalism
Informal institutions are deeply embedded in the society and shape the activities that
occur within it. Ideology is one manifestation of the informal institutions. Going back to North’s
description of ideology (1988), one should note that ideology percolates through institutions and
affects how the economy is run and outlines what actions are permitted. In Canada, there are two
central institutions that underpin the society – liberal democracy and economic neoliberalism -

60

that serve as the guiding posts shaping interstate relations and stakeholder politics. The ideals of
liberal democracy and economic neoliberalism provide an overarching structure for rules and
norms governing the Canadian society. These rules and norms become integral elements of the
institutional environment within which domestic stakeholders and foreign investors operate. This
brief section provides a general overview of the liberal democracy and economic neoliberalism
in Canada.
In Canada, state-society and state-corporate relations are shaped by the principles of
liberal democracy. At its essence, liberal democracy is based on electoral politics where citizens
elect their representatives who in turn make and implement laws on behalf of the citizenry in a
system of representative governance run by the majority (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987, 4-6). The
liberal element is based on the freedoms of expression and organization granted to the citizens
(Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987, 5). This general definition of a liberal state envisions that citizens
will influence policy indirectly. Since liberal democracy, along with the concept of liberalism,
are applied differently across countries, the concept needs to be reinterpreted in the Canadian
context. According to Shrivastava (2015), Canada’s political system is based on a notion of
“social liberalism” where the state addresses social and economic issues and promotes civil
liberties, including party politics, elections, separation of power, and a representative
government (8). This system envisions a constant renegotiation of the rules in response to
societal demands where economic and political “losers” compete against the “winners” to attain
an equitable policy (Shrivastava 2015, 10).
Canadian political institutions are closely tied with the economic ones. Canada is a liberal
market-based economy, where economic actors pursue their objective of profit maximization. 23
In doing so, economic actors interact with the state to produce a joint regulatory framework that
seeks to minimize social costs while maximizing economic benefits. Pursuing these objectives,
Canada adopted a neoliberal approach to economic governance, which according to Shrivastava
(2015) turned into a “roll-out neoliberalism”24 under Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Premier
Ralph Klein in Alberta. Neoliberalism can be “understood as a political ideology” or a “belief
system” that justifies and explains the activities of actors operating in a system (Shrivastava
2015, 37). In Canada neoliberalism is characterized by a reduced role of the state in societal and
welfare systems alongside the maintenance of “class privilege and market dominance”
(Shrivastava 2015, 6). A “small state” coupled with a “strong market” shape corporate relations
with the state, where the Canadian government assumes the role of a “neutral referee mediating
among competing definitions of public goods” (Shrivastava 2015, 5).
In the oil and gas industry, neoliberalism shapes the relations between the Canadian
government, domestic companies, and foreign investors. The industry is driven by multiple
private for-profit enterprises, such as Suncor, Husky Energy, and Enbridge. These firms can
unite under industrial associations, such as The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
(CAPP), to champion their joint interests. The state, in turn, plays the role of a regulator, as noted
earlier. The state-corporate relationship that exists today is guided by the liberal market
23

It is important to note that other objectives, aside from profit maximization exist, but are not discussed given that
they are not central to my research.
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Shrivastava borrows the term from Peck and Tickell (2002).
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principles. Under these principles, domestic firms can sell their assets to foreign investors and
form joint ventures with foreign partners in accordance with domestic regulations. Foreign
investors, like Chinese SOEs, can acquire whole companies in Canada and invest in hydrocarbon
assets without facing substantial limits on their participation, unlike in the countries where the
government dominates the energy sector, such as Russia.
To summarize, the principles of the free market coupled with minimal regulatory
interference have shaped the Canadian approach to governance of domestic hydrocarbon
resources. As Canadian policymakers privilege market fundamentals and limit state interference
in the economy, they enable free movement of capital into the Canadian hydrocarbon industry
from both domestic and international actors. In general, Canada’s openness to foreign investment
and its preference for market principles attracts a substantial amount of FDI. At the same time,
democratic principles allow multiple stakeholders – aside from the government and corporate
actors - to shape the nature of the hydrocarbon industry, which, as I propose, may make it harder
for foreign investors to invest and operate in Canada. As I will explore in the next sections of this
chapter, the principles of neoliberalism and liberal democracy impact the ability of stakeholders
to challenge projects in the hydrocarbon industry.
Formal Institutions: Investment Screening mechanisms
Formal institutions complement and reinforce the informal ones. As noted earlier, the
first domestic institution that influences FDI is an investment screening regime. This regime
determines the accessibility of the Canadian hydrocarbon sector to foreign investors and
formulates a set of conditions that must be met by foreign investors before entering Canada. The
key regulatory framework for investment screening is outlined under the ICA. Under the ICA,
the government reviews foreign investment entering Canada that is above a certain threshold. 25
For the purposes of the review, the ICA stipulates a set of conditions that a foreign investor must
meet before investing in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. For Chinese SOEs, the ICA is the first
regulatory hurdle that they must overcome before investing in Canada. Although Canada is
relatively open to foreign investors, it has a comprehensive investment screening mechanism to
shield its economy from the new realities of the 21 st century. Some of these new realities include
global changes in economic conditions, terrorism, and fluctuating investment trends (Hale 2014).
Ultimately, these issues incentivize regulatory innovation, which is made possible by an
adaptable investment regime that allows Canada to adjust its policies.
Canadian policymakers can tighten the investment screening processes when foreign
influence becomes dominant or when foreign ownership harms Canadian interests. The “Grey
Report” (1972) and the “Watkins Report” (1968) were among the first guiding documents that
shaped the investment screening regime. Both were fundamental in influenced the perception of
Canadian policymakers regarding foreign investment as they justified policymakers’ decision to
tighten regulatory control over incoming FDI (Collins 2011, 143-144; Li and Zhang 2016, 20).
At other times, regulatory reviews have led to a cautious opening, such as the expansion of
threshold limits in the aftermath of the recommendations released by the Wilson Panel (2008).
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The threshold is dependent on the nature of the investor – state-owned or private enterprises – and increases on a
yearly basis.
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The “Compete to Win Report”, published by the Wilson Panel, also served as an impetus to
enhance investment oversight over any investment that may jeopardize Canadian national
security.
Studying the Canadian investment screening regime, Geoffrey Hale (2014) identified
four distinct periods in Canada’s treatment of FDI: a) “resentment” of FDI (1973-1984); b)
gradual liberalization (1985-1995); c) regime consolidation (1995-2008); and d) “incremental
policy adaption to shifting global and domestic environments for international trade and
investment” (2008-2014) (359). Although Hale wrote the article in 2014, the last period
continues to be representative of the current investment screening regime.
The FDI ‘resentment stage’ identified by Hale was driven by protectionist sentiment in
Canada and coincided with the existence of Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA). The
agency channeled “nationalist sentiment” driven by the Canadians who wanted to limit foreign
ownership of the Canadian companies (Woo 2014). The agency acted as a gate-keeper that
dissuaded foreign investment from entering Canada by delaying FDI transactions, increasing
administrative and legal costs, and imposing performance requirements (Dawson 2012; Woo
2014). Liberalization of the Canadian FDI regime was marked by the implementation of a new
regulatory framework under the ICA, adopted by Brian Mulroney’s government in 1985, that
coincides with the “gradual liberalization” that was later “consolidated” and adapted to new
conditions (Hale 2014).
The ICA rebranded Canada as a welcoming destination for foreign investors. The Act is
set to provide minimal regulatory burdens and, as Dawson (2012) suggests, is based on a ruledriven, precedent-based, fair, and consistent regulatory system. The goal of the ICA is to review
“significant investments in Canada by non-Canadians in a manner that encourages investment,
economic growth and employment opportunities in Canada” and to screen investments that
“could be injurious to national security” (Minister of Justice 1985). Ultimately, under the ICA,
Canada has created an “open FDI regime” for foreign investors (Klaver and Trebilcock 2013,
141) that filters out threatening investment (Dawson 2012).
The ICA has been an important mechanism for reviewing any investment in the natural
resource sector. To bring the importance of the investment review process into perspective;
under the ICA’s ‘net benefit test’, a substantial amount of FDI in natural resources has been
reviewed. I compiled and analyzed data from the ICA’s reports from 2010 to 2016 on the
reviewed foreign investment in Canadian natural resources. Based on this data, I constructed a
graph that depicts foreign investment deals reviewed under the ICA in billions of Canadian
dollars (Figure 4.3). As illustrated in this graph, the volume of reviewed FDI was the highest in
2010 and 2011 with $6.4 billion of FDI in enterprise value 26 reviewed in 2010 and $7.8 billion
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Enterprise value, under the ICA, for publicly traded-entity is “capitalization of…entity plus its liabilities less its
cash assets” and for non-publicly traded-entity it is “the gross book value of the assets” based on audited financial
statements. (Clark et al. 2014, 6).
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in 2011. The transactions in natural resources that were reviewed by the ICA dropped in 2012 27
and remained relatively modest until 2015.
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Figure 4.3: FDI in Canadian Natural Resources Reviewed under the ICA in Billions of $CAD (data for 2015 are
composed from enterprise value $2.49 billion and asset value $451 million) (source: ICA)

The contemporary ICA regime rests on three pillars – the net benefit test (that includes
guidelines for SOEs), the cultural review, and the national security test (added in 2009). Each of
these pillars may be triggered when a foreign investor declares his/her interest to invest in a
Canadian business. For investors in the hydrocarbon sector, only two tests apply – the net benefit
test and the national security test. Each of the two tests is triggered under a set of specific
conditions.
The net benefit test is triggered when foreign investment exceeds a specific threshold. For
SOEs, the threshold in 2017 was $379 million in asset value, while for a non-SOE foreign
investor whose country of origin is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
review threshold was raised to $1 billion (Innovation, Science and Economic Development
Canada 2017). The net benefit test can also be triggered when a foreign investor acquires over 50
per cent of voting interests in a corporation or an asset (Innovation, Science and Economic
Development Canada 2017). The national security test is triggered when an acquired business is
perceived as a security risk and/or when the acquirer may be deemed as a risky investor
(depending on the investor’s origin) (Campbell 2017). National security clause allows the
Canadian government to review any FDI coming to Canada either before, during, or after the
deal is made (Asaaf and McGillis 2013, 14).
Investors need to pass the ‘net benefit’ test to proceed with their investment in Canada.
To pass this test, an investor must prove that his/her investment will be of ‘net benefit’ to the
Canadian society by submitting corporate undertakings (or promises) that the corporation will
implement after the investment takes place (Collins 2011, 147; Assaf and McGillis 2013). The
27

A decline in the amount of reviewed FDI under the ICA can be explained by two factors. The first one is a general
decline in commodity prices and associated fall in the FDI in this sector. The second factor may be related to a
relaxation of FDI thresholds that were increased to allow foreign, non-SOE, investors to engage in more expensive
transactions without triggering the review mechanism.
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Canadian Minister of Industry applies “net benefit” guidelines to check whether a given
investment has a potential to contribute to economic development of Canada. Specifically, the
Minister considers a set of the following factors: a) investment’s contribution to Canadian
economic activity; b) Canadian participation in the acquired business or industry; c) investment’s
role in enhancing productivity and technological development/innovation; d) domestic and
international competitiveness; and, e) investment’s “compatibility…with national industrial,
economic and cultural policies” (Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada 2013).
To help foreign investors navigate the ICA’s ‘net benefit’ test, Canadian officials have
released a set of Guidelines. These Guidelines outline exemplary undertakings that foreign
investors can use to convince the Minister that their investment will be of ‘net benefit’ 28 to
Canada. These undertakings include the following factors: a) appointment of Canadian citizens
as directors on the board or as senior managers; b) incorporation of the enterprise in Canada;
and, c) the listing of corporate shares on the Canadian stock exchange (Investment Canada Act
Guidelines 2017).
When a foreign enterprise commits to these undertakings, it is bound to carry them out in
practice. Experts note that investors are expected to uphold the proposed undertakings for three
years unless they are an SOE for which this period is undefined and may remain in force for a
longer period (Campbell, Men, and Wortley 2013, 502; Campbell 2017). This is an informal
practice as it is not codified in the ICA’s regulations and adds an additional layer of protection in
case the investment does not perform as expected.
The ICA appears to be an effective manager of incoming FDI in terms of its ability to
implement the guidelines and block foreign investment that does not meet them. In the resource
sector, a few notable cases failed to pass the ICA’s review. Among these cases are BHP’s failed
acquisition of Potash Corporation in 2012 (as it failed to meet the net benefit test) (Stobbe 2010);
Minmentals’ unsuccessful attempt to purchase Noranda in 2004 (due to the human rights abuses,
related to Minmetals’ use of forced labour, that have likely impacted the government’s decision
about the deal) (Dhir 2006), and Alliant Techsystems Inc’s failed bid to take over the
MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. corporation in 2008 (on the basis of a net benefit
decision) (Industry Canada 2008). In 2018, the federal government blocked CCCC International
Holding Ltd’s bid to acquire AECON, a large Canadian construction company, due to national
security considerations (Blatchford and Bronskill 2018).
The ICA can also be used to punish foreign investors that do not follow the undertakings
that they stipulated in their review packages. Officials from the Investment Review Division of
the Industry Canada conduct post-investment reviews29 to ensure that foreign investors comply
with the undertakings and monitor investors’ overall contributions to the Canadian economy
(Investment Canada Act Guidelines 2017). In a case of non-compliance, the government has the
power to enforce the undertakings submitted by foreign investors. An example of a successful
28

For the net benefit test corporations may re-appeal the decision by submitting new undertakings within a 30-day
appeal window. An example of a successful appeal was launched by Petronas, which subsequently acquired
Progress Energy.
29
The review is usually performed 18 months after an acquisition takes place as per ICA, section 40(2). However,
new legislation stipulates that foreign investment can be reviewed at any time after the acquisition took place.
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non-compliance litigation occurred in 2009 when the Canadian government sued the United
States Steel Corporation for failing to fulfill its commitments listed in the undertakings (Collins
2011, 115-157; Asaaf and McGillis 2013). In the aftermath, the US Steel Corporation had to pay
the fines stipulated by the Canadian judiciary.
Given that the ICA’s guidelines are very broad and encompassing, from the outset
Chinese FDI was shaped by these general considerations, which became more specific over time.
The general ‘net benefit’ guidelines for FDI were established on the basis of Canadian
experience with the IOCs; thus, the ICA had no specific clauses set out to regulate investment by
Chinese SOEs (Li 2017). A first set of SOE specific guidelines was developed by Canadian
regulators in 2007 as a response to a rapid rise in FDI from SOEs in the early 2000s. The new
guidelines sought to provide clarity on the treatment of foreign investment made by SOEs in
Canada. The Directives defined an SOE as “an enterprise that is owned, controlled or influenced,
directly or indirectly by a foreign government” (Investment Canada Act Guidelines 2017). Under
the directives, SOEs are prompted to disclose their connections with the government and to
“demonstrate their strong commitment to transparent and commercial operations” (Innovation,
Science and Economic Development Canada 2017b). In 2012, the Canadian government has
tightened the Guidelines by adding specific restrictions for SOEs’ FDI in the oil sands and
placed the onus on SOEs to prove that they will pass the ICA test. The two sets of guidelines are
outlined in table 4.1.

-

-

-

2007 Guidelines
General
Response to an increase in FDI by
SOEs
Guidelines for Minister of Industry for
review of FDI by SOEs to determine
their net benefit
Concern: to address the risks
associated with SOEs’ FDI

Concern (1) monitored by the Minister
of Industry:
o political influence by home
state
Rationale:
o “may be inconsistent with
Canadian national industrial
and economic objectives”

-

-

2012 Guidelines
Sector Specific (with general provisions)
Response to an increase in FDI by SOEs in
the oil sands
Guidelines for investors
Places “burden of proof on foreign investors”
to meet the “net benefit” test
Goal: to reinforce the position of private
firms in the oil sands;
“acquisition of control of a Canadian oil
sands business by a foreign SOE to be [of]
net benefit to Canada on an exceptional basis
only”
investor’s concerns:
o prove commercial orientation
o free from political influence
o adherence to Canadian laws and
standards
o “sound corporate governance and
transparency”
o support productivity and efficiency of
Canadian industries
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-

-

Concern (2) monitored by the Minister
of Industry:
o “adverse effects on efficiency,
productivity, and
competitiveness” of acquired
companies
Rationale:
o may negatively affect
Canadian economy

-

Minister of industry responsible for:
o Monitoring SOE transactions
o Checking if meet ‘net benefit’ test
o Check influence of SOEs on the
Canadian business and industry preacquisition
o Political influence over SOE
o Protect “private sector orientation of
an industry”

Table 4.1: SOE Specific Guidelines under the ICA

Since Canada had no specific SOE-related guidelines until 2007, SOEs’ investment has
grown at a rapid pace. This rapid growth of investment sparked a protectionist sentiment against
SOEs amongst Canadians that spurred further regulatory measures in 2012. The regulatory
expansion is an example of the circular causation that I noted in the earlier chapter, where the
regulatory guidelines have tightened in responses to the inflow of Chinese FDI. According to
Woo (2014), these regulations marked the ‘First Phase’ of anti-SOE scrutiny in the Canadian
FDI-related regulations. Under the new guidelines, the regulators will examine whether SOEs
conform to Canadian corporate governance principles and reporting; adhere to Canadian laws
and practices; provide economic contribution; have limited ties with their home state; and
operate on a commercial basis (Investment Canada Act Guidelines 2017). While these new
guidelines released to regulate SOEs investing in Canada apply equally to all investors, anecdotal
evidence suggests that Asian SOEs, in particular, those from China, were targeted by the new set
of regulations. However, Neil Campbell (2017), an expert on the ICA regime, suggests that
ICA’s guidelines do not target investors on the basis of their country of origin instead these
regulations are directed at all SOEs.
In summary, the ICA serves as a gatekeeper that filters and shapes foreign investment
entering Canada. Under the ICA, Chinese SOEs acquiring assets over the given threshold must
pass the ‘net benefit’ test. They may also be required to pass the ‘national security’ test if the
investment threatens Canadian security. If Chinese SOEs pass these tests they will be able to
acquire hydrocarbon assets in Canada; however, it is likely that their acquisition strategy will be
shaped by the undertakings that they have submitted to the ICA for review. Summing up, I
propose that the investment by Chinese SOEs will be shaped by the ICA, which itself is
changing in response to rising investment from SOEs.
Formal Institutions: Domestic Regulations and Property Rights
The second set of regulatory institutions that influence Chinese FDI in the Canadian
hydrocarbon sector are domestic laws and property rights. This sub-section will briefly outline a
set of laws and statutes central to the hydrocarbon sector in Canada before discussing property
rights. Both sets of institutions are legally enforceable and can be utilized by the Canadian
stakeholders to challenge FDI across hydrocarbon projects, which may negatively impact
investment decisions.
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Canadian federal and provincial governments have passed various laws and statutes that
apply to the hydrocarbon sector. At the federal level, there are several acts, such as the Canada
Oil and Gas Operations Act of 1985, which was designed to govern licensing, operations, and
production of hydrocarbons that are not governed under provincial legislation or the Aboriginal
title. At the provincial level, individual provinces have developed laws to govern their
hydrocarbon industry. An example of a provincial Act governing hydrocarbons is Alberta’s
Mines and Minerals Act (Revised Statures of Alberta 2000, Chapter M-17, 2016). The various
laws are implemented and revised by a set of regulatory agencies and departments. The National
Energy Board (NEB) and the Natural Resource Canada, among others, govern hydrocarbon
resources located in federal jurisdictions. Individual provinces also have several ministries and
bureaus, such as British Columbia’s Ministry of Energy and Mines and Alberta’s Energy
Regulator, that manage hydrocarbon industry across their respective jurisdictions. These
regulatory institutions provide a set of central guiding principles for the hydrocarbon industry.
The set principles are shaped by stakeholders that can challenge hydrocarbon projects on
the basis of property rights, which define legal ownership over property, including land and
natural resources. There are two types of property holders – landowners and Indigenous groups –
whose interests are protected by the legal system in Canada. In Canada, Indigenous groups hold
extensive property rights under the Aboriginal land title that was first acknowledged under the
Canadian Constitution Act of 1982. This Act has acknowledged and reaffirmed “[t]he existing
aboriginal and treaty rights” (Constitution Act 1982, Section 35-1). The 1982 Act was reaffirmed
by the Supreme Court of Canada in the landmark case of Calder v British Columbia (1993). As
the Supreme Court clarified in its later resolutions, the Aboriginal title gives First Nations’
communities “the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title”
(Delgamuukw v. British Columbia 1997). In a 2014 court case between Tsilhqot’in Nation and
British Columbia (2014, SSC 44), the application of the law expanded as the Court has stipulated
that the title “is not confined to specific sites of settlement but extends to tracts of land that were
regularly used for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting resources and over which the group
exercised effective control at the time of assertion of European sovereignty”.
The land title provides Indigenous groups with legal protections that can be used to
defend their title to the land. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada has established that the
Crown has a duty to consult the Indigenous peoples and accommodate their concerns about
activities that will have an impact on their land (Haida Nation v. British Columbia 2004; Taku
River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia Supreme Court 2004). Thus, the process of
consultation and accommodation is firmly enshrined in the Canadian legal documents that form a
precedent for subsequent court cases.
Since Indigenous groups hold a title to their lands, the Crown must consult and
accommodate their interests when proposing to develop new hydrocarbon projects that will be
built on the land that belongs to specific Indigenous groups. Although the Crown may delegate
the duty to consult and accommodate to corporate actors 30 (Terry, Helbronner, and Lax 2015), it
Delegation process, as it is currently institutionalized, does not diminish the Crown’s responsibility to consult
with the Indigenous groups. On the contrary, delegation is meant to supplement consultation that will occur between
the Crown and the Indigenous groups.
30
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remains responsible for overseeing the process. If the process of consultation and
accommodation implemented by the companies is inadequate, the government intervenes and
takes over. Additionally, Indigenous peoples can use legal avenues to delay and frustrate new
projects, but this is often prohibitively expensive for the community (Sarson 2018). As Sarson
(2018) noted in the interview, this process can significantly increase costs for the proponent and
stall projects beyond the point of visibility. If the court rules that the proponent has not fulfilled
obligations related to the duty to consult, the proponent is obligated to halt the project until
sufficient consultation can occur (Sarson 2018).
The legal system thus provides a set of institutional mechanisms for the Indigenous
communities and other right-holders to govern FDI in the hydrocarbon sector. In practice,
Indigenous groups can rely on the Canadian legal system to initiate litigation against the
Canadian government or a private corporation when either of them infringes upon the Aboriginal
title. Indigenous groups may also resort to international law and United Nations statutes, such as
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, that protect the rights of
Indigenous people. These institutional mechanisms provide Indigenous communities with a
political leverage required to influence extractive projects and ultimately influence foreign
investment in the hydrocarbon sector. As noted earlier, Indigenous groups are not the only
stakeholders that can influence extractive projects as I will demonstrate in the next section.

Stakeholders
Stakeholders are the final component of my theoretical model. They are composed of
individuals or groups that drive policy forward by interacting with domestic institutions and
foreign investors. As noted earlier, there are four stakeholder groups that influence political
decisions in my model – the Canadian government, the public/civil society, the Indigenous
Peoples, and the industry/corporate players. Each of these broad categories subsumes smaller
entities that can unite to form multiple groups within a single unit. For example, the category of
the Canadian government hides several subgroups, such as different levels of government (i.e.
the federal and provincial government branches), individual departments, political parties, and
members of parliament. The public is composed of all individuals living in Canada, and, thus, is
the broadest category that may include members that belong to other categories. Indigenous
peoples are a more straightforward category that subsumes individual groups and associations
with distinct land claims and cultures. Lastly, the industry refers to businesses that are related to
the hydrocarbon industry or those that are impacted by it. This section traces how each of the
four stakeholders may impact Chinese FDI in Canada by examining a set of metaphorical
licenses that each of the groups grants to foreign investors.
As I indicated in the methodology section in chapter three, foreign investors need to
obtain three sets of licenses to operate in Canada -– a political license, a social license, and a
market license. A political license is granted by the Canadian government and can be
conceptualized as a political support for the project. In Canada, a political license alone is
insufficient for a company to carry out a hydrocarbon project. Domestic and foreign companies
also require a social license, which is granted by the civil society and Indigenous groups. A
market license is also important in Canada, where competing businesses can challenge foreign
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investment in a given project. If a foreign investor lacks a social or market license to operate,
Canadian stakeholders can appeal to regulatory institutions to challenge the investment. In this
way, each of the stakeholders holds sway over policy on Chinese FDI.
To understand how these licenses can be evoked by each of the stakeholders, I explore
how each of these groups may influence Chinese FDI. While doing so, I also identify statesociety and state-business relations to explore how the Canadian government, civil society
actors, and businesses interact to influence the final decision on Chinese FDI. This section will
be divided into four components – each focused on an individual stakeholder group. In the first
of these four sections, I will discuss the role that the Canadian government – both federal and
provincial – plays in the governance of natural resources. Second, I will examine the role of the
Canadian public in influencing the government’s decisions about Chinese FDI. In the third
section, I will focus on Indigenous groups that can challenge hydrocarbon projects located in the
segments of land for which they hold a title. Finally, I will analyze the role of corporate actors in
shaping government’s decisions about extractive projects in Canada. As I argue in this section,
each of the stakeholders can mobilize and use political institutions as a mechanism to shape
decisions about the specific investments and projects in the extractive sectors. In light of these
dynamics, this section seeks to understand how these mechanisms are applied and what are their
implications for Chinese SOEs investing in Canada.
The Canadian Government and Political License
The Canadian government is at the pinnacle of the decision making and regulatory
pyramid as it provides a political license or permission for foreign and domestic corporations to
operate in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. This power is distributed unevenly among the
various agencies and bureaus of the government. Since Canada is a federal parliamentary
democracy, the power is divided among federal, provincial, and territorial governments by the
Canadian Constitutional Act of 1867. This Act determines individual responsibilities across the
different levels of government and serves as a guide for dividing governance responsibilities.
Given such distribution of power, this section discusses the role of individual governments in
regulating FDI and managing exploration of Canadian natural resources.
The federal government influences foreign investment by determining inter-provincial
and national trade issues, dealing with cross-jurisdiction pipelines, developing environmental
regulation, and regulating natural resource exploitation in the Canadian North, the offshore
marine areas, and on the Indigenous lands. More specifically, the federal government oversees
resources located outside the provinces and deals with issues that cross provincial border
(Constitutional Act of 1867, Section 109). The legislative branch of the Canadian government
also develops and drafts regulations and laws that are re-interpreted by the Canadian
policymakers, who formulate decisions about foreign investment. The executive branch of the
federal government and its agencies are, in turn, responsible for assessing foreign investment
coming to Canada through the ICA. As noted in the earlier section, the ICA allows the federal
government to manage FDI by either blocking foreign investment from entering Canada or
shaping a proposed investment through a set of undertakings that foreign investor promises to
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undertake. The activities of the federal government are supplemented by provincial and
territorial governance bodies.
Provincial and territorial governments regulate the development of the hydrocarbon
resources found on their territory and extract revenue from their development as per the
Constitutional Act of 1867 (Section 109). For example, both governments set taxation policies
among other things. Both types of governments also run the bidding process and grant
exploration licenses for hydrocarbon fields located on their territory. As there are ten provinces
and three territories among which hydrocarbon regulation differs, foreign investors must adjust
to the rules that exist in each of the political divisions. Provincial governments interact with the
federal government to manage the exploration of natural resources and regulate FDI by
designing and implementing relevant regulations. In this process, the state along with its various
agencies interacts with the society and corporations appealing to the aforementioned principles
of neoliberalism.
It is important to note that there are internal tensions among the individual political
parties on some of the major issues. Canadian leadership at the provincial and federal level
appears to be divided on the topic of Chinese FDI. At the federal level, there is opposition to
large-scale Chinese investment from the New Democratic Party (NDP) and the Green Party. The
division will be illustrated in the subsequent chapter when I analyze the government’s position
on the CNOOC-Nexen’s takeover that resulted in a rift among the Canadian federal parties. The
provincial divide will be explored in detail in the case of LNG in British Columbia in the next
chapter. Finally, it is important to note that the government’s decisions are not just shaped by
policymakers and members of the parliament as both are influenced by public opinion, which
shapes their final decision.
The Role of the Society and Social License
Canadian society/public provides a social license for businesses to operate in Canada.
The public is the broadest category that encompasses multiple stakeholders. Due to its size and
multiplicity of beliefs, associations, and cultures, it is difficult for this group to organize.
However, some members of the public can unite into groups/organizations around specific issues
and interests, which may underpin a concrete strategy. Relatedly, segments of the public can
coordinate voting strategies to sway electoral mechanisms in pursuit of a common agenda, such
as “vote anyone but X” campaigns. However, coordinated voting and group activities are not
practiced by all of the members of the public. Given the breadth of the category, individuals hold
a multiplicity of beliefs and associations that make generalizations impossible. The members of
the public, who are united around a single cause, can use several mechanisms to sway political
decisions – write letters to the government, sign petitions or exercise their democratic power by
voting out the party that adopted a specific policy. Generally, the most vocal groups are the ones
that may be suffering from environmental or societal implications of foreign investment in the
hydrocarbon sector.
As noted in the previous section, public opinion can sway government’s decisions on
important topics, including extractive projects and Chinese FDI. Michelle Luk, a researcher at
the Oil Group, notes that “local communities are becoming more relevant in the governance of
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energy development in Canada, playing a key role in policy decision making” (2016, 1).
Conversely, Hale (2014) cautions that the public is not the “primary factor… leading
governments to veto major takeovers,…[however,] its influence may become decisive if
Canadian governmental or business elites are deeply divided on the merits of particular
transactions” (359). Nonetheless, the government and polling agencies closely monitor the
attitude of Canadians on a set of hot-button issues, such as Chinese investment in Canada. In this
instance, public opinion about a specific foreign investor may serve as an indicator of an
approach the government may adopt to regulate a given investor.
Canadian polling agencies have conducted several surveys to measure the attitude of
Canadians toward Chinese investment. The most comprehensive surveys measuring the
perception of the Canadian public toward Chinese investors were carried out by two Canadian
polling agencies, the Asia Pacific Foundation (APF 2016) and the Abacus Data (Anderson
2016). APF’s (2016, 7) poll results indicate that Canadians are “distrustful of foreign stateowned enterprises…investing in Canada”. The survey data suggest that the majority of
Canadians polled (80 per cent) by the APF (2016) are opposed to the investment by Chinese
SOEs in Canada. Data generated by Abacus indicate that 39 per cent of Canadians are not
supportive of Chinese investment in the oil sector, 44 per cent are conditionally supportive of
Chinese FDI in the oil sector, while the remaining 17 per cent indicated their full support for
Chinese investment (Anderson 2016). Similar numbers can be observed when respondents were
asked about Chinese investment in the extraction of natural gas; 35 per cent of Canadians
indicated that they are against Chinese FDI in natural gas, 47 per cent appeared supportive
provided that the investment met certain conditions, and the remaining 19 per cent declared that
they are supportive of Chinese FDI in natural gas (Anderson 2016).
The two polling agencies also indicate that the polled Canadians were generally opposed
to Chinese ownership of hydrocarbon assets in Canada. Abacus’s data indicates that Canadians
are generally against Chinese ownership in the oil (53 per cent) and natural gas (55 per cent)
sectors (Anderson 2016). The results also reveal that only 15 per cent of those polled indicated
that they support Chinese investment in the oil and gas industry, while the remaining percentage
of those polled have indicated that they may conditionally support Chinese investment – 33 per
cent were conditionally supportive of Chinese investment in the oil sector and 31 per cent in the
gas sector. Based on this data, one can conclude that Canadians are very suspicious about
Chinese investment in the hydrocarbon industry. Interestingly, APF’s poll indicates that
Canadians who participated in the survey are generally supportive of selling oil and gas
resources to Asia, with 56 per cent in support of natural gas sales to Asia (APF 2016, 34). Since
China is geographically part of Asia, one can conclude that Canadians may also support oil and
gas trade with China. Based on these data, one may conclude that Canadians are more supportive
of closer trade relations and are more sceptical of China’s growing FDI in the Canadian energy
sector.
Given the observed hostility of the Canadian public toward Chinese investment, one can
anticipate that the public will be very skeptical about Chinese SOEs’ investment in Canada. This
skepticism may cause problems for Chinese investors as the public may form into organized
groups that will lobby the Canadian government against Chinese investment. As noted earlier,
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individual members of the public can sway political opinion by raising their concerns during a
public consultation period about specific projects or by convincing politicians via
correspondence to block a certain investment deal. In the past, Canadian citizens have been very
active in self-organization and have staged several demonstrations against specific projects that
they did not support. The anti-Northern Gateway protests, which will be explored in the next
chapter, demonstrated the power of the Canadian public in shaping final investment decisions.
Individual members of the public may also create and run NGOs or protest groups that
can lobby the government to facilitate a policy change in response to rising FDI. Thus, one can
conclude that the Canadian public has a set of strategies to influence government’s decision
about Chinese investment. This power is especially acute when some members of the public
unite and organize a campaign around a specific issue. It should be noted that public opinion and
perception is not constant and changes over time. As an illustration, the opinion of Québécois
Canadians about Canada’s engagement with China has improved in the post-Trump environment
as indicated in a recent article by Evans, Li and Massot (2018). Therefore, it is possible that the
members of the public may shift their position regarding specific projects over time.
An anonymous interviewee (2018) suggested that the Canadian government is responsive
to the electorate’s perception as it follows public and internal polling data when making a policy
decision about approving/rejecting foreign investment. Thus, as the interviewee (2018) reveals
that changes in public opinion have an important impact on the government’s relative openness
to investment from China. As the Canadian public becomes more open to closer economic
relations with China, the Canadian government has more leverage to pursue bilateral investment
and trade deals with China. Thus, the public perception is a very important consideration when
examining political and social license as the two are closely interrelated in democratic countries,
like Canada. As mentioned earlier, the public influences decisions made by the government but
does not generally hold a veto power over that decision. The only exception to this is found in
the case of the Indigenous groups, which can resort to a legal action to wield a veto power over
specific greenfield hydrocarbon projects.
Indigenous Peoples and Social License
Indigenous groups are endowed with a legally potent power to influence the
governments’ decisions regarding natural resources. Canadian institutions have evolved over
time to provide Indigenous groups with the power to shape environmental governance (Grant et
al. 2014; Maclean, Robinson and Natcher 2015); yet, that is not to say that these rights and
privileges are universal and apply to all Indigenous peoples across Canada (Maclean, Robinson,
and Natcher 2015). The rights and privileges of Indigenous groups are defined by their relations
with the provincial and federal branches of the Canadian government (Rossiter and Wood 2015;
Maclean, Robinson, and Natcher 2015). The broader ideology of neoliberalism often clashes
with the Aboriginal title, especially in the provinces with an “unstable property” regime, such as
British Columbia, where the courts have stepped in to reinforce Aboriginal rights to the land
(Rossiter and Wood 2015, 901). Despite these ambiguities in the Aboriginal title, Indigenous
groups have gained “priority rights” over natural resources located in their territories and should
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be consulted prior to the commencement of any new extractive project (Climate Action Network
Canada 2012).
Indigenous groups can resort to regulatory institutions, which were discussed in the
previous section, to ensure that their rights are upheld by the Canadian legal system. Scholars
examining participation of Indigenous groups in the governance of natural resources have
identified two types of strategies that these groups can use to influence policymaking: a)
“consensus building”, when they collaborate with the government to develop common solutions
to the problems; and, b) “constructive conflict”, where Indigenous groups seek to produce a
change in the existing regulations through protest or other modes of action that express their
dissatisfaction (Maclean, Robinson and Natcher 2015). In addition to these two methods,
Indigenous groups can resort to institutional mechanisms, such as consultation and
accommodation along with the impact-benefits agreements that are firmly enshrined in the
Canadian legal statutes and court proceedings that provide a precedent for legal action. The legal
system is an institutional mechanism that Indigenous communities can use to govern FDI in the
hydrocarbon sector. Hence, Indigenous communities play a very important role in shaping
extractive projects in Canada.
In general, Indigenous groups have presented a largely coherent message – that of the
Indigenous peoples’ stewardship of the land - across different institutions and fora. They have
expressed a desire to protect the Canadian environment from the extractive projects that will
damage the livelihood of future generations. While there is a single coherent message that ties
the Indigenous communities together, each of the Indigenous communities may choose to take a
different stance on specific regulatory issues or projects. Some communities emphasize the
benefits of the extractive industries for their communities, while others are concerned about the
impact of resource extraction on their livelihoods. To pursue their goals, Indigenous groups have
often partnered with NGOs, who advocate on their behalf domestically and internationally.
However, the advocacy aspect has been problematic in the past as the anti-development
messages that NGOs champion may at times misrepresent interests of the Indigenous groups,
which want to partner with extractive companies to develop natural resources (Cattaneo 2017).
The Role of Market Actors and Business License
The last stakeholders that will be discussed in this section are the Canadian-based
hydrocarbon companies. These companies can influence decisions of the Canadian government
regarding extractive projects. As a liberal market economy, Canada is shaped by commercial
principles of competition, deregulation, and “regulatory neutrality” (Hale 2014, 355-356). This
produces a “firm-centered, shareholder-oriented regime for corporate governance, including
rules governing its relatively open, competitive market for corporate control; and the
accommodation of constitutionally entrenched provincial natural resource regimes” (Hale 2014,
368). In this system, hydrocarbon firms are financially powerful actors that compete against each
other and use economic resources to influence political decisions related to the hydrocarbon
sector through monetary channels.
Generally, actors in the hydrocarbon industry are very coherent in pursuing their
objectives. Industry players have a set of mechanisms to advance their interests. Organized under
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the industry union, CAPP, the main actors in the hydrocarbon industry often champion a
coherent message about their goals/interests. Aside from the CAPP, individual oil and gas
corporations have lobbyists that support corporate goals, which are advanced by specific firms or
by the industry in general. Oil lobbies are quite active in Canada as they influence the
government’s decision on specific projects and initiatives in the hydrocarbon sector (Nikiforuk
2010; Cayley-Daoust and Girard 2012, 2). A report by the Polaris Institute, released in 2012,
estimated that between July 2008 and November 2012, twenty-seven oil corporations and eight
industry associations 31 met with the public office holders through lobbyists (Cayley-Daoust and
Girard 2012, 2-3).
In addition to the lobbying efforts, market actors provide financial contributions to
specific political parties or to the community programs. Fraser, Mannani, and Stefancik (2015)
find that corporations operating in the Canadian oil and gas sector are important donors to
political parties in Canada (147). Financial links to the government combined with the lobbying
efforts may shape political decisions that the government makes. It is also possible that
businesses can challenge their competitors through these lobbying efforts and campaigns. For
instance, businesses worried about their competition may ask the government for additional
protections or support as I will demonstrate in the case study section. Therefore, it is important
for foreign companies to acquire a market license to operate. One way to do so is by partnering
with local companies.
Financial contributions to local communities through stakeholder management programs
may also sway public opinion. Therefore, companies often engage in CSR practices and
programs that center on voluntary contributions to local groups. Companies also focus on
stakeholder engagement strategies to gain public support. These programs and strategies are
adjusted to the needs of local societies. For example, in Canada, SOEs are expanding their
consultation with the Indigenous communities and taking over an aspect of the “duty to consult”
from the shoulders of the government (Wanvik 2016, 524). These social campaigns and political
campaign carried out by oil companies are useful tools to gain a social and political license to
operate in a given society.
Ultimately, corporate actors play a secondary role in the political decision-making
process. They can transmit their preference about a specific project or foreign investor to the
Canadian policymakers through a lobbying campaign or a consultation process, such as the one
organized by the NEB. Still, the government’s decision is ultimately the outcome of a
bureaucratic deliberation process that takes into account the viewpoints of all stakeholders in
Canada. As noted in this section, businesses can use targeted campaigns or extend financial
packages as part of the impact-benefit agreements or CSR campaigns to persuade civil society
and Indigenous groups to support their project. Corporate actors can not only influence decisions
of other stakeholders, they can also withhold a market license from Chinese SOEs. Therefore, it
is important for Chinese SOEs to ensure support from Canadian companies when investing in the
hydrocarbon sector.

31

These numbers include both IOCs and SOEs.
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Bringing the Actors Together
By bringing together the four sets of stakeholders – the government, civil society,
Indigenous groups, and corporations – operating within the Canadian political institutions we
uncover a complex interaction between the individual groups. In pursuit of their objectives,
individual stakeholders or groups interact with each other to produce unique outcomes that are
reinforced by regulatory institutions. A foreign investor interested in establishing his/her
businesses in Canada must acquire support from the Canadian government, which issues a
political license for a business to operate. This license is shaped by inter-governmental debates,
public opinion, and corporate lobbying efforts among other factors. A foreign investor will
benefit from also obtaining a social and market licenses to operate; the former is granted by the
Canadian public and Indigenous groups, while the latter is extended by the Canadian businesses.
The foreign/domestic company that acquires all three sets of licenses - political, social,
and market – will find it easier to operate in the Canadian hydrocarbon industry. This is not to
say that the company has to acquire all three sets of licenses as the business may be able to
operate even if it has only obtained a political license. However, if it lacks the other two licenses
there is a likelihood that the political license can be revoked. In this case, the government can
withdraw its support for Chinese investment in the hydrocarbon projects. Relatedly, if the
political license has not been granted yet, the government may choose to withhold this license
from the investor in the face of a widespread opposition staged by civil society and/or market
actors
The complex interaction between the four sets of stakeholders increases the uncertainty
for foreign investors as they cannot predict whether their project will be permitted given that it
must pass these three metaphorical hoops to acquire political, market, and social licenses. The
four stakeholders are interacting with other variables in my theoretical model. Domestic
stakeholders interact with (and, at times, reshape) domestic regulatory institutions that regulate
FDI. As noted earlier, policymakers and bureaucrats are responsible for applying and modifying
the ICA in response to changing corporate/public needs. Likewise, stakeholders can appeal to a
legal institution to dispute any infringement on their property rights or title. Additionally,
bilateral economic relations between the investors’ home and host state are also an outcome of
domestic interests and factors championed by individual stakeholders.

Conclusion: Assembling the Theoretical Model
The objective of this chapter was to develop a model to explain why Chinese SOEs are
sometimes successful in establishing their operations in Canada’s hydrocarbon sector and at
other times not. Since Chinese SOEs predominantly participate in the Canadian hydrocarbon
industry through FDI, the model focuses on the reception of their investment. The model
proposes that the ability of Chinese SOEs’ to participate in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector will
be determined by three factors –inter-state relations, formal and informal institutions, and
stakeholders. Institutions – regulatory and ideological - and stakeholder politics are central to my
explanation of the ability of Chinese investors to operate in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector.
The remaining factor - bilateral inter-state relations – is a variable that creates a favourable
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environment for FDI but does not explain its success. These three variables are captured in the
model depicted in figure 4.4.

Inter-state
Relations

SOEs investment

Ideology
Investment above
reviewable threshold*

Investment below
reviewable threshold*

Investment Canada Act
('net benefit test' /
'national security test'
(if required))

National Security
Test (if required)
Resubmit
(x1)

Rejection

Approval

Acceptance
Stakeholder
Politics
Social / Political /
Market Licenses to
Operate

Rejection

Acceptance

Rejection

Figure 4.4: Model for a Review of SOE investment in Canada (•Reviewable threshold for 2017: $379 million) (the
graph does not include the Competition Act under the assumption that most of the investment from China will
increase competition in Canadian hydrocarbons.
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Inter-state relations, which are depicted by the orange oval in the graph, is the first factor
that impacts the inflow of Chinese FDI into Canada because it shapes the stakeholders’
perception of Chinese SOEs. As investment decisions can be an outcome of political
negotiations, bilateral efforts to promote collaboration in specific industries may predetermine
the inflow of investment into specific sectors of the Canadian economy. For example, British
Columbia’s recent trade and investment mission to promote the LNG sector is associated with a
rise of Chinese FDI in the LNG projects across the province. Inter-state relations may explain the
timing of the flow of Chinese FDI into Canada. While this variable explains the timing of the
entry, it cannot explain why Chinese SOEs sometimes succeed in completing their proposed
investment in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector, while at other times fail. To explain the failed
cases, we need to analyze the role of institutional factors and stakeholder politics.
I have divided institutions into two distinct groups – informal and formal. The informal
institutions in Canada are captured by the ideology of liberal democracy and neoliberal market
principles that distribute power among the stakeholders and shape their interaction within the
institutional environment. Ideology, which is depicted by the turquoise-coloured oval in the
graph, shapes the decisions of stakeholders. The impact of ideology may be manifested in two
ways. In the first instance, Chinese investors should be able to operate in Canada with minimal
interference from the state. In the second instance, the investor should be free to acquire any
business he/she likes, unless this investment threatens national security or will not be of ‘net
benefit’ to Canada. The ideology will help me to explain the nature of Chinese entry and account
for the relations between domestic stakeholders and institutions.
The formal institutions are operationalized by investment screening mechanisms and
property rights (both are regulatory institutions), which play an important role in shaping
Chinese FDI. Regulatory institutions, along with the stakeholders, are captured by a set of boxes
in Figure 4.4. Based on the theoretical model, Chinese investment may take one of two
trajectories. Under the first trajectory, SOE’s investment falls below the ICA’s reviewable
threshold and is exempted from the ‘net benefit’ test. The investment is thus able to proceed
without regulatory scrutiny, provided that it does not threaten Canada’s national security. Under
the second trajectory, the investment exceeds the reviewable threshold and will need to pass the
‘net benefit’ test.
As I mentioned in the section on the regulatory institutions, to pass the ‘net benefit’ test
the investor must submit a set of undertakings to prove that his or her investment will be of ‘net
benefit’ to the Canadian economy. At the review stage of the proposed investment, the Canadian
Minister of Industry may reject any investment that does not meet the test. If the investment is
rejected, the investor can submit an appeal that may include additional undertakings. Thus, the
‘net benefit’ test is the first hurdle that influences Chinese FDI entering Canada. If the Chinese
SOEs pass the ‘net benefit test’ (and the ‘national security test’, if necessary) the investment will
gain a permission to proceed. These two tests – the ‘net benefit’ and the ‘national security’ tests
– shape the nature of FDI even before it enters Canada. Any investment that passes these tests is
already molded into a particular shape by the regulatory institutions.
The final modification of foreign investment occurs at the societal level, where
stakeholder politics are the ultimate shapers of foreign investment that occurs in Canada. At the
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core of the stakeholder engagement is a set of metaphorical licenses – political, social, and
market ones - that foreign (as well as domestic) businesses need to acquire to operate
successfully in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. The political license denotes a political support
from the provincial and the federal government for the investment. It also indicates that the
project will be more likely to pass the regulatory hurdles during the investment review process.
The second license that the investor should obtain is the social license to operate. A social
license to operate signals public’s “acceptance and approval for [specific] projects” in the
hydrocarbon sector (Luk 2016, 5). This license is bestowed upon the business by the civil
society and Indigenous groups. Often business obtain the social license through consultation and
accommodation process with the impacted communities and groups. Lastly, there is a market
license to operate granted by the business community or industry to the investor. The project’s
proponent must gain the support of the industry players to obtain this license.
As noted earlier, an investor will find it easier to operate in Canada if he/she succeeds in
obtaining all three licenses, however, under the current conditions, the investment can proceed
with only the political one. Although a project can proceed without a social license to operate,
any project that lacks this license is prone to suffer due to public resistance. This resistance can
manifest itself through protests. In extreme cases, a lack of social license can result in a legal
action against the investor’s project. A legal action launched by the civil society (ex. NGOs or
Indigenous groups) may alter or halt the project or alter its nature/conditions. Similarly, a project
that is missing a market license to operate will be likely met from corporate opposition, which
may lobby the government against the deal.
Based on this model, I propose that a foreign investor will find it easier to operate in the
Canadian hydrocarbon sector if he/she manages to obtain all three of the licenses. Therefore,
Chinese SOEs interested in investing in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector must be prepared to
engage with all four sets of stakeholders to obtain these licenses. As Li (2017) notes, both
political and social licenses are “critical for any firm operating in the resource sector”. Thus,
Chinese SOEs have an incentive to get involved with the local communities and Indigenous
groups to obtain a social license (Li 2017). Since Chinese SOEs do not have to engage with local
communities in China, they “need to develop capabilities to deal with the other stakeholders” in
Canada (Li 2017). Given that Canada has a different set of institutional conditions it is
theoretically harder for Chinese SOEs to integrate into the Canadian resource sector. An expert
on Chinese FDI, Michael Laffin (2017), who is a former Asia Region Chair at Blake, Cassels &
Graydon LLP, has noted that the approval processes regarding First Nations, environmental, and
investment Canada approvals may complicate Chinese FDI in the hydrocarbon sector, yet they
do not deter Chinese investors from coming to Canada and pursuing investment in the oil sands.
Ultimately, I propose that Chinese participation in Canada will be determined by the
three factors identified in my model –inter-state relations, institutions, and stakeholder politics.
There are three core theoretical expectations that I have noted in this chapter; a) inter-state
relations influence the timing of the inflow of Chinese FDI32, where close Sino-Canadian ties
32

Li and Liang (2012), Sarson and Nossal (2016) and Camba (2017) suggest that close bilateral political relations
lead to an increase in the IFDI from China to host countries. Conversely, during political tensions, Chinese IFDI
tends to fall as data from China Investment Tracker illustrate (Houlden 2019).
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will increase the scope and scale of Chinese FDI in Canada, as it shapes stakeholder’s
receptiveness toward Chinese SOEs; b) Canadian formal and informal institutions, such as
investment screening mechanisms and principles of liberal market economy, will determine the
conditions under which Chinese SOEs will enter Canada and thus influence the ability of
Chinese SOEs to acquire assets in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector; c) stakeholder politics
influence the ability of Chinese investors to acquire assets in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector
through a set of licenses – social, political, and market – that become more salient when Chinese
SOEs invest in greenfield oil/gas plants. This general model that I have built in this section will
be tested in the subsequent section that focuses on a set of case studies focused on specific
investments made by Chinese SOEs in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector.

Chapter 5.

Exploring Chinese FDI in Canada: China’s Engagement in the
Oil Sands, LNG facilities, and Pipelines

Introduction
Chinese SOEs have become integrated players in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. At
the time of my analysis, Chinese SOEs had investments (or had attempted to invest) across the
entire chain of the hydrocarbon industry, including extraction (of conventional and nonconventional hydrocarbons), infrastructure, and refining. This chapter will use three case studies
– the CNOOC-Nexen deal; SOEs’ attempted investment in British Columbia’s LNG plants; and
a failed attempted investment of Chinese SOEs in the Northern Gateway pipeline - to examine
why Chinese SOEs have a mixed investment success rate across different parts of the
hydrocarbon industry in Canada. In doing so, I will apply the theoretical model constructed in
the previous chapter.
Based on this model, I argue that stakeholder politics operating within the Canadian
institutional environment have played a central role in influencing the success of Chinese SOEs
in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. Specifically, I propose that Chinese SOEs had trouble
acquiring the three licenses – social, political, and market – to operate in the Canadian
hydrocarbon sector. These licenses enable me to account for the difficulty faced by Chinese
SOEs in participating in greenfield projects in Canada. As noted earlier, foreign companies
participating in projects that require greenfield investment need to obtain all three sets of licenses
to proceed with the planned investment. On the other hand, Chinese SOEs’ participation in
brownfield investment projects, where they acquire pre-existing social and market licenses,
helped Chinese SOEs to establish and expand their operations in Canada. Thus, the greenfield
and brownfield investment distinction encapsulates the number of licenses an investor will need
to obtain to operate in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector.
My argument is based on the data from fieldwork and interviews that I carried out in
Canada in the spring/summer of 2017. The argument is formulated across three case studies of
Chinese FDI that were selected to illustrate the power of stakeholder politics in shaping Chinese
investment in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. In the first case study, I examine CNOOC’s
acquisition of Nexen, a Canadian-based oil company, for $15.1 billion USD. I chose to analyze
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this case because CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen is the largest investment deal completed by a
Chinese SOE in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. The second case examines the involvement of
Chinese SOEs in British Columbia’s nascent LNG industry. This case is composed of three LNG
projects proposed by Chinese SOEs. I chose to analyze all three available cases of Chinese FDI
in the LNG industry as at the time of my fieldwork all of the projects were in pre-implementation
stage. The final project that I examine in this section is the financial support for (and attempted
acquisition of stakes in) the proposed Northern Gateway pipeline extended by CNPC, Sinopec,
and CNOOC. I selected the Northern Gateway case as it is the only available case of Chinese
investment in the Canadian pipeline infrastructure. My analysis of these cases provides a unique
empirical contribution to the existing research as scholars have not examined Chinese
engagement across these projects in a systematic fashion.
This chapter is organized into five sections to trace these propositions. These sections are
divided into two broad parts – one focuses on Chinese engagement in Canada in general, while
the other focuses on the aforementioned case studies. The first section provides a brief outline of
Chinese engagement in the Canadian energy sector, while the second gives a general overview of
the strategies adopted by Chinese corporations investing in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector.
The second part of this chapter focuses on the three case studies. The CNOOC-Nexen case
illustrates a relative (or failed) success of a brownfield investment made by a Chinese SOE in
Canada. The second case study, which focuses on the three LNG projects supported by Chinese
SOEs, illustrates the complexity of stakeholder politics involved in a set of proposed greenfield
investments in Canada. The last case study focuses on the social and political factors that have
led to the failure of the Northern Gateway pipeline. The goal of these case studies is to uncover
the role played by the Canadian stakeholders and institutions in determining the success of
Chinese investors in acquiring assets in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. The final section of
this chapter provides a set of concluding remarks that reflect the nature of Chinese SOEs’
participation in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector.

Tracing Chinese Investment in the Canadian Hydrocarbon Sector
In order to situate Chinese FDI in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector, this section reviews
the stages of Chinese investment over time. Canada has substantial potential to establish a closer
relationship with China on the energy front. Empirical data that I gathered during my fieldwork
and desk research reveal that Chinese investment in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector 33 has been
sporadic and came in waves over time. To understand the dynamics and identify the trends
associated with Chinese investment, this section will trace the investment made by the Chinese
SOEs and private corporations in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. It links Chinese FDI with the
broader theoretical model that I have outlined in the previous section. As this section
demonstrates, there are four stages (or waves) of Chinese FDI in Canada – the exploratory,
learning, expansionary, and contractionary stages (in chronological order). These stages broadly
correspond to corporate strategies of Chinese businesses investing in the Canadian oil and gas
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In this case, Chinese investment refers to FDI by SOEs and private oil companies.
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sector and reflect the specific alignments of inter-state relations, institutions, and stakeholders at
a particular time.
The foray of Chinese SOEs into the Canadian hydrocarbon sector is led by three large
SOEs – CNOOC, CNPC, and Sinopec – and their subsidiaries – Phoenix Energy Holdings
Limited (CNPC), Brion34 (CNPC), Sinopec Canada (Sinopec), and more recently Nexen
(CNOOC). From 2009 to 2013, these three enterprises invested C$35 billion – which is equal to
a third of FDI coming from China to Canada during that period (Jiang 2015). Over a third of this
amount can be attributed to CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen. These companies have
predominantly acquired capital-intensive, unconventional resources, such as the oil sands, while
liquefied natural gas and conventional oil appeared to be of secondary importance to Chinese
investors.
Individual investments by Chinese enterprises in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector are
depicted on a timeline in Figure 5.1. The timeline runs from 2003 to 2017 and includes names of
individual investors, acquired corporations/projects, and lists shares in terms of the percentage
acquired by the Chinese investor. In a single year, there may be multiple investments by Chinese
companies in Canada; these are separated by a slash on the timeline. The timeline is based on the
data I compiled from media, corporate documents, databases, grey literature, and journal articles.
I have selected only the investments confirmed by multiple sources to ensure that the reported
investments have indeed occurred. These investments correspond to the four stages of Chinese
investment noted earlier – the exploratory, learning, expansionary, and contractionary.
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Phoenix Energy and Brion were subsumed under the large SOEs in Canada in 2017 and trace of their corporate
activity is no longer publicly available.
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Figure 5.1: Timeline of Chinese Investment in Canada

An exploratory stage of Chinese investment began in the late 1990s and ended in the
early 2000s. This stage was marked by a first wave of Chinese investment into Canada. During
this stage, the investment was relatively small and was led by a single SOE – CNPC. In 1992,
CNPC registered its operations in Canada and set up an oil and gas exploration company.
Subsequently, in 1993, CNPC acquired shares in eight oil and gas blocks in Alberta and
Saskatchewan. In the following year, CNPC acquired 15.8 per cent shares in the North Twinning
Oil Field project and 11.5 per cent shares in a natural gas processing plant (China National
Petroleum Corporation 2017). In total, China acquired oil reserves worth C$11.64 million in
Canada during those two years (Downs 2006). At this stage of Chinese investment, SinoCanadian relations were expanding under Prime Minister Mulroney’s leadership as noted in the
earlier section. The other two variables from my theoretical model – stakeholder politics and
institutions – were likely either supportive or indifferent about Chinese investment at the time.
As evidence suggests, at the early stages of Chinese investment in Canada, Chinese SOEs
benefited from “broader acceptance” as they were compared to other SOEs from Norway or
Brazil (McCarthy 2017). This explains why the initial reaction of the Canadians to large
investment deals by SOEs was generally perceived as positive (McCarthy 2017).
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Chinese SOEs waited for almost 11 years35 after the initial investment foray before
initiating their second stage – the learning stage - of investment into Canada. The term learning
stage indicates that both Chinese SOEs and Canadian stakeholders have been adjusting their
strategy towards each other as Chinese investment expanded. This stage of Chinese FDI into the
Canadian hydrocarbon sector lasted from 2004 to mid-2012. It is characterized by multiple,
smaller-scale investments in existing business and hydrocarbon operations (i.e. brownfield
investment). Investment transactions initiated at this stage fit under the framework of mergers
and acquisitions (M&As) and joint ventures; some corporations also acquired shareholding
interests in the existing projects. During this stage, all Chinese hydrocarbon SOEs, as well as
other Chinese investment bodies, participated in the investment process. This stage witnessed
several minor investment deals by each of the SOEs. Jointly these deals helped Chinese investors
to expand their presence in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector.
During the ‘learning period’, Sinopec exponentially expanded its presence in Canada. In
2005, Sinopec acquired 40 per cent of the Northern Light project developed by Total E.P. After
working on this project with Total E.P. for four years, Sinopec acquired another 10 per cent in
the project boosting its ownership of the project’s shares to 50 per cent in 2009. In the same year,
Sinopec also acquired Addax Petroleum Corporation. Next year, in 2010, Sinopec invested in
Syncrude. First, Sinopec acquired 9 per cent of the company’s stake for $4.75 billion (Natural
Resources Canada 2016). In the following year (2011), Sinopec expanded its activities in the
Canadian hydrocarbon sector by acquiring Daylight Energy and forming a joint venture with
Enbridge to develop the Northern Gateway pipeline.
CNOOC also played an important part during this wave of acquisitions. In 2005, it
invested $150 million in MEG Energy Corporation to acquire 16.7 per cent of the firm. In 2011,
CNOOC acquired a failing Canadian company – OPTI Canada – for $2.2 billion (Natural
Resources Canada 2016). By assuming its obligations, CNOOC pre-empted OPTI’s bankruptcy
at the time. CNOOC has also acquired interests in multiple upstream projects in Canada,
including Aurora oil sands (7.23 per cent of shares), Hangingstone (25 per cent of shares), Long
Lake (100 per cent of shares), MacKay River (100 per cent of shares), Meadow Creek East (25
percent of shares), and Mildred Lake (7.23 per cent of shares) (BMI Canada 2017). It took
CNOOC just a few years in the mid-2000s to build a diversified portfolio of hydrocarbon assets
in Canada.
At this stage, CNPC also remained an active participant in the Canadian hydrocarbon
industry. In 2007, CNPC won exploration rights to 11 oil sands projects and purchased its first
controlling stake in the oil sands. In 2009, CNPC’s subsidiary, PetroChina, invested $5 billion in
Athabasca oil sands to acquire 60 per cent stake in two underdeveloped projects. In 2012,
PetroChina (represented by Phoenix Energy Holdings Limited / Brion Energy) acquired 20
percent of Groundbirch tight gas and bought 40 per cent of shares in MacKay River oil sands
project for $670 million. After acquiring the 40 per cent of the shares for MacKay River project,
35

There is no publicly available information that explains the ‘waiting period’ between China’s first investments in
the energy sector in the early-1990s and the subsequent wave of FDI. One plausible explanation is that the ‘Go
Global’ has not been launched until 1999/2000 and it is possible that Canadian energy sector at the time was not a
priority.
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PetroChina became the sole owner of the project. During the same year, PetroChina also
acquired 49.9 per cent of Encana’s Duverney shale gas project for $2.2 billion (Natural
Resources Canada 2016). As part of this shopping spree, CNPC purchased an interest in Grand
Rapids Pipeline in 2012, where it holds a 50 per cent interest in a non-operational joint venture
with TransCanada. During this stage, CNPC’s portfolio in Canada diversified substantially and
now includes multiple hydrocarbon assets.
Following Chinese oil and gas SOEs, Chinese investment agencies also decided to join
the global investment spree in the hydrocarbon sector. The China Investment Corporation (CIC)
became very active in the Canadian oil sands in the mid-2000s. In 2009, the CIC acquired 17.2
per cent of Teck Resources Ltd. for $1.7 billion Canadian dollars. In 2010, the CIC formed a
joint venture with Penn West Exploration. In exchange for the CIC’s investment, Penn West
offered the CIC a 45 per cent stake in the oil sand properties, Seal Main. The CIC also
participated in the acquisition of shares in the Sunshine Oilsands Ltd in 2012 along with other
institutional investors. The CIC focused its investment on the acquisition of shares in oil projects,
which was likely a part of a grander strategy to diversify its investment portfolio. It is plausible
that the CIC saw these investments as an opportunity to learn about investing in the Canadian
hydrocarbon sector.
This second wave of Chinese investment into Canada’s hydrocarbons was characterized
by SOEs’ attempt to acquire minority positions in the existing projects and business. After
acquiring a minority position in a Canadian-based hydrocarbon firm or in a project run by an
established company in Canada, Chinese investors became “strategic partners” to their Canadian
counterparts. Majority of investments made by Sinopec, CNPC, and CNOOC during this stage
fell into this category. An analyst looking at Chinese investment strategy during this period
speculated that this strategy was adopted “to avoid the political problems of assuming control of
resource projects” (Grant 2012, ii; 14). The analyst’s assumption correctly underscores the
importance of political factors in Canada in shaping Chinese investment. In this case, a minority
position allows Chinese corporations to take a back seat and to learn about the local policies and
stakeholder relations before taking a more prominent position in the Canadian companies.
Although Chinese investors have generally invested in projects where they were minority
players, they also took over failing businesses by acquiring whole companies. In the majority of
cases where Chinese SOEs acquired a full-ownership of a Canadian hydrocarbon firm, the
acquired company was undergoing financial difficulties (Grant 2012, iii). An example of this
type of acquisition is PetroChina’s investment in Athabasca’s MacKay River and Dover projects.
In both projects, PetroChina started out as a minority investor but promised that it will acquire
the rest of the business in the future. For Athabasca’s assets, PetroChina’s acquisition of the
MacKay River and Dover projects coincided with the economic downturn that has pressured the
original owners to sell Athabasca’s assets to the Chinese investors. A similar strategy was used
by Sinopec to acquire the Daylight project. Another exception to the “minority investor” trend
was when CNPC invested in the oil assets that were not tied to an existing oil company.
Canadian stakeholders have adjusted their strategy to growing FDI from Chinese SOEs.
Initially, Chinese SOEs received corporate and political support from the Canadian stakeholders
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as Chinese investment helped to maintain the productivity of the hydrocarbon sector and
occurred in politically and economically insignificant projects. The ideology of open markets has
facilitated the growth of Chinese investment that was initially supported by close bilateral
relations. However, over time these trends begun to reverse, at least temporarily after the election
of Prime Minister Stephen Harper. In 2006, then-Prime Minister Harper noted that “Canadians
[would not] want…[the government]…to sell out important Canadian values” referring to his
opposition to human rights issues in China (Fitz-Morris 2012). Harper’s political stance toward
China lasted until 2009 (Fitz-Morris 2012), during that time Canada adopted SOE-specific
guidelines under the ICA. The first set of SOE-specific FDI guidelines were implemented in
2007. This brief political stalemate can be linked to falling FDI flows into the hydrocarbon sector
(Nossal and Sarson 2013). Chinese investment has begun to flow into Canada again as the SinoCanadian bilateral relations have begun to improve. Still, regulatory transition indicates a more
cautious stance adopted by the Canadian stakeholders toward China that was reinforced during
the third stage of Chinese FDI.
The third, ‘expansionary’, stage of Chinese investment in the Canadian hydrocarbon
sector began in mid-2012 and ended in mid-2014. This stage was short-lived as it was interrupted
by a change in the Canadian regulatory environment and broader shifts in the global energy
market coupled with changes in stakeholder preferences in Canada. The ‘expansionary’ stage of
Chinese FDI in Canada is connected to the preceding stage of Chinese FDI as the exceptional
cases from the second stage - the outright acquisition of Canadian businesses by Chinese SOEs became the norm. At this third stage, Chinese SOEs acquired full ownership of multiple
Canadian oil and gas businesses. CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen was a defining moment of this
stage. The deal overshadowed other minor acquisitions made by PetroChina and Sinopec during
2014, such as PetroChina’s acquisition of Athabasca’s remaining assets for $1.23 billion that
gave PetroChina (represented by Brion Energy) a 100 per cent controlling position in the
MacKay River and Dover Oil Sands projects. The Nexen-CNOOC deal, as I will explain in the
subsequent section, was also partially responsible for the new regulatory measures adopted by
the Canadian government in 2012 that have led to a tightening of the Canadian FDI regime. This
tightening of regulatory regime continues to impact SOEs’ investment in the oil sands today.
The last stage started in mid-2014 and is predominant today. It is defined by a smaller set
of acquisitions made by a set of relatively unknown Chinese oil and gas corporations. At this
stage, we can observe a change in the investment strategy of the large SOEs. CNPC, CNOOC,
and Sinopec have shifted away from the oil sands and moved into other projects focused on
conventional oil and natural gas (predominantly the LNG sector). At the same time, we can see
the emergence of FDI from private Chinese firms that were not previously well-established in
Canada. A good example is China Oil and Gas Group Ltd.’s investment in Baccalieu Energy in
2014. This pattern of investment continued in 2016 when Sinoenergy Pacific invested $170
million in New Star Energy and another $100 million in the Long Run Corporation. These trends
will likely dominate Canadian hydrocarbon sector in the near future as regulatory institutions
have made it more difficult for Chinese SOEs to acquire Canadian businesses operating in the oil
sands.
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As noted in the previous section, SOEs are not the only source of Chinese FDI in Canada.
Private businesses and individual investors are actively involved in the Canadian hydrocarbon
sector. Chinese private businesses are often operating at a smaller-scale as they invest in minor
energy projects. Investments by private Chinese enterprises in the Canadian oil sands has been
on the rise according to media reports (Franson 2017; Lewis, Jones, and Vanderklippe 2017). In
a Globe and Mail article, Lewis, Jones, and Vanderklippe (2017) trace the investments made by
private Chinese investors in Canada. They conclude that “a handful of well-connected Chinese
financers and oil executives…[have] spent nearly $2-billion in a series of deals” in the Canadian
oil sands (Lewis, Jones, Vanderklippe 2017). These private investors have acquired a set of
“small to mid-size oil and gas producers”, such as Spyglass Resources Corporation, New Star
Energy Ltd., Twin Butte Energy Ltd., and Hyperion Exploration among others (Lewis, Jones and
Vanderklippe’s 2017). The change in the investment dynamics from state-owned investors to
private ones will likely impact regulatory innovation in Canada in the future.
Empirical evidence discussed in this section indicates that Chinese investors have
acquired shares or gained ownership over several oil and gas companies that are located across
Canadian provinces. The majority of Chinese energy investment, in terms of number of deals,
went to Alberta with 91 deals, closely followed by British Columbia with 34 deals 36 (China
Institute 2017). The uneven spread can be explained by geological distribution of oil and gas
reserves across Canada. As the largest oil and gas reserves are in Alberta, the province received a
large proportion of Chinese energy-related investment. In fact, Alberta’s oil and gas sector
attracted over 75 per cent of the total Chinese FDI in this sector in 2012, closely followed by
Saskatchewan with 16.5 per cent, and British Columbia with 16.3 per cent (KPMG 2013, 11). In
monetary terms, Alberta has been a recipient of C$29,611 million 37 from mainland China, while
British Columbia received only C$746 million (The Asia Pacific Foundation 2017b). This
distribution of investment reflects differential resource endowment and political situations across
the Canadian provinces. Despite the unequal distribution of Chinese FDI across Canada, all of
this investment is driven by a set of similar strategies as will be revealed in the next section.

Chinese FDI Strategies in Canada
Chinese SOEs have implemented three core strategies to gain access to the Canadian oil
and gas projects: they engage in acquisition of shares in the Canadian oil and gas companies;
form joint ventures, consortia or mergers with other companies operating in the Canadian
hydrocarbon sector; and acquire Canadian-based corporations outright. Chinese SOEs have
invested in both greenfield and brownfield projects. As greenfield projects involve construction
of new hydrocarbon plants and facilities, they are inherently riskier as they require societal,
corporate, and political support. To mitigate the inherent risk, SOEs can focus their activities on
brownfield projects by acquiring shares in existing companies, participating in mergers and
36

The other provinces have only a few deals: Ontario 9 deals, Quebec 2 deals, and Saskatchewan 1.
The data may underrepresent investment from Chinese SOEs not domiciled in the mainland China and does not
include investment that has occurred before 2003. In comparison to these numbers, data released by the Alberta’s
government (2015) reveal that Chinese SOEs – Sinopec, CNPC, and CNOOC – have invested $35 billion into
Alberta’s hydrocarbon sector (Alberta Government 2015).
37
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acquisitions, or acquiring full ownership of an established company or project. Each of these
strategies has implications for the operations of Chinese enterprises in Canada and differs based
on a degree of participation and influence (or control) a Chinese enterprise has over a Canadian
business. The next few paragraphs describe these differences in more detail with a specific focus
on the types of FDI, which have an impact on the ability of Chinese SOEs to acquire specific
assets.
The first strategy, based on the acquisition of shares in Canadian businesses, allows SOEs
to practice a hands-off management approach. In this case, a Chinese SOE relies on its Canadian
counterpart to manage the day-to-day activities of their joint business and relies on the domestic
company to manage stakeholder relations. In return for the financial commitment (where an
equity investor provides financial capital to a Canadian firm), Chinese shareholders receive a
share of profits from the revenue generated by a Canadian hydrocarbon firm. This approach has
been popular among Chinese financial institutions, which rely on the managers of the Canadian
companies to steer their joint businesses (Jiang 2015, 16). An example of this strategy is CIC’s
acquisition of shares in Teck Resources Ltd. in 2009 and in Penn West Energy in 2010. This
strategy allows Chinese investors to distance themselves from bilateral relations, stakeholder
politics, and host-states’ institutions.
The second strategy rests on a more hands-on approach as it relies on joint ventures,
consortia, and mergers. This model is based on a partnership between two or more companies
that form a single independent firm to take on a joint project. This strategy allows corporations to
pool common financial resources, divide risks, share technology and/or expertise, and distribute
profits. This strategy has been popular in the context of the Canadian LNG sector where it is
used to diversify risks associated with the greenfield investment and to share technology and
expertise. The Aurora LNG, the LNG Canada, and the Pacific NorthWest LNG are some of the
examples that utilized this strategy. According to Jiang (2015, 16), who is an expert on Chinese
SOEs operating in the Canadian energy sector, PetroChina has been one of the most active SOEs
in forming joint ventures in the Canadian oil sands and natural gas projects. Given that joint
ventures are created to develop greenfield energy projects, they are heavily influenced by intersate relations, stakeholder politics, and institutions in Canada.
The last strategy used by Chinese SOEs is a direct acquisition of an existing Canadian
business in the oil and gas industry. This strategy provides Chinese investors with an ultimate
control over a Canadian hydrocarbon enterprise that they acquire. The CNOOC-Nexen takeover
fits perfectly under this last category of SOEs’ investment strategies. There are other deals that
fit under this category; as noted earlier, Chinese SOEs have purchased financially-struggling
Canadian hydrocarbon corporations that were facing bankruptcy. For example, PetroChina has
acquired Athabasca’s assets to gain full ownership of the project after the latter began suffering
from financial problems. In these cases, Chinese SOEs became the ultimate owners, operators,
and managers of the selected hydrocarbon projects in Canada. This strategy requires favourable
inter-state relations, supportive stakeholders, and regulatory approval.
Each of these strategies is likely driven by a different motive. The acquisition of shares in
the Canadian hydrocarbon companies is likely motivated by profits. Other investment strategies
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may be motivated by gaining access to the Canadian hydrocarbon resources, learning from the
Canadian management expertise, and acquiring brands or technology that can be re-used by the
SOEs in the future to upgrade their products and move up the chain of production (Klaver and
Trebilcock 2013, 126-129). More specifically, Chinese SOEs are interested in gaining
“management skills and technical know-how of extracting heavy oil and shale that the Canadian
firms possess” (Jiang, Zweig, and Siqin 2015, 114). One of the technologies of interest to the
Chinese investors may be the Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage Technology (SAGDT). SOEs
can use the SAGDT in China to extract unconventional or hard-to access oil and gas (Global
Data 2012). Although an investment in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector is costly and the
acquired assets may lose value over a short period of time (Jiang 2015), strategically the
investors gain technology and expertise that make the investment attractive despite the perceived
high-costs.
In general, it appears that Chinese investors operating in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector
are still learning how to operate in the advanced industrialized countries, like Canada. In an
interview, Jing Li, professor of international business and Canada Research Chair in the Global
Investment Strategy, has noted that Chinese SOEs see their investment in Canada as a unique
opportunity to learn about Western corporate standards (2017). It appears that Chinese SOEs
willingly pay “tuition fees” to participate in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector (Li 2017). Another
expert on China, Paul Evans (2017), revealed that to gain business knowledge, Chinese
companies were at first willing to engage in ‘bad deals’ that were less profitable. Today, Evans
(2017) argues that Chinese SOEs became “more sophisticated”, where “any premium would be
justified less on new knowledge of a sector than acquisition of technology that is perceived to be
of special research or innovation advantage”. The interviewed experts and scholars, studying
Chinese engagement in Canada, appear to agree that Chinese SOEs are learning by engaging
with the Canadian hydrocarbon companies and other stakeholders. Although learning is not
explicitly discussed in my dissertation, it can be pursued by future studies as an important factor
in China’s engagement with host societies.
The next part of this chapter focuses on the activities of Chinese SOEs by examining the
three aforementioned projects – CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen; SOEs’ investment in the LNG
sector; and, SOEs’ engagement in the Northern Gateway pipeline. The issues raised in this part
will assist in explaining the dynamics discussed in each of the three projects.

The CNOOC-Nexen Case Study
CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen, which is a Canadian hydrocarbon company
headquartered in Calgary, Alberta, in 2013 marked the peak of Chinese investment in the Canada
oil extraction. The deal, worth of $15.1 billion, is the biggest acquisition made by Chinese SOEs
in the Canadian energy sector (Vanderklippe 2012). Although this deal involved a brownfield
investment that in general does not entail elaborate consultation and accommodation with local
stakeholders, its sheer scale in terms of the monetary value and the significance of Nexen in the
Canadian oil sands sector have stirred a protectionist sentiment among several stakeholders as I
will illustrate in this section. The objective of this section is to analyze how the CNOOC-Nexen
deal was influenced by the Canadian stakeholder politics and regulatory institutions to
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understand why the deal was approved and how it affected SOEs operations in the oil sands. In
doing so, it draws on the inter-state and informal institutional variables that have shaped the
responses of the Canadian stakeholders to CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen.
This section will examine the conditions that shaped CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen to
understand why this successful deal has negatively impacted future Chinese investment in the oil
sands. In this way, one may reinterpret this deal as a ‘failed success’ as it achieved its objective
but compromised future investments by the SOEs in the oil sands. As I will argue in this section,
the scale of the CNOOC-Nexen deal, combined with a fear of the growing involvement of
Chinese SOEs in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector, incentivized a regulatory expansion of the
Canadian investment screening regime. The deal was also influenced by stakeholder politics,
informal and regulatory institutions, and shifting bilateral relations. Ultimately, this chapter
reveals the importance of stakeholder engagement and lobbying efforts in the North American
energy markets (Hall and Welsch 2012).
To explore these propositions, this section is sub-divided into four core parts: overview,
stakeholder receptiveness, regulatory influence, and conclusion. Ultimately, this section argues
that the deal was an outcome of a specific alignment of inter-state relations and institutional
arrangements that have shaped the activities of the Canadian stakeholders, who in turn triggered
a regulatory modification of the investment screening regime.
Overview of the CNOOC-Nexen deal
CNOOC revealed its intentions to acquire a full ownership of Nexen in 2012. At the time,
the deal sparked debates among policymakers and the broader public across Canada. The debate
was partially driven by the scale of the proposed investment. Media projected that it will be the
“second-biggest energy deal” and the “sixth-largest takeover” in Canada, not to mention that it
will be the largest acquisition by a Chinese SOE in the world (Vanderklippe 2012). Media also
reported that the deal was the “most ambitious push” made by the Chinese SOEs into the
Canadian hydrocarbon sector as it was “nearly equivalent to total Chinese investment in the
province of Alberta, excluding real estate” (Hall and Welsh 2012). The reporters also noted that
CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen helped SOEs to “build a ‘bridge’ to the energy markets of the
developed world” by showing that “China can work with very developed legal and social
system” MacKinnon 2012a).
The deal was seen by the media as a symbol of “increasing assertiveness by Chinese
firms” at the global level (Vanderklippe 2012) and signified “China’s growing comfort level [in]
operating in the developed world” (Hall and Welsh 2012). Others suggested that it may become
“a model for Chinese enterprises ‘going out’” (MacKinnon 2012b, refers to Xinhua’s news
report). In general, the deal was a bold step, given that previously Chinese SOEs only acquired
minority stakes in the Canadian hydrocarbon industry (except for their investment in
corporations undergoing financial difficulties). The financial scale of the deal combined with the
size of the acquisition has sparked a series of concerns in Canada that were mitigated by the
nature of the acquisition target – Nexen.
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Nexen, previously known as the Canadian Occidental Petroleum Ltd. founded in 1969,
has assets in conventional and unconventional oil and gas projects, including the oil sands and
shale gas, in Canada and across the globe (Global Data 2012, 2). Prior to CNOOC’s acquisition,
Nexen established itself as a mid-sized Canadian company and developed its brand. Although
Nexen is a Canadian company and has investments in multiple hydrocarbon projects at home, its
operations are international. The company has stakes in projects in the North Sea, West Africa,
and the Gulf of Mexico (Global Data 2012, 2). In fact, about 72 percent of Nexen’s hydrocarbonproducing assets are from its overseas projects (Sustainalytics 2012, 2). The remaining 28
percent of Nexen’s petroleum assets are produced in Canada. Thus, Nexen does not even make it
into the top twenty of Canadian oil and gas producers as it has access to less than 1 per cent of
Canada’s total hydrocarbon reserves (McLellan 2012). It could be argued that the international
distribution of Nexen’s assets made CNOOC’s bid more politically tolerable in Canada as the
deal would not threaten national security.
How did Canadian stakeholders react to CNOOC’s bid to acquire Nexen?
CNOOC’s proposal to acquire Nexen triggered a debate between individual stakeholders
that influenced the outcome of the bid. This section examines the responses of the federal and
provincial governments, Alberta’s citizens, and the industry to the CNOOC-Nexen deal. By
mapping their responses, we will be able to understand how the Canadian politico-economic
environment shaped the outcome of the deal. Together, these stakeholders, operating within
politico-economic institutions, have influenced the response of the regulatory institutions that
will be discussed in the second section of this case study.
The interparty divisions at the federal level of the Canadian government occurred
between the three major parties in the parliament – the Conservative, the Liberal, and the NDP.
Individual parties adopted a polarized perspective on CNOOC’s proposed bid for Nexen. While
the Liberal Party supported the deal on the grounds of growing economic relations between
China and Canada (Berthiaume 2012), the NDP vehemently opposed CNOOC’s growing
influence in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. The NDP criticized CNOOC’s environmental
practices (Lunau 2012; Galloway and Tait 2012; Henton 2012), human rights records (Galloway
and Tait 2012), and close connections to the Chinese state (McCarthy 2012c). The NDP also
suggested that CNOOC’s takeover may come at the expense of Canadian jobs (Galloway and
Tait 2012; Henton 2012) and could undermine national security (Henton 2012). National security
was likely at the centre of the polarized debate (Berthiaume 2012) related to the foreign
ownership of Canadian natural resources (McCarthy 2012f). The Conservative party, which was
in power at the time, found itself in the middle of this polarized debate and tried to find a
balanced approach to the proposed deal.
Changing inter-state relations played an important role in shaping the political calculus of
the Canadian policymakers. The deal came at the time of improving Sino-Canadian relations.
The Conservative party, under the leadership of the Harper administration, which was generally
critical of China’s engagement in Canada, decided to support CNOOC’s bid to acquire Nexen.
Their support can be traced to changes in bilateral relations, which coincided with Prime
Minister Harper’s trade and investment mission to China. During this mission, Canada and China
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signed a series of bilateral agreements and initiatives covering multiple issues, including energy
(Government of Canada 2012). Therefore, this mission created a political momentum conducive
to large-scale transactions that would have faced a regulatory pushback otherwise (McCarthy and
McNish 2012, citing Oliver Borgers, a lawyer with McCarthy Tetrault). Statements from the
Canadian officials at the time confirmed the importance of this timing. To illustrate, the
Canadian Minister of Finance, Jim Flaherty, noted that the rejection of the CNOOC’s bid would
have negatively impacted Canada’s relationship with China (McCarthy 2012e).
Despite the conducive timing, the Conservative party had to balance internal discord
regarding the proposed acquisition at the cabinet and caucus levels (Morgan 2012; Ibbitson
2012; McCarthy and Vanderklippe 2012; McCarthy and Curry 2012; Berthiaume 2012). Aware
of the delicate nature of the CNOOC-Nexen deal, Prime Minister Harper was very cautious
about navigating multiple interests of the Canadian stakeholders. Thus, Harper chose a middle
ground and joined a “pragmatists’ camp” (McCarthy and Curry 2012). In doing so, he
acknowledged that the transaction will have “significant implications for the Canadian economy”
and that it will likely shape Canada’s “long-term policy direction” (The Globe and Mail 2012).
The balanced approach adopted by the Harper administration has signaled that the hydrocarbon
deals with China will remain on the table, yet they will likely be subject to increased regulations.
A polarized debate, which occurred at the federal level, was less prominent in the
province of Alberta. In fact, Alberta has opened its doors to Chinese investment in the
hydrocarbon industry. At the time of the bid, Alberta’s Premier, Alison Redford, the leader of the
provincial Conservative party, publicly expressed her support for CNOOC’s acquisition of
Nexen (Henton 2012; McCarthy and Curry 2012; McCarthy 2012d). Redford suggested that the
project should be approved if it will generate socioeconomic benefits for the province of Alberta
and for Canada at large (Wheeler 2012; Henton 2012). She stipulated that CNOOC should
maintain Nexen’s CSR program and management style and retain Nexen’s employees based in
Canada (Henton 2012). These conditions were likely designed to quell any public opposition to
the deal in Alberta. As the next paragraphs will demonstrate, public’s division about Chinese
FDI also motivated a cautious response adopted by the government toward the deal.
As noted in the theory section, the Government’s position may be swayed by the public
opinion as the Canadian government is receptive to the viewpoints of its electorate. Since
Nexen’s headquarters are in Calgary, the opinion of Alberta’s residents has been closely
monitored by scholars and policymakers alike. At the time of the deal, media revealed that
Alberta’s residents voiced concerns about Chinese investment in the Canadian natural resource
sectors (Cryderman 2014; Cattaneo 2013b; Bolger 2012; McCarthy 2012b). To map public
opinion about the deal, I used data published by The China Institute of Alberta (2011; 2012;
2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017). I have categorized these data into four categories, which
correspond to four sets of tables. Table 5.1 charts Albertans’ receptiveness to Chinese investment
in energy and natural resources. Table 5.2 captures the responsiveness of Alberta’s citizens to
SOEs’ FDI in the energy sector. Subsequently, table 5.3 depicts Albertans’ opinion about
Chinese ownership of the Canadian businesses. Finally, Table 5.4 examines whether the
Albertans’ are supportive of tougher regulations on Chinese SOEs.
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Statement:
Alberta should welcome Chinese investment in energy and other resource
sectors of the province (2011)
Alberta should welcome Chinese investment in energy and other resource
sectors of the province (2013)
Alberta should welcome Chinese investment in energy and other resource
sectors of the province (2015)
Alberta should welcome Chinese investment in energy and other resource
sectors of the province (2017)

Agree
52

Disagree
25

Neutral
23

43

34

23

42

31

27

51

22

27

Table 5.1: Public Survey of Albertans on whether the province of Alberta should welcome Chinese FDI into energy
and natural resource sectors

As these data on Chinese investment in energy and natural resources reveal, Alberta’s
residents are relatively open to Chinese investment in these sectors with over 40 per cent of
citizens on average responding positively to Chinese FDI in energy and natural resources. In
2017, the number of Albertans supportive of Chinese FDI in these sectors rose above 50 per cent,
as table 5.1 indicates. Still some of the polled residents remained opposed to Chinese FDI. The
number of citizens opposed to Chinese FDI in the energy and natural resource sectors ranges
from 25 per cent to 34 per cent. This indicates that Albertan citizens are not concerned about the
Chinese investment in Canada in general. However, the picture becomes more complicated when
we consider investment by foreign SOEs in the energy sector.
Statement:
FDI in Alberta’s energy by SOE acceptable (2012)
FDI in Alberta’s energy by SOE acceptable (2014)
FDI in Alberta’s energy by SOE acceptable (2016)

Agree
24
22
27

Disagree
53
59
55

Neutral
23
19
18

Table 5.2: Public Survey of Albertans on whether the province of Alberta should welcome SOEs’ FDI into energy
sector

The data reveal that Alberta’s citizens appear to be more concerned about SOEs’ FDI in
the energy sector than by the Chinese investment in energy and natural resources presented in
table 5.1. As table 5.2 reveals majority of the respondents (over 53 per cent) do not think that
SOEs’ FDI in Alberta’s energy sector is acceptable. In comparison to table 5.1, Alberta’s
residents are more supportive of FDI by Chinese private companies compared to SOEs’ FDI.
This is an interesting result because it indicates that Albertans are more likely to oppose
investment by a specific investor – an SOE – rather than FDI by a specific investor based on a
country of origin, such as China. In light of the concerns related to SOEs’ investment, the
Canadian government has incorporated SOE-specific guidelines into the ICA. In general,
public’s concerns are likely associated with the close relationship between SOEs and their home
state (Globerman and Shapiro 2009; Deng 2012; Hsueh 2016) that can lead to politicization of
FDI in a host country (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2014; Hsueh 2016).
Additionally, the analyzed data shows that the public is very concerned about Chinese
investors seeking to acquire full ownership of the Canadian companies. As data in Table 5.3
indicate, at the time of the proposed CNOOC-Nexen takeover, a majority (64 per cent) of the
surveyed Albertans expressed that they are against investment deals that grant Chinese firms full
ownership of the Canadian businesses. On the other hand, the public appeared to hold a mixed
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opinion about partial ownership of the Canadian companies by the Chinese SOEs. Data in Table
5.3 indicate that the respondents were roughly equally split between supportive/opposed/neutral
stance toward partial ownership.
Statement:

Agree

Disagree

Neutral

Statement:

Agree Disagree

Neutral

Chinese FDI partial
ownership
acceptable (2012)

37

36

27

15

64

21

Chinese FDI partial
ownership
acceptable (2014)

40

40

20

15

69

16

Chinese FDI partial
ownership
acceptable (2016)

44

34

22

Chinese FDI
full ownership
acceptable
(2012)
Chinese FDI
full ownership
acceptable
(2014)
Chinese FDI
full ownership
acceptable
(2016)

21

63

16

Table 5.3: Albertans response to Chinese ownership of Canadian business (partial versus full ownership)

Finally, the public appeared to be divided on the question of the Canadian regulatory
oversight over SOEs’ FDI in Canada. As Table 5.4 indicates roughly a third of the surveyed
wanted to expand regulations related to SOEs’ FDI, while the majority of Albertans appeared to
be neutral or confident in the existing regulations. Drawing a conclusion on the basis of these
three tables it appears that Albertans would have been opposed to CNOOC’s acquisition of
Nexen as they were generally against Chinese investment in the energy sector, especially if a
Chinese state-owned acquirer will gain the whole company. Interestingly, the data also indicate
that Alberta’s residents did not see the necessity to change regulations to prevent SOEs’ FDI in
the Canadian oil sands.
Statement:
More regulation for FDI from SOEs than for other investors
(2014)
More regulation for FDI from SOEs than for other investors
(2016)

Agree
32

Disagree
44

Neutral
24

36

42

22

Table 5.4: Albertans view about regulation of investment from SOEs

Economic players have likewise influenced the government’s position on the CNOOCNexen deal. Media reports and industry polls capture a growing concern among the Canadian
industry players about SOEs’ investment in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. According to the
media reports, Canadian companies exhibited nationalist sentiment when they urged the
government to adopt tougher regulations on foreign investment coming from Chinese SOEs into
the Canadian hydrocarbon sector (McCarthy and McNish 2012; McCarthy 2012b). Media have
also reported that the Canadian corporate executives have “waved the Canadian flag over the oil
sands” (Cousineau 2012). Even the executives that backed the deal have made their support for
the deal conditional on the government’s promise to adopt tougher regulations for SOEs
investing in the oil sands (Coates 2014, 43). In this move, the Canadian corporate actors have
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argued that Canada “needs strong domestic companies in key sectors such as the oil sands”
(McCarthy 2012b).
Overall, it appears that the industry expressed a nationalist sentiment during the ICA’s
review period of the CNOOC/Nexen deal. This sentiment is backed by the industry polls. In a CSuite survey of business executives, half of the surveyed corporate executives revealed that they
opposed the CNOOC-Nexen deal, while 42 per cent of the executives indicated their support for
it (Blackwell 2012). The survey also revealed that several executives wanted to place conditions
on CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen and to adopt clearer rules for the investment screening,
especially for the deals in the strategic sectors, such as oil and gas (Blackwell 2012).
Unfortunately, the data in the C-Suite survey do not distinguish surveyed executives in terms of
their affiliation. Thus, it is difficult to assess whether those that were against the deal were in
direct competition with CNOOC. However, as noted in the earlier paragraph, it appeared that
even those that were supportive of the deal wanted to place restrictions on SOEs’ FDI.
Industry’s growing calls for protectionism coincided with a mixed public attitude toward
the CNOOC-Nexen deal. The proposed takeover obtained support from the Nexen’s shareholders
and the Liberal Party of Canada, yet failed to convince the NDP and other corporate players of
its benefits. The public at the time also appeared to be concerned about the deal. In light of this,
several stakeholders expressed their desire to protect the oil sands from future foreign investment
by SOEs given that the oil sands are a strategic asset for Canada. The general protectionist
sentiment has shaped the broader political debate, which has incentivized the government to
adopt a more cautious response to future investment of this kind. Since CNOOC’s acquisition of
Nexen did not envision the construction of a greenfield hydrocarbon-related project, the deal did
not involve complex stakeholder negotiations as the project has already obtained a social and
gained a political license to operate after passing the investment screening tests that will be
discussed in the subsequent section.
Ultimately, a protectionist tendency among Alberta’s citizens and industry players,
exposed in this section, has served as an impetus for tighter regulations. In this case, political
institutions have helped to channel the interests of specific stakeholders into regulatory
institutions. As the next sub-section will propose, regulatory institutions shaped CNOOC’s
strategies via ‘undertakings’ as part of the ICA. At the same time, as will be explained in the next
section, regulatory institutions were reshaped to respond to political concerns that arose during
the deal.
Regulating CNOOC’s acquisition
The ICA provided a key regulatory framework for the Canadian policymakers to evaluate
large-scale acquisitions of the Canadian businesses by foreign investors, such as the CNOOC’s
bid to acquire Nexen. As the CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen exceeded the reviewable threshold,
it triggered the ICA’s ‘net benefit’ test. To pass this test, the acquirer, in this case, CNOOC, had
to submit a set of legally-binding commitments regarding finance, employment assurances, and
corporate responsivity targets. These commitments, as I will demonstrate in this section,
subsequently shaped CNOOC’s activities in Canada. On the basis of the documents submitted by
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CNOOC to the ICA, including the commitments, the Minister of Industry and a set of relevant
agencies decided to permit the acquisition. In CNOOC’s case the approval, granted by the
Canadian Minister of Industry, can be reinterpreted as a ‘failed success’ as I will propose in this
section.
To meet the ICA’s ‘net benefit test’, CNOOC promised to pay $15.1 billion USD for
Nexen, which exceeded the market valuation by 61 per cent, and to take over Nexen’s debt of
$4.3 billion USD (CNOOC 2013). CNOOC also assured the officials reviewing the deal that it
will establish regional headquarters in Calgary, retain Nexen’s current employees, expand
Nexen’s capital expenditures, list corporate shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange, increase
social and community spending, and continue to support Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance
(COSIA) (CNOOC 2013). CNOOC has also committed $5-$8 billion for the development of the
North American hydrocarbon sector and agreed to expand investment in the oil sands
(McCarthy, MacKinnon, and Jordan 2012; Vanderklippe 2013). It also promised to expand
financing for Nexen’s projects and provide investment for social programs (Sustainanalytics
2012, 2). These commitments appear to be a product of a back-and-forth discussion between
CNOOC’s corporate leaders and the Investment Canada officials (McCarthy 2012).
These commitments/undertakings can be interpreted as one aspect of China’s localization
strategy under which Chinese SOEs embrace a set of new business practices to fit into the
Canadian corporate environment. An expert on China’s corporate internalization, Jing Li (2017)
has noted in an interview that a well-developed localization strategy is the best way for Chinese
SOEs to succeed in advanced industrialized countries. As Li (2017) has pointed out this strategy
functions via an exchange of economic benefits (granted to the local companies and residents)
for a social license to operate. If carried out properly, a localization strategy can generate a
positive image for an SOE in a host society.
CNOOC’s leadership appears to recognize the importance of the localization strategy. Li
Fanrong, the CEO of CNOOC, has noted that his company wants to “become [one of the]
qualified local citizens” and an integral “part of Canadian society” by supporting a growing
Sino-Canadian cooperation in the hydrocarbon industry (Wheeler 2013). In a pursuit of the
localization strategy, CNOOC decided to retain Nexen’s CSR strategy. Under CNOOC’s
leadership, the company also contributes to COSIA and supports local communities to “earn and
maintain…[a] social license to operate” in Canada (Nexen 2015, 7). Some of the past examples
of CNOOC’s commitments to local communities include CNOOC’s financial support to the
Western Canada Summer Games held in Alberta, a donation of $15 million to Calgary’s public
library, and a set of scholarships and training packages offered to students (Government of
Alberta 2017; US Official News).
Despite CNOOC’s attempt to localize its operations, some of the commitments that
CNOOC submitted to the ICA as part of the review package were not upheld. For example,
CNOOC did not keep its promise to retain Nexen’s former employees. After the acquisition was
approved, CNOOC downsized Nexen’s activities and dismissed some of the staff; it also closed
Nexen’s crude-oil trading desk (Lewis 2015; Jones 2015) and dismissed 400 employees of whom
300 were employed at the Calgary office (Stephenson 2015; Healing 2016). The media estimated
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that approximately 21 per cent of Nexen’s employees were affected by this restructuring
(Cattaneo and Lewis 2014). According to the media, the most affected by CNOOC’s changes
were the employees at the executive level, where almost half of the senior executive board were
dismissed after the acquisition of Nexen took place (Cattaneo 2014). Although the layoffs have
run counter to CNOOC’s commitments under the ICA, it had limited impact on the company’s
activities.
Layoffs in the hydrocarbon industry are not an unusual practice; in fact, they are
considered by experts to be an “industry standard” in the large-scale hydrocarbon mergers and
acquisitions (Vanderklippe 2013, cites Chen Wi Dong, CNOOC’s chief energy research).
Although corporate restructuring and layoffs surprised many Canadians and generated media
backlash, they did not violate ICA’s regulations. CNOOC was not reprimanded for the dismissal
of Nexen’s employees as it did not run counter to market practices. Quinn Wilson, Nexen’s
senior vice-president for human resources and corporate services, asserted that the dismissal of
Nexen’s employees did not violate conditions of the takeover stipulated by the Industry Canada
as it was “commercially” motivated (Stephenson 2015). The motive is linked to “an erosion of
nearly 60 per cent in the price of [Canadian] commodities” (Stephenson 2015). Since the
dismissals had a commercial rationale, the Industry Canada, which monitors CNOOC’s
compliance with the undertakings, did not intervene to stop the downsizing (Cattaneo and Lewis
2014; McCarthy 2015). This example suggests that the ICA continually monitors Chinese FDI in
Canada, yet it also suggests that some of the commitments submitted by SOEs to the ICA are
reversible if based on commercial motives, rendering some of the commitments ineffective.
While commitments submitted to the ICA apply to a specific company and its activities,
the CNOOC-Nexen deal had a more systemic impact on SOEs operating in Canada. The deal can
be considered as a “limbo deal” which occurred during a time of policy reorganization – where
the government tried to balance political pressure with the economic needs as Neil Campbell
(2017), an expert on the ICA, noted in an interview. Although the deal was approved on
February 25th, 2013 by Christian Paradis, Canadian Minister of Industry at the time, as
CNOOC’s acquisition has met the ‘net benefit’, it acted as a motivation for the government to
tighten Canadian regulations regarding SOEs’ investment in the hydrocarbon projects. The
regulatory tightening occurred in response to growing stakeholders’ concerns about SOEs’
expanding influence in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. Media revealed that the deal stimulated
a political debate about foreign investment in the Canadian strategic industries; in the case of
SOEs, the concerns were even more amplified (Ibbitson 2012; Healing 2014). Analyzing the
political debate, Hale (2014) noted that the dynamics of the project’s approval exposed how
“competing interests and objectives [among Canadian stakeholders] facilitated an outcome
consistent with pluralist brokerage politics” (368).
Given the above-mentioned discord among stakeholders about the CNOOC-Nexen deal,
Canadian policymakers responded by expanding the scope of regulatory institutions that will
impact future deals made by the SOEs in Canada. As a result of regulatory re-balancing, the
government approved Bill-C60, which produced a more stringent regulatory regime that targeted
SOEs. As noted earlier, tighter regulations appear to be partially motivated by close relations
between Chinese SOEs and their home state (Chen 2013; Du 2016). Commenting on the
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CNOOC-Nexen deal, Prime Minister Harper noted that “Canadians have not spent years
reducing the ownership of sectors of the economy by our own governments, only to see them
bought and controlled by foreign governments instead” (Vanderklippe, McCarthy and Mcnish,
2014). This speech not only revealed a growing protectionist sentiment but also exposed that
Canada is aware and sceptical about a close link that exists between the Chinese state and its
SOEs. In the aftermath of the deal, Harper announced that SOEs’ attempts to acquire a majority
of shares in the Canadian oil sands projects will be approved “on an exceptional basis only”
(McCarthy and Chase 2012).
Harper’s statement has been codified in the Statement Regarding Investment by Foreign
State-Owned Enterprises released by the Canadian department of Innovation, Science and
Economic Development (2012). Under this document, the government stipulates that SOEs’
investment in the oil sands will be considered for review only in an “exceptional basis”. The
document also highlights that “given the inherent risks posed by foreign SOE acquisitions in the
Canadian oil sands the Minister of Industry will find the acquisition of control of a Canadian oil
sands business by a foreign SOE to be [of] net benefit to Canada on an exceptional basis only”
(Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada 2012). Observers have suggested that
these regulations will make it increasingly prohibitive for Chinese SOEs to acquire projects in
the oil sands (McCarthy and Tait 2013b; Hale 2014, 349). Thus, one may conclude that under the
new, more stringent regulations CNOOC-Nexen deal may not have been approved.
Although the Canadian policymakers implemented tighter regulations on SOEs’ FDI in
the oil sands, they have left the back door open for exceptional deals. The meaning of the
“exceptional basis” remains to be clarified. Since clarification of the phrase is pending, investors
and policymakers can exploit legal and political ambiguity to serve their purposes. For
policymakers, an arbitrary interpretation of the term opens the door for regulatory expansion,
where they can clarify the applicability of the “exceptional basis” concept against further
investment (Dobson 2014; Ibbitson 2012). For investors, it provides a loophole through which
they may challenge the applicability of the term to their investment. Notwithstanding these
constraints, Chinese SOEs still have “room…to do smaller things” as they can “take significant
but not controlling stakes” in the oil sands (Campbell 2017; McCarthy and Tait 2013b;
Campbell, Men, and Wortley 2013, 505). Additionally, SOEs can indirectly acquire hydrocarbon
resources, make investments below a reviewable threshold, form joint ventures with the
Canadian companies, or obtain a minority stake in an existing project (Campbell 2017).
Nonetheless, the regulatory change reduces the maneuverability that Chinese SOEs have in the
oil sector and ultimately rules out a possibility for Chinese SOEs to attain full ownership over
Canadian-based projects in the oil sands in the future.
Lessons Learned from Chinese Acquisition of Nexen
This section examined CNOOC’s ambitious takeover of Nexen. The deal was a major
step toward expanding SOEs’ operations in North America, in general, and in the Canadian oil
sands, in specific. Reporters noted that CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen helped SOEs to “build a
‘bridge’ to the energy markets of the developed world” by showing that “China can work with
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very developed legal and social system” 38 (MacKinnon 2012a). It appeared as though the
CNOOC-Nexen deal aspired to provide credibility for SOEs’ future acquisitions of hydrocarbon
resources in the advanced industrialized countries. However, the deal had multiple unintended
consequences, including regulatory changes that now constrain SOE-led FDI in the oil sands.
As I argued in this section, the CNOOC-Nexen deal is an outcome of several confluent
variables – closer Sino-Canadian relations under Prime Minister Harper’s second leadership
term, rising concerns about an FDI by SOEs in the oil sands among Canadian stakeholders,39 and
regulatory reorientation. To assuage their fears, CNOOC has submitted a set of undertakings to
meet the ICA’s ‘net benefit’ test. If we think in broader terms, the deal had wider ramifications
for other SOEs interested in investing in the oil sands. The general concerns, held by multiple
stakeholders about the deal, have generated momentum for a regulatory innovation in Canada as
I argued above.
Ultimately, this case study showed how stakeholders, interacting with regulatory
institutions and the government, have determined the nature of CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen
at a time of improving Sino-Canadian relations. As I argued, CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen can
be reinterpreted as a ‘failed success’. More specifically, I have proposed that the approval of the
deal, which is a ‘success’, has triggered a regulatory reaction (“exceptional circumstances”
clause) that will negatively impact future deals of a similar nature in the oil sands, which is a
‘failure’. This failure is an outcome of a growing protectionist sentiment that emerged in Canada
as a response to an upsurge in investment by SOEs. The rise in protectionism may have also been
motivated by a clash between the Canadian neoliberal economic ideology and SOEs’ state
capitalist background.
The ideological difference between the political and economic institutional systems of
Canada and China can increase the wariness of Canadian stakeholders towards investment from
an enterprise that operates under a different set of politico-economic institutions. Stakeholders
may object to FDI from Chinese SOEs on the grounds that these companies may engage in unfair
competition as they receive economic and political support from their home state (Chen 2013;
Klaver and Trebilcock 2013). As noted earlier, stakeholders may also be worried about close
connections between SOEs and the Chinese state, which may lead to a politicization of energy
production in a host country (Chen 2013; Du 2016). In light of these concerns, there is an
increased likelihood that stakeholders will be more cautious about approving FDI from Chinese
SOEs in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. Institutional differences thus make it harder for
Chinese SOEs to invest in Canada. The dynamics exposed in this case study reflect the
experience of Chinese SOEs in acquiring brownfield assets in Canada, which is relatively easier,
than a greenfield investment, as I will show in the subsequent section on Chinese investment in
the British Columbia’s LNG industry.
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In this quote, Mark MacKinnon refers to Mr. Xu’s, the chair of the World Energy Research Project at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, a government-run think tank, statement.
39
The Canadian public, industry players, and governmental actors were deeply concerned about the deal.
Indigenous peoples were not deeply involved in the CNOOC-Nexen deal as it was a brownfield investment that did
not require the approval of the Indigenous peoples to proceed.
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Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) in British Columbia
Canadian coastal provinces announced plans to develop an LNG industry in the mid2000s to take advantage of high hydrocarbon prices on international markets. British Columbia’s
provincial government is among the most active proponents of the LNG industry. However, this
industry will require substantial greenfield investments from domestic and foreign companies.
After British Columbia announced plans to develop the LNG sector, both foreign and domestic
investors submitted ambitious plans to build LNG plants to liquefy natural gas along the Pacific
Coast. However, their plans are complicated by the politics associated with greenfield investment
in Canada as proposed greenfield projects undergo a rigorous review process that involves
consultation and accommodation of multiple stakeholders in Canada. In this section, I argue that
the process of stakeholder accommodation and consultation made it difficult for Chinese
investors to advance their planned LNG projects.
This section will examine three LNG projects backed by Chinese SOEs in British
Columbia to understand why some of these projects never materialized. I will analyze the role of
stakeholder politics in each of the three deals to explain why two of the three Chinese investors
decided to scrap their investment plans. I will argue that SOEs’ planned investments in the LNG
sector were complicated by political, corporate, and social actors involved in the approval of the
proposed projects. More specifically, I will demonstrate that Canadian stakeholders have wielded
power over the decision making regarding greenfield investments in the LNG sector by
appealing to the institution of land ownership and property rights. In this case study, I will also
show that accommodation and consultation processes play a central role and have likely
impacted China’s engagement strategy in this sector.
In doing so, I will examine the responses of local stakeholders to the individual projects
to explain why certain projects became unviable. I will focus on the role played by the
stakeholders in shaping the approval process for the projects and examine investors’ decision to
proceed with the investment or to abandon it. The central argument of this section is that two of
the three LNG projects in which Chinese SOEs participated failed despite gaining political
support because stakeholder issues and economic factors made their projects costlier than
originally expected. To explore this argument, this section will begin by situating the three LNG
projects – LNG Canada, Pacific NorthWest LNG, and Aurora LNG – in terms of their key
players and characteristics. Subsequently, I will analyze politico-economic factors by focusing
on stakeholder responses to these projects. In this part, I will go over the role played by the
industry, British Columbians, and the provincial government. Finally, I will examine the role of
regulatory institutions in shaping the final investment decisions made by Chinese SOEs.
Situating the Three LNG projects backed by Chinese SOEs
Since the plans to develop the LNG industry in British Columbia were announced in the
mid-2000s, industry players have proposed to develop 19 LNG projects along the provincial
coastline. Out of these 19 projects, listed in Table 5.5, three had obtained provincial approval to
proceed at the time of writing, three were at the review stage, three were shelved, and ten were at
the conceptualization stage. Of these 19 projects, three have secured funding from Chinese
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SOEs, which joined these projects through joint venture agreements. Two of the projects funded
by Chinese SOEs obtained licenses from the provincial government to proceed with the project,
yet only one of these – Canada LNG - moved forward with the investment.
As noted earlier, joint ventures enable investors to distribute financial risks among the
investors that minimize costs to individual investors. Following this strategy, PetroChina (Brion
Kitimat LNG Partnership) acquired 20 per cent in the LNG Canada that it jointly owns with
Shell (Shell Canada Energy) (50 per cent), Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS Canada LNG ltd.)
(15 per cent), and Mitsubishi Corporation40 (15 per cent). The LNG Canada plant is expected to
be built in Kitimat, British Columbia. 41 Similarly, the Pacific Northwest LNG project is managed
by a group of Asian-based companies - Petronas (owns 62 per cent of shares), Sinopec/Hudan
(owns 15 per cent of shares), Japex (owns 10 per cent of shares), Indian Oil Corporation (owns
10 per cent of shares), and PetroleumBrunei (owns 3 per cent of shares). The proponents of the
Pacific NorthWest LNG picked Lelu Island, District of Port Edward, as a location for their
natural gas liquefaction plant. The last project under consideration, the Aurora LNG, was a joint
venture between Nexen (60 per cent), which was at the time owned by CNOOC, and two
Japanese hydrocarbon firms – Inpex and JGC (split the remaining 40 per cent in half). Nexen and
its partners chose to locate the Aurora LNG plant on the Digby Island, off the coast of Prince
Rupert in the North-Western British Columbia.
Proposed (Not Submitted)

Proposed (shelved)

1. Canada Steward
1. Triton LNG
Energy Project
2. Pacific
NorthWest
2. Cedar LNG
LNG*
3. Discovery LNG
3. Aurora LNG*
4. Kitsault
Energy
Project
5. NewTimes Energy
LNG
6. Niga’a LNG
7. Orca LNG
8. Steelhead
LNG:
Malahat LNG
9. Steelhead
LNG:
Sarita LNG
10. Watson
Island
LNG
*indicates participation of Chinese SOEs in a project

Preapplication / Review Stage
1. Grassy Point LNG
2. WCC LNG Ltd.
3. WesPac

Approved
1. Kitimat LNG
2. LNG Canada*
3. Woodfibre
LNG

Table 5.5: Proposed LNG projects in BC as of 2018

Chinese investors took on a minority position in the proposed LNG plants (except for
CNOOC/Nexen) to shift the burden of stakeholder negotiation/engagement onto their corporate
partners. As this section will illustrate, both CNPC and Sinopec adopted this strategy when they
entered into joint ventures in their respective LNG projects. In both cases, SOEs relied on the
40

It is known as Diamond LNG Canada Ltd.

41

It is the territory of the Haisla Nation.
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support of local advisors to navigate stakeholder politics in Canada. CNOOC/Nexen is the only
exception to this trend as the company owned a majority of shares in the proposed Aurora LNG
plant. As of 2017, Pacific NorthWest LNG and Aurora LNG proponents have renounced their
investment plans. The only project that remains under consideration is the LNG Canada plant,
which is backed by a major international oil corporation, Shell. This begs the question of
whether Shell’s participation in the project can account for the success of the deal, given Shell’s
experience with the local stakeholder politics.
Before examining stakeholder responses to individual projects, it is important to note
their similarities for the purposes of cross-comparison. The three projects share several
characteristics in common as all of them involve greenfield investment and all of them were
announced after 2010. For each of the proposed plants, proponents were expected to build a
liquefaction plant, marine terminals, and surrounding infrastructure (Stantec Consulting 2013;
Stantec 2013b). All of the projects promised to bring substantial economic benefits to the
province, including higher revenue and GDP growth. The proponents also promised to create
new jobs in the province – the Pacific NorthWest LNG was expected to create 650 full-time jobs
in BC (BC Environmental Review Office 2014), while Aurora LNG was supposed to generate
around 2650-5000 short-term construction jobs in the first phase and around 3000 permanent
jobs to maintain plants operations (Nexen 2017).
Geographical location is another important factor that needs to be considered in the
discussion of the proposed LNG projects as it shapes the discussion of land rights. Aurora LNG,
Pacific NorthWest LNG, and Canada LNG are depicted in Figure 5.2. The location of these
plants infringes on the lands of Indigenous groups and other landholders. The holders of these
rights determine who can have access to a given land and how the land will be utilized. In
Canada, Indigenous peoples and private landowners can claim the land that they inhabit. Since
LNG plants trespass upon territories that are currently (and have been historically) inhabited by
the Indigenous groups and private landholders, proponents of the LNG projects need to gain
permission from the title holders to build LNG plants on the landholders’ territory. Even the
proponents whose projects are located on the federal lands, such as the Pacific NorthWest LNG,
are expected to consult with Indigenous groups that may have used these lands in the past for
sustenance and economic activities and may still claim rights to these lands (Clark 2013; Stantec
2013). In most of these cases, the land rights necessitate consultation with the landholders about
the proposed LNG projects.

102

Figure 5.2: Location of the LNG plants (generated by Bing maps in 2017)

Given that SOEs are still mastering the strategy of community engagement, they may
find it difficult to address community backlash over the plant’s proposed location. The Aurora
LNG and the Pacific Northwest LNG projects both ran into complex negotiations with the
landowners over the proposed locations for their plans. Although proponents of the Aurora LNG
plant obtained the right to use the Crown Land from the provincial government in 2013 (Timetric
2016), they failed to obtain local support for the plant. The Dodge Cove community has opposed
the location of Aurora LNG project as the expected boundary of the plant would have been
located within 0.5km of their community, which is against international standards released by the
Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO).
According to the SIGTTO standards, the boundary of an LNG plant should be 3.5km
away from a residential area (Environmental Assessment Office 2016). This distance should
minimize the expected damage to the communities residing in close proximity to the LNG
terminals which may pose hazards to local residents. Scholars find evidence that LNG terminals
have negatively affected communities through natural gas leakages and spills that may lead to
explosions and create a fire hazard (Sovacool 2008). Given that LNG plants are dangerous, local
communities have multiple concerns that can be alleviated through a consultation and
accommodation process. Land ownership issues, as the next subsequent section will show,
complicate the development of new LNG projects in the province.
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Approving LNG projects politico-economic institutions
British Columbia’s provincial government, under the leadership of Premier Christy Clark,
actively supported the development of the LNG industry. The province declared that the
development of the LNG industry was “a key priority” for the government in 2011
(Environmental Assessment Office 2015b). The government released British Columbia’s Natural
Gas Strategy in 2012 with a goal to make the province into “a global leader” in the LNG industry
(British Columbia’s Natural Gas Strategy 2012). The Strategy’s goal was to help British
Columbia’s LNG producers to reach new markets and establish strong partnerships with new
energy consumers (Environment Assessment Office 2015b). This plan sought to expand the
provincial trade with the Asian energy consumers to remedy the expected drop in prices due to
falling demand for natural gas on the North American market (Moore et al. 2014; Gomes 2015).
To support the growth of the LNG sector, the province set a target to have three operational LNG
facilities by 2020 in The BC Jobs Plan (Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Natural Gas 2013). In
light of this plan, the LNG industry has enjoyed sustained political support from the province’s
Liberal government.
Political support for the LNG industry rested on a governing coalition led by the former
premier of British Columbia, Christy Clark. Clark championed the LNG industry, which became
a large part of the provincial platform during Clark’s final term as the Premier of British
Columbia. In one of the public comments, Clark revealed that, if the approval of LNG plants
depended on her, the province “would have five [LNG projects] by 2020” (Thomas 2013). To
achieve this plan, the Liberal Party looked for financial support overseas and organized several
trade missions to Asia to attract investment for the nascent LNG industry. The province has also
cut down regulatory red-tape by modernizing the Oil and Gas Activities Act, negotiating Impact
Benefits Agreements with Indigenous groups, and streamlining the environmental review process
by signing a substitution agreement with the federal government under the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act of 2012. British Columbia’s Lieutenant Governor, Judith Guichon
(2016) praised these efforts by noting that the “government has done everything it set out to do
to attract investment for the cleanest LNG in the world”.
Political support for the LNG industry may, however, diminish in the upcoming years as
a new political coalition emerged in the summer of 2017. The change in political leadership that
occurred in British Columbia may impact the future of the LNG industry. The NDP-Green party
coalition that took over the leadership reins in the fall of 2017 holds a more hostile stance toward
the LNG industry. The Green party, especially, continues to be opposed to the LNG
development, while the NDP, which has won more seats in the parliament, has stated that it will
(conditionally) support the industry. NDP’s support for the industry hinges on a set of political
conditions, including a corporate guarantee to provide local employment and training, grant a
fair share of profit to the province, operate in an environmentally friendly manner, and engage
with the Indigenous groups (Bailey 2017). The agenda of the new government on the subject of
LNG will likely be re-defined over the next couple of years, yet it is likely that the new
government will remain supportive of the industry as it is projected to have substantial benefits
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for the province. Ultimately, the government’s attitude toward the LNG sector will likely be
influenced by the corporate actors and province’s residents in the upcoming years.
Industry players are very enthusiastic about the emergence of the LNG sector in British
Columbia. In anticipation of the LNG industry, corporate actors have formed a BC LNG Alliance
to support the development of the LNG industry in the province. Their support rests on the
expectation that the LNG industry will bring substantial economic benefits along the supply
chain (Blyschak 2016). In a recently released research paper on the supply chain benefits, Paul
Blyschak (2016), a corporate lawyer at Blakes and an advisor to Shell Canada Energy’s LNG
Canada project, identifies several beneficiaries of the new LNG industry in the province,
including natural gas producers, pipeline companies, natural gas liquefaction facilities,
transportation companies, and downstream LNG buyers.
Each of these corporate actors has a different set of incentives to support LNG projects in
the province. The actors involved in the upstream hydrocarbon industry – natural gas producers –
are supportive of the new LNG projects because these projects will provide producers with
access to global natural gas markets. Businesses operating in the midstream of the hydrocarbon
industry (that engage in processing, marketing, and transportation) are the main proponents of
LNG as they will build the plants and obtain the largest benefit from their operations. Businesses
in the downstream industry – the refiners and distributors - will also benefit from having access
to new markets for their processed products. It is also likely that the benefits from these new
plants will expand to other associated industries, such as service companies that produce
components for LNG plants and pipelines.
Although LNG projects are supported by the government and the industry, public
opposition serves as an important roadblock for the investors. Public’s response to the proposed
LNG projects can be analyzed by examining comments submitted by individuals or groups to the
British Columbia’s Environmental Assessment Office (BCEAO) during the consultation process
conducted for each of the reviewed LNG projects. I analyzed and coded public comments
(available on the BCEAO’s website) for the projects in which Chinese SOEs participate, to
examine the public’s responses to Aurora LNG, Canada LNG, and Pacific NorthWest LNG. I
have coded the submitted responses based on two sets of criteria: 1) public’s receptiveness to the
project as - supportive, request for more research, concerned, or against; and 2) concerns voiced
by the public - environmental concerns (damage to flora and fauna, climate change, and
pollution), social concerns (health, noise, and community lifestyle), and regulatory concerns
(information deficit and regulatory gaps). I will discuss public receptiveness toward each of the
LNG projects and outline publics’ general concerns in the following paragraphs.
The public has responded differently to each of the three LNG projects proposed by the
Chinese SOEs. Based on the BCEAO’s data, the LNG Canada project received the most support
from the public. The data, presented in Figure 5.3, reveal that out of the 51 comments submitted
to the BCEAO (2014) over half of the respondents (53 per cent) expressed their support for the
project, while only 4 per cent of the respondents expressed their sentiment against the project.
Even though 36 per cent of the comments called for more research to determine the project’s
impact, the public appeared to be widely supportive of the LNG Canada plant.

105

Public Comments for LNG Canada submitted in 2014
3%

4% 4%
supportive
more research needed
53%

36%

concerned
empty message
against

Figure 5.3: Public reception of the Canada LNG project (BCEAO 2014)

The Pacific NorthWest LNG project appears to be a more polarizing project for the
public. Even though the BCEAO has received only 45 comments from the public regarding the
project, the majority of the comments appeared to be concerned about the impact of the proposed
plant. As the pie chart in Figure 5.4 demonstrates, almost half of the comments (48 per cent)
submitted by the public expressed concerns about the project, while a third (29 per cent)
indicated opposition to the project. Only 20 per cent of the respondents indicated their support
for the Pacific NorthWest LNG plant. Overall, BCEAO’s data shows that a majority of
comments submitted by the public about the proposed plant were negative as over half of those
comments questioned the project’s impact on the local environment and society.
Public Comments submitted for Pacific NorthWest LNG in
2013 and 2014
3%
concerned

20%
48%

against
pro

29%

not applicable

Figure 5.4: Public reception of the Pacific NorthWest LNG project (BCEAO 2013 and 2014).

The Aurora LNG plant appears to be the most controversial among the three projects. It is
the only project that has received 1186 comments, which is 12 times higher than the number of
comments provided to the other two projects combined. A majority of the submitted comments
(69 per cent) in regard to Aurora LNG indicated community’s opposition to the project. The pie
chart in Figure 5.5 illustrates that another 22 per cent of respondents expressed concerns about
the project, while only 3 per cent of the respondents indicated their support for the Aurora LNG
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plant. The opposition to the Aurora LNG is substantively large in comparison to the other two
projects. The question is what caused this negative response? To answer this question, I looked
into individual responses submitted by the public in regards to the three projects.

Public Comments for Aurora LNG submitted in 2017
3%
22%
pro
against

6%

more research
69%

concerned

Figure 5.5: Public Reception of Aurora LNG (BCEAO 2017)

Canada LNG received the most supportive feedback in comparison to the other two
projects. The project was specifically praised for its public engagement strategies. The comments
submitted by the public to the BCEAO expressed their approval of Shell’s leadership and
community engagement. Some responses praised Shell for being a reliable and supportive
partner for the local communities (BCEAO 2014). The comments also revealed that the public
believed that the LNG Canada project will bring substantial economic and social benefits to their
community, such as local employment and training. On the other hand, the public’s comments
about Aurora LNG have focused on the negative aspects of the project. The proponents of
Aurora LNG were subject to a sustained criticism and opposition. As noted earlier, residents of
the Dodge Cove community opposed the location of the project because it did not follow the
SIGTTO international standards discussed earlier. The community argued that, if the project is
built, it will negatively impact “community cohesion”, environment, heritage, lands, and water
(Environmental Assessment Office 2016). Residents have also expressed their dissatisfaction
with the Aurora LNG project and proposed that “the only acceptable solution…[will be a]
relocation of the proposed Project away from Digby Island” (Environmental Assessment Office
2016).
Several public comments submitted to the BCEAO voiced specific concerns about the
foreign ownership of the Aurora LNG plant. A few comments noted that they are against
Chinese ownership; some of these claimed that Chinese SOEs may not abide by the local
regulations. The anti-China sentiment expressed in these comments may reflect the fact that the
majority of shares in Aurora LNG were owned by Nexen (CNOOC), which has been under
public scrutiny since 2012. While the concerns about foreign ownership have focused on Chinese
corporate behaviour, they remained sporadic and may not have swayed general sentiment of the
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public. Faced with a strong public opposition, the proponents of Aurora LNG had to suspend the
Environmental Review process in 2017 to address environmental issues, including air quality,
human health, wetland/fish habitat, wastewater discharge, marine disposal, flare design, aviation,
noise, and water supply (Janko 2017). In a letter requesting a suspension of the environmental
assessment review, Darcy Janko (2017), Regulatory Manager for Natural Gas Division at Nexen
Energy, noted that Aurora LNG needs to resolve the aforementioned concerns before resuming
the review process. These concerns delayed the project, increased the costs of the consultation
process, and derailed the proponents’ plan to build an LNG terminal in British Columbia.
The public had a set of broad concerns about each of the projects that they noted in the
comments they submitted to the BCEAO’s website. I coded individual concerns raised in the
comments and created bar graphs documenting the results for each of the projects. These graphs
are included in the appendix. The graphs reveal that the public was predominantly concerned
about environmental degradation associated with the LNG industry. The top three environmental
concerns that the public raised were the impact of LNG plants on local flora and fauna,
associated climate change, and air/water/land pollution. Societal impacts of the LNG industry
were also listed as one of the main concerns by the public as individual respondents worried that
these projects will negatively impact their health and disrupt their local life (BCEAO). The
public also noted that they are concerned about the quality of information provided by the
proponents and about the deficiencies in the regulatory standards in the LNG industry.
Indigenous groups and NGOs were especially concerned about the environmental
ramifications of the proposed LNG plants. Several NGOs, including the Pembina Institute (2017)
and David Suzuki Foundation (Bryant and Kadowaki 2012), have noted that the proposed LNG
plants will have negative environmental and societal consequences. Similarly, Indigenous groups
voiced their concern about the environmental aspects of these plants. Their opposition to the
Pacific NorthWest LNG provides a good illustration of this phenomenon. Indigenous groups Metlakatla (Wilson 2015a), Lax Kw’alaams (2016), Métis Nation of British Columbia (2016),
and Kitsumkalum (Biagi 2017) – questioned Pacific NorthWest LNG’s environmental impact.
The groups noted that the project may destroy local salmon habitat and the Flora Bank due to its
precarious location (Biagi 2017; Lax Kw’alams 2016). The Métis cautioned about the negative
impacts that the plant will have on local flora and fauna (2016).
If the representatives of the Pacific NorthWest LNG had consulted with the Indigenous
Peoples and environmental groups about the proposed location, they would have likely chosen a
different site for their LNG facility. The environmental concerns that the indigenous
communities and NGOs raised, are universal concerns and apply to all of the proposed LNG
projects. A Kitselas representative whom I interviewed in 2017 noted that Indigenous groups are
predominantly concerned about the local environmental and societal impact that the proposed
LNG projects have on the local environment and society, notwithstanding the ownership of the
these plants.
Concerns raised by the broader public and Indigenous groups illustrate that Pacific
NorthWest LNG and Aurora LNG failed to obtain a social license to operate from the impacted
communities. Conversely, Canada LNG has secured social support for its project. In the case of
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Canada LNG, it is possible to assume that the community’s support was linked to Shell’s CSR
strategy and relevant experience in working with the Canadian stakeholders. The stark difference
in social support is one of the central explanatory factors for why Chinese SOEs decided to
abandon the two other LNG projects despite having obtained a political and market license to
build a plant in British Columbia.
A lack of social support does not always mean that the domestic/international companies
will pull out from a project as they may engage in prolonged consultation and accommodation to
obtain this support. However, the project’s proponents may choose to pull out from a project
when a lack of social support is combined with other factors, such as decreasing hydrocarbon
prices. To illustrate, investors that championed the Pacific Northwest LNG project have cited
changes in the “macro-economic environment” that made their project unprofitable as a reason
for abandoning the project (Jiang 2017). In this case, the two factors combined to make the
project economically unfeasible. Yet, by itself, the macroeconomic environment, does not
explain why the proponents of LNG projects choose to proceed with the investment or to
withdraw from a project. A case in point, is the LNG Canada plant, which is currently being
built, as the proponents chose to proceed with the investment despite changing macroeconomic
conditions. The only variable that differed between the LNG Canada project and the two other
LNG projects (Aurora LNG and Pacific Northwest LNG) was stakeholder support for the
project. Furthermore, the legal action launched by indigenous and environmental groups against
Pacific NorthWest LNG would have likely delayed the implementation of the project and
increased its overall investment costs.
As this section illustrated, the provincial support along with the corporate backing proved
to be inadequate for Aurora and Pacific NorthWest LNG projects. Thus, one can conclude that in
the LNG sector social license, granted by the Indigenous groups and landholders, was an
important factor as without it foreign investors struggle to operate in the Canadian LNG sector.
In the LNG cases that I have analyzed, we can observe that landholders and rights holders,
Indigenous groups and landowners, can cooperate with the broader civil society groups to delay
an extractive project that requires greenfield investment through regulatory institutions as I will
demonstrate in the subsequent section
Regulatory Institutions
As the Pacific NorthWest LNG and the Aurora LNG plants failed to acquire a social
license to operate, Indigenous groups resorted to legal mechanisms to stop these projects. As
noted in the theoretical section in chapter five, the Crown has a duty to consult with the
Indigenous groups that hold title to the lands that may be negatively impacted by an extractive
project. Judicial precedents indicate that inadequate consultation may be used as reasonable
grounds for legal action. If the legal proceedings are launched, they may potentially put a halt to
an extractive project. In the case of the Pacific NorthWest LNG project, Gitga’at, Metlakatla, and
The Allied Tsimshian Tribes of Lax Kw’alaams voiced their concerns about inadequate
consultation process launched by the proponents of the project (see: Cardinall 2014; Wilson
2015a; The Allied Tsimshian Tribes of Lax Kw’alaams 2016). Mark Biagi, a Fish and Wildlife
Operations Manager for Kitsumkalum Indian Band, revealed in an interview that the project’s
109

proponents were “not listening” nor talking to the Indigenous stakeholders about their project.
Considering the implications of the legal action, Biagi noted that if the First Nations decide to
follow a legal route against an LNG plant, the proposed project will be delayed for several years
(Biagi 2017).
As the Pacific NorthWest LNG project failed to meet the consultation and
accommodation principles, the Indigenous groups decided to act. Indigenous groups joined
forces with environmentalists to file a lawsuit against the Pacific NorthWest LNG project in
2016 with a goal to protect the local environment (Ananthalakshmi 2016; Biagi 2017). If this
lawsuit went ahead, it could have overturned the government’s preliminary approval of the
project. Thus, it is plausible that the legal action could have complicated the Pacific NorthWest
LNG project. Indigenous nations and communities regularly stall extractive projects and
complicate approval procedures for proponents in response to perceived violations of their land
title, autonomy, and other Aboriginal rights (Sarson 2018 interview). This process can make
extractive projects economically unfeasible by raising operational costs for the proponents
(Sarson 2018 interview). Since there are multiple Indigenous groups in British Columbia that can
be impacted by extractive projects, consultation and accommodation processes become a very
important element in corporate considerations when investing in the province.
Businesses can pre-empt legal action by engaging in proper consultations with
Indigenous peoples. Consultation process allows corporations to learn about potential
environmental and societal impacts from the people that know the area well. Biagi notes that
First Nations have experts that study the environment of the area and can help businesses
interested in building an LNG plant to find the best location (interview with the author 2017). In
fact, Biagi notes that First Nations support LNG development when these plants are based in
environmentally-friendly locations. Therefore, Biagi (2017) advises businesses to stop using
‘divide-and-conquer tactics’ and cautions them against giving out financial rewards that often
“pit First Nations against each other”. As Biagi reveals, these strategies create an atmosphere of
“mistrust and anger” that hinders meaningful consultation (2017). Instead, Biagi (2017) suggests
that companies should be prepared to invest in a “deeper consultation” with Indigenous groups to
ensure that their chosen location for an extractive project is appropriate and their environmental
mitigation strategy is sound. Without the support of the stakeholders, business will face a
difficult operating environment and may be forced to abandon their proposed project, as we saw
in the case of the Aurora LNG and the Pacific NorthWest LNG.
Lessons Learned from Chinese Investment in the LNG sector in British Columbia
As this section illustrated, two of the LNG projects supported by the Chinese SOEs were
halted due to a complex mix of factors that cut into the proponents’ financial bottom lines. Media
suggested that the Pacific NorthWest LNG project failed to proceed due to unfavourable market
fundamentals (Jones 2017), however the decision to abandon this project was likely influenced
by the broader political and social factors. In an interview, Biagi (2017) revealed that the
opposition voiced by Indigenous and Environmental groups against the Pacific NorthWest LNG
project has likely factored into corporate decision to abandon the project. This conclusion is
supported by Petronas’ – the largest investor in the Pacific NorthWest LNG - recent
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announcement according to which it is currently considering alternative options to purchase a
minority stake in the LNG Canada project (Jang 2017). If indeed the market fundamentals were
unfavourable as the media has suggested, then we would not expect to see a leading investor in
the Pacific NorthWest project seeking to invest in another LNG venture.
This section also revealed that the Aurora LNG and the Pacific NorthWest LNG
underestimated the role of political, societal, and economic actors in shaping greenfield
investment projects in the Canadian hydrocarbon industry. As noted earlier, greenfield
investments are characterized by the uncertainty that underlines unpredictability of the outcomes
produced by regulatory and political institutions in Canada. This uncertainty can lead to cost
overruns that may reduce the competitiveness of the Canadian LNG industry (Gomes 2015).
These cost overruns may jeopardize all of the proposed projects noted in this section. Media cite
regulatory environment and social license to operate among the key factors that make it difficult
for the LNG sector to materialize in the province (Tao 2014, 21; Gomes 2015, 1).
As this section argued, stringent regulatory environment and complex stakeholder
politics, that are embedded in the Canadian political and regulatory institutions, have hindered
several LNG projects where Chinese SOEs participated. Although projects in which Chinese
SOEs participated were approved by the government and regulatory institutions, the support of
the provincial government (or the political license to operate) is often inadequate for a project to
move forward. As I demonstrated in this section, the BCEAO granted licenses to two out of the
three projects backed by the Chinese SOEs. However, without the social license to operate,
which is granted by the Indigenous groups and the broader public, projects face regulatory delays
that put a strain on their financial resources. Thus, by stalling projects and increasing their
operating costs, opponents may block the development of the LNG industry. The prime example
was the court appeal launched by Indigenous groups to challenge specific projects by launching
legal action against the developer. As I proposed in this section, businesses can mitigate this
opposition by relying on local partners to manage corporate engagement with stakeholders.

Building Pipelines to China
Canada may benefit from expanding its cross-country pipeline infrastructure as it may
improve its access to international oil markets. Due to historical factors, Canadian hydrocarbon
products are closely tied to the North American regional energy market. This is supported by
data on export volumes indicating that 97 per cent of the Canadian exported oil is going to the
United States (Natural Resources Canada 2016). Canada’s dependence on the regional markets
does not conform to “new realities” of the global energy market, characterized by slowing
demand for energy in the United States and growing energy demand in Asia (Holden 2013). In
response to the shifting global energy demand, two Canadian energy transportation companies –
Enbridge and Kinder Morgan – proposed to expand existing pipeline infrastructure from Alberta
to the coast of British Columbia in the mid-2000s.
Both projects submitted plans to bring hydrocarbons from the Canadian producers to the
Asian market. Kinder Morgan submitted a plan to expand an existing Trans Mountain route to
increase its carrying capacity. Enbridge, on the other hand, submitted an ambitious proposal to
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construct a new pipeline – The Northern Gateway – to transport unprocessed bitumen and
synthetic crude from Alberta to British Columbia. Both projects aspired to reach the Asian
energy market; Enbridge even succeeded in gaining financial support from Chinese SOEs for its
project that would have turned to FDI. However, as I will argue in this section, despite
Enbridge’s success in attracting Chinese finance, the project failed to gain a social license and
subsequently lost its political license to operate.
In this section, I examine the failure of Enbridge to construct the Northern Gateway
pipeline that was financially backed by CNPC, CNOOC, and Sinopec. I propose that the failure
of the Northern Gateway project exposed the interlaced relationship between politico-economic
and regulatory institutions that influences greenfield projects in Canada. In exploring this idea,
this section will first identify strategies adopted by Chinese SOEs to participate in construction
of the Canadian pipeline infrastructure. More specifically, it will examine the implications of a
hands-off strategy adopted by Chinese SOEs in this project. The second part of this section will
outline the roles played by individual stakeholders within politico-economic institutions. This
discussion is closely connected to the third part of this section that will examine the regulatory
institutions that are shaped by the interests of Canadian stakeholders. This section will conclude
by examining the constraints that foreign investors face when investing in greenfield projects in
the Canadian hydrocarbon sector.
Chinese SOEs’ Strategy to Support Development of the Canadian Pipeline Infrastructure
Chinese SOEs are participating in the development of infrastructure to transport
commodities around the world as part of the BRI. Although Canada is currently not directly
involved in the initiative, Chinese SOEs appear to be willing financiers of pipeline infrastructure
in Canada as they are interested in shipping the oil produced in Alberta to the world markets.
Thus, Chinese SOEs were very hopeful in the early- to mid- 2000s that the pipeline infrastructure
connecting their petroleum assets in Alberta with the British Columbia’s ports will be developed
(Wang 2017). To assist with this development, Chinese SOEs indicated their interest to support
Enbridge’s Northern Gateway pipeline. The Northern Gateway pipeline project, championed by
Patrick Daniel, Enridge’s president and chief executive, was supposed to reach “the real market,
the world market” (Greenspon 2012) and re-route an estimated one-third of Canadian energy
exports to China (York 2005; Holden 2013).
The proposed pipeline attracted Chinese SOEs that became important financiers of the
project. CNOOC (represented by Nexen) and Sinopec (represented by MEG Energy) both
contributed $10 million to cover Enbridge’s pre-construction expenses that included costs related
to regulatory approval of the project. Jointly the three SOEs provided around $30 million to
cover pre-implementation expenses. These financial contributions extended by Chinese SOEs
came with some strings attached. For example, Sinopec’s financial contribution was conditional
on “a right to invest into…[the] pipeline” once it becomes operational (Solomon 2012). It is
plausible that other SOEs stipulated similar condition in their deals with Enbridge. If this was the
case, then Chinese SOEs would have been partial owners of the pipeline. This assumption is
consistent with a media report, which noted that the Northern Gateway pipeline was to be the
“first major pipeline in Canada [to be] partially owned by Chinese interests.” (VanderKlippe
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2012). Although evidence suggests that Chinese SOEs would have invested in the pipeline, no
data are available to assess the extent of investment as it did not occur. Chinese companies were
also expected to sign long-term oil trade contracts according to CNPC’s memorandum of
understanding with Enbridge, where the two parties agreed to ship 200,000 b/d of bitumen to
China (York 2005; Oil Daily 2006).
Chinese SOEs adopted a hands-off strategy that relied on Enbridge’s local managers to
guide the development of the pipeline. A hands-off strategy appears to be a preferred option
selected by SOEs when they operate in an uncertain environment with complex regulations and
complicated stakeholder politics. This strategy enables Chinese SOEs to take a back seat and to
refrain from getting involved in social and political aspects of the project. Instead, they rely on a
local company, which takes on a responsibility to promote a given project in Canada and to
obtain political and social support for it.
In the case of the Northern Gateway pipeline, Enbridge took an active role in formulating
a set of commitments to the Canadian stakeholders that included economic benefits, like
employment, investment, and financial support for local communities (Northern Gateway 2016).
Enbridge also developed a specific package of incentives to gain Indigenous support for the
project. In exchange for support from the Indigenous groups, Enbridge promised to provide First
Nations and Métis groups with an equity stake (33 per cent of the controlling interest) in the
Northern Gateway venture via Aboriginal Equity Partnership (Northern Gateway 2016).
Enbridge also proposed to create a mechanism for joint governance of the pipeline that will
enable Indigenous communities residing along the pipeline’s route to manage local operations
(Northern Gateway 2016). These strategies were developed by Enbridge to obtain a social
license to operate for the Northern Gateway pipeline.
Although Chinese SOEs initially believed that Enbridge would succeed in building the
Northern Gateway pipeline, the odds were stacked against the project. First, the Northern
Gateway pipeline was a greenfield investment project, which, as noted earlier, is politically and
socially complicated. Since Canada has a complex approval process that hinges on multiple
stakeholders and institutions, it increases the uncertainty of investors about the success of a
proposed project. In other words, it is harder for a greenfield energy project to obtain social and
political licenses to operate. In the Northern Gateway project, a political license was especially
important as it is required for projects to be successfully implemented in Canada. One may
propose, that it may have been easier for Chinese SOEs to invest in the Trans Mountain
expansion project that envisioned an expansion of the existing pipeline. However, even that
project is currently being blocked by social protests and is stalled by a court’s decision initiated
on the basis of this opposition (Smart 2018). While initially Kinder Morgan’s project looked like
a safer bet, targeted social protests against pipelines are an obstacle to pipeline development in
Canada in general.
Charting Stakeholders’ Positions on the Northern Gateway Pipeline
The Northern Gateway pipeline proposal generated controversy among and between
stakeholders. The proponents championed financial and economic benefits of the project, while
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the opponents questioned its economic and social sustainability. In this section, I examine
positions regarding the Northern Gateway project taken by individual stakeholders. This section
begins by examining the internal discord among the industry players, who held opposing views
about the project. Subsequently, this section analyzes public’s response to the project with a
specific focus on the role played in the project by Indigenous groups and NGOs. Lastly, this
section examines the government’s response to the project in light of the interests presented by
societal and business actors.
From the outset, the industry players were divided about the Northern Gateway project
and its benefits. The project’s proponents and several hydrocarbon producers championed the
economic benefits of the pipeline. They stressed that the project would contribute to the
diversification of Canada’s hydrocarbon exports, which will improve Canada’s energy security
(Lemphers 2010, 3; Calgary Chamber 2012). Conversely, the opponents challenged market
fundamentals of the project and suggested that it may generate economic losses. The refining
industry, some petroleum producers, and direct competitors were opposed to the project
(Lemphers 2010; CITGO 2010). The opponents claimed that the export of raw bitumen would
lower employment opportunities for Canadian labourers in the refining and upgrading sectors
(Lemphers 2010, 24). Critics also argued that the Northern Gateway project will result in an
“excess of crude oil pipeline capacity”, which will increase the cost of tariffs/rates across
individual pipelines as they are not used at their full capacity (CITGO 2010). Similarly, Kinder
Morgan representatives have pointed out that the project directly competes with their Trans
Mountain expansion project and worried about the ability of the market to utilize the new
supplies of oil (Oslert, Hoskin & Harcourt L.L.P. 2010a).
The competition among the two pipeline projects makes it harder for either actor to
acquire a market license as the evidence suggests. As both projects are competing for the same
customers and markets, it makes it harder to obtain widespread support from the industry. In fact,
economic competitors appeared to be aligned against the Northern Gateway pipeline. Since
Canada is an open market economy, businesses operating in Canada must compete in a
marketplace that may not have room for all projects devised by the corporate actors. Therefore,
the Northern Gateway project lacked a market license to proceed and failed to obtain a social
license as I will discuss in the next paragraph.
Civil society actors joined industry players that were opposed to the project. NGOs,
including the Citizens of the World, Greenpeace, and the West Coast Environmental Law Group,
among others have questioned economic and environmental aspects of the projects. They
challenged the economic benefits of the project (Lee 2012); exposed environmental dangers
associated with the project (Lee 2012; West Coast Environmental Law 2012) and outlined the
adverse impacts that the project may have on the Indigenous groups (Joint Review Panel for the
Enbridge Northern Gateway Project 2013; West Coast Environmental Law 2009). Additionally,
NGOs vehemently opposed an associated increase in tanker traffic and pipelines in British
Columbia due to the environmental risks associated with oil spills, which can destroy local
environment and wildlife (West Coast Environmental Law 2012). In their protests against the
Northern Gateway pipeline, NGOs have adopted a set of diverse strategies, including public
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protests and a targeted occupation of the Northern Gateway offices in British Columbia
organized by the Greenpeace (2010).
Canadian residents, especially British Columbians, were generally opposed to the
Northern Gateway pipeline project. Bloomberg-Nanos conducted a poll in 2014 to survey
Canadians across the nation about the pipeline. The poll revealed that 34 per cent of the polled
Canadians wanted to block the pipeline, 33 per cent wanted to delay the project, and only 29 per
cent were supportive of the project (Bloomberg-Nanos 2014). This data indicates that a majority
of those surveyed (67 per cent) were concerned about the project. Another poll carried out by the
Forum Research Inc. (2012) revealed that over half (52 per cent) of the polled British
Columbians were opposed to the pipeline. 42 Data from both polling agencies indicate that the
public was generally not supportive of the project. Public and NGO opposition undermined the
social legitimacy of the Northern Gateway project and raised a set of questions about the ability
of the project’s proponents to acquire a social license to operate. In order to acquire this license,
the proponents of the pipeline had to convince British Columbian residents and Indigenous
groups that the project will be beneficial to the environment and society.
One of the main roadblocks to the Northern Gateway project was Indigenous groups’
opposition to the project. The proposed pipeline was expected to pass through territories claimed
by hundreds of Indigenous groups, including treaty and non-treaty First Nations, Métis, and other
Indigenous groups, councils, and organizations (Atkins n.d.). Proponents of the Northern
Gateway project needed to consult and accommodate the interests of the Indigenous peoples
residing along the proposed route in order to gain their approval for the project. From the outset,
multiple Indigenous groups were opposed to the project. Indigenous groups were concerned
about four key aspects of the pipeline: 1) land issues; 2) environmental impact; 3) pipeline spills;
and 4) the socio-economic impact of the project (Neufeld 2005). In light of these concerns, a
Pembina Institute report on the issue noted that “[n]o First Nations communities have officially
expressed their support for the pipeline” (Lemphers 2010). Since the project lacked support from
indigenous groups, the groups could have resorted to regulatory institutions and pursued legal
avenues to challenge the project as it did not meet their demands.
Canadian federal and provincial governments consider multiple factors aside from the
public opinion, including bilateral political and economic relations, when considering new
pipeline projects. At the time of the Northern Gateway proposal, Canadian energy relations with
the United States had begun to deteriorate as the Obama administration rejected a Keystone XL
expansion project (Grant 2012; Hale 2014, 354). Considering the altered energy landscape, the
Canadian Minister of Natural Resources at the time, Joe Oliver, revealed that Canada will
“intensify…efforts to sell the oil elsewhere” (Investor’s Business Daily 2011). As the Prime
Minister, Stephen Harper, revealed in interview Canada was “very serious about…selling…
energy products off to Asia” (Investor’s Business Daily 2011). As relations between Canada and
the United States have begun to deteriorate, Canadian policymakers turned to the Asian markets.
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A survey carried by Ipsos Reid (2012) (commissioned by Enbridge) has produced a different set of data with 32
per cent British Columbians against and 42 in support of the pipeline. Given that the survey was commissioned by
the proponent of the pipeline, the numbers should be assessed critically.
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To get hydrocarbons to Asia, the federal government and Alberta’s provincial leadership,
headed by Premier Alison Redford, expressed their willingness to back the Northern Gateway
Project. Their enthusiasm about the pipeline was not shared by the political leadership in British
Columbia. The Premier of British Columbia at the time, Christy Clark was notoriously opposed
to the pipeline stating that it was “not very good for British Columbia” as the province will take
on the “vast majority of the risk…[for minimal] benefits” 43 (Wingrove and Taber 2012). This
discord led to the interprovincial disagreement between Alberta and British Columbia about the
pipeline.
In response to the inter-provincial tensions over the pipeline, the government of British
Columbia released a set of five conditions that the Northern Gateway had to fulfill in order to
obtain political support from the province. These five conditions outlined that the proponents of
the Northern Gateway had to pass an environmental review, develop an emergency preparedness
plan to address oil spills, gain acceptance from the Indigenous groups, and outline its economic
contribution to the province (Minister of Environment 2012). The inter-provincial debate was
halted briefly when Premier Redford and Premier Clark agreed on the “Canadian Energy
Strategy” in 2013. Under this Strategy, Alberta’s leadership stated that it was supportive of
British Columbia’s five conditions (Alberta Government 2013).
The political support for the project was, however, short-lived. The project lost political
momentum after the election of new provincial and federal leadership. Newly elected provincial
and federal leaders – Premier Rachel Notley and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau - had struck
down the proposed project (Smith 2015; Stone 2014). After Trudeau and Notley took over their
respective leadership positions, the media declared that the “Northern Gateway is probably dead”
(Hunter and Tait 2015). The media were right. In 2016, the federal government announced its
decision to block the pipeline and impose a tanker moratorium on crude oil tanker traffic
expanding the de facto moratorium of 1988 (Cattaneo 2016; Trumpener 2015). All of these
policies were implemented shortly thereafter, and the Northern Gateway pipeline lost its political
license.
Regulatory institutions
The Harper administration provided substantial political backing for the Northern
Gateway project from the outset. In support of the project, the administration cut down the red
tape and expedited the approval process for the project. As part of this process, the federal
government approved a controversial Bill C-38, the “Responsible Resource Development” act, in
2012. This Bill C-38 was criticized by experts, scholars, and NGOs in Canada as it curtailed the
environmental review process to 18 months, confined consultation process only to the “directly
affected” groups, and enabled auditors to review the charitable status of environmental NGOs,
thus limiting their activity (Le Billon and Vandecasteyen 2013, 49-50). A more relaxed
regulatory environment coincided with a favourable political momentum created by the federal
43

This view was backed by the official opposition party, the NDP, Adrian Dix, who declared that the pipeline is
“not in the public interest” as it may “cause significant adverse environmental effects” (Dix 2012, 1). The NDP was
concerned about oil spills, greenhouse emissions, and loss of refining jobs among others (Dix 2012, 1). For Dix
(2012) “environmental, economic and social risks…simply outweigh the benefits” (3).
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government under Prime Minister Harper and Alberta’s provincial government led by Premier
Alison Redford.
Despite the political backing and supportive institutional environment, the Northern
Gateway pipeline, had to undergo a complex approval process, given that it was a greenfield
investment project. The National Energy Board formed a joint review panel with the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Agency in 2006 to review the project’s impact on the Canadian
economy, society, and environment based on the Canada Environmental Assessment Act of 2012
and the National Energy Board Act (National Energy Board 2013). The Panel consulted
independent specialists, representatives of the project, business actors, Indigenous groups, and
other stakeholders. After prolonged consultations, the Panel stipulated 209 conditions to be met
by the proponents to ensure that the project produces substantial benefits to Canada (National
Energy Board 2013, 71). In its concluding statement, the Panel determined that it was “not
persuaded that construction and routine operations of the project would have [a] negative effect
on [the] social fabric” and on the Indigenous communities, noting that any adverse effects will be
temporary and confined (National Energy Board 2013, 21 and 25).
The preliminary decision to conditionally approve the project was repealed in 2016 by
the National Energy Board. The decision to rescind the approval came in the aftermath of the
Court Proceedings carried out by the Federal Court of Appeal in the case of Gitaxaala Nation v.
Canada (2016). As noted in the theory section, Indigenous groups can launch an appeal when a
new project fails to adequately consult and accommodate the impacted groups on the grounds of
the Aboriginal Title and Rights (West Coast Enviornmetnal Law 2009; Stueck 2012). As the
legal precedent of the Tsilhqot’in First Nation ruling (2014) shows, Indigenous groups can
successfully use legal avenues to assert their title on the land. Based on these precedents, the
Court has found that “Canada has not fulfilled its duty to consult” Indigenous communities [8]
and that the Certificates granted by the National Energy Board to the project “are…a nullity and
must be quashed” [333] (Gitaxaala Nation v Canada 2016). In the aftermath of this Court case,
the Board has rescinded the Certificates issued to the Northern Gateway’s proponents (NEB
2016). In this case, the Canadian legal system has upheld the rights of Indigenous groups, and in
doing so it demonstrated that stakeholders can rely on the regulatory institutions to challenge
unpopular pipeline projects.
This decision also undermined the project’s political license extended under the Harper
administration. As noted earlier, after the Harper-Redford political coalition was replaced by
Trudeau and Notley, the state-corporate bargain has lost its momentum. Thus, we observed that
the new political coalition, representing the interests of the electoral majority, has repealed the
decisions made under the previous government by rescinding a political license granted to the
Northern Gateway project under the previous administrations. Without the political license, and
with the court order to stop the project, the Northern Gateway proponents were unable to carry
out the project.
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Lessons Learned from Chinese Engagement in the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project
The Northern Gateway project for which Chinese SOEs provided around $30 million for
the pre-construction expenses did not go according to plan. The project never obtained a social
license to operate and, in the end, lost the political license which was granted under the Harper
administration. This section has examined several factors that led to the demise of the project.
First, the project failed to obtain support from the industry players. Although the project was
backed by the Chinese companies and a few domestic corporate actors, the other industry players
questioned the economic rationale of the pipeline. Second, Indigenous groups’ opposition to the
Northern Gateway project can be perceived as one of the main roadblocks for the project’s
implementation. Since Indigenous groups have a recourse to the Canadian legal system to
resolve controversial projects, they wield a substantial power in determining the fate of
greenfield investments in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector. Their power is reinforced by the
‘duty to consult’ the Indigenous groups before approving any new projects that will pass through
Indigenous territories. Third, the project did not manage to obtain a lasting political license. The
election of a new federal and provincial administration that did not support the project made it
clear that the project’s political license was not permanent. In the end, the Northern Gateway
project failed to obtain the support from the key stakeholders that was required to proceed
forward.
The case study of the Northern Gateway pipeline exposed the instability and uncertainty
that greenfield hydrocarbon projects face in Canada. As this section has revealed, projects that
fail to obtain public support can lose political support when the election brings new political
parties into power. One may conclude that there is an indirect linkage between electoral
institutions and project’s approval; where elections can be used as a mechanism for the public to
‘vote out’ unpopular projects in the hydrocarbon sector. Although the link is indirect, the
responsiveness of the Canadian policymakers to civil society’s interests has been likely an
important contributing factor to the failure of the Northern Gateway. At the same time, this
section also demonstrated that Indigenous and NGO groups play an important role in shaping
extractive projects in Canada. In the case of the Northern Gateway, Indigenous and NGO
opposition has made the pipeline “a no-go politically” as both groups can appeal the
government’s decision to permit the project through the legal system (Argitis and Mayeda 2014).
Based on this evidence, one may conclude that Canadian stakeholders can rely on institutional
mechanisms to block unpopular pipeline projects. Ultimately, stakeholder opposition has stymied
Chinese SOEs’ agenda to expand Canadian pipeline infrastructure that is necessary to support
hydrocarbon trade with Asia.
Despite the uncertainty about the future of Canadian pipelines, SOEs are not in a “rush to
exit” the Canadian hydrocarbon sector as they see Canadian energy resources as a “part of [their]
global investment portfolio” (Woo 2017). Therefore, Chinese SOEs operating in Canada are
willing to ship their oil to where they can earn greater profits; in the case of Canada the market
remains localized and focused on the domestic and American energy consumers (Lemphers
2012, 4). Furthermore, Chinese SOEs may support the expansion of the Trans Mountain pipeline
as Wenran Jiang proposes (Cattaneo 2016). Enbridge’s failure to implement the Northern
Gateway project serves as a learning experience for Chinese SOEs as it demonstrated that
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greenfield energy projects in democratic countries require a social, economic and political
license before proceeding.

Conclusion: Wrapping Up the Case Studies
This chapter provided an overview of Chinese investment in the Canadian hydrocarbon
industry. By reviewing this investment, I was able to chart a general picture of Chinese FDI in
the Canadian hydrocarbon sector that I explored deeper in the three case studies. The three indepth case studies revealed that Chinese SOEs face a relatively challenging operating
environment in the Canadian energy sector. While expanding diplomatic ties have resulted in
stronger trade and investment links between the two countries, this section has illustrated that
domestic stakeholders and institutions have blocked closer collaboration in several of the
proposed investment deals. After investing in Canada, Chinese SOEs have learned that
individual stakeholders have substantial power in shaping the fate of new hydrocarbon projects.
As I argued in this chapter, stakeholder politics influence foreign investment in the Canadian
hydrocarbon sector through a series of mechanisms that are related to political, social, and
market licenses to operate.
The findings from the case studies illustrated that Chinese SOEs participation in the
hydrocarbon sector was influenced by political, social, and economic demands of the Canadian
stakeholders. Investors that did not satisfy stakeholders’ demands lost their licenses to operate
and had to abandon their projects. This was illustrated by the two LNG projects – Aurora LNG
and Pacific NorthWest LNG - where Chinese SOEs participated and by the shelved Northern
Gateway pipeline. The relative success of the CNOOC-Nexen deal illustrated that Chinese SOEs
can buy into an existing business (brownfield FDI) that has obtained the necessary licenses to
operate in Canada. In this case, Chinese SOEs adopt the pre-existing stakeholder engagement
strategies of the acquired enterprise. I have also proposed that institutional differences between
Canadian and Chinese corporate and governance cultures, may lead to a rise in protectionism in
the host society. One example of rising protectionism in Canada, was the government’s decision
to expand the SOE-specific Guidelines in the aftermath of CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen. This
suggests that Canada’s neoliberal ideology may protect itself from the inflow of SOEs that are
governed on the basis of state-capitalist ideology.
Another interesting finding that emerged from my interviews with the experts on Chinese
FDI in Canada is an aspect of learning by Chinese SOEs. This aspect will require further
investigation and analysis that is beyond the scope of my research. However, it is interesting to
note that several studies suggest that SOEs are not used to operating in a business environment
where they are constantly under the watchful eye of civil society that may influence corporate
activities (Zhao 2013; Mayer et al. 2018). Preliminary empirical evidence along with my
interviews indicate that Chinese SOEs and Canadian stakeholders have engaged in mutual
learning through collaborative efforts. An example of this mutual learning is a regulatory
adaptation. To illustrate, Chinese SOEs have learned not to underestimate the processes of
accommodation and consultation in Canada, while Canadian policymakers used their learning
experience to alter domestic regulations (Wang 2017).
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Therefore, SOEs are becoming increasingly cautious about their operations in Canada
given that they are closely watched. To reduce the pressure on their activities, Chinese SOEs are
trying to adapt to the Canadian corporate and governance standards, including labour regulations
and consultation processes, however media reports suggest that they are having a hard time
adapting (Cattaneo 2017). It is difficult to evaluate the progress that Chinese SOEs have made
over time as their operations are less transparent than those of the international oil companies
operating in Canada (Cattaneo 2017; McCarthy 2017). In an interview, Cattaneo (2017) revealed
that information about activities of Chinese SOEs in Canada is scarce and emerges only when
they run into problems in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector.44 According to Cattaneo (2017),
Chinese SOEs operating in Canada may be less successful than international oil corporations
because they find it difficult to adapt to Canada’s “highly competitive environment” that is
shaped by a set of regulatory and environmental standards, which are influenced by a set of
complex stakeholder relations.
Thus, it is not surprising that SOEs have predominantly adopted a more hands-off
strategy in Canada, where they partner with local corporations to learn from their Canadian
counterparts. Cattaneo (2017) suggests that because SOEs remain isolated from the communities
where they operate and rely on local partners to manage stakeholder relations, their learning
progress may be slow. To ensure a successful implementation of future hydrocarbon projects,
Chinese SOEs should pay close attention to stakeholder relations in Canada and other advanced
industrialized countries. In the advanced industrialized countries, Chinese political influence is
less prominent because SOEs cannot prop their deals with loans and infrastructure packages as
they do in developing countries (Li 2017). Given that these packages helped Chinese SOEs gain
a political and social edge in developing countries, without them Chinese SOEs need to compete
with other businesses on the level playing field in countries like Canada. In this case, SOEs must
operate according to the established political and social standards to obtain a social and political
license to operate (Li 2017). As Chinese SOEs desire to be “global players” and want to expand
their operations across the world (McCarthy 2017; Wang 2017), this learning experience helps
them to build an image of a skillful operator that can interact with a complex set of stakeholders
with a diverse set of demands.
Overall, the in-depth case studies, discussed in this chapter, illustrated that Chinese SOEs
have at times miscalculated the importance of the Canadian stakeholders and institutions.
According to McCarthy (2017), SOEs had little experience engaging with First Nations and did
not appreciate the importance of doing so. They only learned about the power of Indigenous
groups in Canada after the Northern Gateway was blocked (McCarthy 2017). This argument is
backed by the results of my LNG case studies, where Chinese SOEs have found it difficult to
negotiate the proposed LNG projects with the local communities. This can be explained by an
institutional distance between SOEs home and host states. As Jia Wang (2017) suggested in an
interview, in China, stakeholder politics and court challenges are rare, which indicates that SOEs
have to face a “steep learning curve” in Canada. Even in the case of Nexen, where CNOOC
succeeded in acquiring the company, Chinese SOEs were met with a resistance in the form of
44
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regulatory constraints on future FDI by SOEs in the oil sands. It is plausible that this was not
anticipated by CNOOC at the time that the deal was proposed. Therefore, I argue that this case
can be interpreted as ‘failed success’.
On the basis of my interviews and field work, it appears that Chinese SOEs are adapting
to the Canadian environment; the learning process, however, does not come cheap as Chinese
companies have made several suboptimal deals in Canada (Li 2017). The learning aspect also
explains why Chinese SOEs continue to invest in Canada despite a string of failures that they
experienced. An example of this learning process is visible from a recently announced
partnership between Sinopec and Indigenous groups to build a joint refinery (Morgan 2018).

Chapter 6. Chinese engagement in Russia: Toward a Theoretical Model
Introduction
Like Canada, Russia is abundantly endowed with fossil fuels, which are exported
regionally and internationally. According to BP’s (2017) estimate, the country has the largest
proven natural gas reserves and the sixth largest oil reserves in the world. Russia is also the
largest producer of oil and the second largest producer of natural gas, according to EIA’s (2017)
2016 data. On average, Russia exported over 7 million barrels per day and 7.5 trillion cubic feet
of gas in 2016 (Energy Information Agency 2017). Majority of these exports –72 per cent of
Russian oil exports and 93 per cent of natural gas exports - are transported to Europe (Energy
Information Agency 2017). In comparison, China accounted for only 18 per cent of Russia’s
total oil exports and a negligible amount of natural gas in 2016 (Energy Information Agency
2017). Given Russia’s large export capacity, countries, like China, are interested in establishing
stronger energy ties with Russia through economic collaboration via investments, loans, and
long-term supply agreements.
Since the turn of the 21 st century, the Sino-Russian energy partnership has reached an
unprecedented level. Some scholars even posit that today the Sino-Russian energy collaboration
has attained a “strategic” level (Petersen and Barysch 2011; Røseth 2017). These growing energy
ties are premised on geographic and economic complementarities that are reinforced by a shared
border (Downs 2010). Despite these complementarities, early attempts to establish Sino-Russian
energy collaboration were impeded by Russia’s fear of becoming a ‘resource appendage’ to
China (Downs 2010, 152; Bellacqua 2010, 160). Chinese investors were also pushed away by
high investment barriers imposed by Russian formal institutions, which discouraged foreign
investors from coming in (Heinrich, Kusznir, and Pleines 2002). While Russia remains afraid of
China’s growing economic and political power in the region, it needs foreign partners to help its
struggling oil and gas companies, which lack finance and technology (Henderson 2015). This
inherent tension between welcoming Chinese FDI and protecting domestic resources is one of
the factors that shapes Chinese involvement in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. In light of this,
the central question posed by this chapter is: how do Russian institutions and stakeholders
influence the ability of Chinese SOEs to participate in the Russian hydrocarbon sector?
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The answer to this question rests on the interaction between Russian stakeholders and
institutions that jointly determine the ability of Chinese SOEs to join projects and determine the
nature of their participation – through investment, loans, or trade deals 45. I capture this
interaction in a theoretical model, which I will develop in this chapter along with a set of
theoretical propositions that will be tested in the subsequent chapter. This model captures how
interstate-relations, domestic institutions, and stakeholder politics determine Chinese
engagement in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. The first element of this model is captured by the
changing geopolitical factors, including an exodus of foreign investors from Russia and the
imposition of Western sanctions, that impact inter-state relations. Inter-state relations provide a
more nuanced argument about the timing of the inflow of Chinese FDI into the Russian
hydrocarbon sector as they shape stakeholder politics. The second element of the model rests on
informal and formal institutions. In the Russian case, state capitalism and resource nationalism
underpin the ideology of the informal institutions. While these variables may make it harder for
foreign businesses to invest in the hydrocarbon sector, I argue that in the Russian case these
factors are surprisingly conducive to Chinese FDI. Stakeholder politics are the last but most
important component of the model. These politics are shaped by power differential that favours
the state and large NOCs.
According to this model, the success of Chinese SOEs in the Russian hydrocarbon sector
depends on institutional environment and stakeholder politics which are influenced by inter-state
relations. On the basis of this model, I will identify several testable propositions and general
principles in this chapter that will be further explored/tested in chapter eight that examines
Chinese engagement in specific projects in the Russian energy sector. One of the theoretical
propositions that will be explored in this chapter is that favourable alignment of these variables
produced a conducive environment for the success of Chinese participation in the Russian
hydrocarbon sector in the mid-2000s.
To analyze this argument and to develop a model of Chinese engagement in Russia, this
chapter is subdivided into four sections. The first section examines inter-state relations by
focusing on Russia’s cooling energy partnership with Europe that is tied with the Russia’s “Pivot
to the East”. It also explores growing Sino-Russian diplomatic relations that are conducive to
closer energy collaboration. The second part of this chapter focuses on the role played by
institutions – informal and formal - in shaping Chinese participation in the hydrocarbon projects.
The final part of this chapter focuses on the role of stakeholders in influencing the success of
Chinese energy projects in Russia. After analyzing each of these factors individually, the last
section ties everything together and outlines a set of expectations that will be examined in the
subsequent chapter.

Inter-state Relations and FDI
The first building block of my model is represented by inter-state relations between
Russia and its foreign partners in the energy sector. As in the Canadian case, inter-state relations
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shape stakeholder’s receptiveness of foreign companies, including Chinese SOEs, and thus
influence trade and investment patterns in the Russian oil and gas industry. During the Cold War
period, Russia became deeply integrated into the European energy market (Högselius 2013).
Europe’s growing dependence on Russian energy has affected the flow of energy-related trade
and investment. As an illustration, the data on Russian energy exports, presented in the
introduction to this chapter, indicated that majority of Russian exports (over 70 per cent of oil
and 90 per cent of natural gas of the total exports as per 2016 data) are transported to European
countries (Energy Information Agency 2017). It is plausible that Sino-Russian bilateral relations
will have a similar impact on trade and investment flow, especially in light of the changing
energy demand and geopolitical factors that are currently aligned in China’s favour.
This section examines how changing geopolitical factors and shifting energy demand
may influence Chinese engagement in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. I propose that these two
factors are shaped by the energy security considerations. Jointly energy security, shifting energy
demand, and changing geopolitical factors are expected to reshape the existing patterns of energy
investment and trade. To explore these arguments, the first part of this section will focus on the
geopolitical changes, while the second part will examine emerging trends in the Sino-Russian
energy partnership.
Foreign Investors, Geopolitics and Energy Security
Energy security is a central pillar of the Russian political system and economy. Energy
security, conceptualized as the security of supply for the domestic use (Minister of Energy of the
Russian Federation 2010), plays a central role in the energy calculus of the Russian policymakers
given the government’s political and economic dependence on the energy sector. According to
the official statistics, gathered in November 2017, the oil and gas sectors accounted for 39.7 per
cent of federal budget revenue 46 (Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation 2018). The
concept of energy security is one of the core principles outlined by the Russian government in
the Energy Strategy of Russia; For the Period Up to 2030. The Strategy states that energy
security is central to Russia’s “national security”, which is under threat from “external
(geopolitical, macroeconomic, market) factors” and internal domestic issues (2010, 28).
The Energy Strategy of Russia outlines two aspects of energy security. The first aspect
rests on the premise that the existing hydrocarbon resources can satisfy domestic supply and
honour the “obligations under the international export contracts” (Strategy 2010, 30). In the
second instance, energy security means that energy resources can generate enough revenue to
support government’s activities. The Strategy outlines that one way to do so is through
“international cooperation in the energy sector” (Strategy 2010, 30). The objective of this
collaboration is to develop new energy infrastructure and to obtain the necessary technology to
enable energy extraction. Therefore, energy security considerations in Russia envision closer
cooperation with international oil companies and oil-importing states.

In the past, the government’s reliance on the hydrocarbon sector was even higher; an IEA report (2014, 18)
indicated that over 50.2 per cent of Government’s budget were generated by oil and gas in 2013.
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Russia has established close energy relationship with Europe focused on energy trade and
FDI to ensure that it can support domestic resource extraction. European consumers have formed
strong investment ties with Russia. Accordingly, British IOCs - BP and Shell (part Dutch) - held
a dominant position in Russia in terms of investment and corporate presence until the mid-2000s.
Integrated energy trade and investment patterns have produced an interdependent energy
partnership between Europe and Russia that was reinforced by the regional energy infrastructure.
One of the examples is the Russian relationship with Germany that has been reinforced by the
construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline 47 that connects the two countries directly through
the Baltic Sea (Svyatets 2015).
Despite strong bilateral relations with Europe, changing geopolitical realities over time
have instigated the exodus of Western corporations and finance from Russia’s hydrocarbon
sector. One of these geopolitical changes is linked to the European plan to diversify their
hydrocarbon suppliers in hopes to reduce their dependence on Russia’s energy exports (see:
Proedrou 2016). If European demand for Russian hydrocarbons declines, Russia will need to find
other consumers. Therefore, Europe’s diversification policy motivated Russia’s search for new
energy consumers. One factor that has contributed to Europe’s policy shift is the prolonged
disagreement over natural gas between Ukraine and Gazprom that begun in 2005. This
disagreement has escalated into a “gas crisis” during which Russian suppliers reduced deliveries
to Europe that negatively impacted local consumers (Stern 2006). This crisis increased Europe’s
energy insecurity thus prompting it to look for energy supplies elsewhere. In turn, Europe’s shift
in demand has likely acted as an impetus for the Russian energy producers to seek new export
markets elsewhere.
Russia’s shift to other energy consumers was reinforced by the “Pivot to the East” – or
Russia’s turn toward the Asian markets. I propose that the “Pivot” is directly related to China’s
growing presence in the Russian hydrocarbon sector, which is linked to two major events – the
Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 and the Western sanctions in the aftermath of the Ukraine
crisis. Scholars posit that the Global Financial Crisis was one of the first significant markers for
growing Sino-Russian partnership, where a decline in Western finance was replaced by finance
from Chinese lenders (Pale 2013; Kaczmarski 2016, 418). Subsequent Western sanctions, in the
aftermath of the Ukraine conflict, served to reinforce Sino-Russian collaboration as Russian oil
and gas companies have lost access to finances and technology created by the Western firms
(Weitz 2014, 83; Yilmaz and Daksueva 2017, 6; Henderson 2015; Kaczmarski 2016, 418). The
loss of Western finance and technology has negatively affected Russian companies as capital and
technology are required for domestic oil firms that seek to develop new, hard-to-access
hydrocarbon fields (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2015).
The loss of Western technology and finance brought Russia closer to China. Given that
Russia’s existing oil and gas fields are aging, Russian oil companies need to develop new
deposits to maintain domestic energy security and safeguard their international export position.
However, to develop new hard-to-access deposits they need international finance and technology
(Henderson 2015). One method to generate finance is by borrowing money from domestic banks
47
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or by requesting support from the government. However, a Russian banking expert whom I
interviewed in 2016 has noted that domestic banks lack financial capital required to finance risky
new projects (Anonymous 2016). Since domestic banks lack finance, Russian oil companies
have to rely on the sale of oil and gas on the international markets to generate capital. Since the
timing of the Global Financial Crisis coincided with the falling oil prices that reduced profits,
Russian companies were pushed closer to China (Li and Wang 2015). As Western IOCs left
Russia and oil prices began to fall, the Russian government and companies needed an alternative
source of finance and technology, which they found in China. In this way, the timing was
conducive to a closer Sino-Russian collaboration in the energy sector.
As this section revealed, Russia’s hydrocarbon industry has reoriented itself from the
Western-centric export strategy to one that focuses on Asian markets. Some scholars even argued
that Sino-Russian energy collaboration is an outcome of re-aligned geopolitical and geoeconomic interests that brought the two regional powers together (Yilmaz and Daksueva 2017,
23). Ultimately, the temporal dimension that opened the door for China to enter has also exposed
the uncertainties present in the Russian hydrocarbon industry. As noted earlier, Overland’s
(2011) analysis exposed that the Russian government creates a hostile investment environment
by using institutions to challenge foreign firms, such as IOCs, that fall out of government’s
favour. Given the importance of time in the Sino-Russian relationship, one wonders if China’s
success is only a temporary phenomenon. It is plausible that this success may only last as long as
the factors that are currently conducive to closer energy partnership remain favourable. While
this question cannot be addressed in this dissertation as it is difficult to make predictions, it is
still important to understand how Sino-Russian bilateral diplomacy influences the ability of
Chinese SOEs to participate in the Russian hydrocarbon sector.
Bilateral Diplomacy
Bilateral diplomatic relations are a formative factor in Sino-Russian energy collaboration.
Historically, Sino-Russian energy ties were hindered by a mutual suspicion that led to an arms
race and border violence in the 1950s and the 1960s that culminated in the “Sino-Soviet split”
(Dittmer 2001; Anderson 2013). The history of this political standoff and mutual mistrust have
blocked economic collaboration between the two sides in the past (Downs 2010; Bellacqua 2010;
Eder 2016), despite the economic compatibility and geographic proximity of the two countries
(Lo 2008; Herman 2008; Paik 2012). As Sino-Russian tensions de-escalated in the 1980s, their
bilateral relationship began to improve under Yeltsin’s administration, albeit the improvement
centered predominantly on rhetoric rather than on concrete action (Anderson 2013). One of the
reasons that held Russia back from selling its energy to China was the rapid economic rise and
regional expansion of the latter that threatened Russian “national security” (Downs 2010, 160).
Russia was especially afraid that it will become a “raw materials appendix to the Chinese
colossus” (Lodgaard 2012, 22-23; Bellacqua 2010; Downs 2010; Eder 2016). This generated
“commitment fears” (Downs 2010, 146) and hindered early attempts at collaboration between
the two powers (Herberg 2009; Perovicc and Orttung 2009; Lain 2015).
In Russia, as in any resource rich-country, the debate about welcoming Chinese investors
into the energy sector is complicated by the idea of resource nationalism. In the case of the Sino125

Russian relationship, the history of the political standoff in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet
ideological split that occurred in the 1960s made Russia cautious about China’s investment in the
energy sector in the 1990s (Mitrova 2016). Thus, China’s early attempts to acquire Russian
hydrocarbon resources were blocked due to strategic and political fears (Krutikhin 2016).
Therefore, under the Yeltsin administration, an early wave of energy collaboration between the
two sides amounted only to trade (Norlign 2009). Even though the hydrocarbon industry was
privatized by Yeltsin at the time, the earlier tensions along with politico-economic instability
pre-empted FDI in the 1990s and early 2000s. Despite the slow start, Sino-Russian energy
relations improved under the Putin and Medvedev administrations. Reflecting on closer energy
relations with China, Russian President, Vladimir Putin announced that while Russia is
“generally very careful [about]…the admission of…foreign partners” into the energy sector,
“there are no restrictions for our Chinese friends” (Tarasov 2014).
Putin has been a key figure in forging stronger energy ties with China. Under Putin, the
two sides agreed to promote closer bilateral collaboration in the energy sector. Closer bilateral
ties were established under the Treaty for Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2001, Article 16). This treaty
served as the basis for other agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) that
followed. The two sides signed multiple agreements to promote energy collaboration, including
15 bilateral agreements signed in 2006 to promote energy trade and investment (The State
Council of the People’s Republic of China 2006). The two sides have also outlined a joint
commitment to construct pipeline infrastructure from Russia to China and establish joint
ventures between Chinese SOEs and Russian NOCs (Jing 2006). The timing of these agreements
coincides with the aforementioned disagreement about gas deliveries to Europe that arose
between Gazprom and Ukraine.
The first set of energy-related agreements was reinforced in 2009 during a bilateral
discussion of the progress achieved since the Treaty for Good Neighbourliness and Friendly
Cooperation. During the meeting, the two neighbours signed MOUs on natural gas cooperation
and ratified the China-Russia Investment Cooperation Framework to encourage investment in
multiple sectors, among them the energy industry (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China 2009). The timing of these agreements also coincides with another major
global event that impacted Russia’s energy sector – the Global Financial Crisis. The crisis
lowered oil prices, forcing Russian companies to look to China to sell more oil and to obtain
financial support in the form of loans for projects, such as the ESPO pipeline.
During the 2009 meeting, the two sides signed another important energy-related
agreement in 2014. After the long period of negotiations, Gazprom and CNPC have signed an
agreement for 38 billion of cubic metres of gas deliveries worth of $400 billion for 30 years
(Luhn and Macalister 2014). According to the media, the Sino-Russian gas deal “underscores
Russia’s shift towards Asia amid strained relations with the West" in the aftermath of the
Russian conflict with Ukraine (Luhn and Macalister 2014). These instances increase the
likelihood that Sino-Russian energy ties are closely linked with the changing energy calculus.
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Closer bilateral ties have also extended to regional fora and organizations. Sino-Russian
energy collaboration has been institutionalized at multiple regional fora, including the SCO and
the BRICS summits. Policymakers incorporated clauses on energy collaboration into joint SinoRussian statements released during regional and international summits, such as the BRICS
summits and the SCO meetings. Although the SCO is generally perceived as a security
organization that promotes Eurasian political, economic, and security alliance, it has several
initiatives focused on energy specifically. SCO’s member states, including Russia and China,
have reaffirmed the importance of energy collaboration at a recent summit by implementing joint
projects in the energy sector (Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2018). Similarly, at the BRICS
summits, the emerging economies have placed emphasis on collaborative energy relations to
ensure energy security and to stimulate energy-related investment (BRICS information Centre
2008, clauses 8 and 9).
The two sides have also incorporated mechanisms for bilateral energy collaboration into
their broader diplomatic initiatives within the region. One of the key bilateral mechanisms to
resolve issues related to energy collaboration between Russian companies and their Chinese
counterparts is the Russian-Chinese energy commission under Putin and Wen Jiabao in 2008
(Christoffersen 2012, 141; Guobao 2018). The commission supported political dialogue between
the two sides on energy issues at the political level (prime ministerial-level) designed to promote
energy collaboration (Christoffersen 2012, 142). The commission’s meetings are scheduled
based on the needs of the two parties and are often tied to the negotiation of new energy projects
(Guobao 2018).
More recently, the two have created other bilateral initiatives to promote broader
economic collaboration - China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia’s “Pivot to the
East”. The BRI was designed by the Chinese government to facilitate closer economic
collaboration with countries positioned along the route, including Russia, through infrastructure
development. In China’s official documents, the government outlines cooperation in energy
exploration and in the construction of energy infrastructure as a central element of the BRI (The
State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2015). The BRI coincides with Russia’s “Pivot
to the East” initiative, which aims to expand Russian economic relations with Asia. As
mentioned earlier, the “Pivot” is backed by the Russian Energy Strategy that advises Russian
producers to diversify their export destinations and to increase energy exports to the Asia-Pacific
region in specific (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2010).
Both initiatives were announced in 2013 with an aim to develop closer energy
collaboration. Under the BRI, Sino-Russian collaboration in the development of energy
infrastructure appears to be one of the joint priorities (Zhang and Serdar 2017). As an illustrative
example, the Silk Road Fund has begun funding Russian hydrocarbon projects in the Arctic as
part of the Polar Silk Road. Similarly, under the “Pivot”, Russia aims to establish closer energy
ties with China by expanding energy infrastructure and trade relations (Hill and Lo 2013). I
propose that both initiatives appear to open an avenue for foreign investors to engage in bilateral
investment, in this way they act as enablers of FDI, but do not guarantee it. Ultimately, the
evidence presented in this section reveals that diplomatic ties have been an important factor in
the Sino-Russian energy collaboration.
127

Regulatory Institutions
Institutions are the second building element of my theoretical model as they shape the
interaction between domestic and international actors that are operating in the Russian
hydrocarbon sector. This section focuses on the role of formal and informal institutions. The
formal institutions will be subdivided into two groups – those that affect the entry of foreign
investors and those that influence their operations within the host country. The former
institutions are represented by the investment screening laws, while the latter institutions are
embodied by domestic laws and rules. The informal institutions are captured by the variables that
shape the ideology of the state. I identify two informal institutions in Russia: state capitalism and
resource nationalism. This section discusses how each of these variables shapes political
arrangements in the Russian economy and influences the distribution of power among the
stakeholders. After discussing each of these factors, this section draws propositions about their
impact on Chinese SOEs’ participation in the hydrocarbon sector.
As I will propose in this section, formal and informal institutions influence Chinese SOEs
ability to engage in hydrocarbon projects at different times and at varying degrees. The
investment screening laws impact the entry of foreign investors, which influences their
subsequent operations in Russia. Domestic legal statutes, in turn, shape Chinese FDI only after it
establishes its operations in Russia. The two regulatory institutions can be adapted and remodeled to respond to changing flows of FDI. The informal institutions, as I will propose in this
section, play a central role in influencing Chinese FDI as they determine state-business
arrangements in the energy sector. Therefore, one of the hypotheses proposed in this section is
that Chinese investors may be at the mercy of specific political-business alignment that may shift
at any moment. In order to analyze these dynamics, this section examines how formal and
informal institutions influence foreign investment in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. Before
discussing these propositions, this section will outline historical factors that have led to the
emergence of informal institutions in Russia. Subsequently, I will analyze the role played by the
formal institutions in the Russian hydrocarbon sector.
The emergence of informal institutions in Russia; understanding the implications of state
capitalism and resource nationalism
Russia’s domestic institutions have been in flux since the fall of the Soviet Union. After
the institutional collapse, Russia had to create a new set of formal and informal rules. Theorizing
about this change, Poussenkova and Overland (2018) identify two temporal periods – the 1990s
and post-2000s – that have produced two types of power alignments that affected decisionmaking in the hydrocarbon sector. One can extend their argument beyond the oil sector as the
two periods are roughly representative of broader politico-economic changes in the Russian
society. During the first period, Russian leaders took it upon themselves to rebuild the state. The
hybrid regime that emerged in the 1990s combined authoritarian and democratic elements under
a single political framework (Sakwa 2000; Levitsky and Way 2002; Taylor 2011). Under this
new power arrangement, the government proceeded to design a set of formal rules, which will be
discussed in the latter part of this section. However, according to scholars, the Russian
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government failed to create a system of rules with a “credible commitment” and thus was unable
to exercise its authority to enforce the new laws (Robinson 2000). While the rules existed on
paper, they were seldom and selectively enforced.
In the absence of strong formal institutions, actors sought alternative arrangements to fill
the void left by formal institutions. In Russia, a politico-economic transition that occurred has
facilitated the emergence of informal institutions that were designed by actors to regulate their
interactions in the market (Robinson 2000; Ledeneva 2006). However, informal institutions may
create greater instability in a society. As Ledeneva (2006) notes, informal practices and personal
networks are used by “competent players to manage and manipulate the system to
their…advantage” (1). In this way, political and economic power became tied together in a way
that allowed businesses to influence decisions made by the central government. This, in turn, led
to political “capture [of the state] by economic interests” (Gordon 2000, 125). In the 1990s, these
arrangements enabled economic actors to benefit from “privileged treatment” and to “control
entry to the economic arena” (Gordon 2000, 127).
The transition in Russia’s political regime has affected existing arrangements in the
hydrocarbon sector. The formative years of the Russian Federation coincided with the
development of new regulations for the oil and gas industry (Overland 2011). From the 1990s
until the early 2000s, the Yeltsin administration embarked on the privatization of the
hydrocarbon industry – otherwise known as the ‘shares for resources’ (also known as ‘loans for
shares’) scheme. Under this scheme, NOCs (aside from Gazprom) were sold to the interested
domestic bidders, who later became known as the oligarchs, such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky who
was the owner of Yukos oil company (Eder, Andrews-Speed and Korzhubaev 2009, 221;
Poussenkova and Overland 2018, 262-264). The timing was conducive for the expansion of
oligarchs as they benefited from regulatory gaps coupled with a weak legal system where they
could use their privileged position in the economy for personal enrichment (Eder, AndrewsSpeed and Korzhubaev 2009, 221). According to Poussenkova and Overland (2018, 262-264),
the 1990s was an era of “gangster capitalism” led by oligarchs who lobbied the government to
privatize the oil sector and decentralize policymaking. This period signified a transition from
state ownership of the strategic industries that was characteristic of the Soviet Union’s economy.
An oligopolistic oil industry emerged in the aftermath of this transition.
During this period, Western IOCs were the leading foreign investors. The IOCs were
permitted to form joint ventures with Russian oil and gas companies, participate in the
Production-Sharing Agreements (PSAs), and engage in equity investment provided that they had
a Russian partner (Heinrich, Kusznir, and Pleines 2002, 496). While IOCs expanded their
presence in Russia, the period was not ideal for FDI as it coincided with policy uncertainty,
which ensued in the aftermath of rapid privatization that produced regulatory chaos. The chaos
that ensued was the outcome of the government’s failure to develop a strong legal system with a
comprehensive energy strategy capable of regulating the newly independent oil and gas
companies (Eder, Andrews-Speed and Korzhubaev 2009, 221). Selective regulatory enforcement
that was normal during this time has deterred multiple foreign investors from expanding their
operations in the Russian hydrocarbon sector (Overland 2011, 154). Given the unstable politico-
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economic environment, unexperienced investors, such as Chinese SOEs, avoided investing in the
Russian hydrocarbon sector at the time.
The institutional environment that emerged in the 1990s could not support the new
system where powerful corporate players and a weak state produced an unstable environment for
FDI (Locattelli 2006). During this period, market institutions, transported to Russia from the
West, coupled with the government’s inability to develop domestic institutions to reinforce the
market system, produced a conflict of interests among the oligarchs and policymakers. This
conflict led to a systemic “fragility and lack of credibility in the market institutions” as it could
not guarantee property rights and enabled “arbitrary action by public powers” (Locattelli 2006,
1077). The instability of the liberal market system in Russia that emerged due to the
government’s weakness and a general absence of the rule of law produced conditions ripe for the
emergence of informal rules (Locattelli 2006; Locatelli and Rossiaud 2011). The failure of the
market institutions to stimulate the development of new oil fields coupled with the government’s
inability to tax the oil sector produced incentives for renationalization of the oil sector in the
2000s (Locattelli 2006).
These dynamics have changed in the 2000s under Putin’s leadership. Russia’s economic
privatization and liberalization did not last beyond Yeltsin’s administration. The liberal
economic model, developed in the 1990s, did not fit with the vision of a new President of the
Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. After Putin took the presidential post in 2000, the federal
government embarked on a renationalization program that was formalized under the “Energy
Strategy of Russia”48 (2003). The Strategy stipulated that the federal government should expand
its control over the energy industry due to its strategic nature (Eder, Andrews-Speed and
Korzhubaev 2009, 223). The plan to expand government’s power in the energy sector, developed
during the first few years of the Putin administration, had gathered its full speed in 2004. During
the same year, the economic and political power of oligarchs declined, and tensions among
domestic and international oil companies emerged (Overland 2011, 136).
This coincides with the ideology of resource nationalism that emerged in Russia at the
time. Resource nationalism is conceptualized by social scientists in terms of the following
criteria: a) maximization of governmental profits at the expense of the corporate actors, which
leads to a reduction in corporate profits; b) state-guided resource development; and c) reduced
corporate autonomy (Haslam and Heidrich 2016, 1). In Russia, resource nationalism has
manifested itself through a renationalization of the oil industry in the hands of a few large
Russian NOCs at the expense of foreign investors (Bremmer and Johnston 2009; Vivoda 2009;
Orttung, Perović, and Wenger 2009). Government’s renationalization of Yukos, which was a
private oil company, through its incorporation into Rosneft, which is a NOC, in 2006, is
perceived by scholars as an example of growing state power over the Russian energy sector
(Vivoda 2009; Domjan and Stone 2009). Empirical evidence supports this idea as state
ownership in the Russian hydrocarbon sector grew substantially over time; in the early 2000s
around 90 per cent of the extracted oil came from private enterprises, in contrast, in the mid-
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2000s private enterprises accounted for only 20 per cent of the total number of oil barrels
produced (Maniruzzaman 2009).
As an ideational factor, resource nationalism shapes the ideas and norms that guide the
activities of actors and institutions in a given country (Rosales 2018). In Russia, resource
nationalism is used to justify government’s expanding control over domestic natural resources
that is accompanied by growing protectionist tendencies against foreign investors. Scholars note
that foreign companies face a difficult operating environment in Russia as their activities are
constrained by the Russian state (Perović and Orttung 2009, 125). Analyzing Western IOCs’
engagement in Russia, Indira Overland (2011) notes that IOCs have been involved in a “highstakes conflict” with the Russian state and corporate actors. As part of this conflict, foreign
investors have suffered from “blatant attacks on foreign capital by the Russian authorities”
(Overland 2009, 135). As resource nationalism has grown in popularity in Russia over time, it
has prevented several IOCs from entering Russia’s energy sector (Downs 2010, 155). In fact, due
to the deteriorating business climate, the Russian hydrocarbon sector has relatively few foreign
companies (Klaas 2016).
The 2000s were emblematic of a growing state presence in the hydrocarbon sector that
coincided with the renationalization of the oil and gas assets. Poussenkova and Overland (2018)
refer to this period as “authoritarian capitalism”, where NOCs began to expand, civil society
weakened, and state intervention in the economy grew (265-266). This temporal dichotomy
provides a very important analytical leverage for discerning the power dynamics and for
identifying the ‘movers and shakers’ of public policy. This period is characterized by a complex
interplay between a regulatory capture and growing state influence over the hydrocarbon sector.
Scholars find that a regulatory capture remains a pervasive factor in the hydrocarbon sector in
Russia as the NOCs are closely connected with the state (Victor and Sayfer 2012). However,
under the new system, privileges of corporate actors are curtailed by a more powerful state under
Putin’s leadership. Therefore, the influence of the state over the businesses needs to be
interpreted on a case by case basis.
The transition toward stronger state control over the economy is based on a set of
informal institutional arrangements under state capitalism which, according to Ian Bremmer
(2009, 41), is “a system in which the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses
markets primarily for political gain”. Russian state capitalism is defined by close relationship
between the government and the corporate players (Bremmer 2009; Klimina 2013). Due to close
state-corporate relations, “any large business [that wants to succeed in Russia] must have
favourable relations with the state” (Bremmer 2009, 40). Under this system, the elite actors
control important businesses and appropriate the generated wealth (Klimina 2013, 550), while
the state oversees economic activities by controlling the market and economic actors (Tsygankov
2014, 117). As the Russian government embraced control over the market, it moved away from
“the liberal, market-based economic model” (Tsygankov 2014, 118).
By distancing itself from a free market, the Russian government reinforced its power over
the economy. Under this model, the Russian state becomes an “active participant” in the
economy by picking and choosing losers and winners of the economic process (MacDonald and
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Lemco 2015). State intervention appears to be concentrated in the strategic sectors of the
economy, where large NOCs operate. According to Ian Bremmer (2009), policymakers and
CEOs of energy NOCs are interconnected in such a way that policymakers can become CEOs of
NOCs and relatedly CEOs of NOCs can become government officials (2009). The model is very
similar to the one practiced in China, where managers on the SOE boards have a spot reserved in
the government after they retire from their position (Jiang 2012).
Ultimately, the transition of the Russian politico-economic institutions toward state
capitalism and resource nationalism has arguably brought Russia closer to China in terms of
institutional complementarity. This growing institutional complementarity between the two sides
is theoretically conducive to economic integration in the energy sector, which has been observed
in other cases of Chinese FDI in energy, including the study by Lv and Spigarelli (2015). The
temporal distinction identified in this section helps to explain the timing of the inflow of Chinese
FDI into Russia, while the role of informal institutional arrangements explains the nature of
closer collaboration. Therefore, I propose that the new informal institutional arrangements
shaped by state capitalism may determine the success of Chinese investment in the Russian
hydrocarbon sector. Yet, as noted earlier, informal institutional arrangements are not acting
independently from the formal institutions that often adapt to the informal ones.
Investment screening mechanism
One of the formal institutions is the investment screening mechanism. In Russia, the legal
regime to oversee FDI emerged in the late-1990s/early-2000s and continues to evolve under
Putin’s administration. In 1999, Russia adopted a Federal Law on Foreign Investment, which has
since been amended several times. The law guarantees investors’ rights in Russia in accordance
with domestic legislation and stipulates that the government can block or restrict incoming FDI
only to protect constitutional rights, health, national defense, and state security (Federal Law No.
106-FZ 1999, Article 4.2). This law provides a basic framework for the governance of incoming
FDI in the hydrocarbon sector. Since this law did not place any specific restrictions on FDI by
SOEs or for FDI in strategic industries, the government decided to implement additional laws.
The decision to implement additional laws was a response to FDI that was perceived to threaten
national security. There was a particular case in which the government noticed regulatory
loopholes for FDI. The case that triggered regulatory innovation was Siemens’ (a German
conglomerate) proposed acquisition of the Russian firm Power Machines that produced around
90 percent of turbines in Russia in 2007 (Bam 2013). In the aftermath of this proposed deal, the
Russian government adopted new regulatory mechanisms to pre-empt similar deals.
In 2008, the Russian government implemented the “Law on the Procedure of Foreign
Investment in Business Entities Having Strategic Importance for the Defence of the Country and
the Security of the State” (or the “Strategic Law”; N57-FZ) that restricted FDI in ‘strategic
industries’. The “Strategic Law” requires government’s approval for any investment above a
designated threshold. On the basis of this law, private (i.e. non-state) investors can acquire 25 49
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percent or fewer of the voting shares in a strategic sub-soil50 industry without triggering a review
process (Federal Law No. 57-FZ, 7.2). Although the law emerged as a response to FDI by private
companies, it had singled out SOEs by putting stricter guidelines on their investment. The SOEs
cannot acquire more than 5 per cent of the voting shares in a strategic sub-soil industry without
obtaining government’s permission (Federal Law No. 57-FZ, 7.5). Therefore, any foreign
investment that is above the stipulated threshold will need to acquire a permit from the Russian
government to proceed.
Investors need to obtain the permit from the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service
(FAS) and the Government’s Commission on Monitoring of the Foreign Investment, which is
overseen by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and the Ministerial Committee 51. The
Commission reviews incoming foreign investment to ensure that it does not undermine Russian
national security. Since the Commission’s inception, it has reviewed 229 individual FDI cases;
out of this number, only 5 per cent failed to pass the review (Russian Government 2018).
Incoming FDI is also screened by the FAS that investigates whether a foreign investor may pose
a threat to Russia’s national security. Jointly the two bodies act as the gatekeepers that screen
incoming FDI, yet as the statistics indicate the majority of FDI proceeded unimpeded, which
suggests that the regulatory tightening had a limited effect.
Under the “Strategic Law” the institutional arrangements privilege domestic corporations
over the foreign ones by limiting foreign participation in the ‘strategic industries’. This law is
consistent with the government’s general tendency to protect strategic resources, such as oil and
gas, from foreign investors. Given that the government considers hydrocarbons as one of the
strategic sectors (The Subsoil Law of the Russian Federation 1992), foreign participation is
generally restricted. Yet, there is also evidence that the government favours foreign investors that
are willing to partner with local companies by acquiring minority stakes in the Russian firms
(BMI 2009, 91).
If the legal framework is a decisive determinant of incoming FDI, then one would expect
that Chinese SOEs will find it difficult to participate in large and strategically important
hydrocarbon projects in Russia as they cannot acquire more than 5 per cent of voting shares
without the support of the Russian government. While we have observed a regulatory tightening
on paper, the statistical data from the Government’s Commission on Monitoring of the Foreign
Investment indicates that the majority of FDI has been approved. However, one may expect that
when the investment does not fit the Commissions’ agenda, it will likely be rejected by the
policymakers reviewing the deal. This suggests that the legal framework is flexible and can be
adapted to the needs of the Russian state and corporations reinforcing the earlier proposition that
Chinese investment will be subject to the political and economic variables that shape the
policymakers’ decisions to permit FDI. Some analysts even go as far as to propose that the
existing laws allow Russian policymakers to “pick favourites” by exploiting the loopholes in the
regulation in doing so (Bam 2013, 49).
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The limits are higher for the strategic industries that are not linked to sub-soil assets.
In 2018, the committee was composed of: Minister of Finance (A. Siluanov), Deputy Minister of the Russian
Federation (M. Akimov), Head of the Federal Antimonopoly Service (I Artemyev), and Minister of Energy of the
Russian Federation (A. Novak) among others.
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Domestic Regulatory Institutions – Property Rights, Indigenous Peoples, and the legal system
Once foreign investors enter Russia, they are bound by Russia’s domestic rules and
regulations. As minority investors, Chinese SOEs can rely on their local partners to handle
domestic matters, including regulatory approvals for their joint projects. Specifically, foreign
investors in joint ventures rely on their local counterparts to deal with the acquisition of licenses
while foreign investors provide financial and technological contributions (Heinrich, Kusznir, and
Pleines 2002, 496). Relatedly, local partners are responsible for obtaining political approval for
the construction of greenfield hydrocarbon plants, dealing with Indigenous communities, and
following regulatory guidelines. Even though Chinese investors distance themselves from dayto-day management of the company, they are still impacted by the local conditions and
regulations, including property rights.
Property rights – especially, land ownership - are a significant factor in Russia’s
extractive industry as they determine which stakeholders can influence extractive projects. In
Russia, land and sub-surface resources are owned by the state and cannot be purchased (Fondhal
and Poelzer 2003; Stammler and Forbes 2006, 54). Although Russia has private property
provisions for land ownership, the government retains ultimate power to redistribute the
privatized land provided it compensates those individuals that had to relocate. Since the state
owns the land, it is free to redistribute it to the extractive companies (sometimes even without
consultation with the Indigenous groups and landholders) (Novikova 2008). Land redistribution,
in turn, impacts Indigenous rights in Russia.
Indigenous rights are enshrined in the federal laws that provide a set of protections for
Indigenous groups against the extractive industry. Russia has two 52 legal statutes that protect
Indigenous groups’ right to land – “On Guarantees of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the
Russian Federation” (Federal Law No. 82-FZ 1999) and “On the Territories of Traditional
Nature Management of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian
Federation” (Federal Law No. 49-FZ 2001). The former law stipulates that the government will
protect lands and natural resources inhabited by the Indigenous groups (1999, Article 5-2) and
will compensate for any damages to natural habitat caused by the industrial activities and
resource extraction (Federal Law No. 82-FZ 1999, Articles 5-11 and 8-8). The latter law also
stipulates that any land expropriated from the Indigenous groups by the government will be
compensated for by another land plot of an equivalent value (Federal Law No. 49-FZ 2001,
Article 12). These protections should, in theory, provide a legal basis for Indigenous groups to
influence the extractive activities and relatedly foreign investment inflows into new extractive
projects.
Legally, Indigenous groups are entitled to land and natural resources located within their
territories (Obshchinas) free of charge for eternity (or until the land is repossessed by the
government) (Fondhal and Sirina 2006, 64). Although Indigenous groups can register tracts of
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Some scholars, such as Tomaselli and Koch (2014), identify three laws that protect Indigenous rights to land in
Russia. The third of these laws – “On General Principles of Organization of Obshchina of Numerically Small
Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation” is however too broad for the
purposes of my work and therefore I do not include it into the main discussion.
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land which they occupy, registration is often costly and may conflict with a migratory lifestyle
practiced by the Indigenous groups (Yakovleva 2014, 163). Therefore, multiple groups live on
unregistered land that is not protected by property rights. Without property rights, Indigenous
rights “remain in limbo” (Overland 2009). In the absence of property rights to the traditional
territories, Indigenous groups are at the mercy of the Russian state. In this situation, the
government reserves the right to dispossess the land from Indigenous groups based on the
principle of “state need” in exchange for relocation and monetary compensation (Yakovleva
2014, 63; Fondhal and Sirina 2006, 64; Tomaselli and Koch 2014, 15).
In Russia, government’s interests often align more closely with the interests of the
extractive companies than with those of the Indigenous groups. This alignment of interests
benefits foreign investors involved in the hydrocarbon industry. As Yakovleva (2014) proposes
“[t]oday, the Russian extractive industry, supported by state policies and underdeveloped
regulation, has no incentives to deal with Indigenous peoples’ concerns in resource extraction
projects” (168). Furthermore, the rights of the Indigenous people are restricted by the
applicability of the laws focused on indigenous groups. Laws designed to protect Indigenous
rights to property are only applied to Indigenous groups that meet the following criteria: a) the
groups are under 50,000 individuals; b) reside in places of traditional residence; c) are engaged
in traditional economic activities; and d) self-identify as a distinct ethnic community (Federal
Law No. 82-FZ 1999). If an Indigenous group does not meet these criteria, none of the
protections identified earlier can be used to safeguard their rights to land. Furthermore, laws
themselves do not restrict extractive development as we can see in the law on “Territories”
(2001; Article 13).
Federal laws that protect Indigenous people are also restricted on the ground. Therefore,
domestic and foreign investors seldom worry about the needs of Indigenous groups. In their
analysis of legal provisions related to indigenous groups, Gladun and Ivanova (2017) find that
Russia’s current system of laws and legislations is fragmented, which makes it “impossible [for
Indigenous groups] to implement the declared rights” (142). This is further complicated by the
government’s inability to enforce the outlined rules and the existence of gaps in these rules
(Stammler and Peskov 2008, 837; Fondahl and Poelzer 2003, 114). Moreover, scholars note that
Indigenous rights that are written into the Russian Constitution can be reinterpreted in any way
the government chooses (Vinogradova 2012, 60; Novikova 2008, 29), which defeats their
purpose. Multiple studies note that the rights are poorly implemented, lack clarity, and remain
uncoordinated (Vinogradova 2012; Tomaselli and Koch 2014; Gladun and Ivanova 2017, 138).
Given that formal institutions are ineffective, Indigenous groups rights find it difficult to use
legal avenues to enforce their rights against extractive companies.
The last element of the institutional framework, the legal system at large, may be a
stumbling block for the stakeholders trying to influence the decisions regarding new projects in
the hydrocarbon sector. Courts are weak in Russia as they are influenced by political actors,
suffer from impartiality, and lack enforcement capacities (BMI 2009, 92). Hendley (2009), a
scholar of the Russian legal system, refers to the Russian system of laws as “dual”. On the one
side, it resembles the independent rule of law, while on the other, it is driven by a political
power, where the government interferes in legal cases and restrains judiciary independence (one
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example of this is known as “the telephone law”, where the government can call the judiciary to
influence a decision) (257-258). In the oil and gas industry, scholars question legal reach and
integrity, citing abuse of environmental protection laws, ambiguous tenders, and selective law
enforcement (Keeping 2007; Overland 2011). Weaknesses of the legal system in protecting
private property rights have negatively impacted companies operating in Russia because these
firms face corruption and corporate raiding, as demonstrated by the case of Yukos (Elzenstat
2016). In this instance, predictability and stability for domestic and foreign actors operating
within the Russian regulatory system is not guaranteed. Thus, I propose that Chinese investors
may be at the mercy of specific state-corporate alignments that may shift at any moment.

Stakeholders
The last factor in my theoretical model is captured by the four sets of stakeholders – the
Russian government, businesses, civil society actors, and Indigenous groups – and the associated
sets of licenses – political, social, and market. Each of these stakeholders plays a role in
influencing Chinese FDI, with some playing a more influential role than others. The objective of
this section is to identify the role that each stakeholder plays in the governance of the oil and gas
industry and to trace the impact that they jointly have on Chinese FDI. By analyzing the power
that each group wields in shaping executive decisions to regulate foreign investment in the
hydrocarbon sector, we will be able to understand which groups of actors play a central role in
influencing the ability of Chinese SOEs to participate in the Russian hydrocarbon sector.
The dynamics of power are important in the stakeholder theory as some stakeholders are
better able to organize and defend their interests than others. The state is regarded by scholars as
the most powerful stakeholder given that it can alter the legitimacy of other stakeholders and
influence their interactions (Olsen 2017, 71). In Russia, the state’s power is reinforced under
state-capitalist framework, which I discussed in the earlier section. Under this framework, the
state can singlehandedly influence the success rate of Chinese SOEs’ in Russia by either
providing or withholding a political license. On the premise of state capitalist relations of power,
businesses play a secondary role in influencing Chinese SOEs’ participation in the hydrocarbon
sector by extending the market license. Although other stakeholders may be marginalized by the
distribution of power, they still play a limited (but in some cases growing) role in influencing
Chinese FDI. The importance of other stakeholders rises when greenfield hydrocarbon projects
are large and attract global attention, which elevates the importance of social license to operate.
In this section, I examine the proposition that Chinese FDI is primarily influenced by the state
and corporate actors with some input from the civil society.
The Russian Government
The federal government is a key decision maker (and the only veto player) in the Russian
hydrocarbon sector as it drafts regulatory statutes and pursues high-level inter-state diplomatic
relations with China. Although Russia is a “democratic federal law-bound State with a
republican form of government” under the Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993), the
federal government wields the majority of political power. The government gained this power by
stripping the provinces and regions of political power and reducing them to an advisory role
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(Poussenkova and Overland 2018, 266). Unimpeded by other sources of political power, the
federal government can unilaterally grant a political license to new greenfield hydrocarbon
projects and shape foreign investment through regulatory institutions. The centrality of the
Russian government in the stakeholder politics suggests that Chinese engagement in the Russian
hydrocarbon sector will be predominantly determined by the interests of policymakers and highlevel officials, who can shape the regulatory apparatus and influence other stakeholders.
The expanding role of the Russian government in the hydrocarbon industry is supported
by the ideology of resource nationalism that rose to popularity in the mid-2000s as a result of
growing commodity prices. As the strategic value of energy increased, Putin took it upon himself
to manage the energy sector. His central role is evident from the annual meetings between the
President and the heads of national and private oil corporations. It appears that the President uses
his political power to exert control over the oil industry. Scholars suggest that the government
exercises control over energy companies via fiscal and political resources, including taxation
policy and bureaucratic red tape (Perović and Orttung 2009, 124). The government’s relations
with the market actors appear to overpower any formal institutional arrangements, where the
government has the ability to reshape any regulations that do not fit its agenda.
Under this system, the President and his cabinet shape the dimensions of Sino-Russian
collaboration in the energy sector, which appears to be a top-driven process, designed by highranking officials, and implemented during high-level meetings. Given that in Russia the
government is highly centralized, high-ranking officials, such as the President and the Prime
Minister, hold the ultimate power to shape investment decisions (Canadian Security and
Intelligence Service 2010). This allows for a prompt response to geopolitical shifts, such as the
Western sanctions imposed in 2014. The Western sanctions against Russia are targeting some of
the large oil and gas producing companies in Russia, which undermines their ability to access
Western technology and finance. These sanctions, according to Mark Gyetvay, CFO and Deputy
Chairman of Novatek, have “provided the necessary catalyst for Russian policy-makers to
…pivot to the Asian markets…[which] will accelerate economic cooperation and investment
opportunities to Chinese companies” (2016 interview with the author).
The reorientation from the West to the East was clear from Putin’s announcement that
“there are no restrictions” for Chinese investors in the oil and gas sector, even though Russia is
“very careful about letting in…foreign partners” (Chazan 2014). Putin’s statement reveals that
by strategically responding to changing political and economic factors, the Russian leadership
charts the path of Chinese engagement in Russia’s hydrocarbon sector by providing an agenda
and model for collaboration that can be adopted by the companies on the ground.
Corporate Actors
Corporate actors are the second most important stakeholders in Russia that can influence
participation of foreign firms in the hydrocarbon sector. In Russia, there are two types of
corporate actors engaged in the oil industry – private and state-owned oil corporations (often
referred to as national oil companies or NOCs). Lukoil and Novatek are two of the largest private
oil companies that precede over multiple important projects in Russia, while Rosneft, Transneft
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and Gazprom are the best known NOCs in Russia. Their relative influence over the Russian oil
sector has shifted over time due to a process of liberalization that occurred in the 1990s and
subsequent renationalization in the 2000s. These two economic processes have reshaped statecorporate relations as I have explained in the section on informal institutions. Since the 2000s,
NOCs have begun to expand their market power at the expense of private oil companies. These
changes in the distribution of power have confused foreign investors in Russia and affected the
inflow of FDI into the Russian hydrocarbon sector from China and other countries.
Renationalization of the oil industry in the 2000s produced a new set of corporate-state
arrangements under which the government’s control over the industry grew. The
renationalization process was designed to undermine political and economic power amassed by
the Russian oligarchs (Perović and Orttung 2009, 123-124). As part of the renationalization
effort, Russia restructured its hydrocarbon industry, which left the hydrocarbon sector
fragmented along the lines of private companies and NOCs53 both with allegiance to the regime
in power. Several private companies, including Yukos, were bought up by the NOCs (Eder,
Andrews-Speed and Korzhubaev 2009, 223). The government also reinforced Transneft’s
monopoly over the oil pipelines in Russia and Gazprom’s monopoly over the distribution of
natural gas (Eder, Andrews-Speed and Korzhubaev 2009, 223). This process has brought into
power a new group of actors – siloviki – who are former officials of the Russian security
services, such as the KGB (Overland 2011). As siloviki are closely tied to the state, they aspire to
expand state’s interests in the hydrocarbon industry by turning NOCs, such as Rosneft, into
powerful oil companies (Overland 2011). Igor Sechin, a former Deputy Prime Minister of Russia
and current CEO of Rosneft, is one of the leading siloviks in Russia today.
Renationalization produced a new set of hybrid institutional arrangements. The hybrid
model of governance in the hydrocarbon sector was more suitable for the Russian institutions,
where NOCs were used to “remedy/substitute for the shortcomings of the market institutional
arrangements” replacing the market mechanisms, such as contractual relations, through “the
personalization of relations between the heads of the state-owned companies and those in power
in Russia” (Locatelli and Rossiaud 2011, 11). Close state-corporate connections give corporate
actors preferential access to the Russian government and allow them to shape policy. In this way,
corporate actors are taking on a policymaking role, where they can lobby the government on
behalf of their industry. This is best illustrated by the political power of Igor Sechin who is
sometimes regarded as the “grey cardinal” of Russia because he amassed a substantial political
influence that allows him to shape energy policy (Fory 2018). Scholars propose that Sechin uses
his political power to alter regulations pertaining to the oil industry, yet his position on the issues
is complicated by his divided allegiance as a CEO of an energy company and a government
employee (Locatelli and Rossiaud 2011, 15).
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Today, Russian oil and gas sectors are home to 301 corporations, with Rosneft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz and
GazpromNeft as the top producers, which have produced around 71 per cent of total energy output in 2013 (IEA
Russia, 2014, 138-139). Although private companies remain in the hydrocarbon sector (such as Novatek and
Lukoil), majority of the oil and gas production is in the hands of large state-owned enterprises, like Rosneft and
Gazprom.
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Ultimately, close state-corporate relations that have emerged in the aftermath of
renationalization of the oil industry have led to close collaboration between corporate actors and
policymakers in shaping the hydrocarbon industry through regulations. Given the
interdependence between corporate and political actors, Chinese investors have to interact with
both to negotiate the terms of their investment agreements. This may have positive consequences
for Chinese SOEs as they may obtain a commitment from both market actors and the state and
thus acquire both market and political license at the same time. In both cases, Chinese investors
must be prepared to accommodate the interests of the government and its NOCs during the
negotiations.
Civil Society
In resource-rich countries, civil society can play the role of a watchdog that protects the
local environment and society from undesirable investment in the hydrocarbon sector. In this
process, civil society may withhold social license to operate from non-compliant businesses.
However, in Russia’s case, civil society often plays a minor role in the decision-making process
as it is subsumed under the apparatus of the Russian state (Sundstrom and Henry 2016). Scholars
examining environmental groups in Russia note that their numbers increased over time, yet the
number of protests staged by these groups has declined, and their impact on political decisionmaking remains low (Henry 2016; Poussenkova and Overland 2018). At the same time, their
monitoring capacity remains underdeveloped, which makes them less effective in championing
environmental interests on behalf of the broader population (Henry 2016; Poussenkova and
Overland 2018). One of the reasons for their limited influence is their dependence on the
financial support from the government (Sundstorm and Henry 2016). Since civil groups are
financially dependent on the government, they may be afraid to pursue any activities that may
jeopardize their stream of revenue and are therefore unlikely to speak against Chinese FDI that
has obtained the political and market support (or licenses) from the state and NOCs.
Russian civil society groups find it increasingly difficult to rely on international finance
to support their activities under the Russian legislation. In 2012, the Russian government passed
a law “On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Regulation
of the Activities of Non-profit Organisations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent” to
prevent Russian NGOs from accessing international finance. Under this new law, NGOs that rely
on foreign finance to support their activities must register as “foreign agents” (Poussenkova and
Overland 2018, 271). This new law makes it difficult for foreign-funded NGOs to operate in
Russia. Analyzing the impact of this law on NGOs’ activities in Russia, scholars posit that it has
negatively impacted NGOs as it reduced their activities and increased their reliance on the
government’s funds (Crotty, Hall, and Ljubownikow 2014). Any NGOs that want to remain
effective now have to rely on the Russian government and companies to support their activities
(Poussenkova and Overland 2018, 271). Ultimately, the law has reinforced the government’s
power over NGO activity, which will likely lead to fewer protests against activities supported by
the state.
Although Russian civil society is underdeveloped and faces financial constraints, it had
some success in boycotting certain projects in the hydrocarbon sector. Russian civil society
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groups have launched a successful protest against Yukos' plan to build a pipeline around the
Lake Baikal, which would have endangered the freshwater sources if the proposed pipeline
leaked (Javeline and Lindermann-Komarova 2010). However, this case is one of a few
exceptional success stories as local resistance against hydrocarbon projects remains limited.
Instead, locals try not to disrupt government’s projects, unless they are directly harmed by the
extractive activity. In light of this, Russian citizens may be perceived as “passive” observers that
participate in information sessions, yet have little influence over corporate activities in the
extractive sector (Poussenkova and Overland 2018 281-283; Overland 2018, 8). Nevertheless,
some scholars posit that the Russians are generally not supportive of foreign engagement in the
hydrocarbon sector (Poussenkova and Overland 2018, 282). Despite this fact, civil society
appears to act as a passive observer rather than an active participant in the Russian politicoeconomic system.
Even if civil society actors wanted to influence Russian decision-making on the issue of
Chinese FDI, their response would have been likely supportive of closer engagement with China
despite their general opposition to FDI in the hydrocarbon sector. A public survey carried out by
the Yuri Levada Analytical Center indicates that the majority of Russian residents surveyed by
the Center were generally supportive of growing Sino-Russian alliance. Cross-regional survey of
1600 people indicates that Russian citizens perceive China as one of Russia’s closest allies with
34 per cent of respondents choosing China as the closest ally of Russia (Levada 2016).
Additionally, the majority of respondents (61 per cent) indicated that they are generally
supportive of China (Levada 2016). In fact, it seems that Russia is one of a few states whose
perception of China has been largely positive and slightly improving over time as Figure 6.1
indicates (Pew Research Center 2016). A positive perception of China does not guarantee that
Chinese FDI will be successful in Russia, as multiple experts indicate that Russia is still afraid of
China’s takeover of its domestic assets (Eder 2016). Nonetheless, the data suggests that the
opposition to Chinese FDI will unlikely jeopardize specific hydrocarbon projects where Chinese
SOEs decided to participate.
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Figure 6.1: Russian perception of China (percentage of people that consider China favourably) (Pew Research
Centre 2016)

Indigenous Peoples
Like the civil society groups, Indigenous communities residing in the Russian Federation
lack systemic power to influence domestic extractive projects and by extension Chinese
engagement through FDI and loans. Russian Indigenous communities appear to be systematically
“marginalized” in the decision-making processes pertinent to the extractive industry in Russia as
the current policy fails to safeguard “traditional natural resource use” (Yakovleva 2011, 710).
Additionally, the Indigenous participation in the discussions related to new projects is limited as
the processes of consultation and accommodation are weakly embedded in the Russian corporate
and political culture/institutions. Observers note that extractive projects may be approved
without informed consent from the Indigenous communities (The Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination 2017, 5). Likewise, Indigenous access to consultation has also been
restricted by the costs of participation, insufficient information, and knowledge discrepancy (i.e.
Indigenous groups may not be familiar with the standards and practices of the extractive
industries) (The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2017, 14). This is
partially a result of power discrepancy between indigenous groups and state-corporate alliance
that I noted in the section on regulatory institutions.
The regulatory framework, which was discussed earlier in this chapter, has not reinforced
Indigenous rights. Therefore, the “ability [of] Indigenous groups to stop [extractive] projects
appears [to be] limited” (Fondahl and Poelzer 2003, 118). Given Russia’s economic dependence
on the oil and gas sector, the government often prioritizes extractive industries over the interests
of Indigenous groups. Thus, the Russian government provides companies with a license to
operate and supports their activities (Stammler and Wilson 2006). In evaluating the role of
Indigenous groups in the extractive projects, Tomaselli and Koch (2014) even go so far as to
argue that Indigenous groups become “victims of prioritised industrial interests” (16). Given that
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Indigenous groups are weakly protected by the legal system, they have learned to rely on
themselves to champion their interests.
Indigenous groups have created multiple NGOs to advocate on their behalf. Although
these NGOs initially had some success in influencing a few energy projects in the past rerouting of the ESPO pipeline away from the Lake Baikal is one example of this success -,
today their hands are tied. As mentioned earlier, since the passage of the law that targets NGOs
with foreign funding, NGOs advocating for the rights of Indigenous groups had to adapt their
activities to the changed rules of the game. Multiple NGOs agreed to cooperate with the
government and became Government-Organized NGOs (GONGOs) as they lost their
independence (Stammler and Forbes 2006, 56; The Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination 2017, 5).
The new NGO law has reduced the capacity of NGO groups to launch campaigns against
extractive industries. Empirical evidence reveals that NGOs are under tight control of the state
authorities. For example, one of the largest indigenous-led NGOs in Russia, The Russian
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), had to briefly stop its activities
before re-emerging with a new pro-governmental leadership (see: Tomaselli and Koch 2014). If
NGOs resisted collaborating and retained their foreign support, they were subjected to closer
monitoring (The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2017, 5). Reports by
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination disclose that multiple members of
NGOs were harassed or sent to exile (The Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination 2017, 5). In light of these factors, Indigenous-led NGOs are often unable to
champion Indigenous interests and by extent to challenge the extractive projects.
As preliminary analysis suggests, Indigenous groups are not systemic players in the
Russian hydrocarbon sector, as opposed to the Canadian case. These groups lack the power to
influence decisions made by corporate and political actors in the extractive sector. Instead, the
institutional environment privileges government’s interests that often align with the interests of
the extractive companies, rather than with those of the Indigenous groups. Therefore, a social
license that Indigenous groups can withhold from the extractive companies is trumped by the
political and market licenses in Russia. The inability of Indigenous groups to influence decisionmaking in the extractive sector rests in part on the set up of the regulatory institutions, which I
have discussed in the earlier section. Ultimately, under the existing conditions, it seems that
Chinese SOEs and other foreign investors are unlikely to face strong opposition from Indigenous
groups that mat lead to a possible cancellation of a proposed hydrocarbon project.
What can we learn from Bringing All Actors Together?
In the Russian case, the distribution of power privileges the interests of the state and the
NOCs over civil society and indigenous groups. As I noted in this section, this produces a topdriven system where a foreign investor will succeed in pursuing his investment if he/she obtains
a political and market license. Thus, Chinese SOEs that aspire to invest in Russia may find it
easy to operate in the Russian hydrocarbon sector if they succeed in obtaining a political and
market license. Under this system, the social license to operate, extended by indigenous groups
and civil society actors, becomes a secondary concern for foreign investors. However, as I noted
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in the earlier section, for larger hydrocarbon projects that are closely monitored by the
international community social license to operate becomes an important consideration. To obtain
the social license to operate, Chinese SOEs often rely on their Russian counterparts as Chinese
investors only control a minority of shares in the Russian oil and gas projects. Furthermore,
Chinese SOEs may participate in the hydrocarbon projects indirectly by providing loans or
signing long term supply agreements, which expands the options that SOEs have to successfully
engage in a desired project. Under this system, greenfield versus brownfield investment
distinction is less important as domestic oil companies and the state take it upon themselves to
obtain a social license from civil society.
Unlike in the Canadian case, Chinese SOEs are more certain that their investment will
proceed if they obtain political and corporate support. However, one should not assume that the
system produces a stable investment environment as the uncertainty arises from a possible shift
of state and corporate interests as we have observed in the case of the IOCs. As noted earlier,
Russian stakeholders also interact with the institutions as the power differential is embedded
within a state capitalist model of economic governance. Under this system, the state amasses a
majority of power and redistributes it to its preferred companies. Similarly, flexible regulatory
institutions entrench the interests of the most powerful actors in the society and marginalize civil
society and indigenous groups. In this case, the ability of Chinese SOEs to successfully acquire
companies in the Russian hydrocarbon sector is based on the support from the Russian
government and NOCs.

Conclusion: Building a Theoretical Model
This chapter applied the general theoretical framework to fit the Russian case. As in the
Canadian case, the model starts from the inter-state variable, which influences stakeholder’s
receptiveness toward Chinese SOEs. In doing so, it affects the timing of the SOE’s participation
in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. As I noted in this chapter, historically, Russia has developed
close bilateral and energy relations with Europe that led to bilateral trade and investment
integration. The strong inter-dependence that has developed between the two countries has made
it harder for new investors to come in. However, as tensions between Europe and Russia have
begun to grow and Europe has begun to diversify its energy imports, Russia turned Eastward. In
the “Pivot to the East” initiative, introduced in 2013, the Russian government has declared its
intentions to create closer energy relations with Asia. As I illustrated in this chapter, Russian
bilateral relations with China have been cautious due to historical tensions and mistrust that
continue to limit bilateral energy trade and investment between the two sides. Nonetheless, some
scholars perceive that Sino-Russian bilateral relations today are closer than ever, which
motivates the inflow of Chinese FDI (Røseth 2017). As the inter-state variable influences
stakeholder responsiveness toward foreign investors and financiers, it accounts for the timing
when Chinese SOEs became successful in Russia. However, when this variable is considered by
itself, the variable fails to account for why Chinese FDI was successful.
Informal and formal institutions provide a partial answer to why Chinese SOEs were
successful in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. Informal institutions, such as state capitalism and
resource nationalism, indirectly shape the activities of political, social, and economic actors in
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Russia, who in turn determine the success of Chinese SOEs in Russia. Resource nationalism is
an important element of the ideological variable on the basis of which the Russian government
(with the support of NOCs and other private companies) exercises upper hand over the oil
industry. This variable is reinforced by state capitalist system that privileges state’s interests over
those of other stakeholders. Informal institutions then percolate into formal institutions.
We can observe the influence of resource nationalist ideology on the formal (regulatory)
institutions, such as the investment screening regime. As noted earlier, Russia’s investment
screening mechanism determines if the investment will be allowed to proceed. The “Strategic
Industries Law” implemented by the Russian government in 2008 limits foreign ownership of
strategic assets. For Chinese investors, this means that they will need to obtain the approval of
the Russian government to acquire above 5 per cent shares in a Russian energy company. The
system is thus ideologically biased against FDI in the energy sector, even though Russia requires
FDI to develop new energy fields (Energy Strategy of Russia 2010). Property rights are the
second set of regulatory institutions that shape investment in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. In
the Russian case, property rights and legal system remain weak and underdeveloped, which
allows powerful stakeholders to influence regulatory institutions at the expense of other groups.
Furthermore, Russian NOCs often take on responsibility for addressing the property rights as
SOEs are only able to acquire minority stakes in the Russian hydrocarbon projects. In light of
this, NOCs may become de-facto informal regulators of foreign investors as these investors
blend in with the NOCs post-acquisition.
Stakeholders are the final factor in my theoretical model. In Russia, the dominant
stakeholders that influence Chinese FDI are governmental actors and corporate players. As noted
earlier, Sino-Russian cooperation in the energy sector is very formalized and top-driven process.
Agreements on energy are signed by the high-ranking officials representing the two states and by
the corporate actors selected to implement government’s energy strategy. In this way, energyrelated investment, trade, and loans provided by China to Russia are concluded at the top-level,
where political and market license influence Sino-Russian energy investment. As I illustrated in
this section, other stakeholders, such as Indigenous groups and civil society actors, lack power to
influence political and economic decisions as they are weakly protected by the regulatory and
politico-economic institutions that privilege state-corporate relations over the state-society ones.
In light of this, social license to operate becomes a secondary concern for foreign companies
operating in Russia.
The final model, captured in Figure 6.2 suggests, that SOEs’ participation in the Russian
hydrocarbon sector will follow the agenda of corporate and political players. As noted in the
earlier sections of this chapter, regulatory institutions play a secondary role in shaping Chinese
FDI as the government has left loopholes in the existing regulatory institutions that allow
policymakers to pursue their interests. The government has also monopolized its control over
some of the key regulatory institutions. For example, the investment screening mechanism is
chaired by the Prime Minister of Russia accompanied by other Ministers, who decide whether to
permit foreign investors to invest in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. If the Russian government
supports a given foreign investor, the investor will face few obstacles as property rights and legal
institutions are weak and unable to overturn the government’s decisions. While this makes it
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easier for foreign investors supported by the Russian government and NOCs to invest in the
Russian hydrocarbon sector, it also increases political and economic risks of this investment as
any foreign investor may lose either political or market license to operate, thus jeopardizing
his/her business in Russia. From this model, we may conclude that Russia’s flexible institutions
allow for the accommodation of the interests of powerful figures from the government and
corporate sector, who ultimately influence FDI in the hydrocarbon sector.
This model captures all of these complex relationships through a set of simple figures.
The blue boxes depict stakeholder politics and formal institutions. The former also includes the
three sets of licenses – political, social, and market -, while the latter focuses on investment
screening mechanisms. The orange oval depicts inter-state relations that shape the inflow of
Chinese FDI into the Russian oil and gas industry and, as noted earlier, influences stakeholders’
receptiveness toward this type of investor/financier. The turquoise-coloured oval represents
ideology (or informal institutions) that in turn shapes stakeholder politics. Unlike in the Canadian
case, the relationship between formal institutions and stakeholder relations is flipped given that a
majority of the large-scale oil and gas-related contracts are pre-negotiated by the political leaders
even before they are reviewed by the formal institutions.
On the basis of this model and evidence presented in this chapter, we can derive three
theoretical expectations that will be tested in the subsequent chapter. First, looking at the interstate variable, one can theorize that Chinese participation in the Russian hydrocarbon sector will
expand in the aftermath of Russia’s conflict with the West. Second, I propose that informal
institutions – resource nationalism and state capitalism – will place limits on foreign investors’
participation in the hydrocarbon sector but will favour China’s investment and loans if they
follow the agenda of resource nationalism and support re-nationalization of the oil and gas sector
in the hands of the Russian NOCs. Lastly, stakeholder politics will be dominated by the regime
in power as in Russia political license currently subsumes social and market licenses. Relatedly,
formal institutions are expected to play a weaker role in shaping Chinese FDI in the Russian
hydrocarbon sector. One important note about the Russian model, which makes it unique,
emerges from the terms of participation that foreign companies may choose to engage in the
Russian hydrocarbon sector. To elaborate, foreign companies may provide loans or sign longterm supply contracts if they are unable to invest in a project. By doing so, they avoid some of
the restrictions noted in the general model.
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Chapter 7.

Chinese Corporate Players in Russia: Navigating Complex
Institutional Environment

Introduction
Operating in the Russian hydrocarbon sector is not an easy task for a foreign investor, yet
Chinese SOEs have managed to establish their presence along the hydrocarbon chain from the
production to transportation stages. Chinese engagement in Russia is also multifaceted as it
combines financial support (usually loans) with FDI and long-term supply contracts. SOEs’
engagement strategy is also adaptable as Chinese investors adjust their strategy to the needs of
different projects. This leads one to wonder why do these differences in engagement strategy
occur and why have Chinese SOEs been able to integrate themselves along the hydrocarbon
supply chain in Russia? And, more importantly, why were Chinese SOEs quite successful in
participating in the Russian hydrocarbon sector since the mid-2000s? I argue that this can be
explained by the interests of the Russian state and corporate stakeholders involved in the projects
as they interact with domestic institutions in a way to enable Chinese SOEs’ participation in the
Russian hydrocarbon sector.
In this chapter, I analyze how powerful stakeholders in Russia determine Chinese
engagement in specific hydrocarbon projects. I focus on three cases of Chinese engagement: a)
Sinopec’s investment in Udmurtneft, an oil producing company in Udmurt Republic which was
previously owned by the TNK-BP joint venture; b) Chinese investment and loans in Yamal
LNG, which is a greenfield natural gas liquefaction plant in the Yamal Peninsula; and c) Chinese
‘loan-for-infrastructure’ granted to Transneft and Rosneft to build the ESPO pipeline from the
Irkutsk Oblast to Primorsky Kraj in the Far East with a spur to Daqing, China. All of these cases
are examples of successful participation of Chinese SOEs in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. The
focus on the successful cases is driven by the data availability, where the ESPO and Yamal LNG
are the only available projects of their kind where Chinese SOEs have declared an interest to
invest. Focusing on these case studies, I propose that Chinese SOEs have been relatively
successful in these projects despite structural and political constraints placed on their
engagement in the Russian hydrocarbon sector.
To advance my argument, I will discuss each of the three cases in detail with a specific
focus on stakeholders and regulatory institutions that have determined the fate of individual
projects. Before jumping into a discussion of individual projects, I will outline other investments
made by Chinese and non-Chinese investors in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. Subsequently, I
will analyze the dynamics of individual cases starting with Sinopec’s acquisition of Udmurtneft
by focusing on the politico-economic and regulatory factors of each case. I will proceed by
discussing CNPC’s and Silk Road Fund’s investment in Yamal LNG, along with the loans
provided by Chinese banks to this project. Finally, I will examine Chinese loans granted to
Transneft and Rosneft at the time of ESPO’s construction. In each of these cases, I explore
stakeholders that interact within the corporate space shaped by the political, economic, and
regulatory institutions.
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Situating Chinese FDI in Russia
Chinese SOEs are relatively new players in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. In the late
1990s/early 2000s, Chinese SOEs were unable to enter Russia’s hydrocarbon sector as their early
attempts to invest in Russia were blocked by a broader ideational/institutional shift toward
renationalization, which created a period of uncertainty for foreign investors, which made it
difficult to acquire assets in Russia. The process of renationalization has impacted collaboration
between Chinese SOEs and the Russian private oil company, Yukos. The Yukos-CNPC
partnership was premised on oil deliveries to China in the late 1990s and continued to expand
until Yukos was nationalized in 2003/2004 (Eder, Andrews-Speed and Korzubaev 2009, 222). In
general, renationalization had a negative systemic impact on foreign investment, as foreign
investors were blocked from participating in Russia’s hydrocarbon sector at the time (Øverland
2011; Yilmaz and Daksueva 2017); foreign investors that were already in Russia began to exit
and new investors were very cautious about entering Russia. Thus, the process of
renationalization of the hydrocarbon sector made it difficult for foreign companies to operate in
Russia.
The entry of Chinese SOEs coincides with a growing conflict between IOCs and the
Russian actors. The conflict spiked during Putin’s second administrative term that lasted from
2004 to 2008, which coincided with the renationalization of the oil industry (Overland 2011,
136). Based on TNK-BP’s experience in Russia and activities of other foreign investors in
Sakhalin II, Overland (2011) argues that the Russian state targeted IOCs by using legislation,
such as environmental statutes and production quotas, to evict foreign investors from the
hydrocarbon sector (138-148). Overland (2011) describes this as “selective law enforcement”,
where the state manipulates laws to serve its objectives (148). As part of this selective
enforcement TNK-BP and foreign companies, involved in the development of Sakhalin II, were
forced to sell their assets to the Russian companies and flee. IOCs thus became victims of
renationalization that occurred at a time of rising oil prices – a common trend identified in the
scholarship on resource nationalism (Bremmer and Johnson 2009; Vivoda 2009). Although
Russia closed its doors to Western investors, it has opened them to investors from other
countries, including China, after the transition period ended. The renationalization of the oil
sector thus made it easier for Chinese SOEs to enter Russia as they enabled Russian NOCs to
regain ownership of oil and gas assets by financing the acquisition of Western-controlled
hydrocarbon assets in Russia.
The second factor that limited Chinese engagement (in the early stages of its investment
in Russia) is stakeholder opposition. Stakeholders were especially worried about Chinese
investment in the strategic industries. First few attempts by Chinese investors to acquire
hydrocarbon assets in Russia in 2002/2003 were blocked by the Russian government and
corporate players. The first failed attempt was made by CNPC in 2002 when it tried to acquire
Slavneft. CNPC’s bid for Slavneft was blocked by the Russian duma, which voted against
Chinese investment in the Russian hydrocarbon sector (Bellacqua 2010). Even though CNPC
offered a higher bid than the other firms, a political coalition voted against Chinese acquisition to
prevent CNPC from acquiring a majority of shares of the Russian company (Kong 2009). To
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elaborate, the Russian Duma sided with Oleg Morozov, who emphasized that Slavneft is a “large
and profitable company” and should not “go to a foreign owner” (Anonymous 2002).
The second example of a failed investment was CNPC’s inability to acquire Stimul oil
corporation in 2003. The dynamics of the CNPC’s second failure had one important difference as
CNPC gained permission from the Russian government to acquire Stimul. Stimul was previously
owned by a consortium of Russian and Western companies - Gazprom’s subsidiary
Orenburggazprom (held 38.2 per cent), American Avalon International (owned 49 per cent of
shares), and Victory Oil (owned 12.8 per cent). The latter two companies were owned by the
Getty family, which decided to sell its shares in Stimul in the aftermath of their struggle to
acquire export licenses required to sell oil products on international markets (Kommersant 2003;
Kommersant 2004). The Getty family concluded a deal with the CNPC in 2003 agreeing to sell
their shares in Stimul. Although CNPC gained permission from the Russian government to
acquire Stimul in 2003, the deal was blocked by the Russian corporate players after Gazprom
filed a lawsuit that compromised the deal (Kong 2009). This deal was subsequently annulled by
the government under Gazprom’s pressure. In the aftermath, the Getty family agreed to sell their
shares to Gazprom and another offshore company54 (Kommersant 2003; Kommersant 2004). The
second attempted takeover illustrates the importance of the market license to operate.
These two failed acquisitions illustrate the importance of political and market licenses to
operate in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. If a company fails to acquire support from the
government or Russian oil companies, there is a higher likelihood that it will not be able to
participate in the oil or natural gas projects in Russia. Although, after re-nationalization, a
political license has begun to overshadow a market license, NOCs and private companies still
retained a significant influence in shaping the dynamics of hydrocarbon projects as they had
access to high-ranking policymakers, such as the President, whom they lobbied to implement
favourable decisions. Stakeholder politics are also affected by ideological factors, such as Putin’s
decision to reorganize the oil and gas sector through a set of policies that enabled resource
nationalization. In light of the renationalization of the oil and gas sector, corporate actors were
unwilling to extend market licenses to new players at the time. Furthermore, as noted in the
earlier section Sino-Russian political relations have only begun to grow in the mid-2000s, which
explains why the Chinese SOEs found it difficult to invest in these two hydrocarbon projects.
Changing institutions and unwelcoming stakeholders, combined with the years of
historical animosity and tensions, have resulted in a relative absence of Chinese FDI in the
Russian hydrocarbon sector until the mid-2000s. Therefore, Chinese investment in Russia’s oil
and gas sector is a relatively new phenomenon. If one was to depict China’s investment in Russia
prior to the mid-2000s, one may note that it was virtually non-existent as it faced multiple
constraints. Even though Sino-Russian energy trade grew in the 1990s and the early 2000s
(Russian Ministry of Economic Development 2016), Chinese FDI was absent. Looking at
Chinese investment from the mid-2000s to 2009, we grasp a different picture, one in which
Chinese FDI has been slowly expanding. Finally, from 2010 to the present Chinese investment in
54

This company appears to have transferred its shares to Gazprom after the deal (or could have been Gazprom’s
offshore subsidiary at the time, as the company is currently owned by Gazprom).
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the Russian hydrocarbon sector has been expanding rapidly into new directions and grew in
terms of its size. Putting these three temporal periods together we can observe three distinct
stages of Chinese FDI in the Russian hydrocarbon sector: 1) a failed exploratory stage; 2) a
learning stage of slow investment growth; and 3) an expansionary stage of growing investment
ties. I have mapped Chinese FDI in the Russian hydrocarbon sector across these three stages on a
timeline in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1: Chinese Investments in the oil and gas sector in Russia

The first successful Chinese investment in the Russian hydrocarbon sector occurred in
2005. During this year, resource nationalism was at its peak as the government seized multiple
private corporations with links to foreign investors. As foreign investors left, it opened an
opportunity for Chinese investors to enter Russia if they agreed to assist Russian NOCs in regaining their power over the hydrocarbon sector. In this way, I propose that China has aided
Russia’s nationalization efforts. This proposition is supported by the fact that Chinese SOEs (in
partnership with Russian NOCs) took over businesses that belonged to the Western investors. In
this way, Chinese SOEs helped Russian NOCs reassert their position in large-scale hydrocarbon
projects previously co-owned by Western IOCs and Russian private oil companies.
Several deals that occurred in 2005, depicted in Figure 7.1, capture this trend. One of the
first examples is Sinopec’s successful acquisition of 25.1 per cent of shares in the Sakhalin-III
project that previously belonged to two large Western IOCs – ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco.
As these IOCs lost their license to operate in the Sakhalin-III block, Chinese companies stepped
in to fill the void (Filimonov 2005). As part of the deal, Sinopec agreed to provide financial
assistance to Rosneft for geological exploration of the Veninsky block, where Sinopec holds 25
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per cent of shares (Rosneft 2005). While it was not clear why the Russian state and corporate
players opened to Chinese SOEs, at that time, one possible explanation for the turn is a shift in
the policy of the Russian government toward diversification and re-nationalization of the oil
industry from the Western IOCs. Ultimately, this deal marked a point of entry for Chinese
investors, which have expanded their presence in the Russian oil and gas sector since then.
The second stage of Chinese FDI in the Russian sector began in 2006 and ended in 2009.
Since 2006, Chinese investors have begun expanding their activities in Russia. During that year,
Sinopec acquired Udmurtneft, which was a joint venture between a private Russian oil company
Tyumen Oil Company (Tyumenskaya Neftyanaya Kompaniya or TNK), and a British oil major,
BP. The dynamics of this deal pointed to an ‘assisted renationalization’ where Sinopec acquired
100 per cent of Udmurtneft’s shares for $3.5 billion and gave a majority of the acquired shares to
Rosneft as part of an oil-for-resources loan. During the same year, CNPC formed a joint venture,
Vostok Energy Ltd. with Rosneft where it holds 49 per cent of the shares. Another successful
investment was made by the CIC, which, at the time, became an active investor in the
hydrocarbon sector across the globe. The CIC acquired 45 per cent of Russia’s Nobel oil group
in 2009 for $300 million (Apoteker 2012). A noticeable trend during this stage was China’s
expanding presence in the upstream oil sector, even though China remained a minority investor.
This stage was characterized by supportive inter-state relations linked with stakeholder support
for Chinese FDI.
In the third stage of Chinese engagement, post-2009, Chinese SOEs also became
important financiers for the Russian oil and gas companies. In the aftermath of the Global
Financial Crisis and the Western sanctions, Russian cash-strapped companies turned to Chinese
SOEs for finance and technology. After Western sanctions reduced Russia’s corporate access to
long-term finance, most of the hydrocarbon companies could not operate as they require longterm financing, which was offered by the Chinese banks (anonymous Sberbank employee 2016).
As Russian businesses could not access Western finance, they saw China as a viable alternative
to Western capital and technology as China has abundant finance and low cost technology (Klaas
2016; anonymous Sberbank employee 2016). Even though China is becoming an important
source of finance for the Russian hydrocarbon companies, Alexei Grivach (2016), deputy
director general for gas issues of the National Energy Security Fund, notes that Russian
companies continue to rely on Western financial markets whenever they can.
During this period, Chinese SOEs provided financial support to several Russian
companies. In 2010, Chinese banks provided finance for the ESPO pipeline that was built by
Transneft. In the aftermath of the Western sanctions, Russian companies turned to China to
finance other complex projects, such as the Yamal LNG plant. In 2014, the Russian government
permitted Chinese SOEs – CNPC and the Silk Road Fund – to invest in the Yamal LNG project,
located in the Russian Arctic. In addition to financial support, the project drew on Chinese loans
- that were extended by the Chinese policy banks CDB and EXIM to Novatek – to overcome cuts
in the financial support from the West (Staalesen 2016; Kravchuk 2016).
Chinese SOEs also expanded their activities in the Russian downstream sector. In 2015,
Sinopec acquired a 10 per cent stake in Russia’s petrochemical corporation, Sibur. The following
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year, in 2016, the Silk Road Fund acquired another 10 per cent in the company raising the
overall percentage held by the Chinese SOEs in Sibur to 20 per cent. During the same year,
Rosneft sold 20 per cent of the Verkhnechonsk-neftegaz to Beijing Gas (Rosneft 2017). The
observed diversification of Chinese investors along the upstream and downstream sector in the
Russian hydrocarbon industry over the past eight years has been remarkable. Yet, Chinese
engagement in the Russian hydrocarbon sector is still relatively shallow, which reduces the
universe of cases available for my analysis.
Expansion of Chinese SOEs in the Russian hydrocarbon sector remains limited but
growing as it replaces void left by the Western investors. This chapter analyzes the retreat of the
Western investors in the case study of Udmurtneft, the cutback in Western finance and
technology in the case of Yamal LNG, and Russia’s expanding oil trade with China through
long-term supply agreements that are fulfilled via the ESPO oil pipeline. The retreat of the
Western investors coincides with the three variables noted earlier: a) a rise in resource
nationalism in Russia (or ideological transition); b) the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 and
Western sanctions in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict that have motivated Russia’s “Pivot to
the East” (or changing inter-state relations); and c) a realignment of stakeholder interests in
favour of the new investors. These factors served as enabling conditions for Chinese SOEs.
Resource nationalism and the decline in Western investment both encouraged Russian
stakeholders to consider other investors. These new investors had to be willing to support
Russian oil and gas projects under new investment conditions characterized by minority
participation in joint ventures with Russian NOCs.
These three factors interact with each other to produce a set of conditions that influence
the success of Chinese engagement in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. The first factor opened
the doors to a new type of investors that were willing to operate under different investment
conditions that privilege Russian NOCs. The latter two factors are closely connected as the
stakeholders’ interests shifted in China’s favour after Russia’s political and economic relations
with the West began to deteriorate. These two factors are also changeable, which means that the
success of Chinese engagement may be a temporary phenomenon and may change as soon as
Russia’s relations with the Western countries start to improve.

Sinopec’s investment in Udmurtneft
In 2006, Sinopec acquired stakes in Udmurtneft, which is one of the biggest petroleumproducing companies in the Udmurt Republic (Volga-Udmurt Region). The deal signified
progress in the Sino-Russian collaboration in the upstream oil sector as it was the first major
investment by a Chinese SOE in Russia. At the time of the acquisition, the deal appeared
unlikely. Scholars studying Russia’s energy sector pointed out that foreign investment in
Russia’s upstream oil sector was an exception at the time (Inkpen and Mofett 2011, 545). While
some may have viewed this deal as unlikely, it supported the government’s re-nationalization
agenda which turned Sinopec’s bid for Udmurtneft into a lucrative deal. I propose that the deal is
an outcome of realignment of politico-economic factors guided by resource nationalism and state
capitalism. More specifically, I argue that the deal was enabled by a supportive coalition between
the Russian policymakers and NOCs in light of the improving Sino-Russian bilateral relations. In
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order to explore the dynamics of the Sinopec-Udmurtneft deal, this section will examine the
factors that made this deal possible and discuss Sinopec’s activities in Udmurtneft post-entry.
Udmurtneft, which was founded in 1967, owns 30 oil deposits and extracts over 60 per
cent of oil in the region (Udmurtneft 2011). Today, the company is an important economic
player with a strong institutionalized presence. Since 2005, the company has contributed over
850 million roubles (approximately $12 million USD) to social programs designed to promote
employment, education, and healthcare in Udmurtia (Izvestija of Udmurt Republic 2016).
Udmurtneft’s engagement with the local society is based on the tradition of the Soviet
monogoroda (cities dominated by a single industry), where corporations are responsible for the
provision of social services to the communities residing in the city where the company operates
(Klaas 2016). In this scenario, a corporation becomes an important provider of social services to
the local communities under an established corporate image. This was convenient for Sinopec,
which acquired Udmurneft’s public image and social license to operate in Udmurtia after taking
over the company. Although social license to operate is generally secondary in Russia, it is still
an important component of a successful business strategy.
Prior to Sinopec’s acquisition of Udmurtneft, the company belonged to TNK-BP, which
as I noted earlier is a joint venture between a private Russian oil company and a British oil
supermajor. TNK-BP acquired Udmurtneft from Sidanco, which was a private oil firm that faced
bankruptcy in the late 1990s/early 2000s (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service 1999). In 2000s,
TNK-BP fell out of political favour. After TNK-BP lost its political support, it encountered
political and industrial opposition in Russia, which coincided with the sale of Udmurtneft to
Sinopec (see: Anonymous 2012). The political-corporate rift between the Russian government
and TNK-BP started in 2006 over a disagreement about a license to develop the Kovyatka gas
field (Anonymous 2012). This disagreement escalated in 2008. During this year, there was a set
of police raids on TNK-BP’s offices and the CEO of TNK-BP, Robert Dudley, had encountered
trouble to acquire a Russian visa (Anonymous 2012). Roughly at the same time, TNK-BP began
to seek a way out of the Russian hydrocarbon sector. One of the options was to sell Udmurtneft.
To acquire Udmurtneft from TNK-BP, Sinopec had to compete against domestic and
international oil corporations. The seller, TNK-BP, received several bids from large companies,
including a joint bid proposed by Russia’s Gazprom and Hungary’s Mol, and another bid from
the Russian company Itera that partnered with the Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporations
(Badyrkhanov 2006; Poussenkova 2007). Both bids fell short of the offer made by Sinopec,
which proposed to pay $3.5 billion for Udmurtneft (Oil Daily 2006a); this amount far exceeded
the second highest bid of $2.5 billion that was proposed by the Gazprom-Mol consortium
(Gurkina 2006). In this instance, overbidding worked in Sinopec’s favour as it won the political
and corporate support to acquire Udmurtneft. However, overbidding was not the only factor that
explains Sinopec’s success.
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Did Russian regulatory institutions act as a barrier to Chinese FDI?
At the time of Sinopec’s acquisition of Udmurtneft, Russian regulatory institutions were
relatively supportive of foreign investment in the hydrocarbon sector. Russia’s investment
screening mechanism was more flexible, yet potent enough to stop Chinese SOEs from acquiring
a substantial stake in a Russian oil company. To illustrate, the Russian Duma, a lower house of
the Federal Assembly, used regulatory institutions to block a similar deal in 2002 when CNPC
proposed to purchase 75 per cent of Slavneft (Norling 2006, 32; Eder, Andrews-Speed and
Korzhubaev 2009, 234-235). During Duma’s negotiations over CNPC’s bid for Slavneft, Duma’s
representatives sided with Oleg Morozov, the head of the deputy group on the “Russian
Regions”, who noted that SOEs should not be allowed to acquire more than 25 per cent of shares
in a Russian oil company in light of the “Law on Privatization” (Anonymous 2002). However,
the “Law on Privatization” by itself is only applicable to domestic companies that engaged in
privatization during the 1990s and early 2000s. The law in itself can only be applicable to
foreign investors by extension; that is, there was no explicit legal clause to block foreign
investment under the FDI regime at the time. This illustrates the flexibility of the Russian
regulatory institutions.
In the case of the Udmurtneft, the federal government decided not to extend the
interpretation of the existing regulations to block Sinopec’s investment. The decision was likely
the result of Sinopec’s agreement with Rosneft that stipulated that Sinopec will sell the majority
of Udmurtneft to Rosneft after acquiring 96.9 per cent of the company from TNK-BP for $3.4
billion (Oil Daily 2006a; Oil Daily 2006b). The deal also occurred before the adoption of the
“Strategic Law”, which was implemented in 2008. If the deal occurred after 2008, it would have
raised red flags. Under the strategic law, the government expanded restrictions on foreign
investment in the hydrocarbon sector by making any investment in a hydrocarbon industry above
5 per cent of voting shares reviewable. Since Sinopec bought over 5 per cent of shares in the
Udmurtneft (before selling a majority of these shares to Rosneft), this transaction would have
required approval from the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service and The Government’s
Commission on Monitoring of the Foreign Investment.
The role played by the powerful stakeholders in shaping Russian regulatory institutions is
thus an important explanatory element. To illustrate, CNPC not only failed to acquire Slavneft
due to political opposition but also failed to acquire Stimul due to corporate opposition. As I will
illustrate in the next section, Russian corporate players, such as Gazprom, can selectively use
legal action to delay and effectively impede foreign investment that is not aligned with corporate
interests (Kong 2009, 107-109). A selective enforcement of legal cases in Russia elevates the
ability of policymakers and corporations to influence FDI as I will illustrate in the next section.
Therefore, Sinopec’s acquisition of Udmurtneft could have been jeopardized by corporate and
political opposition in Russia.
The role of domestic stakeholders in opening the doors for Chinese investors
Stakeholder politics play a central role in explaining Sinopec’s success in acquiring
Udmurtneft. In Russia, foreign investors operate in a space that appears to be rather
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unpredictable as project-related contestation is reserved to corporate and political entities leaving
out civil society and Indigenous communities. In other words, the contestation/negotiation
platform for foreign investment in brownfield projects in the upstream oil sector is shaped at the
corporate and political levels. Civil society and indigenous communities play a minor role in
shaping brownfield FDI as they predominantly interact with the domestic energy companies,
which maintain a social license to operate in a given community. To explore these dynamics, this
section focuses on the stakeholder involvement in Sinopec’s bid to acquire Udmurtneft by
looking at individual stakeholders and their strategies. I propose that Sinopec’s success can be
attributed to the firms’ ability to obtain political and market licenses in support of its acquisition
of Udmurtneft.
In the case of Sinopec, both political and corporate actors were supportive of the deal. In
fact, it appeared as though the Russian corporate actors orchestrated Sinopec’s investment in
Udmurtneft. Empirical evidence suggests that Sinopec acted strategically by forming a close
corporate alliance with Rosneft, one of the biggest NOCs in the Russian energy sector that
benefits from the government’s support. The two companies signed an MOU in March 2006
(several months before the deal was announced), according to which Rosneft would buy the
majority (51 per cent) of Udmurtneft’s shares from Sinopec post-acquisition if their joint bid
succeeds (RBK 2006; Norling 2006, 31-32). The Memorandum also stipulated provisions that
accounted for Rosneft’s difficult financial situation at the time of the deal as the NOC lacked
financial resources to acquire the shares from the Sinopec (Henderson and Mitrova 2016).
Therefore, the agreement included a clause that outlined financial assistance that Chinese banks
promised to extend - in the form of a loan - to Rosneft to help the NOC to acquire the shares
from the Sinopec (RBK 20006; Norling 2006, 31-32). Rosneft agreed to be repay this loan
through the future earnings produced from the oil extracted by Udmurtneft (Henderson and
Mitrova 2016, 40).
The dynamics of the deal resemble SOEs’ investment strategy pursued in developing
countries. The oil-for-loans/resources/infrastructure is a staple of Chinese SOEs in Africa and
Latin America (Brautigam 2011; Gonzalez-Vicente 2013; Gallagher 2016). The investment
package offered to Rosneft by Sinopec differs only slightly from these packages as the aid
component is missing from the deal. Even without the aid component, SOEs’ packages are very
attractive for investment-recipient companies that are in financial need, as was the case of
Rosneft. In a way, China’s financial flexibility enabled the deal to proceed. The MOU also had
political ramifications. In exchange for this deal, Rosneft promised to obtain political backing
from the Kremlin to ensure that Sinopec’s will be able to acquire 100 per cent of Udmurtneft
(Badyrkhanov 2006; Oil Daily 2006a).
The Russian government also supported Sinopec’s bid as it fit with the broader
renationalization agenda. Although the deal may, at first glance, run contrary to the logic of
resource nationalism, in reality, it supported government’s renationalization strategy. To
elaborate on this proposition, it is plausible that the Russian government was interested in
transferring control of Udmurtneft from the hands of TNK-BP, which was a private oil company
with limited ties to the Russian government, into the hands of a state-owned company, Rosneft.
From this perspective, the Rosneft-Sinopec MOU fit with the government’s agenda as it enabled
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Rosneft to take over Udmurtneft and expand its asset base without having to incur immediate
financial costs. In this case, China’s flexible investment strategy fit with the Russian political
agenda, which Henderson and Mitrova (2016) summarize in terms of asset consolidation in the
hands of the Russian national oil giants (39). In other words, the deal allowed Russian NOCs to
expand their “grip on the energy industry” (Oil Daily 2006a). In doing so, the deal has met
strategic objectives outlined by the Russian government.
The deal also coincided with the government’s objective to build closer energy ties with
China. This objective was reinforced by the MOUs and other bilateral agreements signed on
March 2006 during the Year of Russia ceremony, which occurred in Beijing. After Putin arrived
in Beijing the two sides signed three documents on energy cooperation (Feng 2006), including a
joint statement, signed on March 22 nd, that pledged close bilateral energy cooperation and joint
exploration of hydrocarbon assets (Jing 2006). These documents were signed a couple of months
prior to Udmurtneft’s takeover. While Udmurtneft was not explicitly mentioned during these
negotiations, the two sides reportedly signed an agreement on collaboration between CNPC and
the Russian NOCs; CNPC was expected to partner with the three largest NOCs in Russia – with
Rosneft to explore upstream oil assets, with Gazprom to promote trade in natural gas, and with
Transneft to develop pipeline infrastructure (Jing 2006). Judging by these agreements, the
acquisition of Udmurtneft fit within the closer energy collaboration penned at the high-level
bilateral meetings. Based on these factors, one may conclude that inter-state negotiations may
have shaped the terms of Sinopec’s acquisition of Udmurtneft.
Even if the timing of these agreements and Sinopec’s successful bid for Udmurtneft is
coincidental, political support was very important for Sinopec’s bid as noted by the corporate
players. For example, Gazprom’s comments about the deal revealed that Sinopec succeeded in
acquiring Udmurtneft because the government made a “political decision” in favour of Rosneft
(Pousenkova 2013, 15). While Gazprom’s comment has purposefully underestimated financial
superiority of the bid to make its own lower-priced bid seem equally competitive, its nod to the
political side of the deal is very informative. Moreover, it brings the analysis back to the RosneftSinopec MOU that was premised on Rosneft’s promise to lobby policymakers to ensure that the
government approves the deal.
Empirical evidence suggests that Sinopec’s acquisition of Udmurtneft was orchestrated
by the Russian corporate and political players with little to no involvement of civil society
groups. In Russia, unlike in Canada, civil society is not directly involved in the government’s
decisions about foreign investment in a brownfield oil project. Although there was a media
report that Udmurtia’s residents were not happy with the deal (Orlova 2006), there was no
evidence of any protests staged by the local residents in the news reports that I analyzed. My
research suggests that the public was not consulted about the deal. Furthermore, an oil worker
whom I interviewed in Udmurtia revealed that employees in the oil sector had little say regarding
decisions made at the corporate level (Anonymous oilfield worker 2015). Thus, Udmurtneft’s
employees and residents were less likely to protest against changes that occur at the company, as
long as their lives are not negatively impacted by the new owners (Anonymous oilfield workers
2015).
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Indigenous groups, as recognized within the legal statutes of the Russian Federation, do
not inhabit Udmurtia. Therefore, consultation and accommodation process was not legally
required. Furthermore, Udmurtneft is an established company, where the acquirer gains the
social license acquired by the prior owners of the firm. Nonetheless, a social license to operate
can become contested if the company does not follow established corporate practices. The
observed lack of civil society involvement can also be explained by a general weakness of civil
society in Russia, as noted in the theoretical chapter. Although protests are less likely in Russia
given general weaknesses of the civil society, any company that fails to maintain its social
license may be negatively perceived by the local society. Ultimately, civil society is likely to
remain dormant, as long as Udmurtneft continues to undertake CSR activities developed by the
previous owners.
This section has demonstrated that Russian policymakers and NOCs play a central role in
influencing the success of FDI by Chinese SOEs in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. I noted that
previous failures of Chinese SOEs to acquire energy companies in Russia occurred due to the
absence of political or corporate support. After applying the analogy of licenses to operate to the
case study, I noted that Udmurtneft was able to obtain a political and market license to operate in
Russia by supporting the agenda of resource nationalism pursued by the Russian government and
NOCs. I have also noted the limited role played by the civil society actors, indigenous groups,
and regulatory institutions in the Sinopec’s investment. This case supports my argument that in
Russia Chinese SOEs will be successful when they obtain political and economic support of
local stakeholders.
Sinopec’s activities post-acquisition
The deal struck between Sinopec and Rosneft, to partition the ownership of Udmurtneft
in Rosneft’s favour, meant that Sinopec obtained a minority position in the firm, which impacted
its subsequent activities. This partition of shares helped Sinopec fit itself within political and
corporate priorities in Russia that prioritize domestic companies over the foreign ones.
Therefore, Chinese SOEs can get a foothold in Russia only if they agree to be minority investors
in a Russian hydrocarbon company. Elaborating on the structure of this investment, experts have
noted that Sinopec’s investment resembles a “portfolio investment”, where changes to the
existing corporate operations are minimal (Gabuev 2016). In this way, Chinese SOEs gain a seat
at the table without being able to modify the rules of the game. In this case, it is plausible to
conclude that Sinopec took on a role of the financier by taking on the financial burden of
Udmurtneft without obtaining controlling interests in the company (Badyrkhanov 2006). In other
words, Sinopec assumed the financial risks of the project (Norling 2006, 34). This high-risk
gamble opened the door for Sinopec to enter the Russian upstream oil sector but did not
guarantee that the SOE will be able to shape corporate activities.
Joint ventures with a relatively equal partnership, such as Udmurtneft, presuppose that
the two parties will split the managerial roles equally. Sinopec became well-integrated in the
managerial board of Udmurtneft as per the November 11, 2006 shareholder agreement signed by
Rosneft and Sinopec to delineate joint management of the company and distribute management
stakes (Rigzone 2006). As part of this deal, the two companies formed a joint venture, Taihu
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Ltd., to manage Udmurtneft and lock in the distribution of shares between the two companies.
The two agreed on an equal division of the eight board member seats, while Rosneft retained the
right to appoint the general director of Udmurtneft from its ranks (Oil Daily 2006b). This
division of seats fits into the agenda of the resource nationalism championed by the Russian
government (Oil Daily 2006b). Even though the managerial appointments are roughly equal,
Chinese managers appear to rely on their local partners to manage the day-to-day operations of
the company. For example, newspaper agencies reported that the Chinese managers travelled to
Russia to learn about Russia’s labour conditions, extractive culture, norms, and regulations
(Industrial and environmental safety, labor protection 2008). Judging by these reports, it appears
that the Chinese managers viewed Udmurtneft as a learning opportunity.
In general, Chinese engagement has been a double-edged sword in terms of Udmurtneft’s
operations. On the one hand, Chinese geologists have brought in expertise in extractive
techniques that helped to boost oil production from the mature fields (Udmurtneft 2008). This
resulted in the expansion of oil extraction in 2017, which exceeded initial expectations (Global
Data 2017). On the other hand, Chinese corporations bring in cheaper technology and equipment
(Gromov and Titov 2017). Among these corporations is the Chinese firm Kerui petroleum,
which supplies specialized equipment to Udmurtia, including drilling rigs and electric motors
(Udmurt Truth 2016). Although Chinese equipment helps Russia to reduce its reliance on the
Western technology, which post-sanctions became very hard to access, it comes with potential
drawbacks.
In theory, China’s technology and supplies should be beneficial for Udmurtia’s oil
industry. However, on the ground, some observers note that the imported technology may “flood
the market” as Chinese firms may engage in “dumping” of the cheaper products to undermine
domestic players’ ability to compete and may potentially lead to bankruptcies of the local firms
(Klaas 2016, Poghosyan 2017). If the dependence on Chinese equipment and technology will
continue to grow, this may lead to technological dependence on the “East” and may decimate the
domestic industry (Poghosyan 2017). Although China’s entry into the upstream oil sector
worries industry players that provide technology and services, Sinopec’s contribution to
Udmurtneft helps the company to expand its productive capacity. If the power alignment among
the shareholder remains the same, it is unlikely that Russia’s local firms will be able to challenge
SOEs’ presence in Russia.
Lessons Learned from the Udmurtneft case
Sinopec’s acquisition of Udmurtneft from TNK-BP reveals a set of interesting dynamics.
First, as this section illustrated, Rosneft appeared to play a critical role in pushing the deal
through. Since the deal favoured Rosneft disproportionately, it appeared that the NOC used its
political ties to influence the government. Second, the willingness of the Russian government to
approve the deal signalled that Sinopec met the government’s dual objectives – to promote
resource nationalism and establish stronger energy ties with China. Third, the absence of civil
society opposition to the deal, noted in this section, signalled that the transaction has not been
significant enough to generate societal action. Fourth, the brownfield nature of investment
(where property rights were already established) coupled with flexible institutions (where the
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FDI screening mechanism did not stipulate any restrictions on FDI) made Sinopec’s FDI easier.
In other words, a supportive politico-economic coalition in the absence of regulatory restrictions
made it easier for Sinopec to invest in Russia.
The openness of the politico-economic coalition toward Sinopec’s bid does not guarantee
that Sinopec will have an easy operating environment in Russia. As this section highlighted,
Sinopec’s subsequent activities in Russia were the outcome of the inter-corporate agreements
with Rosneft that shaped the distribution of management roles in the company. As part of the
deal, Sinopec gained an equal number of seats and voting power, yet appeared to be a more
passive observer than an active manager of the company. Under this power dynamics, Sinopec
became the financier and provider of technology for the company. However, as I noted in the
previous section, Chinese equipment was criticized as it directly competed with the local firms.
Ultimately, Sinopec’s engagement has confirmed the hypothesis that in Russia corporate players
and the state play a central role in influencing the success of Chinese FDI.
As one of the larger upstream investments in Russia, Udmurtneft was a test case for SinoRussian cooperation in the upstream oil sector. This cooperation revealed interesting dynamics
that hint at a broader strategy of Chinese state-owned investors. First, it reaffirmed the broader
hypothesis in the literature that Chinese SOEs adapt to the host country’s regulations and local
conditions (see: Economy and Levy 2014; Alon, Leung and Simpson 2015). Second, the deal
resembles the dynamics of Chinese investment in developing countries. It combined FDI with a
loan to Rosneft backed by future oil sales. This acquisition strategy broadly resembles loans-foroil extended by Chinese policy banks and oil companies to developing countries in Africa and
Latin America, such as Angola and Venezuela. The ability of Chinese SOEs to combine loans
and investment packages has allowed them to overcome the odds against foreign investors in the
oil and gas sectors. The dynamics of the deal are replicated in the upstream LNG sector as will
be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

CNPC and the Silk Road Fund in the Russian Arctic; a Partnership with Novatek to Develop
Yamal LNG
The Arctic region is often regarded as a ‘resource frontier’ by scholars such as Michael
Klare (2012) as the resource exploration in this region is challenging due to the harsh climate. As
the climate continues to change and technological advancements permit resource exploration in
extreme environments, Arctic resources have recently become accessible to extractive
companies. Extractive industry moves into the region to explore these newly available resources.
The Yamal Peninsula, located in the Russian Arctic, is one of these frontier regions that is now
home to the largest and most ambitious natural gas liquefaction plant in the Russian Arctic –
Yamal LNG. This plant is the “most northerly project of its kind” (Soldatkin and Astakhova
2016), as it is currently the only large-scale LNG plant in the Russian Arctic that produces,
liquefies, and ships natural gas from the South-Tambey field, which contains 1.3 trillion m3 of
natural gas reserves (Kremlin 2013).
The plant is an example of a successful Sino-Russian partnership in the region. It follows
a string of several unsuccessful proposals to explore the Arctic’s hydrocarbon resources jointly
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as Sino-Russian earlier plans to explore Pechora and Shtokman LNG fields did not move beyond
the drawing board (Konyshev and Serguin 2012). In the case of the Yamal LNG project, Chinese
companies joined the project at a post-conceptualization stage by taking on a role of investors
and financial partners. CNPC acquired 20 per cent of shares in the project in 2014 and China’s
Silk Road Fund bought another 9.9 per cent of shares in 2016. Chinese SOEs joined Novatek
(which now holds 50.1 per cent of the shares in the project), and French oil major Total (which
acquired 20 per cent of the shares in 2010). The French Total joined the project prior to the
Western sanctions and retained its role in the project despite the sanctions; Chinese SOEs joined
the project after the sanctions. CNPC acquired 20 per cent stake in the project in 2014 after
signing a framework agreement with the Russian government officials and Novatek’s
representatives. Two years after (in 2016) the Silk Road Fund joined the project by acquiring 9.9
per cent of shares (Gerden 2016).
The project is illustrative of China’s growing financial engagement in the Russian
hydrocarbon sector. One can visualize this engagement through an interconnected web of
investments, loans, and long-term supply contracts extended by Chinese SOEs to their Russian
counterparts. Evidence suggests that China became the ultimate financier of the project as it
provided over 50 per cent of the finance – via loans and investment - required for the successful
implementation of the plant (Negrejeva and Abarkina 2016).
The project fits within the China’s BRI that seeks to expand the reach of Chinese
corporate actors along the route and simultaneously attain resource security. Yamal LNG was
one of the first projects financed by the BRI’s Silk Road Fund that has reached the Arctic (Benett
2017). More generally, the project fits within the “Polar Silk Road” framework articulated in
China’s Arctic policy. Chinese engagement in Yamal LNG, as Weidacher Hsiung (2016) posits,
may be driven by dual considerations - to acquire experience/technology for the development of
the hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic environment and to establish itself as an important player
in the Arctic region. The Yamal LNG joint venture is thus a prong in the wider strategy of the
Chinese government, advanced by the corporate players, that meets the needs of the participating
states.
In this section, I argue that Chinese financial engagement in the Yamal LNG plant can be
partially attributed to geopolitical changes that have moved Russia closer to China in search of
financial and technological support. These geopolitical changes have affected the calculus of the
powerful stakeholders in Russia, who under the current institutional system, turned toward China
for financial and technological support. To develop this argument, I examine the changes in
Russia’s investment screening mechanism after the passage of the “Strategic Industries Act” in
2008 and analyze the role of stakeholders in shaping Chinese investment. In the case of the
Yamal LNG, stakeholder politics take center stage in determining Chinese engagement. This
section outlines the reaction of the Russian government, corporate players, and Indigenous
groups to Chinese engagement in Yamal LNG. As part of this discussion, I will refer to
institutional factors that have shaped Chinese investment in the joint venture before moving to
analyze Chinese participation in Yamal LNG.
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Regulating Chinese Activities in Yamal LNG
Foreign investors who acquired stakes in Yamal LNG were reviewed under an updated
investment screening mechanism. The updated screening mechanism is enshrined in the 2008
law on “Strategic Industries” that restricts foreign investment in the strategic industries. As
Chinese SOEs wanted to acquire over 5 percent of voting shares - CNPC 20 per cent and the Silk
Road Fund a 9.9 per cent stake - in Yamal LNG, the government had to review the investment.
Both companies had to file a report under the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian
Federation, which passes the application to the Government’s Commission on Monitoring of
Foreign Investment. If the government opposed Chinese FDI in Yamal LNG, then they could
have easily withheld permission for the project to proceed. However, as the government
supported Chinese investment, the Commission, which was composed of the leading Russian
policymakers such as Alexander Novak (Minister of Energy) and Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedv among others, granted Chinese SOEs a permission to invest in the Yamal LNG project.
After receiving the regulatory approval to invest in Yamal LNG from the Russian
government, Chinese participation in Yamal LNG faced minimal regulatory burdens on the
ground. As noted earlier, Chinese companies joined the Yamal LNG project after a preimplementation stage. At the implementation stage, greenfield projects have already settled
majority of issues related to property rights and acquired political, social, and market licenses to
operate. In practice, the project should have been overseen by regulatory institutions in the
Yamalo-Nanetsk Autonomous Okrug. While the Okrug regulates any extractive activities in the
region and shapes the rules for the extractive companies (Negrejeva and Abarkina 2016), its
regulatory capacity is constrained by the federal government (French et al. 2017, 123).
Ultimately, the decisions about property rights in the Arctic were made by the regulatory bodies,
such as the Federal Agency for Subsoil Management (Rosnedra), that granted exploration
licenses at the federal level.
The engagement of large extractive corporations and state agencies in the development of
the Arctic’s hydrocarbon resources reduces the power of local actors. As French et al. (2017)
suggest the Arctic’s development and governance are no longer “fully self-sourced, that is, based
on its Indigenous population and local resources” (124). Instead, local groups are increasingly
reliant on foreign investors to bring money and development to the region (Zolotukhin 2016).
This increases the bargaining position of extractive companies that provide a set of socioeconomic services, outlined in a comprehensive CSR plan, in exchange for local support.
Furthermore, local actors have little say in determining which companies enter the region to
explore their natural resources. Instead, the federal government makes all final decisions about
the proposed projects in the region.
As demonstrated in this section, Chinese investors were not limited by the regulatory
burdens in the Yamal LNG project, even though their investment exceeded the investment
threshold stipulated under the 2008 law on “Strategic Industries” and was subjected to review.
Given that Chinese investment exceeded the threshold for permitted investment, the question is
why it was not rejected by the government given the strategic nature of these resources? The
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answer to this question is based on the stakeholder politics, which will be explored in the next
section.
Getting China on Board with the Yamal LNG
The nature of Chinese engagement in the Yamal LNG project can be explained by the
confluence of stakeholders’ interests operating within the institutional parameters. The
interaction of the two ultimately determines the development of the hydrocarbon assets in the
Arctic region. On the one hand, regulatory institutions provide the Russian government with the
levers to stop the hydrocarbon development in the region. On the other hand, stakeholders
determine if the regulatory levers are pulled. In the case of Yamal LNG, state and corporate
actors appeared to be on board with the Chinese investment even though it appeared to run
counter to the government’s Arctic strategy.
The Russian government prioritizes the development of hydrocarbon resources located in
the Russian Arctic. The government acknowledges that these resources are essential for national
security and socio-economic development of the country (The Government of Russia 2013). As
part of the Arctic Strategy 2020 - The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the
Russian Federation and National Security Efforts for the period up to 2020 – the government has
stated that international partners can support the extraction of hydrocarbon resources in the
Russian Arctic (Government of Russia 2013; sub-section 7 c and 11a). Since the government
appears to promote international partnerships under the Arctic Strategy, it is likely that the
government will be supportive of joint ventures with foreign companies in the region. At the
same time, the government remains protective of its Arctic resources, given their strategic nature.
As experts note, Russia has traditionally adopted a “rigid position” on the questions regarding
Arctic’s development and emphasized the central role of the Arctic states in the region
(Filimonova and Krivokhizh 2014). This makes Chinese investment in Yamal LNG a “hard
case”, where according to the geopolitical and strategic factors Chinese investors should not have
been successful in acquiring shares in the project (Røseth 2014).
Although the Russian government is generally guarded against growing influence of the
non-Arctic states in the Arctic (on the grounds of national security), it recognizes that the
involvement of the Asian states can support broader strategic goals identified by Russia for the
region (Zysk 2014). Some scholars, like Kravchuk (2016), even posit that the government sees
new projects in the Arctic as part of its “Pivot to the East” strategy (37). Thus, it is not surprising
that the government gave Chinese companies a green light to invest in the Yamal LNG project
and provided a set of “economic and political guarantee[s]” for the successful implementation of
project (Weidacher Hsiung 2016). For example, the government relaxed the environmental laws
to ensure the successful development of the project (Krutikhin 2016) and provided substantial
financial support in the form of tax breaks and subsidies (Gerden 2016; Lars and Fjaetoft 2014;
Staalsen 2016; Reuters 2016). Experts examining the financial side of Yamal LNG suggest that
without these subsidies the project would not have been profitable (Lunden and Fjaertoft 2014).
The government’s support for the project is consistent with Putin’s statement that the Yamal
LNG plant is a project of “national importance” (Kremlin 2013). Thus, the project itself and
Chinese SOEs obtained state’s backing.
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Russia and China used diplomatic missions to discuss the Yamal LNG project. Highranking officials from Russia and China oversaw CNPC’s negotiations with Novatek about a
potential FDI deal. For example, Putin and Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli oversaw the
signing of the partnership agreement between CNPC and Novatek, which was tabled under The
Protocol of the Russian-Chinese Agreement on Cooperation on the Yamal LNG Project (Kremlin
2016). Other officials were present during several meetings to discuss the deal, including
Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (CNPC 2013). In the
aftermath of these meetings, the two parties have signed a framework agreement stipulating that
China will import 2 million tons of LNG from the Yamal LNG plant over the next 15 years
(Gerden 2016; CNPC 2013). In the aftermath of these bilateral talks, China became an important
investor and financier of the Yamal LNG project.
The Russian government and companies welcomed Chinese investment and financial
support as it is difficult for them to develop these projects unilaterally. Foreign investment is
necessary to develop hydrocarbon resources located in the Arctic region as it helps companies to
diversify risks and to gain access to advanced technology (Filimonova and Krivokhizh 2014;
Negrejeva and Abarkina 2016). Therefore, Russian oil and gas corporations sought to explore
hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic through joint ventures with foreign partners. Initially,
Russian corporations relied on finance and technology provided by the Western IOCs, which
became inaccessible post-sanctions (Kravchuk 2016, 2-16; 37-38). As the Western financiers
also withdrew their financial support from the project, Novatek fell short of funds to complete
the project. In the absence of Western financing, Novatek turned to China to solicit finance for
the project, which reportedly cost $27 billion (Staalesen 2016; Kravchuk 2016), of which the
company was able to raise $13.94 billion 55 (little less than half of the projected cost) (Kremlin
2016a; Negrejeva and Abarkina 2016).
Novatek’s executives welcomed Chinese investment in the aftermath of Western
sanctions. Mark Gyetvay, Novatek’s CFO and Deputy Chairman, revealed in an interview that
Novatek “welcome[s] this type of joint venture” with China as the two parties obtain “mutual
benefits” from the Yamal LNG plant (2016). Novatek’s representatives also acknowledged that
local residents also benefit from this investment as it contributes to “regional job growth…[and]
budgetary funds” (Gyetvay 2016). Likewise, statements made by Leonid V. Mikhelson, CEO of
Novatek, revealed that Chinese investment “will contribute to the… financing of the project and
further facilitate its successful implementation” (LNG World News Staff 2015). These
statements from Novatek’s executives suggest that Chinese investors have obtained a market
license to operate in the Arctic.
Given the large scale of the project and the involvement of international companies,
social license became an important component for the project. In the case of the Yamal LNG
plant, local citizens appeared to be supportive of the project. The region is generally supportive
of proposed projects that develop new hydrocarbon fields in the region, as this development is
essential for sustaining the Okrug’s economic growth since 67 per cent of the Yamalo-Nanents
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budget revenue is attained from taxation of gas enterprises operating in the region (Kharitonova
and Vizhina 2009, p 120). Thus, the development of the hydrocarbon resources is at the center of
the Yamalo-Nanets Autonomous Okrug’s Strategy for socioeconomic development until 2020.
The strategy is centered on the development of primary resources, improvement of local
infrastructure, and attraction of “megaprojects” to the region (Kharitonova and Vizhina 2009, p
121). Interviewed experts have suggested that the Yamal LNG project will likely provide finance
for Indigenous groups in addition to the development of local infrastructure (Anonymous
interview 2016). Thus, civil society has welcomed China’s financial participation in the Yamal
LNG project as it provided necessary financial resources for the project to proceed forward.
Although regional opposition to the Yamal LNG project appears to be absent, the
Indigenous groups could have challenged the project since the plant may reshape the socioeconomic landscape of the region and negatively impact the lives of Indigenous groups.
Scholarly and environmental reports maintain that Yamal LNG may damage local ecology and
may lead to a loss of local flora and fauna (Environ 2014; Gritsenko 2017; Knizhnikov,
Golubchikov and Zaitseva nd). The project may also disrupt reindeer migration routes, which
will negatively impact Indigenous groups living in the vicinity (Viallon 2018). Furthermore, the
inflow of migrant workers from other parts of Russia to the region may lead to social tensions
due to a growing competition for limited resources (Gritsenko 2017). Despite the potential
adverse effects of the project on the local population, Indigenous groups have limited power to
influence the project as they are constrained by the power differential incorporated in stakeholder
relations via the institutional factors.
Although the Indigenous groups may be disproportionately affected by the project, they
lack leverage to stall or modify a hydrocarbon project built on their territory. In general, it
appears that Indigenous groups are against the development of hydrocarbon resources in the
Arctic (Poussenkova and Overland 2018, 274) and have not consented to these projects in the
region (The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2017; Blue Action 2017).
Thus, the region has a history of Indigenous-led protests targeting hydrocarbon exploitation
(Hele 1994, 261). The Yamalo-Nanets Indigenous communities are well organized to extract
benefits from the oil and gas projects and use their organization skills to negotiate with the oil
and gas companies located in the region (Tomaselli and Koch 2014, 13). Despite their
organizational skills, Indigenous groups are unable to intervene in the extractive projects in the
region (The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2017; Blue Action 2017). In
general, Indigenous groups in the region cannot exercise collective action and find it difficult to
pursue their interests as they are a “marginalized group”, struggling to navigate corporate and
state activities in the region (Haller et al. 2007).
How did Chinese SOEs integrate themselves into the Yamal LNG?
As in the other hydrocarbon projects in Russia, Chinese SOEs have agreed to be minority
partners in Yamal LNG and to provide necessary finance and technology for the project. As
noted earlier, Chinese SOEs have contributed over 50 per cent of finance for the project
(Negrejeva and Abarkina 2016). A large portion of this finance came in the form of loans from
China’s EXIM bank and the CDB. These two banks provided two loans (15-year credit lines) for
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the project worth 9.3 billion Euro (approximately $10.4 billion USD) and 9.8 billion RMB
(approximately $1.4 billion USD) (Yamal LNG 2016; Negrejeva and Abarkina 2016). These
loans are the third-largest financial loans extended to Russian corporations historically and signal
Russia’s ability to go around Western sanctions to complete energy projects (Reuters 2016).
Additionally, the data released by the Global Development Policy Center (2018) indicates that
this was the largest loan extended by the Chinese banks to a single country.
Loans extended by the Chinese policy banks did not come without conditions. Experts
note that these loans were tied to the purchases of Chinese technology (Krutikhin 2016) and
premised on the acquisition of shares in the Yamal LNG project (Grivach 2016). In exchange for
the shares, the Silk Road Fund 56 invested $5 billion USD in the Yamal LNG project and
provided an additional $800 million USD for the implementation of the project (Gerden, 2016),
while CNPC invested $5 billion USD in the project (Kremlin 2016). Like other loans, the two
credit lines will have to be repaid within 15 years (Yamal LNG 2016). These tied loans that
Chinese policy banks granted to Yamal LNG resemble China’s investment strategy in
developing countries, where investment is packaged with preferential loans and long-term energy
supply agreements to obtain political and market licenses to operate.
Following their general investment model in developing countries, Chinese companies
also signed long-term supply contracts for shipments of LNG to China with Novatek. According
to Novatek’s data, Chinese consumers will receive 27 per cent of the total natural gas produced
at the Yamal LNG plant (Kremlin 2014. CNPC will receive three million tons of LNG per year
from the Yamal LNG plant tor a 20-year supply agreement that the company signed with
Novatek (Yamal LNG 2014). One should note that China is one of the multiple actors that have
signed such long-term supply contracts with Novatek. France’s Engie and Spain’s Gas Natural
Fenosa are among other consumers that signed on to long-term supply deals with Novatek
(Reuters Staff 2015; Yamal LNG 2013). These long-term supply contracts ensure the
profitability of the Yamal LNG project as they provide guaranteed revenue in exchange for the
future supply of natural gas.
Scholars commenting on the deal were not surprised by this distribution of financial
burden among Russian and Chinese companies. According to Flake (2013), China took “the role
of the junior partner” in the Yamal LNG joint venture willingly. Potentially, because they lacked
technology that was necessary to become a “full-fledged partner[s]” in the project (Peng and
Wegge 2015; Widacher Hsiung 2016). However, this argument does not hold as Chinese
enterprises became the main producers of technology for the project. In fact, Chinese SOEs
assembled several modules for the LNG plant. For example, CNPC was responsible for four
engineering packages for Yamal LNG, which were completed in, and shipped from, the
Shandong Province in China (CNPC 2016). Chinese engineers have also constructed polar
drilling rigs for the project. These rigs accounted for 60 per cent of Russia’s imports of this
equipment (Bennett 2017). An expert on the Russian energy sector, Tatiana Mitrova (2016)
estimated that around 80 per cent of the equipment for the Yamal LNG plant was made in China
and funded by the Silk Road Fund. In addition to technological contributions, Chinese
corporations also provided raw materials, such as steel for the project (Chinarealnews 2015).
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Thus, Chinese SOEs slowly became “equals to Western companies in the Arctic” as Røseth
(2014, 848) suggests.
Lessons Learned from the Yamal LNG case
The case study of the Yamal LNG plant demonstrates China’s growing financial
engagement in the development of hydrocarbon resources located in the Russian Arctic. While
the Russian regulatory institutions have tightened regulations for FDI from SOEs after the
implementation of the 2008 law on FDI in the strategic industries, this did not prevent Chinese
companies from gaining a political license to operate in Russia. In fact, Chinese companies have
acquired political support twice – the first time for CNPC’s acquisition of 20 per cent of the
Yamal LNG project in 2014 and the second time for the Silk Road Fund’s acquisition of 9.9 per
cent in the Yamal LNG project. The second roadblock that could have hindered Chinese
investment was property rights. These rights could have been contested by the Indigenous
reindeer herders, who were provided financial reimbursement to cede control over their
territories. Ultimately, the case illustrates that the political and market licenses obtained by
Chinese SOEs enabled them to enter and successfully engage in the Yamal LNG project.
Although Chinese SOEs are only minority investors in the project, they have been very
important financiers and providers of technology. Chinese corporations have also signed longterm supply contracts with Novatek to import LNG from the Yamal plant. Scholars note that
Chinese energy collaboration with Russia in the Arctic region is a reflection of growing bilateral
energy relations (Filimonova and Krivokhizh 2014). Dynamics of the Sino-Russian corporate
partnership in the Yamal LNG project appear to have been influenced by the needs of Russian
political and corporate actors, who searched for alternative sources of finance and technology
that was withdrawn in the aftermath of the Western sanctions (Huang, Lasserre, and Alexeeva
2015). It is thus plausible that the scale of Chinese investment is a result of geopolitical tensions
and Russian corporate need to acquire finance to support its energy projects. Chinese finance
also supported a grander strategy of the Russian government aimed at expanding its control over
the hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic. I propose that the ability of Chinese companies to
follow signals of the Russian domestic players have enabled their expansion in the Russian
hydrocarbon sector. This was also supported by China’s non-interference policy, where the
companies separate business from politics and do not participate in the economic sanctions
levied by the Western states.
The Yamal LNG plant is a testing ground for future Sino-Russian projects in the Arctic,
where successes and failures of the Yamal LNG project will shape future projects beyond the
Arctic region. In the Arctic region, Sino-Russian bilateral collaboration will likely expand in the
face of stronger corporate ties developed by Chinese and Russian hydrocarbon companies. As an
illustration, Novatek’s CEO, Leonid Mikhelson has already signed agreements to expand
partnership with Chinese SOEs in the upcoming Arctic LNG projects, such as the Arctic LNG II
(Energy Monitor Worldwide 2017). CNPC’s and Silk Road Fund’s successful investment in
Yamal is also illustrative of a mutually beneficial agreement between Russian and Chinese
companies. Chinese experience as the financier of the Yamal LNG plant replicates its earlier
engagement with Transneft on the ESPO project, which will be discussed in the next section.
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Negotiating the ESPO Pipeline
The ESPO pipeline is a politically and economically important mega-project (Konończuk
2008). The pipeline runs from Taishet/Tayshet, Irkutsk (Eastern Siberia), to Kozmino, Primorsky
Krai (Far East).57 The first section of the pipeline was completed in 2008 by Transneft. In 2010,
Transneft partnered with CNPC to jointly expand the pipeline with the addition of a spur from
Skovorodino to Daqing, located in Heilongjang province of China. In 2016, the two sides started
the construction of the second spur from Russia to China that became operational in 2018
(Bloomberg 2018). Transneft was responsible for the construction of the pipeline running
through Russia, while CNPC built the Chinese section of the pipeline. As observers note, the
ESPO is currently Russia’s largest oil pipeline and “one of the most expensive…[ones] in the
world” (Konończuk 2008, 5). This pipeline has been on the political and corporate agenda since
the 1990s when Chinese and Russian counterparts began to negotiate oil supply contracts.
However, it did not materialize until the mid-2000s. This delay can be explained by the
confluence of actors’ interests that were modified by the Russian institutions. More specifically,
I argue that the ideological flux in political and economic institutions in Russia led to a delay in
the pipeline construction and resulted in China’s shallow engagement in the ESPO.
Chinese engagement in the ESPO’s construction revolved around loans and long-term oil
supply contracts. As I will propose, China’s limited engagement is an outcome of the Russian
institutional arrangements. These arrangements, premised on state capitalism and resource
nationalism, stipulate that the pipeline infrastructure should be owned and operated by Russian
NOCs that will represent the interests of the Russian state. In Russia, Transneft, a NOC in charge
of the oil pipelines that deliver 93 per cent of oil in Russia, is also a representative of the Russian
government (Vatansever 2010, 8). Therefore, the Russian government and Transneft have played
a central role in the development of the ESPO pipeline. However, they are not the only actors
that were influential in this case. As I argue in this section, both domestic and international actors
were fundamental in shaping the ESPO project as will be exemplified in the negotiation of the
pipeline’s route among different domestic and international players.
To examine these propositions, I will first outline regulatory institutions that shaped the
nature of the ESPO pipeline. Subsequently, I will discuss the interests of individual stakeholders
and map them on to the institutional landscape. This strategy is helpful for identifying interests
and tensions that exist among the stakeholders in Russia that ultimately influenced the nature of
the pipeline negotiations. Building on the previous sections, this section will examine four sets of
core stakeholders with the addition of international actors as another factor that influenced the
negotiation. Subsequently, I will analyze Chinese operations in the ESPO after the pipeline was
approved.
Ideology and Regulatory Institutions influencing the ESPO pipeline
Pipeline infrastructure in Russia is run by a single NOC, Transneft, due to institutional
arrangements that privilege the state. Although there is no legislation that blocks private
57
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companies from building pipelines, there is evidence that the government has stopped giving
licenses to private companies interested in building pipelines on the Russian territory (Belyi
2013, 170). Therefore, Transneft holds a monopoly power over the construction of oil pipelines
in Russia. Due to these institutional arrangements, private companies are at a disadvantage.
Chinese SOEs are no exception. As an illustration, CNPC’s partnership with a Russian private
company, Yukos, came to a halt in 2006 after the two attempted to construct a pipeline from
Russia to China that bypassed Rosneft and other NOCs. To understand why CNPC-Yukos
partnership failed we need to consider the ideology of resource nationalism that became
increasingly popular among the Russian policymakers. In light of this strategy, the government
sought to increase the power of NOCs (Locatelli and Rossiaud 2011), which could have been
undermined if a private company was allowed to build a pipeline that will be outside of the
government’s managerial reach.
The ESPO negotiations date back to the late 1990s/early 2000s, when Yukos proposed to
build an oil pipeline from Russia to China. Yukos started negotiating with the CNPC to jointly
construct a new pipeline that would have connected the two countries (Henderson 2011; Eder
2014). A pipeline would have reduced costs of oil exports transported to China by rail and would
have created a faster and more reliable connection between the two countries. The initial
proposal to build a cross-national pipeline obtained a political and financial backing from the
Russian government, which seemed to support Yukos’ bid to develop a pipeline spur to China at
the time (Henderson 2011). Russia’s Energy Minister, Victor Kalyuzhnyi, signed an agreement
with China’s Minister of the State Planning Development Commission, Zheng Peiyan, in 2000 to
build a pipeline from Russia to China (Oil and Gas journal 2000). Yukos, Transneft, and China
National United Oil Corporation (Chinaoil) agreed to start the construction in 2003 with a
completion date of 2005 (Oil and Gas Journal 2000) The pipeline was designed to transport oil
from the Angarsk oil fields to Beijing (Oil and Gas Journal 2000). The initial project was never
implemented as it fell out of political favour due to a shift toward resource nationalism that was
reinforced by the growing power of the state under state capitalist economic model. This shift
has reshaped the existing power arrangements in favour of the state and its NOCs.
Political alliance that supported Yukos’ pipeline proposal was not successful in pushing
the project forward. The support for the initial plan to construct an independent pipeline
crumbled as the Prime Minister, Kasyanov, who backed the deal, lost political support
(Henderson 2011, 3). At the same time, President Putin began championing a new direction in
energy governance – domestic resource renationalization (Overland 2011). In other words,
growing resource nationalism (and a history of state-owned pipelines) in Russia motivated the
government to block a deal in which a private company would build a pipeline to China
(Petersen and Barysch 2011, 16; Pousenkova and Overland 2018, 266). This explanation is
closely linked with the institutional factors mentioned earlier. The second factor that made the
pipeline proposed by Yukos problematic was based on the chosen route. If this route was
implemented, it would have locked Russia into a ‘monopsony’ 58 – a market based on a single
consumer – relationship with China as China would become the only consumer of the oil flowing
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along the proposed pipeline (Downs 2010, 152). Both ideational and economic factors were the
likely culprits for the government’s decision to block the pipeline project proposed by Yukos and
backed by the CNPC.
The initial proposal by Yukos to build a pipeline to China came at a time of corporate
restructuring in Russia. During this time, the government sought to expand its position in the oil
and gas industry, while Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a prominent Russian oligarch, wanted to expand
his political power and re-enforce his financial partnership with China through Yukos. Given that
the Yukos’ pipeline proposal did not follow the government’s strategic interests, the proposal fell
out of favour by 2003 (Trickett 2017). The failure of the proposed pipeline exposed a broader
struggle between the oligarchs and the government for the control of the energy sector that
placed China in a precarious position. China’s relations with Yukos were compromised after
Mikhail Khodorkovsky over-stretched his political and economic muscle that put him into the
cross-hairs with the government (Petersen and Barysch 2011; Eder 2014, 44). In the end,
Khodorkovsky lost his battle against the government and was convicted and sentenced for fraud.
His company was renationalized by Rosneft with the support of Chinese loans (China Daily
2005). After the nationalization of Yukos was completed the proposed pipeline was scrapped and
a new pipeline proposal had to be developed by Transneft.
Under the new proposal developed by Transneft, the pipeline would remain in the hands
of Russian NOCs. Since Chinese SOEs only provided loans for the construction of the pipeline,
the investment screening mechanism was not triggered by China’s engagement in the project.
Given that the pipeline was a domestic matter, Chinese engagement in the pipeline was
predominantly determined by the stakeholder politics in Russia. As I will illustrate in the next
section, the Russian government and corporate players played a central role in the ESPO
negotiations, while civil society took on a minor role in shaping the route of the pipeline.
Mapping the Stakeholders along the ESPO
The new ESPO pipeline proposal emerged after the Yukos proposal was scrapped by the
government. After nationalizing Yukos, the government used the agreement reached between
Yukos and CNPC on a pipeline pre-feasibility study as a starting point for its negotiations of a
new pipeline with China. Experts observing the negotiations noted that the pipeline was a “state
project where geopolitics and prestige [took] precedence over economics” (Gorst 2007). These
negotiations were largely driven by Russian policymakers and high-level officials. The media
suggested that President Putin was directly involved with the project’s negotiations (Anonymous
2005). Reports also emerged that the ESPO agreement, struck between Transneft and CNPC on
the pipeline construction, occurred right after a meeting between Vladimir Putin, Russian Prime
Minister at the time, and Wen Jiabao, Chinese Prime Minister (Watkins 2008a).
There is other evidence suggesting that the new deal was clearly coming from the top
echelons of the Russian government. The new pipeline was also supported by the regional
governors in the Russian Far East as they sought to attain economic benefits from the new
pipeline (Nefte Compass 2005). In addition to the diplomatic support for the project, the
government provided financial backing, including tax relief and subsidies (Henderson 2011, 16;
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Konończuk 2008). This support was essential as the pipeline would not have been profitable
otherwise (Watkins 2008b; Graham 2007). In the end, the pipeline was partly an outcome of the
negotiations among the top-level officials and the CEOs of the hydrocarbon companies (Watkins
2008a).
The Russian government worked closely with the domestic industry on the ESPO project.
Transneft and Rosneft, both state-owned companies, engaged in the negotiations of the new
pipeline with the Chinese SOEs and government officials. Both companies have obtained loans
from China to support the construction of the ESPO; those loans were also used to help Rosneft
acquire Yukos’ assets after the latter was declared bankrupt (Henderson 2011, 3). As part of the
deal, Rosneft obtained $15 billion dollars from China, while Transneft obtained $10 billion
dollars as part of the loans-for-oil scheme (Tippee 2013). This financing helped Rosneft to
acquire Yuganskneftegaz from Yukos and supported Transneft’s pipeline construction
(Anonymous 2010).
The ESPO pipeline was backed by Rosneft’s leadership and other domestic oil
corporations. At the time of the negotiations, Igor Sechin, Rosneft’s CEO, declared his support
for developing a stronger relationship with Chinese SOEs to help Russia diversify from the
European market (Neft Rossii 2014). As part of this diversification plan, Rosneft sought to
establish joint ventures with Chinese SOEs in the upstream oil industry. For example, Rosneft
formed a joint venture with CNPC (known as Vostok Energy) to explore oil assets along the
ESPO’s route (Neft Rossii 2013). The best-known fields discovered along the route are the
Verkhnechonsky and West Chonsky, in Eastern Siberia. Both fields are considered by Rosneft
(2007) as important Eastern Siberian energy resources that will supply Asia-Pacific markets.
Aside from Rosneft, Russian oil contractors also benefited from gaining access to Chinese
workers and equipment. Mitrova (2016) estimates that around 60 per cent of the drilling
equipment for the ESPO came from China along with a few Chinese labourers.
The opposition to the project was surprisingly wide-ranging. The opponents included a
mix of industry players, civil society actors, and Indigenous groups. Since the pipeline was in
direct competition with the Russian Railways, the CEO of the Russian Railways at the time,
Vladimir Yakunin, did not support the new pipeline as it would have undercut corporate revenue
that his company obtained from the transportation of oil to China via rail (Oil Daily 2007a). Yet,
his opposition was inconsequential, as the Russian Railways surrendered their demands and
decided not to form alliances with the other groups in opposition to the project. Conversely, civil
society and Indigenous groups formed close alliances to challenge the ESPO project. However,
their protests were not directed against the ESPO project per se; instead, they were driven by
economic and environmental considerations of the project (Fondahl and Sirina 2006; Stammler
and Ivanova 2016). More specifically, they disputed the route of the pipeline, which was
expected to cross the River Lena and run in close proximity to the Lake Baikal, which is one of
the pristine drinking water spots.
Protests against the ESPO’s possible damage to Lake Baikal, in one way or another,
started a wave of protests that criticized the ecological aspect of the project. Civil society, led by
Indigenous and environmental groups, staged several campaigns that questioned the

170

environmental feasibility studies produced by Transneft when planning the ESPO (Stammler and
Ivanova 2016, 1228). Russian branches of the Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF)
raised the international profile of the issue in their calls for the protection of the Lake Baikal
(Greenpeace 2005). Since the Lake Baikal is the UNESCO World Heritage Fund, it is protected
under UNESCO’s cultural and natural heritage laws. Greenpeace noted that the Natural Resource
Ministry, Federal Forestry Agency, and Federal Service for Nature Management Supervision of
the Russian Federation had all confirmed that the project violated the UNESCO’s cultural and
natural heritage if it crosses the Lake Baikal (Greenpeace 2005). Similarly, media pointed out
that Russia’s Natural Resource Ministry has acknowledged that the route is in close proximity to
the Lake Baikal, which violates Russian environmental requirements (Nefte Compass 2005).
The rising protests against the ESPO’s pipeline segment along the Lake Baikal reached
President Putin, who used his political power to release a decree that moved the pipeline away
from the Lake (Oil and Energy Trends 2006; Henderson 2011, 11). This was the first successful
campaign staged by the Russian environmental NGOs against the ESPO, as they were able to
persuade the government to re-route the pipeline further away from the Lake. The second antiESPO campaign, staged by the environmental NGOs, succeeded in convincing the government
to move the oil terminal away from Perevoznaya Bay to Kozmino Bay to protect the local habitat
(World Wildlife Fund 2007). These small victories did not, however, have a substantial impact
on the pipeline. Although the environmental NGOs were successful in their campaigns, there
could have been other factors at play; for example, Overland (2011) posits that the route may
have fallen out of favour with the Russian government due to other factors, including high-cost
estimates (153). Furthermore, the changes in the route were mandated by the president, who held
the ultimate power over the project, rather than by a national court.
Lastly, the indigenous groups that were affected by the pipeline played a limited role in
shaping the project. Given that the pipeline passes through Indigenous lands, Russian regulations
stipulate that the proponents should consult with the Indigenous groups along the route. Yet, as
Fondahl and Sirina (2006) suggest ESPO’s consultation with the Evenki group was “shallow” as
the majority of the people were not informed, travel costs to the consultation sites were
prohibitive, and Indigenous concerns about the project were dismissed by Transneft (65-66).
Ultimately, Indigenous groups had the smallest impact on the ESPO’s construction. Thus, the
pipeline was advanced and devised by the government and its NOCs.
China’s involvement in the ESPO; one voice among many?
The ESPO negotiations were also affected by the international actors from the Asian
region - predominantly by China. As noted earlier, China forged strong commercial connections
with Yukos that spearheaded bilateral negotiations regarding pipeline infrastructure between
Russia and China. As noted earlier, the preliminary agreement between CNPC and Yukos fell
through due to a shift in the government’s ideology toward resource nationalization. The
government also wanted to avoid a monopsony market; thus, it entered into negotiations with
Japan and South Korea to diversify export markets for oil that will be shipped via the ESPO
(Konończuk 2008). Japan was one of the more active supporters of an alternative pipeline route
and even offered financial support for a suitable alternative. Japanese financial support for the
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pipeline directly competed with China’s engagement in the project as the two powers deployed
financial levers to ensure that the ESPO followed their preferred route (Gorst 2007; Masudo
2007). Seeing the competition between the two regional powers, Russia used Japanese financial
commitments as a bargaining chip during negotiations over the pipeline route with China.
However, Japanese financial support was only temporary because Japanese policymakers
decided to withdraw their financial support after citing irreconcilable differences over the
partition of the Southern Kuril Islands with Russia (Henderson 2011, 4). This left Rosneft and
Transneft in a weaker bargaining position.
Since Rosneft and Transneft were scrambling for international finance to support the
construction of the ESPO, they turned to China, which was a willing financier of the project.
China promised to give loans to both companies. Transneft and Rosneft promised to repay those
loans through the shipments of oil to China through the ESPO pipeline (Wilson 2015b). The
conditions of the loan, extended by the Chinese banks to the Russian NOCs, fit under the oil-forinfrastructure framework, where Chinese SOEs extended credits to the Russian companies to
build infrastructure (Gabuev 2016). Additionally, CNPC has also concluded multiple long-term
oil export contracts with Rosneft to ensure the economic viability of the ESPO pipeline (Nazarov
et al. 2014). For example, in a 2013 contract between CNPC and Rosneft the two parties agreed
to supply 300,000 b/d oil over 25-years for $17 billion through the ESPO (The Economist
Intelligence Unit 2015). Chinese financial support was timely as it helped Russian NOCs to
withstand financial difficulties associated with the Global Financial Crisis (Pervoic and Orttung
2009, 141).
Lessons Learned from the ESPO case
The case study of the ESPO pipeline revealed several key tendencies regarding Chinese
engagement in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. First, Chinese investors could not acquire an
equity stake in the ESPO pipeline due to informal institutional arrangements that discouraged
foreign investment in the pipeline infrastructure. Under these informal arrangements pipeline
infrastructure had to be controlled by a state-owned NOC. Therefore, China’s contribution to the
ESPO project was predominantly financial in the form of loans and long-term oil supply
agreements. Second, Chinese engagement in the ESPO project was shaped by a changing
ideology that moved from privatization to renationalization of strategic assets under state
capitalism. In light of the changing ideology, China’s early attempt to build an independent oil
pipeline with Yukos failed to materialize.
The third factor that shaped Chinese engagement is associated with shifting geopolitics
and bilateral relations. Specifically, as I demonstrated in this section, inter-state negotiations
between China and Russia were affected by Japanese and South Korean interests to participate in
the project. As I argued, Russia tried to use this support as a negotiating leverage to gain
financial support from China. Fourth, the interests of powerful stakeholders played a central role
in determining China’s engagement in the ESPO. A Transneft/Rosneft alliance with the Putin
administration has been supportive of China’s participation in the deal. Other stakeholders, as
evidence suggests, did not impact China’s engagement in the ESPO. However, they did play a
role in shaping the pipeline’s ultimate route.
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Russian politicians and NOCs, working within the institutional parameters, have
determined the points of entry and re-entry of Chinese companies in the case of the ESPO
pipeline. However, in neither of these points were Chinese SOEs able to gain a stake in the
pipeline. An example of the failed entry is China’s first attempt to jointly develop an oil pipeline
with Yukos, which was undermined by the nationalization of Yukos. The failure to build a joint
pipeline with Yukos, however, did not disincentivize Chinese actors from partnering with
Transneft at a later stage. Under the new agreement, China assumed the role of financier of the
pipeline and signed several long-term oil supply agreements. The patience and ability of Chinese
SOEs to adapt to rapidly shifting and unstable conditions have been essential for China’s success
in the ESPO project. Overall, the pipeline has broader geopolitical implications for Russia as it
allowed the country to diversify its export markets away from Europe.

Conclusion: Wrapping up the case studies; what have we learned?
The three case studies discussed in this section reveal a complex interaction between
inter-state relations, domestic institutions, and stakeholder politics in Russia that has ultimately
determined the ability of Chinese SOEs to participate in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. In this
section, I demonstrated that Russia is not a stable investment destination, because changes in
informal institutions have upset the existing institutional arrangements in the hydrocarbon sector.
As I argued, under the new institutional arrangements, which were implemented in the early
2000s, deals in the oil and gas industry are ultimately negotiated at the top level by either the
CEO of a large NOC or by the President. In other words, institutions are set up in such a way that
the government holds veto power over any foreign investment in the hydrocarbon sector. Thus,
unlike in Canada, a political license may be sufficient for an oil/gas deal to proceed in Russia.
However, a political license is at times inadequate. As I proposed earlier, proposed projects are
more likely to fail if they do not have a market license.
The political support provided by the industry players for these deals remains important.
Industry players hold a prominent role in the Russian hydrocarbon sector. Therefore, they can
actively help Chinese SOEs to participate in hydrocarbon projects in Russia. I captured an
example of this in the case study of Sinopec’s acquisition of Udmurtneft. In this case, Rosneft
actively lobbied the government to allow Sinopec to invest in the Udmurtneft oil plant. Given
that large NOCs in Russia are closely linked with the government, they can use their political ties
to support Chinese FDI. As all of the analyzed cases demonstrated, renationalization of the
hydrocarbon sector meant that corporations are closely monitored (and often guided) by the
Russian government. Thus, a market license to operate remains important but, in most cases, it
overlaps with the political license to operate. To illustrate, even when there is opposition to
specific projects from some companies it is often temporary and appears to have limited impact
on the government’s decision. A case in point is a short-lived opposition against the ESPO
pipeline by the Russian railway’s CEO.
In addition to the market and political licenses, companies may need to acquire a social
license to operate. A social license to operate, which emerged as an important factor in the
Canadian case, has been almost inconsequential in Russia. Most of the projects discussed in this
section have not been affected by civil society groups. For example, in the case of Udmurtneft,
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civil society and Indigenous groups had not been consulted about the deal. Civil society’s
representation in the Yamal LNG project has also had a limited impact on China’s participation.
The only case where civil society influenced a hydrocarbon project was in the case of the ESPO
pipeline. Even in this case, NGOs could only claim a small victory when the government agreed
to re-route the pipeline away from environmentally sensitive areas. Based on this evidence, it
appears that foreign investors operating in Russia need only one license to operate in the
hydrocarbon sector – a political one, which is closely tied to the market license.
This chapter has also illustrated that China’s engagement in Russia resembles a strategy
that Chinese SOEs use in developing countries. According to this strategy, Chinese SOEs pursue
a political license to ensure that the deal is successful without paying direct attention to other
licenses. Under this arrangement, Chinese SOEs let the local government resolve any issues
related to other stakeholders. Chinese SOEs operating in Russia have learned over time that the
deals that they forged with Russian private corporations may not be long-lasting if they are not
backed by the leading political figures. The failure of CNPC’s deal with Yukos to build an oil
pipeline is but one example. As I proposed in this section, Chinese SOEs benefit from the
support of the Chinese leadership, which helps them to obtain a political license in Russia. In this
way, bilateral relations between Russian and Chinese leaders are important as they pre-negotiate
most of the successful energy deals. This has been the case of the Yamal LNG project and the
ESPO pipeline.
The findings that I discussed in this chapter also revealed that Chinese engagement is
very responsive to the needs of the Russian hydrocarbon industry. In order to fit the needs of the
Russian hydrocarbon sector, Chinese SOEs participation in hydrocarbon projects is
predominantly focused on the financial packages – composed of loans and investment deals –
coupled with long-term supply agreements. Additionally, Chinese SOEs agree to take on
minority stakes in joint venture projects with the Russian NOCs and outsource managerial duties
to their Russian counterparts. Chinese SOEs are also becoming important suppliers of
technology for the Russian NOCs as the case study of the Yamal LNG plant indicated.
As I argued in this chapter, China has replaced Western investors in Russia due to its
ability to shift its flexible strategy that adjust to the needs of the host state. An expert on Chinese
investment in the Russian oil sector, Mikhail Krutikhin, noted in an interview (2016) that
China’s edge over other foreign investors rests in its pragmatic approach, patience, and
adaptability to Russia’s needs. It is also plausible that China’s success derives from “shared
normative institutional cultures” and “similarities in decision-making and political cultures that
are conditioned by the relative autonomy of state bodies from significant civic-societal
influence” (Cutler 2014, 690). The two countries share a top-driven decision-making process,
where companies follow state directives (Bremmer and Johnston 2009). As demonstrated by the
Yamal LNG studies, government-to-government negotiation between Russia and China resulted
in a bilateral energy agreement that was subsequently implemented by the companies on the
ground. As Yamal LNG was a greenfield investment project, it had some limited input from civil
society.
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This finding is consistent with the business literature that maps location choices of
Chinese investors; these studies generally note that Chinese SOEs are attracted to countries with
weaker institutions (Buckley et al. 2007; Buckley et al. 2008; Kolstad and Wiig 2012) or those
that are institutionally closer to the home state (the institutional proximity argument) (Seyoum
2009; Giroud, Mirza and Wee 2012; Blomkvist and Drogendijk 2013; Lv and Spigarelli 2014).
My findings also suggest that Chinese SOEs find it easier to operate in countries with fewer
metaphoric licenses to operate as it is harder for Chinese firms to adjust their strategies to fit the
needs of multiple stakeholders.
The case studies discussed in this chapter also revealed that Russian policymakers could
place limits on Chinese FDI by appealing to both formal and informal institutions. Although
Russian formal institutions are weak and are easily modified by powerful actors, such as the
President and the heads of the NOCs, both formal and informal institutions can still place
constraints on Chinese FDI. As I illustrated in this chapter, the investment screening mechanism
has lowered investment review threshold for Chinese SOEs to 5 per cent of the voting shares
under the 2008 “Strategic Industries” law. A lower threshold means that Chinese investment in a
strategic industry is more likely to be subject to an internal review by the government. The
investment review committee, composed of the government officials, may block any investment
that does not fit their interests. However, as the evidence suggest any projects that have political
license will get a green light from the commission. Furthermore, Chinese SOEs may opt for
loans or long-term supply contracts to participate in hydrocarbon projects without directly
investing in them, which makes the terms of their participation easier as they distance themselves
from domestic politics.
The other institutional factor that was discussed in this chapter is found in the property
rights. Property rights, which are utilized by stakeholders in Canada, are weakly enforced in the
Russian hydrocarbon sector, which produces a set of informal institutional arrangements
(Locatelli and Rosslaud 2011). These informal arrangements between the Russian government
and corporations privilege domestic players, who can obtain better bargains than foreign
companies, by collaborating with the local government officials (Locatelli and Rossiaud 2011,
5596). As China has experience with informal arrangements at home, it can navigate the
informal arrangements in Russia by relying on high-level diplomacy to negotiate oil contracts
and by partnering with local NOCs. In turn, Russian NOCs provide Chinese SOEs with a market
license to operate in the hydrocarbon sector.
The recent success of Chinese SOEs in Russia also coincides with broader geopolitical
changes that brought Russian stakeholders closer to China. This is captured by the inter-state
relations in my theoretical model. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis and the Crimearelated Western sanctions, China became one of the few financial support lines for the Russian
hydrocarbon industry. As the flow of the Western finance and technology to Russia was
curtailed, Russian hydrocarbon companies turned to China for alternative sources of finance and
technology. The Yamal LNG plant and the ESPO pipeline are the end results of the closer
bilateral ties between Russia and China. In both cases, Chinese technology and finance made
both projects possible. In other words, neither project would have been feasible without Chinese
financial backing. Therefore, China’s financial backing became one of the central pillars of the
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Sino-Russian energy collaboration that is entering a ‘strategic’ realm according to some
observers, such as Tom Røseth (2017). According to the oil executive Mark Gyetvay, Chinese
investment will continue to grow and promote social and economic stability in Russia (2016).

Chapter 8.

Conclusion

This dissertation examined the response of stakeholders and institutions to growing
participation of Chinese SOEs in the Canadian and Russian hydrocarbon sectors. The study
illustrated that Chinese participation in the hydrocarbon-rich countries has been growing at a
rapid rate since the 1990s prompted by the “Go Global” initiative and reinforced by the BRI. As
the Chinese engagement – investment and loans – in the hydrocarbon sector grows, multiple
questions arise regarding it. The core question that this dissertation chose to analyze is the
following: what explains the ability of Chinese SOEs to successfully participate in hydrocarbon
projects in host countries? As noted in the introduction, Chinese SOEs sometimes successfully
complete their intended investment or participate in hydrocarbon projects through loans (or other
financial means), while at other times fail in completing their intended projects. The difference in
success rates of Chinese SOEs is visible across host countries and projects within these
countries, yet no explanation has been offered by scholars to explain this observed phenomenon.
The objective of this dissertation was to account for this phenomenon in Russia and Canada.
In order to do this, my dissertation has offered a new theoretical explanation based on
novel empirical data. I have found that the success or failure of Chinese SOEs to participate in
the hydrocarbon industry of a host country is determined by that country’s institutions and
stakeholder politics. The distinct nature of the political economies of host countries has in turn
shaped Chinese engagement strategies – loans, investments, and other financial packages,
including long-term supply contracts. My findings also suggested that the entry of Chinese SOEs
into the hydrocarbon sector has had an indirect feedback effect on local institutions and
stakeholder politics.
Based on my findings, I concluded that democratic countries with multiple stakeholders
and strong formal institutions (i.e. those that follow the rule of law and are independent from
political meddling) made it difficult for Chinese enterprises to integrate into specific
hydrocarbon projects. For example, the inability of Chinese SOEs to obtain social license to
operate explains why they failed to proceed with the two projects in the LNG industry - the
Aurora LNG plant and Pacific NorthWest LNG plant. One may thus conclude that foreign
investors, including Chinese enterprises, find it difficult to operate in democratic societies that
prioritize social license to operate because it increases project’s costs beyond anticipated levels,
which may prompt companies to abandon a proposed investment. Despite this, Canada turns out
to be the largest recipient of Chinese SOEs’ FDI in the oil and gas industry.
In an attempt to account for this discrepancy, some studies propose that Chinese SOEs
appear to be attracted to countries with the strong rule of law (usually found in democracies)
(Yang et al. 2018), which may explain why Canada has been the largest recipient of Chinese FDI
in the hydrocarbon sector. However, such an explanation portrays an incomplete picture as it
underestimates the struggles that Chinese SOEs face in democratic countries as it misses the
importance of the licenses to operate in democratic societies. I have proposed that this puzzling
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tension can be explained by the nature of the investment that Chinese SOEs have completed in
Canada. Given that most of the investments made by Chinese SOEs were in the brownfield
sector, which does not require a social license to operate, it was easier for Chinese SOEs to
expand their investment in Canada. The counter-intuitive finding can also be explained by the
scale of the CNOOC-Nexen deal, which is one of the largest investments made by Chinese
SOEs. The deal itself, which is a brownfield FDI (as explained in the case study), can be
perceived as a ‘failed success’. More specifically, I argued that the size and nature of this deal
has led to subsequent backlash against Chinese SOEs’ FDI in the oil sands in a democratic
society as it has led to the adoption of more stringent regulations to limit FDI by SOEs in the oil
sands sector, which makes it harder for Chinese SOEs to acquire assets in the oil sands.
Conversely, in countries with a hybrid regime that are dominated by a strong government
and weak institutions (flexible laws), Chinese SOEs adopt a more flexible engagement strategy
as they can provide loans or sign long-term energy supply contracts that distance Chinese SOEs
from the host country’s domestic politics. Additionally, when acquiring shares in hydrocarbon
projects in these societies, Chinese SOEs often only need to acquire a political license to proceed
with their proposed investment project. Since Chinese investors did not have to worry about
other licenses, it was easier for them to make deals with the government. At the same time, this
strategy is also risky. As investment in a society dominated by a single stakeholder, increase the
risk that the host government may shift its investment preference which may jeopardize activities
of Chinese SOEs. One way to reduce this risk is to participate in hydrocarbon projects by
providing loans to Russian NOCs as it distances Chinese SOEs from domestic politics.
The findings of my study rely on novel empirical data generated during my research and
fieldwork in Canada and Russia. I have spent two months in Russia and four months in Canada
interviewing experts, engaging in field observations, and analyzing data from primary and
secondary sources. I have relied on a qualitative comparative methodology to gather and analyze
the data. Through the process of data triangulation, I have tried to ensure that the findings are
consistent and reliable. As the previous paragraphs illustrated, the findings from my Canadian
and Russian case studies can be generalizable to other countries as the theoretical template that I
have developed can be adapted to other investment-recipient countries to understand how foreign
investment will be influenced by domestic institutions and stakeholder politics. The latter
variable – stakeholder politics – is shaped by another factor that I have characterized as interstate relations, which includes geopolitics.
I have relied on this model to test my general hypotheses that the ability of Chinese SOEs
to participate in a hydrocarbon project in a host country will be determined by stakeholder
politics and institutions in a host country. Relatedly, I have found that Chinese investors will
adapt their engagement strategies to host country conditions. Ultimately, the success of Chinese
SOEs will be determined by the receptiveness of domestic stakeholders and institutions to SOEs’
presence in specific hydrocarbon projects. While carrying out my research, I have discovered
that this relationship has a feedback mechanism due to the presence of a reverse causality, which
I have mentioned in chapter three. The reverse causality is observed when foreign investment
triggers a change in regulatory institutions, which in turn affect Chinese participation in the
hydrocarbon industry.
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The Main Insights From my Research or What Have We Learned
The first finding from this dissertation is related to Chinese engagement strategies in the
host countries. This finding is tied to the ‘engagement package’ used by Chinese SOEs in the
host countries. As noted earlier, this package can be composed of three 59 elements – FDI, loans,
and trade. Statistical data and case studies discussed in this dissertation reveal that Chinese
engagement in the Canadian and Russian hydrocarbon sectors differs in terms of the engagement
package offered by Chinese SOEs to both countries. In the case of Canada, SOEs’ package is
dominated by FDI with a few trade deals in the oil sector. An attempt by Chinese SOEs to
provide a fuller package that combined finance, FDI, and trade failed when the proponents of the
Northern Gateway pipeline did not receive a permission to proceed with the construction. In the
case of Russia, we saw a very comprehensive engagement package that included FDI, loans, and
trade. For example, in the case of the Yamal LNG, Chinese SOEs have combined FDI, loans,
and long-term supply trade agreement. The two types of Chinese engagement are captured in
table 8.1. On the basis of this evidence, one may conclude that in the Russian case Chinese
engagement is more varied than in the Canadian case.
Types of Chinese
Engagement in the
Hydrocarbon Sector
FDI
Loans
Trade

Canada

Russia

Yes
No
Yes (but small)

Yes
Yes
Yes (multiple long-term
energy supply contracts)

Figure 8.1: Chinese Engagement in the Canadian and Russian Hydrocarbon Sectors

The second finding is related to the political economy of host countries that influences
Chinese engagement. My finding suggests that Chinese engagement with the host societies is
constrained by the host country’s political economy. Table 8.2 traces multiple factors that limit
Chinese engagement in the hydrocarbon sector that are tied to my theoretical framework. I have
discussed three central factors - inter-state relations, formal and informal institutions, and
stakeholder politics. As I argued in this dissertation institutions and stakeholder politics, which
were influenced by interstate relations, have determined the ability of Chinese SOEs to
participate in the hydrocarbon industry. The proceeding paragraphs will discuss how each of the
three factors have impacted Chinese engagement.
The first factor that influenced the activities of Chinese SOEs in Russian and Canadian
hydrocarbon sectors is captured by inter-state relations. As I noted in the earlier section, interstate relations have shaped the responses of host country’s stakeholders toward Chinese
engagement in the energy sector. More specifically, I noted that inter-state relations have
explained the timing of China’s entry into a given country. This variable is associated with the
shift in stakeholder preferences toward Chinese SOEs. In my case studies, I noted that energy
relations have reflected broader diplomatic ties. In Canada, a brief interruption in Chinese energy
investment coincided with the deteriorating Sino-Canadian ties under the leadership of Prime
Minister Harper in 2006-2009. Similarly, in the Russian case, inter-state relations played an
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important role in shaping the flow of Chinese FDI. As Sino-Russian energy relations remained
weak until the second presidential term of Vladimir Putin, Chinese FDI was non-existent until
the mid-2000s. As I have proposed in chapters six and seven, Russia’s politico-economic turn to
China in the mid-2000s coincided with inflow of Chinese FDI and loans. Russia’s turn to China
also coincided with Russia’s weakening energy ties with Europe. This turn has accelerated in the
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 and the Western sanctions in 2014. The
geopolitical factors thus appear to play an important role in shaping actors’ decisions about
Chinese SOEs participation in the hydrocarbon sector.
The second factor that has played a central role in influencing Chinese participation in the
energy sector is captured by the formal and informal institutions. In my theoretical model, I
noted that informal institutions, including ideology and norms, played an important role in
influencing Chinese engagement. In Canada, the liberal economic principles have generally
allowed Chinese SOEs to take over a majority, minority, or all shareholding interests in an oil
company. This allowed Chinese SOEs to take on a role of a leading player in the Canadian
hydrocarbon sector. Conversely, in Russia, the ideology of resource nationalism limits foreign
participation in the oil sector as we saw in chapters 6 and 7. Therefore, Chinese SOEs have
acquired less than 50 percent of shares in the Russian oil and gas projects as the majority of
shares is expected to remain in the hands of the Russian NOCs or large private oil companies,
such as Novatek. While informal institutions acted as a constraint in Russia, in Canada they
acted as an enabling factor at first. However, over time power distribution embedded in the
informal institutions in Canada coupled with the formal institutions have created conditions that
made it harder for Chinese SOEs to engage in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector.
Formal institutions, including investment screening regime and property rights, played an
important role in the Canadian case study and a secondary role in my Russian case. This is
partially a reflection of a weaker institutional environment in Russia. Still, Chinese SOEs
investing in both Canada and Russia are constrained by specific regulations that target their
investment. In Canada, investment by Chinese SOEs above a certain threshold is subject to
review and any investment in the oil sands will only be permitted on exceptional basis as
stipulated in the SOE Guidelines that were expanded in the aftermath of CNOOC-Nexen deal. In
the Russian case, formal regulations are very flexible and laws on paper can be easily changed to
fit the needs of the powerful actors. Although SOEs investment in strategic industries is expected
to trigger regulatory review if the acquisition exceeds 5 percent of shares, government generally
approves investment over this threshold if Chinese SOEs obtain political and market licenses to
operate.
The third and one of the most critical factors is captured by the variable of stakeholder
politics that constrained Chinese SOEs from participating in the hydrocarbon sector in host
countries. Stakeholder politics can approximate the institutional distance between the two
countries analyzed in my dissertation. In democratic countries, there will be likely more
stakeholders than in the autocratic ones due to a different distribution of power. This different
distribution of power is important as it approximates who can make and influence decisions in a
host country. I have approximated this relationship by using market, political, and social licenses
that companies may need to acquire in order to operate in a given host country. In Canada, which
is a liberal democracy, we saw that Chinese SOEs had to obtain all three licenses to ensure that
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their participation in hydrocarbon projects that required greenfield investment are successful.
Conversely, in Russia, which is a mixed regime with autocratic elements, I argued that Chinese
SOEs only needed to obtain a political license, which subsumed other two licenses under itself.
Since both Russia and China are state-capitalist economies where the government plays a central
role in the market, it is easier for Chinese SOEs to manage stakeholder relations in Russia than in
Canada.
Host Country Factors
Limiting FDI
Inter-state relations

Canada

Russia

Energy relations grow as interstate ties grow; brief
interruption in energy
investment during Prime
Minister Harper (2006-2009)

Ideology and the type of deals
permissible

Liberal economic principles:
generally, allow foreign
investors to acquire 100% of
shares in a company

Investment Screening
Regulations (SOE clauses)
Regulatory Innovation (to
screen SOEs FDI)

Yes

Energy relations at first weak;
multiple setbacks and
rejections due to mistrust;
relations improve under
President Putin’s second
presidential term
Resource nationalism:
Foreign enterprises should be
a minority partner (less than
50 per cent of shares) in
strategic oil and gas companies
controlled by NOCs60
Yes

Yes

Yes

Restrictions on SOEs FDI

Review of investment above
threshold amount set by the
61
Industry Canada / since
2013 Chinese FDI in oil sands
will be permitted only on
exceptional basis
Multiple stakeholder interests
have to be satisfied; multiple
licenses to operate should be
acquired

Review of investment under
the Strategic Industries Act
(since 2008) for SOEs any
investment above 5 percent
controlling share is reviewed

Stakeholder Politics

Stakeholder politics
dominated by the state and
corporations; often political
license is enough for an
investor to operate in Russia

Figure 8.2; Constraints on Chinese Engagement in Canada and Russia

Engaging in Cross-Case Comparison

60
61

President Putin’s announcement suggested that this may be lifted for Chinese SOEs but unclear when and how.
Changes on a yearly basis.
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The aforementioned findings emerged from a set of within-case studies in Russia and
Canada. The individual within-country case studies were discussed separately in the Canadian
and Russian case study chapters. As these studies were focused on the dynamics of the specific
projects, I have not engaged in cross-comparison of similar projects across the Russian and
Canadian cases. Therefore, I embark on this analysis in this section of my concluding chapter.
The objective of this cross-comparison is to compare how the operations of Chinese SOEs differ
across the two countries by examining the dynamics of comparable projects in each country.
This section will first compare the performance of Chinese enterprises in the brownfield projects
in the upstream oil sector of Canada and Russia. Subsequently, it will examine SOEs’ operation
in the LNG sector. Lastly, it will discuss the engagement of Chinese SOEs in the pipeline
infrastructure of both countries.
The first two case studies looked at SOEs’ investment in the oil extraction in Russia and
Canada. I selected two cases to compare the success of Chinese investors in the Canadian and
Russian hydrocarbon sectors. In Canada, I looked at CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen, which I
labelled as a “failed success”. In this section, I argued that this deal occurred in a period of
improving inter-state relations, which, coupled with a neoliberal ideology, allowed CNOOC to
acquire a 100 percent of shares in Nexen. However, the case came with complications due to
stakeholder politics. As I noted in chapter 5, Canadian industry players and the public were
generally opposed to the project and were supported by the NDP, an opposition party, at the
federal level. This opposition pushed the Conservative party, which was in power at the time, to
introduce regulatory innovation that would limit future investment by Chinese SOEs in the oil
sands.
In the Russian case, the dynamics were different. Sinopec’s acquisition of Udmurtneft
appeared to be a “successful” investment for Sinopec as the company received support from both
political and industry actors in Russia. As I noted in the case study, civil society abstained from
commenting on the deal. The deal was also unique because Sinopec was allowed to buy a whole
company under the condition that it would let Rosneft purchase the majority of shares back after
the bid is approved. This deal fit with the resource nationalist agenda of the Russian government
and companies. As I have noted earlier, other stakeholders were not directly involved in this bid
as Sinopec acquired a company that had already obtained a social license to operate from the
Udmurtia’s residents.
The two cases illustrated a complex interaction between stakeholder politics and
institutions in determining Chinese participation in the upstream oil industry in Russia and
Canada. The dynamics revealed that stakeholder politics make it more difficult for Chinese SOEs
to operate in the hydrocarbon sector of democratic countries as the policies are shaped by the
interests of multiple stakeholders. In these regimes, Chinese SOEs may need to gain broad
acceptance from all stakeholders and acquire social, market, and political licenses to ensure that
their investment is successful. In the case of mixed-regimes with autocratic elements, such as
Russia, Chinese SOEs may only need to obtain political and market licenses to be able to operate
successfully.
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Projects success / failure Oil
Industry

Canada

Russia

Deal

CNOOC-Nexen

Sinopec-Udmurtneft

Result

“failed success”

“success”

Stakeholder Responses

Due to some opposition from
the industry players and
negative public opinion the
government decided to
implement the “exceptional
circumstances” clause that
limits further FDI by SOEs

Due to political and industry support
for the deal. No response from the
civil society.

CNOOC now 100% owner of
Nexen

Sinopec owns 49% of Udmurtneft’s
shares.

Chinese Participation

The government allowed Sinopec to
acquire the whole company under the
condition that Sinopec would sell a
majority of shares back to Rosneft.
Figure 8.3: Chinese Engagement in the Upstream Oil Sector; CNOOC-Nexen and Sinopec-Udmurtneft

Similar dynamics emerged when I examined a set of case studies that traced Chinese
engagement in the LNG sector in Canada and Russia. These cases revealed two contrasting
scenarios. In the Canadian case, we have witnessed two stories of “failure” countered by a single
“success”. While in Russia, the only LNG project that was supported by both sides became a
hallmark of the Sino-Russian energy cooperation. The two cases revealed how different
alignments between institutions and stakeholders determine Chinese engagement in two distinct
political economies.
In the Canadian case, Chinese SOEs invested in Aurora LNG, LNG Canada, and Pacific
NorthWest LNG. With the exception of LNG Canada’s proponents, the investors in the other two
LNG projects appear to have underestimated the power of widespread public opposition that
counteracted the support that the LNG sector obtained from political and corporate actors. As
Canadian regulatory institutions protect consultation and accommodation processes, it was
difficult for Chinese SOEs to pursue LNG deals that would have been embroiled in legal actions
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launched by indigenous groups and NGOs against the respective projects. In the Russian case,
the dynamics were different; the Yamal LNG project was pre-approved before Chinese SOEs
declared their interest to participate in the construction of the plant. In light of this, their entry
was met with a widespread political and industry support. Chinese investment in Yamal LNG
also faced limited civil society opposition. The dynamics in the Russian case were thus
conducive to Chinese engagement in the project. The general information about the two LNG
cases are captured in table 8.4.
Projects success / failure LNG
Industry

Canada

Russia

Deal

Aurora LNG, LNG
Canada, Pacific
NorthWest LNG

Yamal LNG

Result

“failed investment with
one exception”

“success”

Stakeholder Responses

Widespread public opposition
to the projects. Industry and
government support.

Widespread political and
industry support with limited
civil society opposition.

Two out of three projects
have decided that it is
costly to pursue
investments in Canada.

Chinese SOEs became
investors and financiers of the
projects. Chinese companies
also signed multiple long-term
trade contracts.

Chinese Participation

Sinopec (Pacific NorthWest
LNG) and CNOOC (Aurora
LNG) abandoned their plans
to develop LNG plants; in
2018, PetroChina, along with
its partners, declared that they
will construct LNG Canada.

CNPC owns 20 % of shares;
The Silk Road Fund owns 9.9
% shares; Loans by Exim and
CDB worth $11.8 billion;
Long-term LNG supply
contracts

Figure 8.4: China’s engagement in the LNG Industry; Aurora LNG, LNG Canada, and Pacific NorthWest LNG; Yamal
LNG

Lastly, in the case of pipeline politics, Chinese engagement in both projects remained
purely financial – based on loans and monetary contributions. However, there was an indication
that Chinese SOEs wanted to invest and engage in the construction of the Northern Gateway
pipeline in Canada and in the ESPO pipeline in Russia. As summarized in table 8.5, the fate of
these two projects was an outcome of the influence exerted by domestic institutions and distinct
stakeholder politics in both cases. In the Canadian case, Chinese SOEs failed in pursuing their
objectives while, in the Russian case, they succeeded. In Canada, Chinese SOEs were met with
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widespread civil society and industry opposition. This opposition has been reinforced by the
Canadian legal system. Due to the widespread opposition, the project’s proponent Enbridge has
lost political license to operate and scrapped the project altogether. Since the project failed,
Chinese SOEs that provided finance for the project incurred a financial loss as their plans to
construct a pipeline infrastructure from Alberta to British Columbia did not materialize.
In the Russian case, the dynamics were reversed. As I have demonstrated in chapter 7,
Chinese SOEs initially partnered with a private oil company Yukos to construct the pipeline and
obtained a market license to pursue this project. The deal had initially received some political
support. The political support for the deal disappeared shortly after Yukos fell out of political
favour. After the nationalization of Yukos, Russian NOCs, with the support of the federal
government under Putin’s leadership, have successfully re-negotiated a new pipeline with
Chinese SOEs. As part of the new bargain, Chinese SOEs provided loans to Transneft and
Rosneft to build the ESPO with a pipeline spur to China, which was connected to Chinese
pipeline infrastructure by CNPC. In this case, political license appeared to be central to the
success of Chinese-backed project in Russia. On the other hand, in the Canadian case civil
society and industry opposition appeared to be causally central variables in undermining a
pipeline project.
Projects success / failure
Pipeline Infrastructure

Canada

Russia

Deal

Northern Gateway pipeline

East Siberia Pacific Ocean
Pipeline (ESPO)

Result
Stakeholder Responses

“failure”

“success”

Due to widespread civil
society and industry
opposition the project lost
political license to operate and
was cancelled.

Due to industry and political
support the deal successfully
replaced earlier failed
negotiations with Yukos.

Deal did not happen; Chinese
SOEs provided finance to
Enbridge to pursue the
project. Financial loss.

Chinese SOEs provided loans
to Transneft and Rosneft to
build the ESPO pipeline.
CNPC has built a spur from
Skovorodino to Daqing to
transport oil.

Chinese Participation

Figure 8.5: Chinese Engagement in the Pipeline Infrastructure; The Northern Gateway Pipeline and the ESPO

In general, my research findings revealed that Chinese SOEs appeared to be more
successful in completing greenfield projects in Russia as they required fewer licenses to operate.
Unlike in Canada, Chinese SOEs operating in Russia could engage in greenfield projects in the
LNG industry and pipeline infrastructure. This finding is based on the hydrocarbon projects that
required greenfield investment in both host countries. Furthermore, SOEs engagement in Russia
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was more varied than in Canada as Chinese SOEs provided loans and other types of finance,
which allowed for deeper integration into the Russian hydrocarbon sector. This practice was not
feasible in Canada as Canadian businesses operating in the hydrocarbon industry did not seek
SOEs’ loans or long-term supply agreements. As Chinese SOEs learn to operate in societies with
multiple stakeholders, they begin to establish relations with a variety of actors in a host country.
For example, Chinese SOEs are starting to form partnerships with the Canadian Indigenous
groups to jointly develop hydrocarbon projects, such as the new refinery project in Alberta
(Morgan 2018). This partnership would not have been possible in countries where the
government oversees economic decisions, such as in the case of Russia.
My findings also suggest that regulatory institutions, such as investment screening
mechanisms and property rights, played a central role in shaping Chinese engagement in Canada.
The legal system was one of the key explanatory variables in the Canadian cases, but less so in
the Russian cases due to the weaker nature of courts and a general lack of evidence that domestic
stakeholders used legal institutions to challenge hydrocarbon projects in which Chinese SOEs
invested. Lastly, I have also illustrated that inter-state relations, including shifting geopolitical
relations, provided an enabling environment for Chinese participation in the hydrocarbon
projects as they shape stakeholders’ receptiveness towards Chinese SOEs. Inter-state relations
thus acted as an intervening variable that interacted with stakeholder politics to influence the
success of Chinese SOEs’ participation in hydrocarbon projects in a given country.

Research Contribution and Future Research Directions
The core objective of my dissertation was to understand what factors facilitate or block
Chinese engagement in the Canadian and Russian hydrocarbon sectors. This question has
important implications for Chinese SOEs and investment-recipient countries, given that Chinese
investors are new players in the global energy markets and are still learning how to operate in
diverse conditions around the world (Shankleman 2009; Economy and Levi 2014). As this
chapter illustrated, Chinese engagement in both countries has evolved and changed over time. In
Canada, Chinese SOEs have expanded their operations across the hydrocarbon chain and became
more ambitious investors by 2014. SOEs’ expansion in the Canadian hydrocarbon sector has
triggered stakeholder opposition, which made it harder for Chinese SOEs to invest in this sector
in the future. In the Russian case, Chinese investors’ early failures to integrate into the Russian
hydrocarbon industry have over time reversed as political and corporate stakeholders turned to
China for financial and technological support. As I noted earlier, my dissertation has identified
that stakeholder politics and host country’s institutions have played a prominent role in
determining the ability of Chinese SOEs to succeed in Canada and Russia.
In both cases, Chinese strategies have evolved and adapted to match the needs of the host
society. The finding is consistent with the scholarly studies that have hypothesized that Chinese
investors adapt to local conditions when they invest abroad (Economy and Levi 2014; Alon,
Leung and Simpson 2015). Building on this hypothesis, my research has suggested that it might
be easier for Chinese companies to invest in more authoritarian countries, such as Russia, where
deals are conducted at the top level as opposed to democratic ones, such as Canada, where
multiple stakeholders and strong regulatory institutions may hinder foreign investment. My
findings add a novel dimension to the econometric studies exploring the localization patterns of
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Chinese investment, including work by Buckley et al. (2010), Kolstad and Wiig (2012), and Li,
Xia, and Lin (2017). It does so by exploring the factors that determine Chinese success in a
single industry – oil and natural gas / hydrocarbons – across two countries – Canada and Russia where Chinese SOEs invest. In doing so, my research has answered the call made by Smith and
D’Arcy (2013) who proposed that new research should focus on comparative studies analyzing
how Chinese SOEs operate within the same industry but across different countries.
The findings of my dissertation will be relevant to scholars, policymakers, businesses,
and civil society groups. In general, my research contributes to scholarly debates on the role of
institutions and domestic actors in influencing foreign investment. More specifically, it broadens
theoretical and empirical research on Chinese FDI in the oil and gas sector in Russia and Canada.
For policymakers, it provides an overview of the implications that their policies and stakeholders
politics have for Chinese foreign investment in the hydrocarbon sector. Policymakers can draw
insights from my work to develop a balanced policy to regulate Chinese FDI without dissuading
the investment altogether. Since this is not a policy-focused dissertation, I have not proposed
policy recommendations. Businesses can use my findings to navigate complex regulatory and
institutional issues. Specifically, Chinese SOEs may use my research to improve their
engagement strategies in host societies. Civil society can learn from the cross-country experience
of stakeholders in their campaigns to support or oppose specific oil and gas projects. However,
their ability to adopt these mechanisms to challenge specific hydrocarbon projects will likely
differ based on the fact that civil society may lack capacity and institutional support as we saw in
the Russia-Canada cross-comparison.
Research on Chinese SOEs will continue to grow in the future as these enterprises will
continue to expand their presence in the hydrocarbon-rich countries in the forthcoming years.
According to Global Risk Insights (2018), a publication focused on political risk news and
analysis, Chinese SOEs and private firms will continue to invest in hydrocarbon resources
globally. Especially, under the BRI framework that envisions global energy trade and investment
along the routes. Since my research has only focused on Chinese engagement in Russia and
Canada, future studies can expand this comparison either by taking different cases and applying
my theoretical model by engaging in a qualitative comparative study, or by developing a
quantitative study that operationalizes stakeholders and institutional variables to test the
observed relationship statistically. The theoretical framework that I have developed can also be
applied to analyze Western investors, who can be compared to Chinese SOEs in the future
comparative research. Given the range of opportunities for further study, my research hopes to
serve as a stepping stone toward new studies on this topic conducted by scholars across various
disciplines.
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Appendix:
Appendix A:
BCEAO’s individual submissions/responses regarding the LNG projects:
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Top 11 concerns voiced by the public about Pacific
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Appendix B: MNC investment strategies and Institutional Uncertainty:
Based on the work of Phillips, Tracey, and Karra (2009).

Host Country Institutional Uncertainty
Host Country
Institutional
Difference

High

Low

Low

High

Adapt
(moderate risk,
complexity, effort)
Transfer
(low risk, complexity,
effort)

Avoid
(high risk, complexity,
effort)
Hedge
(moderate risk,
complexity effort)

Appendix C: Sample Interview Questions
I will use the following sets of questions to guide semi-structured interviews with the selected
participants. (please note that the questions were slightly modified depending on the
circumstances)
A) Questions to be distributed to Scholars:
1) Are you familiar with the term resource curse? Does [Russia/Canada] suffer from the
resource curse (i.e. Are [Russian/Canadian] natural resources associated with slower
economic development, conflict, democratic deficit, or corruption)? If yes, are there any
domestic institutional or political approaches implemented to alleviate the resource
curse?
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B) Questions to be distributed to Scholars and Policymakers:
1) Do [Russian/Canadian] political and economic institutions have mechanisms to stimulate
sustainable socioeconomic development (or to address resource curse in general)? In
which way do you think [Russian/Canadian] institutions must be improved to promote
sustainable economic development? How do [Russian/Canadian] institutions affect the
nature of Chinese investment and trade?
2) How important is Chinese engagement for the stability of [Russian/Canadian]
hydrocarbon sector today as compared to historical perspective? Is Chinese engagement
displacing or complementing other international financial and trade flows? Does Chinese
funding increase [Russian/Canadian] bargaining power?
3) Are there any parallels between boom (i.e. rising prices) and bust (i.e. fall in prices)
cycles that occurred in 1970s-1990s and the current boom-bust cycle that started in 2000s
and busted in late-2014? Was there an institutional or political change in [Russia/Canada]
after the hydrocarbon prices collapsed or before they begun to rise (ex. countercyclical
policy)? Have you noticed a change in the investment and trade strategy of Chinese
government and corporations in the hydrocarbon sector from the boom to bust period?
4) Are Chinese corporations responsive to the demands of civil society or are their decisions
predominantly shaped by the demand of the local (Russian/Canadian) elites?
C) Questions to be distributed to Policymakers and Businesses:
1) Do international actors demand to change [Russian/Canadian] domestic institutions
responsible for management of the hydrocarbon sector or the economy in general? Has
Chinese entry into the [Russian/Canadian] hydrocarbon sector led to any regulatory
changes? Alternatively, has it encouraged formation of new institutions or changed the
nature of the existing institutions? If yes, what was the effect of those changes on the
hydrocarbon industry and socioeconomic development? Are Chinese government or
corporations intervening in [Russian/Canadian] domestic policy related to the
hydrocarbon sector?
2) Do you have investment from China? How are [Chinese-Russian/Chinese-Canadian]
joint business partnerships performing? What is your experience of working with the
Chinese corporations?

D) Questions to be distributed to Scholars, Policymakers, and Businesses
1) When did Chinese corporations enter [Russian/Canadian] hydrocarbon sector? Did these
corporations or the Chinese government know about the problems associated with the
extraction of the hydrocarbons (ex. environmental degradation, corruption, unsustainable
economic development model) in [Russia/Canada]?
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2) Does the origin and structure of the foreign corporations matter when deciding on the
terms/conditions of the hydrocarbon extraction contracts/deals? Do Chinese hydrocarbon
corporations operate differently than IOCs or other SOEs?62
3) How would you evaluate Chinese engagement in the hydrocarbon sector (benefits or
positive / setbacks or negative)? What do Chinese hydrocarbon corporations bring to
[Russia/Canada]? More specifically, does Chinese engagement contribute to
socioeconomic development?63
4) Do you think that Chinese corporations are exploiting [Russian/Canadian] hydrocarbon
reserves (core-periphery logic) or is China treating [Russia/Canada] as equal partners?
Potentially, does Russia/Canada exercise upper hand over China. Is [Russian/Canadian]
hydrocarbon sector dependent on Chinese investment in the hydrocarbon sector or trade
with China?
5) Is Chinese lending/trading countercyclical or does it follow other financial flows? In
other words, does Chinese finance leave once the market is performing poorly and when
hydrocarbon prices are low or does it remain and exploits more favourable investment
climate and terms of trade?
6) Is Chinese official foreign direct investment (OFDI) different from other investment
flows? What motivates Chinese OFDI (ex. technology/innovation or resources; political
or economic motives)? Does Chinese OFDI face technological constraints? How
commercially viable are the hydrocarbon projects where China invests?

62

Prompt Qs: Are Chinese corporations following domestic standards or international standards (ex. good
governance)? Are corporate-state ties between Chinese corporations and Chinese state affect Chinese
engagement in [Russia/Canada]? Are Chinese Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices complimentary
to [Russian/Canadian] of foreign corporate CSR practices?
63 Prompt Qs: Is Chinese investment in the hydrocarbon sector accompanied by an inflow of Chinese migrant
labour or does this investment contribute primarily to local employment? Does Chinese investment promote
infrastructure? How does Chinese engagement affect local environment? Are Chinese offering better
contractual deals (ex. cheaper rates) than their competitors? Does China promote local economic
diversification? Do you believe that Chinese engagement will lock your country into an extractive path?
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